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ABSTRACT 
This study consists of eleven chapters and a conclusion. Chapter One is 
entitled Introduction - Echoes From the Past. It serves several purposes. It 
introduces briefly a summation of the political aspirations of Malietoa Vaiinupo, 
who accepted the LMS mission, and the political mayhem that beset Samoa 
from the 1850s to 1962. The introduction also introduces briefly the relationship 
between the Samoan (LMS) Church, the LMS missionaries, and Samoan 
politics, and how these interacted with one another, during the political turmoil in 
the late nineteenth century, and the nationalistic fervour of the Samoans ln the 
early twentieth century. 
The next ten chapters are presented chronologically as far as it is 
possible, although the guiding principle for the placement of each chapter is 
thematic, consisting mainly of case studies. Chapter Two, entitled A German 
Plantation and Samoan Aspirations, looks at the German administration of 
Samoa from 1900 to 1914. The study highlights various factors, issues and 
events that contributed to the motivation of Samoans towards independence. It 
looks at Germany's treatment of Samoans under Wilhelm Solf, and how 
Samoans reacted to Selfs administration. The chapter points to inconsistencies 
in the German administration, and Samoan misunderstanding as to their role, 
and Germany's role, in the administration of Samoa. The study illustrates Solfs 
negative treatment of Samoan protocol, which eventually led to hostility, 
rejection, and anti-German opinions and the role of the missions in supporting 
the German regime to the displeasure of the Samoans. The view of the LMS 
mission, and the Samoan (LMS) Church leaders, on the issue of independence, 
during the German period is also discussed. 
Chapter Three is entitled The O!oa Kamupani Controversy. This is a 
case study taken out of the German administration era. The Oloa Kamupani 
(Goods Company) was a Samoan enterprise, which struck a chord with the 
political aspirations of some of the Samoan leaders. Although initiated by a part-
European opportunist, the Samoan Faipule immediately entertained the idea. 
The Samoans were reeling under Selfs administration policies, which had taken 
away most of the Samoan protocol. The political leaders were looking for a way 
to reassert their authority, albeit an economic one. The Oloa Kamupani gave 
the Samoans the opportunity to control their own economic future while, 
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indirectly, voicing an economic protest at the low price offered by the merchants 
and the Germans for their products. It gave Samoans like Mata'afa losefo and 
Lauaki Namulau'ulu Mamoe the opportunity to regain political ascendancy, 
especially in the eyes of the Samoans. The German administration's reaction to 
the Samoan enterprise and the consequence thereafter set a bitter anti-German 
reaction. 
Chapter Four is entitled The Mau a Pule Conflict This is the second 
case study from the German administration period. The Mau a Pule conflict is 
further evidence of the anger stored up within the Samoan community. The 
German administration had by 1909 destroyed all the customs, tradition, and 
authority that meant anything to the Samoans. The failure of the Oloa Kamupani, 
and the punishments meted out to the Samoan leaders for defying German 
authority, was still haunting the Samoans. The worst affected was Mata'afa 
losefo whose status as Alii Sili (Primary or Greater Chief) was diminishing as 
the Faipule closer to Solf were consulted on important Samoan matters. The 
Mau a Pule also provided an opportunity for Lauaki Namulau'ulu Mamoe to 
regain some of his authority, and to re-unite Samoa under Samoan control. The 
Mau a Pule was not just a reaction to the German administration but a cry and a 
call for Samoan independence. 
Chapter Five is entitled A Ramshackle Administration and Samoan 
Expectations. This chapter looks at New Zealand's administration of Samoa 
from 1914 to 1926. It takes a brief look at the Samoans' reaction to New 
Zealand's arrival and Germany's departure because of World War I. New 
Zealand's 'ramshackle administration' caused some animosity among the 
Samoans and Europeans, especially New Zealand's role in the 1918 influenza 
epidemic, which took many Samoan lives. The chapter highlights how New 
Zealand dealt with Samoan rejection, and Samoans called for New Zealand's 
removal. The year 1926 marked the beginning of an era in which Samoan 
nationalism began to surface and New Zealand's competency as administrator 
declined. For the Samoans, the Germans' first fourteen years as administrators, 
compared to New Zealand first fourteen years, was paradise. 
Chapter Six is entitled An Administrative Blunder and The Logan -
Moore Debate. This is a case study taken out of the New Zealand 
administration period. The 1918 influenza epidemic blunder cost many Samoan 
lives, and New Zealand its credibility to administer other nations. The lack of 
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positive action and immediate medical assistance only highlighted the 
incompetence of the New Zealanders. The Samoans were furious, and from 
that time harboured angry sentiments that would surface again and again in 
their future dealings wtth New Zealand. The pain for the Samoans was not just 
a result of the epidemic, but also Colonel Robert Logan's (Samoa's 
administrator) insensitivity in his attack on the LMS mission, especially the 
missionary Elizabeth Moore, and the Samoans. This chapter looks at the impact 
of Logan's actions, and Moore's reactions, and how the Samoans perceived 
their verbal confrontation in relation to New Zealand's irresponsibility. 
Chapter Seven is entitled Political Incompetence and Samoan 
Nationalism. This chapter continues the story that ended in Chapter 5. It 
highlights the beginning and expansion of the Mau movement, and how it 
became the vehicle for nationalistic fervour and independence aspirations. The 
chapter highlights the close working relationship between Samoans and other 
members of the communi1y, especially the half-castes. It discusses New 
Zealand's reaction to Samoan nationalism, and also looks at the efforts of those 
outside Samoa to promote Samoan grievances. The chapter looks at the 
various petitions drawn up and sent to New Zealand, England, America and the 
League of Nations (later replaced by the United Nations) - a sign of 
determination to gain independence. 
Chapter Eight is entitled Samoan Patriotism and the Emergence of 
the Mau Church. This chapter focuses mainly on the relationship of the Mau 
and the Samoan (LMS) Church, at a specific time in the history of the Samoan 
Church, when the involvement of the Mau in the Samoan (LMS) Church was at 
its height (1928 -1931). Although the relationships between the three main 
mission societies were cordial, they sometimes deteriorated into hatred and 
spite. These attitudes were ultimately transferred onto the Mau - Samoan 
(LMS) Church conflict, especially when the Catholics stood in opposition to the 
Samoan (LMS) Church. The other minor denominations, such as the Mormons 
and the Seventh Day Adventists, had very little influence on the Mau. The 
period covered saw the Mau and the Samoan (LMS) Church unite to form the 
Mau Church. The alliance formed a strong foundation for propagating Mau 
beliefs. The alliance also questioned the continuing existence, and the control 
the LMS mission had on the Samoan (LMS) Church. The issue of the Samoan 
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(LMS) Church taking control of its religious life surfaced again during this perlod 
to haunt the LMS missionaries. 
Chapter Nine is entitled Chinese in Paradise and Indentured Labour 
Problems. This chapter covers a period that stems from the German era to just 
after the end of World War IL The previous chapters act as a background to the 
Chinese problem, and the chapter itself will help fill some of the gaps in the 
previous chapters. The chapter has been included because it helps paint a 
bigger picture of the many problems facing the New Zealand administration. 
The problem was not just with indentured labourers but with the Chinese, 
Melanesians, and others arriving in Samoa to satisfy the planters greed. The 
issue at hand was an ethical one - keeping the Samoan race pure, and the 
failure of the New Zealand administration to consult the Samoans in its decision 
to recruit Chinese labourers. The story of the Chinese in this chapter highlights 
the plight of the Chinese in Samoa and how the New Zealand administration 
tried to deal with it. The social problems that went with the recruiting of Chinese 
labourers affected the Samoans greatly. For many Samoans, especially at the 
height of the Mau period, the Chinese issue was both a problem and a blessing. 
The treatment of the Chinese by the New Zealand administration and the 
planters was not condoned by the Samoans. Jt not only black marked New 
Zealand's administration, but it gave the Samoans a further opportunity to 
denigrate New Zealand. 
Chapter Ten is entitled A Question of Authority: Samoan {LMS) 
Church Leadership Challenges. This chapter covers a period that 
encompasses the German era to World War II. lt is a case study chapter that 
highlights the intense conflict between Samoan pastors, especially the Samoan 
elders, and the missionaries of the LMS mission. It looks at the relationship 
between the National Advisory Council and the Samoa District Committee. It 
also discusses the conflict between Samoan pastors and LMS missionaries in 
the mission fields, such as Tuvalu and Kiribati, to highlight the Samoans' 
struggle for leadership and control. The chapter looks at the Goward conflict, 
Sibree and Huckett's dismissal, and other events, which undermined LMS 
leadership in the Samoan (LMS) Church. It includes a case study of Samoan 
pastors trying to replace Christian ideals with fa'ataulaitu or faipe/e practices. 
The radical actions reflected a challenge to the LMS for control of their own 
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spiritual destiny. It happened at a time when the Samoan quest for 
independence had reached the minds and hearts of the League of Nations. 
Chapter Eleven is entitled The Impact of World War II and A Mandate 
For Independence. This chapter deals with the arrival of Americans troops in 
1942 and how Samoans responded to the change of lifestyle and to the wealth 
the Americans offered. It examines the reaction of the missions to the 
Americans, and how they dealt with the problems at hand. The chapter also 
focuses on the events after the war in relation to Samoan's petitions for 
independence and their dealings with the United Nations. It examines the 
pressure and the impact of other newly formed institutions, such as the World 
Council of Churches, on Samoan aspirations for independence. 
Finally, the Conclusion places this study in the context of existing 
literature on Samoan history. The conclusion also collects all the factors, issues 
and events, which motivated Samoans to seek independence, and shows how 
these factors impacted on the Samoans in their struggle for independence. 
These factors, issues and events are evaluated to highlight the intimate 
relationship between the Samoan (LMS) Church and the political vein of 
Samoa's independence movement. The conclusion also evaluates whether the 
Samoan (LMS) Church influenced Samoa's political independence or vice versa. 
It also evaluates the impact of church independence on the Samoan (LMS) 
Church itself, and its relationship to an independent political government. Finally, 
the conclusion attempts to provide an answer to the dilemma as to who made 
Samoa independent, and explores whether independence was indeed the aim 
of the Samoan people or something completely different. 
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designation given to the centres in Upolu 
(Lufilufi and Leulumoega) whose orators were 
considered king-makers, political kingpins in 
Samoan politics on equal status with Pule 
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PREFACE 
In 1994 l attended the 150!h anniversary of the Malua Theological 
College in Samoa. The Ekalesia Fa'apotopotoga Kerisiano i Samoa (EFKS) 
[Congregational Christian Church of Samoa] General Assembly that year was 
postponed to 25 September to coincide with Malua's birthday. It was also an 
opportunity to commemorate 164 years since the arrival of Christianity in 
Samoa. Members of the General Assembly and visitors from around the world 
arrived for the celebration, and it included the last two LMS Principals of Malua, 
Dr John Bradshaw and the Reverend Dr David Bowen. The celebration was as 
grand as any other Samoan celebration and it was a great spectacle for the 
Samoans and their guests. 
However, an incident occurred during the deliberation of the General 
Assembly that, in my opinion, not only marred the celebration but put a question 
mark on the ability of the church leaders to administer the EFKS. The Assembly 
was unhappy that there was no 'landmark memorial' (a building) erected to 
commemorate the third jubilee of the college, as was the case with the Fa/e 
Jupe/i (Jubilee Hall) and the Fale Senetenari (Centenary house). An amnesty 
was offered to all pastors who were suspended disregarding the magnitude of 
their sins per se. The issue of 'amnesty' saw tempers reach uncontrollable 
heights as church members denounced the proposal as disgraceful. Many 
church members believed Malua's 1501h anniversary would always be 
remembered as the 'era of the amnesty,' something many considered o se mea 
valea (unintelligent or stupid thing) and a political undertaking. 
When the celebrations concluded, there was discontentment among the 
church members, especially when church lay members had not been consulted 
by the church leaders on the issue. The Elders and pastors were ridiculed for 
being irresponsible and lacking wisdom and incapable of proper administration 
of the EFKS after 164 years. Many felt the EFKS was straying away from its 
calling as a church and its leaders and members were too involved in playing 
politics outside and inside the church. 
It soon dawned on me that the EFKS might claim to be 164 years old, but 
in reality it was only 32 years old. It was a young independent church. Its 
administrative structure may have been in place many years previously under 
the guidance of the London Missionary Society, but as a new 'independent 
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church' it was struggling to deal with the problems once dealt with by the 
European missionaries. The EFKS tendency to maintain a strong political face 
on par with its ecclesiastical expression stemmed from the strong link it had 
continued to build up with Samoan politics, and traditions, culture and customs, 
since Its independence in 1962. 
The close relationship between the EFKS and Samoan politics and 
protocol had existed since the missionary era, and the independence of Samoa 
and the Samoan (LMS) Church [now EFKS] later was a by-product of the 
resilience of the two bodies. It was with this in mind that the aims and purpose 
for this study began to take shape. 
The title of this work is Samoa Tula'i: Ecclesiastical and Political Face 
of Samoa's Independence, 1900 - 1962. The title is taken from the first line of 
Samoa's national anthem, 'Samoa Tuta'i, ma sisi ia /au fu'a, o lou pale lea'. 1 
The phrase 'Samoa Tula'i,' encompasses the historical struggle of the Samoan 
people from the time they stood up to voice the loss of their political, cultural, 
economic, social, and, to some extent, religious identity, to the time they stood 
up to praise their independence. The following chapters will include examples 
and case studies, to show how and why Samoans were coerced into initiating 
an independence movement. The roles played by Europeans, Chinese, and 
other ethnic groups, are part of the political web and are highlighted throughout 
the chapters. 
The sub-heading 'Ecclesiastical and Political Face of Samoa's 
Independence' is an attempt to focus on specific events, issues, and factors, in 
Samoa's history, which challenged and motivated Samoans not only to rise-up 
and protest against oppression and exploitation, but also to call for 
independence. Several monographs and recent works of scholarship have 
touched on some aspects of the political face of Samoa's independence,2 but 
the authors concerned only allude to most of these factors, events and issues, 
as they are writing for quite different reasons and in different contexts. The 
intention of this study is to show the interconnectedness of the ecclesiastical 
1 literally translated as 'Samoa Stand! And raise your flag, this is your crown'. 
2 For example, see R. P. Gilson. Samoa 1830..1900: Politics of a Mu/Ii-Cultural Society, Melbourne: Oxford 
University, 1970; J. W. Davidson, Samoa mo Samoa: The Emergence of the Independent State of 
Weslem Samoa, Melbourne: Oxford University, 1967; Michael Field, Mau: Samoa's Struggle for Freedom, 
Auckland: Polynesian Press, 1984; Sylvia Masterman, Origins of lntemalional Riva/iy in Samoa, 1845-
1884, London: George Allen, 1934; Malama Meleisea, Lagaga: A Short Hisroiy of Samoa, Suva: USP, 
1987; Malama Meleisea, The Making of Modem Samoa, Suva: USP, 1987. 
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and political face for independence. While the WMMS and the Catholics also 
contributed to Samoa's independence aspirations, this study will focus on the 
influence and impact of the Samoan (LMS) Church on Samoa's independence 
aspirations, under the supervision of the LMS mission, an organisation that had 
simultaneously achieved independence with Samoa. The two movements will 
be seen to be intractably linked. 
It is my intention for this study, being a religious and political history of 
Samoa, to write in a style that would be readily understandable and coherent to 
Samoans, Pacific Islanders, and those who are not academics and scholars, 
but wish to understand this aspect of Samoan history. 
The main research for this study started in 1994, although my interest in 
the EFKS and its close ties with Samoan politics had led me to interview and 
research into the issue some years earlier. I visited and explored the various 
archives and libraries in Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, and Samoa, to uncover 
materials for this study. The archives and libraries explored for this study were 
within the Pacific and Australasia. They included the National Library of 
Australia, Saint Mark's Library, Pacific and Asian History Records Room 
(Australian National University of Australia), Mitchell Library, National Archives 
of New Zealand, Alexander Turnbull Library, Victoria University Library, 
Auckland University Library, National Archives of Fiji, Pacific Theological 
College Library, University of the South Pacific Library, Pacific Regional 
Seminary Library, Marist Archives of Samoa and Tokelau, Archives of the 
Methodist Church, Samoa Legislative Library, Nelson Memorial Library, and the 
Robert Louis Stevenson Museum and Archives. 
There was an abundance of primary as well as secondary sources 
available to be examined. The sources and materials (the ones that I could 
locate), which related to my study are listed in the bibliography. The National 
Library of Australia (Canberra), University of the South Pacific (Suva), and the 
National Archives of New Zealand (Wellington), the London Missionary Society 
South Seas Archives, the Methodist Mission Archives, and the Mormon Church 
materials were amongst the most useful. 
The Mitchell Library (Sydney) had an extensive range of materials that 
complimented those found in other archives relating to various Pacific Islands 
including Samoa. The Methodist Church materials were excellent including 
Peter Turner's Journals, Martin Dyson's Papers, and George Brown's Journals 
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and Private Papers. The Mitchell Library also had a good collection of other 
manuscripts and microfilms, especially on James Lyle Young and J. C. 
Williams. The Samoan photographs from the period under study were also 
interesting and informative. The Pacific and Asian History Records Room 
{Canberra) had the Gilson Papers and several manuscripts in the Samoan 
language, which were also valuable. 
The National Archives of New Zealand, housed some of the most 
important papers relating to Germany and New Zealand administration. 
However, the most important collection was the Island Territories Archives, 
which contained materials relating to the Mau period and the efforts of Samoa 
to gain independence. I selected 107 files altogether from a handful of series. 
The Island Territories Archives contained 88 series, and those read for this 
study are listed in the bibliography. 
There were also excellent materials found in the British and German 
Administration Archives. These include the British Consul Samoa Papers, Great 
Britain Foreign Administration Papers, British Military Occupation Papers, 
German Administration of Western Samoa Papers, German Administration 
Papers, German Colonial Administration Papers, Archives of the German 
Consul, Archives of the Samoan Government, New Zealand Samoan 
Administration Papers, and other bits and pieces. There was an excellent 
collection of Samoan newspapers, which included the Samoa Guardian, New 
Zealand Samoa Guardian, Samoa Herald, Samoa Times, and Samoaniche 
Zeitung. 
The Alexander Turnbull Library is an excellent centre for research. It 
housed the manuscripts of several New Zealand Administrators to Samoa 
between 1918 and 1945, such Stephen S. Allen, Robert W. Tate and Herbert 
Hart. The library also has collections and papers by various government officials 
and personalities that had spent time in Samoa, including the Sir Arthur Gordon 
Papers, Grattan Papers, Westbrook Papers, Gurr Papers, Shultz Papers, and 
H. E. Holland Papers. There were other informative smaller collections, which 
were also useful for this study. The Turnbull Library also houses the New 
Zealand government Gazette called the Appendix to the Journal to the House of 
Representative of New Zealand (AJHR), which provided excellent reports on 
the administration of Samoa. The most important collection for me, however, 
was the Samoan Collection in the Pacific Section. It contained Samoan 
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literature relating to the Samoan (LMS) Church and government in the Samoan 
language. This collection is fully listed in the bibliography. 
The National Archives of Fiji provided an interesting perspective on 
British administration in Fiji compared to Samoa. It also housed some 
interesting papers relating to Bully Hayes, John C. Williams, and other 
interesting personalities, who had spent time in Samoa. Samoa is mentioned in 
the reports by the High Commissioner for the Pacific, and the Anglican Diocese 
of Polynesia Archive. The typescript 'Treaty of Friendship Between Germany 
and Samoa, 1871 -1881' was important for this study. 
The Roman Catholic Church in Apia houses the Marist Archives of 
Samoa and Tokelau Islands. There were excellent collections in English, 
Samoan, and over half in the German and French language. The most notable 
collection belonged to Bishops Broyer, Darnand and Elloy (Tipasa), the great 
leaders of the Catholic mission in Samoa in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. The Methodist Church Archives in Apia had very little material 
concerning the study at hand. Most of the information relates to the Methodist 
church Synods between 1938 - 1960, and referred mainly to financial matters. 
The Nelson Memorial Library (Apia) had materials, which were also 
found in other libraries and archives. It housed the recently discovered Vaimea 
Collection, which, unfortunately, I unable to examine due to unforseen 
circumstances. This collection came to my notice while researching in 
Wellington in 1996. I was given a copy of the items included in the archive, 
entitled 'Official German records- Vaimea - English Translation'. The Vaimea 
collection would have confirmed and corroborated information already gathered 
from other libraries. 
The Western Samoa Gazette is housed in the Samoan legislation 
Library at Mulinuu. Unfortunately, it does not have a complete collection, and 
the earliest copies dated from 1920. It contained information relating to the New 
Zealand administration's dealings with the Mau and other organisations, such 
as the LMS, WMMS, Catholics and the Mormons. It also contains census 
statistics and government appointments. 
The published primary and secondary sources were numerous. The 
hardest task was locating the sources, as many were rare and out of circulation, 
but between the libraries and archives I visited, the final collection was more 
than enough for the task at hand. Some of the rare materials were found in the 
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Pacific Theological College (the Chronicle of the LMS and other LMS materials), 
the Pacific Regional Seminary (especially on the Roman Catholic perspective), 
and the University of the South Pacific. The libraries at Auckland and Victoria 
Universities had theses relating to some of the issues covered in this study. 
Perhaps, the most fascinating archive was housed at the Robert Louis 
Stevenson Museum. It was a collection of Stevenson's books and other 
materials, including a few manuscript papers relating to Samoa. At the time of 
my research (1995 and 1998), the archive was in its infant state, and I believe it 
will be an excellent archive in a few years time. The curator stated that 
Stevenson's personal papers and materials relating to his time were being 
negotiated for their return to Samoa, and all of it would be housed at the 
Museum in the near future. 
In 1995, I interviewed some of the older Samoan generation (above 70 
years) in an effort to establish a closer link with the past through the personal 
experiences of those who had lived in or near the period of this study. The 
thirty-two interviews conducted were of mixed personalities (women and men) 
including ministers, government workers, Mau participants, and so forth. These 
interviews were added to other interviews that had been done in 1992 for a 
different study but related to the Samoan church. The list of interviewees is 
given in the bibliography. 
This study would not have been possible without the support of many 
people. I acknowledge the vision and the confidence that was first shown in me 
by the Reverend Dr Faitala Talapusi, and Dr Andrew Thornley, as a candidate 
for post graduate studies at the Australian National University. Even though the 
relationship between myself and the Pacific Theological College, Suva, ended 
abruptly due to the college's financial difficulties, its contribution cannot be 
ignored. Talapusi and his wife Tausala were great supporters, and I owe much 
to them for their translation of French books and manuscripts that had come to 
my notice. 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank all the people in the archives 
and libraries mentioned already, who helped me to locate the various sources 
that I needed for this study. I will not name you all as I might forget one, but 
your efforts and your guidance are appreciated deeply. I would like to take this 
opportunity to thank Dr Mark Gallagher who had been my mentor at the Pacific 
Theological College, and to whom I owed much in my early research into 
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Samoan church history. Some of the materials used in this present study were 
provided by him. A note of thanks to several friends, Father Spa Silva 
(Mapuifagalele Home for the Elderly - Vallele), the Reverend Tunupopo Patu 
(Leulumoega), Tevaga Peseta Leo (Safua) and Mrs Epenesa Maniti 
(Queanbeyan), for information on people who died in the 1918 Spanish 
influenza epidemic. At this point I remember with sorrow the late Reverend 
lupeli lupeli, who shared much of his experience in the EFKS, and provided 
Samoan papers relating to the EFKS for my perusal. lupeli's 0 le Sulu Samoa 
collection was invaluable. 
I would like to thank the staff members at the Division of the Pacific and 
Asian History, in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, at the 
Australian National University. I would like to thank Professor Donald Denoon, 
the chair of my supervisory panel, for his guidance, for his words of 
encouragement, and for reading some of my disconnected drafts. But, most of 
all, I acknowledge with gratitude the great assistance afforded by Dr Niel 
Gunson, who was humble and patient with me in his role as supervisor. Thank 
you friend for guiding me, and for reading drafts and making suggestions to 
improve the quality and content of the thesis. The use of your personal library, 
especially in relation to rare manuscript papers, such as the Frank Lenwood 
Letters and Journals, was invaluable. Thank you for sharing your experience in 
the Archives, and the humorous discourses with missionaries in the field, it 
made me appreciate other aspects of mission enterprises. You have been an 
inspiration in my efforts to be a 'historian' since 1995, and all your efforts would 
be remembered with prayers. 
I would also like to acknowledge the friendship of Dr Brij Lal and Dr 
Deryck Scarr who in their own ways contributed to the academic discussions 
related to my study, and the staff of the Cartography Section at the Australian 
National University for drawing the maps. I also acknowledge the support and 
friendship of past and present colleagues at the Australian National University, 
Asiata Va'ai, Asofou So'o, Sina Va'ai, Kambati Uriam, Andrew Hamilton, 
Christine Weir, Paul D'Arcy, and Kieran Schmidt for their enlightening 
comments during the weekly seminars, and humorous demeanour, which made 
life more bearable when 'writer's cramp' and 'brain seizure' occurred. Many 
thanks to the administration team, especially to Marion Weeks for her constant 
e-mails to Samoa to get me to finish my thesis, and Dorothy Mcintosh, for her 
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kindness and for making my final three months more bearable in providing an 
office and computer for my use, and sorting out financial expenses. 
I would also acknowledge the big part that my church has played in my 
academic efforts. In 1998 I was asked to return and teach history at the Malua 
Theological College with a promise that I would return to finish my studies later. 
Towards the end of 2000, the Reverend Professor Otele Perelini supported my 
request to take leave for three months to finish my thesis. He arranged finance 
for my return airfare which made things easier financially for my family. I thank 
Perelini, the staff of Malua, and the Board of Malua for their prayers and 
support. 
I would like to acknowledge the support of my family in Samoa, New 
Zealand, Australia, Hawaii and America, especially my mother, Talitiga Liua'ana 
and her family, and my mother-in-law, Luafulu Roache and her family. I am 
indebted to Peter and Shane Roache and their family in Canberra for putting up 
with me for three months, and providing free accommodation and meals for the 
duration of my stay. Thanks to my daughter, Ella Adeline, for covering some of 
my expenses. Thank you all for your support and your prayers. 
Most of all, I would like to thank my wife Virginia Perise, and my children, 
John Roache, Grete Lynn, and Franz Richard Charlie, in Samoa for their 
prayers and support. We were forced to be apart for three months (and over the 
Christmas and New Year period) because they believed in what l had to do. 
They made me work hard to achieve something which would mean much for us 
all, and to them I dedicate this study. Finally, I thank God almighty for his 
guidance, and for the strength and wisdom that I was able to utilise daily in my 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION -
ECHOES FROM THE PAST 
1 
The legend of Nafanua and her exploits in Samoan history accounts for 
many existing myths, stories, songs, and proverbial sayings. Nafanua, the aitu 
fafine {goddess) from Pulotu,1 was believed to avenge her aiga {family) at 
Falealupo for having been enslaved and, through conquest, gathered together 
the paramount matai {chief) titles of Samoa. In the story she subsequently 
bestowed the first tafa'ifa {four paramount titles) upon Salamasina, the daughter 
of the Tuia'ana.2 Nafanua then distributed the rest of the papa and ao (other 
high ranking chiefly titles) to the other high-ranking families of Samoa. The story 
of Nafanua legitimised the power base for Samoan politics, and also gave 
authenticity to the existence of the tafa'ifa and the changes in the fortunes of the 
tama-a-aiga (sons of the royal families or royal families), especially in relation to 
the Tupua and Malietoa lineages. 
The paramountcy of the Malietoa family was also connected to the 
Nafanua myth. It was believed that Malietoa3 sought out Nafanua for a papa or 
ao title to honour his family, but Malietoa found his rivals had taken all the titles. 
Nafanua told Malietoa to "Tali i Lagi Se Ao o Lou Malo,'"' and a few generations 
later Malietoa Vaiinupo believed the prophecy of the aitu fafine was fulfilled 
when he welcomed and accepted Christianity in the form of the London 
Missionary Society {LMS). At the time, Vaiinupo was waging war against A'ana 
in the island of Upolu. The total annihilation of A'ana was not only to avenge the 
1 Pulotu refers to an Elysium to the west, thought to be the ancestral place of several Polynesian groups. 
There are various views on 'Pulotu' set forth in myths and legends of the various islands such as Samoa, 
Fiji, and Tonga, See C. Stubel, Myths and Legends of Samoa, Wellington: A. H. & A. W. Reed, 1976: 
Peter Buck, Samoa Material Culture, Bernice P. Bishop Museum Bulletin, no. 75. New York: Kraus 
Reprint, 1971: Fred Henry, Ta/afa'asolopito o Samoa, (History of Samoa), trans. T. K. Faletoese, Apia: 
Commercial Printers, 1958; Paul Gemerty, "Pulotu, Polynesian Homeland," Joumal of the Polynesian 
Society 102 no. 4, 1993. 
2 The four titles that made up !he tafa'ifa are Tuiatua, Tuia'ana, Gato'al!ele, and Tamasoali'i. See Western 
Samoa, Historical Notes, Island Territories Archives (henceforth 1n 1 Ex .2115; see also Niel Gunson, 
'Great Families of Polynesia,' Journal of Pacific History 32 no. 2, 1997; Penelope Schoeffel, "Rank, 
Gender, and Politics in Ancient Samoa: the Genealogy of Salamasina O le Tafa'ifa; Journal of Pacific 
History 22 no. 4, 1987; Henry, 81-110. 
3 There is still debate over the identity of this Malietoa. The consensus seems to support Malietoa 
Fitisemanu. See Malama Me leis ea, Lagaga: A Shott History of Samoa, Suva: University of the South 
Pacific, 1987, 56-58; Augustin Kramer, The Samoa Islands, vol. 1, trans. Theodore Verhaaren, Auckland: 
Polynesian Press, 1994; Henry, 161. 
4 Literally means 'wait for a title of your kingdom from Heaven.' 
death of his Manono ally, Tamafaiga,5 but was also an opportunity for Vaiinupo 
to consolidate his supremacy over the other leadership claimants to the ma/o 
(conquering or ruling side). 
2 
The arrival of the new papa-lagi or pa-lagl' (European or white man) 
religion at the moment of Vaiinupo's rise in political status, was not only seen as 
the fulfilment of Nafanua's prophecy, but also an impetus that would change 
Samoa's political and religious fortunes.7 The ascendancy of Vaiinupo and the 
arrival of the Gospel were also seen as the remedy to curb hostility and warfare 
in Samoa. For a brief period peace was a reality. However, from 1847 the winds 
of change from various elements in the community soon returned Samoa to 
political mayhem for the rest of the nineteenth century, at a scale far beyond the 
Samoans' own perceptions. The changing political patterns were mainly due to 
a combination of Samoan chiefly rivalry and papalagi rivalry combined with the 
pursuit of economic, political and, to some extent, religious dominance. 
In 1847, the Samoan political leaders never envisioned that within the 
next 100 years, they would lose the right to determine their own political affairs. 
They never envisioned they would compromise their status and authority to 
generate and indirectly indulge European greed and foster political apathy. The 
Samoans observed with despair the efforts of the three European powers, 
Germany, America, and Britain, to exploit Samoan pride, values, traditions, and 
relationships, to achieve dominancy over each other. 
The Samoans tried to regain their political authority by supporting one of 
the three nations with the hope of eventually re-establishing Samoan political 
rule. Unfortunately, disunity in family and district allegiances, mission pride, and 
individual pursuit of power and control, led to a leadership conflict, which the 
5 For a recent study on Tamafaiga, see Tuiatua Tupua Tamasese Efi Tamasese, "Tamafaiga: Shaman, 
King or Maniac," Journal of Pacific History, 30 no. 1, 1995. 
6 The Samoan wonts for European or white person. The common rendering is papa/agi but recent 
development in the Samoan language has used papalagi as the plural form and palagi as the singular. The 
author has taken into consideration the connection that the wont papalagi rather than palagi has with 
similar concepts such as papa-atea (Eastern Polynesia), and papa - rangi (Maori) which refers to gods of 
the earth and sky. (Niel Gunson, Australian National University, Canberra, Interviewed 22 December 
2000). 
7 For some further insights, see John Williams, A Narrative of Missionary Enterprises in the South Sea 
Islands, London: John Snow, 1837 (reprinted facsimile copy 1998 to commemorate 175'" Anniversary of 
Williams in the Cook Islands); John Garrett, To Uve Among the Stars: Christian Origins in Oceania, 
GenevalSuva: World Council of Churches/University of the South Pacific, 1982; Ronald Crawford, "The 
Lotu and the Fa'a Samoa: Church and Society in Samoa, 1830..1880,' Ph.D. Otago University, 1977; 
Featuna'i Liuaana, "Tali i Lagi Sou Malo: Samoan Christians and Samoan Politics, 1830 -1900" M.Th 
Thesis, Pacific Theological College. 1993. 
three powers took advantage of to further their own self-interest. Samoa would 
endure many years of bloodshed without achieving political rule. 
3 
When the curtains closed on the nineteenth century, there were no 
winners - only losers. Germany, Britain, and America dominated the political 
scene but they failed to organise a workable Samoan government under their 
control. The efforts of the three powers were continually thwarted by the 
Samoan efforts to regain political control over their own affairs, even if it meant 
spilling Samoan blood. The Samoans lost many lives in pursuit of their goals 
and they were not about to give it all up to satisfy European dominance. The 
Samoans also witnessed over the years papalagi greed and lust for power and 
wealth at the cost of Samoan lives; an image firmly etched into the minds of 
many dejected Samoans. The nineteenth century closed as Samoa became a 
German colony without any consultation with Samoan leaders - a decision that 
left many Samoans bitter and disillusioned. 
Samoa's new colonial status, however, only encouraged the Samoans to 
further conspire to make another attempt at regaining political control. At the 
beginning of the German reign, various events and issues arose, and continued 
to develop throughout the twentieth century, which kept the Samoans 
persevering and forever stimulated to achieve control. For instance, Samoans 
witnessed and despised Germany's destruction of Samoan protocol. The 
Samoans condemned New Zealand's abysmal administrative performance and 
the perpetual erosion of Samoan traditions and customs. The Samoans 
questioned their lack of participation in the debate over 'racial impurity', 
especially mixed relations between Chinese indentured labourers and Samoan 
women. The Samoans also tested the patience of the mission societies, 
especially those connected with the LMS, as Samoan church leaders 
entertained the notion of controlling their own religious destiny. The same 
independent attitude surfaced as Samoan nationalism developed into a strong 
independence movement. The Samoans also had the opportunity to appreciate 
the technology and material wealth of World War I and World War ll, and 
wished to share these benefits. 
Samoa gained political independence in 1962 and, in the same year, the 
Samoan (LMS) Church, under the supervision of the LMS mission, became an 
independent entity called the Ekalesia Faapotopotoga Kerisiano i Samoa 
(Congregational Christian Church in Samoa [EFKS]). It ended 100 years of 
4 
struggle against dominance by a foreign power, and oppression and exploitation 
under the guise of civilisation to improve Samoan standards of living through 
economic, political, social, and religious development 
The contention of this study is that the simultaneous independence of 
Samoa and the Samoan (LMS) Church was not coincidental. It was the result of 
a close working relationship that had begun in the nineteenth century, and was 
strengthened in the twentieth century, through the persistence and vitality of the 
Samoan leaders. It was also a culmination of factors, which had a lasting and 
detrimental impact on Samoans as they struggled to free themselves from the 
bondage of colonialism. Thus, throughout this study efforts will be made to 
show how Samoa's political and religious events, issues, and factors all 
interacted and finally culminated in the independence of Samoa and the 
Samoan (LMS) Church. 
The outcome of events in the first half of the twentieth century could only 
be understood against the background of the nineteenth century. Even before 
the very first European settlement eventuated in the early 1800s, Samoa had 
contact with other papa/agi, albeit only on sporadic occasions. The sighting of 
the first European ships gliding across the waters of the Samoan Islands 
created a relationship and history of events that continued to develop and 
contribute to the structuring and ordering of Samoa's future. Between 1521 and 
1824, French, Dutch, British, and a Russian explorer, visited Samoa. They 
included Ferdinand Magellan, Jacob Roggeveen, Louis Antoine de Bougainville, 
who named Samoa L'Archipel des Navigteurs, and Jean Francois de la 
Perouse, who lost twelve sailors in Tutuila after a misunderstanding with the 
local people. La Perouse labelled the Samoans 'barbaric and atrocious.'8 Louis 
De Freycinet, in 1819, and the Russian Otto Von Kotzebue, in 1824, were the 
last to visit Samoa before the arrival of the missions.9 
8 For further reading see Peter Dillon, Narrative and Successfi.JI Result of a Voyage ... Fate of La Perouse, 
reprint, New York: Da Capo, 1972; Andrew Sharp, ed., The Journal of Jacob Roggeveen, Oxford: 
Claredon, 1970, 151-155; Andrew Sharp, The Discovery of the Pacific Islands, Oxford: Claredon, 1960, 
99; Louis de Bougairwille, A Voyage Round the World. New Yor1<: Da Capo, no date, 284; John Dunmore, 
French ExploretS in the Pacific, vol. 1, Oxford: Claredon, 1965, 85; Christopher Lloyd, Pacific Horizons, 
London: George Allen and Unwin. 1946, 152; J.C. Beaglehole, The Exploration of the Pacific. London: 
Adam and Charles Black, 1966, 186. 
9 For further reading see Dunmore, 276-285; Sharp (1960), 152; John Dunmore, French Explorer.> in the 
Pacific, vol. 2, Oxford: Clarendon, 1969, 94-95; Otto von Kotzebue, A Voyage of Discovery into the South 
Seas and Seering Straits, 3 vols., New York: Da Capo, 1967; N. A. Rowe, Samoa Under the Sailing Gods, 
London: Putman, 1930, 18-20. 
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These explorers did not establish any lasting relationships, and Samoa 
was left to enjoy its own traditions, culture, and lifestyle. The casual contacts 
meant Samoans knew that papalagi sailed in huge ships, but it gave them very 
little knowledge of their character and demeanour. There were probably a few 
runaway sailors and beachcombers already residing in Samoa, but their scanty 
presence only influenced the Samoans they came into contact with. 10 It was the 
arrival of the mission societies, especially the LMS, which opened up Samoa to 
the world. 
The LMS first set foot in the Pacific in 1797.11 The first Protestant 
organisation to participate in Christian mission in the Pacific landed papalagi 
missionaries on the island of Tahiti. The missionaries, made up of four ordained 
ministers and twenty-two lower middle class mechanics, were not only 
earmarked for Tahiti, but for the Marquesses and Tonga.12 They had high hopes 
of quickly converting the inhabitants of the islands concerned. They believed 
that in order to Christianise they first had to civilise the islanders, thus the high 
percentage of unordained missionaries in the first group. However, their 
expectations never eventuated as many returned to England shattered by the 
experience, with only a handful remaining in Tahiti to continue the work. It was 
not the start the LMS wanted, but it persevered and by 1812 positive results 
began to appear.13 
The LMS was not the only mission in the Pacific at that time. The 
Anglican missionaries were working in Australia and New Zealand, while the 
WMMS missionaries also had a base in Australia, and were trying to establish a 
mission in the island of Tonga. The existence of these missions soon spread 
throughout the Pacific as mission ships and trading vessels visited different 
ports throughout the year. Many of these trading vessels carried islanders as 
part of their crew or passengers. Many of them returned to their islands 
immediately, while others made their homes in their new island surroundings 
10 H. E. Maude, 'Beachcombers and Castaways." Journal of the Polynesian Society, no. 73:3 (Sept 1964), 
254-260. 
11 For an excellent study on the South Seas mission In the Pacific see Niel Gunson, Messengers of Grace: 
Evangelical Missionaries in the South Seas 1797 -1880, Melbourne: Oxford University, 1976. 
12 For a study on the LMS see Richard Lovett, The History of the London Missionary Society, 1795- 1895, 
2 vols, London: Frowde, 1699; Norman Goodall, A History of the London Missionary Society, 1895 • 1945, 
Oxford: Oxford University, 1954. 
"For a good account of the Tahiti mission see John Davies, The History of the Tahitian Mission, 1799-
1830, ed. C. W. Newbury, Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1961; see also Garrett, 22-31; Gunson, 
various sections, especially 25-28, 36-42, 112-116, 119-125, 141-143, 168-173, and so forth. 
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only to return many years later, while others never returned. The same pattern 
transpired with Europeans who escaped their ships and settled among the 
inhabitants of the various islands. Many stayed for a while and then returned to 
their countries, while others stayed for good. Many of these Europeans were 
familiar with Christianity, and many freely took the opportunity, while others had 
to be coerced, to teach and pass on Christian knowledge, albeit impure, to the 
islanders.14 
The Samoans also had the opportunity to travel on many trading vessels 
as sailors, helpers, and passengers. They visited other islands such as Tonga, 
Tahiti, Rarotonga, Hawaii, and even New Zealand and Australia. The 
experiences and knowledge gained on these visits were later shared with others 
upon their return to Samoa. The inter-island migrational habits and trading 
enterprises also established a grapevine that filtered information through the 
islands on current events. The opportunity was available for Samoans to mimic 
Christianity picked up from other islands.15 
In 1828, Saiva'aia, a Samoan who had been visiting Tonga, arrived at his 
village Satupa'itea, Savai'i, with a Tongan version of Christianity, 16 and began to 
teach members of his family about God. While Sava'aia's knowledge and grasp 
of the Christian faith may have been limited, the fact remained that many 
Samoans, like Saiva'aia and his family, had practiced what they thought was 
Christianity. At the village of Lufilufi, a man named Tagipo had his own version 
of Christianity, which ran parallel to the teachings of a runaway sailor in the 
same village. 17 
A Samoan from the village of Eva in Upolu, named Siovili, 18 also 
14 Williams, 463-464; A. W. Murray, Forty Year.s' Mission Worl< in Polynesia and New Guinea, From 1835 -
1875, London: James Nisbet, 1876, 32-34; see also Gunson, 167-169. 
15 See Niel Gunson, "Non-Missionary Religious Developments and Cults Initiated in Samoa in the Period 
1800-1835," 1970, typescript paper delivered at ANZAAS Congress, Port Moresby, 1970; Lowell Holmes, 
"Cults, Cargo and Christianity: Samoan Response to Western Religion,' Missiology: An International 
Review 8 no.4, 1930, 471 -487; K. R. Howe, Vv'hera the Waves Fall, Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1984, 
234-235; Gunson (1978), 169. 
16 In the official Methodist history, the official date for Methodism in Samoa is given as 1835 for Peter 
Turner's arrival at Mano no. See A. Harold Wood, Over.seas Missions of the Australian Methodist Church, 
vol. 1, Tonga and Samoa, Melbourne: Aldersgate, 1975; Martin Dyson, My Story of Samoan Methodism, 
or A Brief History of the Wesleyan Methodist Mission in Samoa, Apia: Methodist Church, 1875. 
17 
"Buzacott to LMS, 1836,' SSL. 
18 J. D. Freeman, "The Joe Gimlet or Siovili Cult: An Episode in the Religious History of Early Samoa," in J. 
D. Freeman, et. al. (eds), Anthropology in the South Seas, New Plymouth: Thomas Avery, 1959, 185 -
200; Elia Ta'ase, "Beyond Samoan Christianity: A Study of the Siovili Cult and the Problems Facing the 
Church in Samoa Today," B.D. Thesis, Pacific Theological College, 1971; D. J. Inglis, "The Siovili Cult,' in 
Religious Studies in the Pacific, Auckland: Colloquium Publishers, 1978, 37 - 44; Gunson (1978), 169, 176 
-179. 
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journeyed the Pacific as a sailor on various trading vessels. Siovili experienced 
the lifestyle and absorbed the latest changes and developments offered at the 
various ports of landing. In Tahiti, Siovili picked up a flawed version of 
Christianity and having arrived in Samoa, he began to teach it to the people of 
Eva, and consequently influenced many people from surrounding districts and 
as far as Savai'i. Siovlli's teachings remained influential up till the late 1840s. 19 
Thus, the sailors, beachcombers, European traders, escaped convicts, who had 
settled among the Samoans, and Samoans themselves, imparted to the 
Samoans a crude form of Christianity until the arrival of the mission societies. 
The LMS mission ship, the Messenger of Peace, with LMS missionaries, 
the Reverends John Williams and Charles Barff, and six Tahitian and two 
Aitutakian teachers and their families on board, arrived in Tonga for supplies 
and to meet the WMMS missionaries.20 While in Tonga, Williams and Barff 
highlighted their plans for Samoa, and solicited the support of their WMMS 
counterparts to leave Samoa solely to the LMS. According to Williams, the 
Reverends Nathaniel Turner and William Cross represented the WMMS, and 
gave their blessing and acknowledged the benefits of leaving Samoa solely to 
the LMS.21 The fruitful encounter set a benevolent mood as the Messenger of 
Peace set sail for Samoa. 
Williams agreed to give passage to a Samoan couple, Fauea and 
Puaseisei, who have been residing in Tonga for some years. Fauea was a 
blessing in more ways than one for Williams. He was a chief and native of 
Mano no, and a relative of Vaiinupo. Williams learnt from Fauea that the Manono 
warrior Tamafaiga, feared by many Samoans, was the leader of the malo. 
Tamafaiga was cruel and barbarous, and would not hesitate to kill those who 
denied his authority. The people of Manono, as well as his other followers, 
believed the spirit of the aitu fafine Nafanua possessed him. Fauea informed 
Williams that Tamafaiga would be the greatest obstacle to the acceptance of 
19 Samoa Reporter, March 1846. 
20 Richard Moyle ed, The Samaan Journals of John Williams, 1830- 1832, Canberra: Australian National 
University, 1984; WHliams, B1-85. 
21 Williams, 79; A. Buzacott (Cooks 1836-1837, May 30 - Mar 10), Rarotonga to Navigator.; Islands, 1837, 
London Missionary Society South Seas Archives, South Seas Letters (henceforth SS!-); John Garrett, "The 
Conflict Between the London Missionary Society and the Wesleyan Methodists in 19'· Century Samoa," 
Journal of Pacific History, 9 (1974), 65-80; Dyson. 28·31. 
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Christianity, otherwise Fauea was confident that Malietoa Vaiinupo would gladly 
receive the new lotu (religion).22 
The Messenger of Peace, under advice from Fauea, detoured from the 
usual ship route that by-passed Manono to avoid contact with Tamafaiga. The 
va'a lotu (mission ship) remained south of Samoa and sailed northwest where it 
rounded Cape Mulinu'u in Savai'i, and finally found anchorage off Puaseisei's 
village, Safune. The stopover off Safune proved propitious as news of 
Tamafaiga's death greeted Fauea. Williams could not contain his joy as Fauea 
confirmed and reconfirmed again the news that Tamafaiga was indeed dead.23 
Fauea was just as happy because it was probably the barbarity of Tamafaiga 
that had originally forced him and his wife to take refuge in Tonga. The way was 
now clear for Fauea to return to his family in Manono. But, most importantly, the 
chance had been given to Williams to offer Vaiinupo the Gospel of Jesus Christ 
at Sapapali'i. 
A message was sent to Vaiinupo who was in Upolu destroying A'ana, the 
district responsible for the death of Tamafaiga. Vaiinupo arrived as his brother 
Taimalelagi entertained the visitors. After the exchange of gifts, Williams 
outlined the purpose of his visit, and Vaiinupo accepted Christianity on behalf of 
the Samoan people without hesitation. He also offered to protect and provide for 
all the needs of the teachers in Samoa.24 Ironically, as Williams and Vaiinupo 
shared the Gospel of Christ, and spoke of peace for the Samoan people, smoke 
continued to rise above the mountains of Upolu as Vaiinupo's warriors 
continued to destroy and burn A'ana. Williams did nothing and said nothing as 
Vaiinupo refused to accept Christianity personally until the annihilation of A'ana, 
its people and their possessions, was completed.25 
Williams left soon after with the success of the LMS mission in Vaiinupo's 
hands. He imparted to Vaiinupo the importance for the teachers to spread out 
and reside throughout the various districts of Samoa. Williams then sailed for 
Rarotonga via Manono, where he met and promised the chief Tuilaepa Matetau 
a teacher on his next visit. Matetau had heard of Williams meeting with Vaiinupo 
and was envious of the teachers at Vaiinupo's disposal. Matetau's request for a 
22 Williams, 85-88. 
23 Williams, 85. 
24 Williams, 87-90. 
25 Williams, 87-88. 
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teacher highlighted the intricacy in relationship between Samoans at various 
levels of society. Matetau was a chief of Manono, the ma/o, and his pride would 
not have his status compromised, nor subordinated to Vaiinupo, by asking for a 
teacher. Manono, after all, was the power base behind Vaiinupo's leadership.26 
Williams took two years before returning to Samoa via Tutuila and 
Manu'a in 1832. In Tutuila, Williams was overwhelmed by the enthusiasm of the 
Samoans wanting to receive Christianity. He found that many of the Samoans 
had received inferior teachings from beachcombers and European settlers, 
such as William Gray, as well as a Tahitian named Hura who had found his way 
to Tutuila and Manu'a.27 In Leone, Williams was amazed with the Christian 
knowledge shared among the people regarding the teachings of the bible. But, 
most of all, they had their own chapel to worship in. Williams was informed that 
a young man named Amoamo travelled to Sapapali'i every fortnight. He was 
given instructions on the bible, and then returned to Leone to teach his 
people.28 
Williams then called at Manono to fulfil a promise. He left the Cook Island 
teacher Teava and his wife in the care of Matetau.29 Williams arrived at 
Sapapali'i to find the teachers well and working diligently. Williams was happy 
with the progress that had been made, although he was disappointed at the rate 
of progress. But, Williams was more disappointed with Vaiinupo's failure to 
distribute the teachers to other districts as he had intended. Williams learnt that 
some teachers had taken it upon themselves to leave Sapapali'i so that they 
could share the Gospel with nearby villages. Williams' disappointment led to the 
redistribution of the teachers to other districts, with the majority still remaining in 
Vaiinupo's care.30 It was an awakening for Williams to quickly provide Samoa 
with LMS European missionaries, not only to give proper supervision but also to 
take the teaching and preaching another step further. The island teachers had 
done the levelling work with the limited knowledge they possessed and there 
was a need to develop the mission physically and spiritually. 
"'Williams, 92-93; see also Gilson, 81. 
27 Williams, 107. 
,. Williams. 108-109. 
29 Aaron Buzacott, Mission Life in the Islands of the Pacific, London: Snow. 1866, 136-138; William Wyatt 
Gill, Life in the Southam Islands or Scenes and Incidents in the South Pacific end New Guinea, London: 
London Missionary Society, 1876; 125 -127; Murray, 19 -20, 64-65, 11 O - 111; Williams, 110. 
30 Williams, 115-116. 
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Williams' disappointment with Vaiinupo's actions highlighted just how 
very little Williams knew of Samoan protocol. Williams may have entertained the 
idea that Vaiinupo's tafa'ifa rank made him king over Samoa, a status 
equivalent to that of Pomare of Tahiti, Makea of Rarotonga, and Taufa'ahau of 
Tonga. 31 To Williams, Vaiinupo had failed to distribute the teachers to 
demonstrate that he had absolute authority to do as he pleased. This, in reality 
was the case but for quite different reasons. Vaiinupo only wanted to protect his 
elite status and to maintain peoples' respect for his authority, not only as tafa'ifa 
but through wealth, contact with religious teachers and foreigners. Vaiinupo 
knew very well that in using Williams and the LMS to his advantage, he could 
maintain his authority and status over and above his peers. Matetau knew this 
very well when he had asked Williams for his own personal teacher. 
The official arrival of the WMMS in Samoa was due mainly to this 
obsession to maintain status and chiefly authority. The chief Lilomaiava and 
Tuinaula of Satupa'itea knew Vaiinupo's status was enhanced by the presence 
of the Tahitian and Cook Island teachers. They also knew Vaiinupo was 
guaranteed material possessions every time the va'a lotu visited. Consequently, 
they asked Vaiinupo to share his teachers, but Vaiinupo refused. Lilomaiava 
and Tuinaula turned to Tonga for teachers, and as a result the WMMS 
dispatched Tongan teachers and the Reverend Peter Turner.32 
Turner landed on the island o Manono in 1835, where he was welcomed 
by several Manono chiefs, especially Matetau. Turner, and especially the 
Tongan teachers, were easily accepted. Tonga and Manono had very close 
links through trade and intermarriage. The Tongans would have presented 
Matetau with some gifts from Tupou Taufa'ahau, the powerful chief of Tonga at 
the time, as Matetau's daughter, Salote, was one of Taufa'ahau's wives. 33 The 
Manono matai who owed allegiance to Vaiinupo tried to persuade Turner to stay 
with Vaiinupo without success. After leaving Tongan teachers at Manono, 
Turner sailed on to Satupa'itea and to Lilomaiava's residence where he was 
31 Gunson (1978), 289; see also Native Situation, Sept, 1921, IT 88/5. 
32 Dyson, 4. Note: The competition for wealth and status based on foreign teachers and white missionaries 
became a common occurrence in the nineteenth century. See Mulipola to the Directors of LMS, n.d., SSL; 
Finau (Falealili) to the Directors of the LMS, 10 Jan, 1886, SSL. 
33 John Williams Journal, 5 Nov, 1932, London Missionary Society, South Seas Archives, South Seas 
Journals (henceforth SSJ); Garrett (1974), 65-80. 
once again welcomed. Turner was given land to set up a mission station and 
immediately found success with many Samoans drawn to his teachings.34 
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It is unknown just how much Turner's presence had affected Vaiinupo 
politically, especially when Turner was attached to one of Vaiinupo's rivals. It 
may have offended Vaiinupo but there was nothing he could do about it. But. it 
was clear Vaiinupo was eager to have his own papalagi missionaries. The 
presence in Samoa of the Reverends Aaron Buzzacott and Charles Barff in 
1834, and the Reverend George Platt in 1835, to prepare the Samoan mission 
field for the arrival of LMS missionaries, informed Vaiinupo of Williams' plans to 
provide European missionaries for Samoa.35 Vaiinupo was also aware that not 
one but five European missionaries were earmarked for Samoa. He was, 
therefore, not unperturbed by Turner's affiliation with a rival matai. Vaiinupo's 
fore knowledge of the new missionaries was clearly shown when he was 
present at Sagaga, Mulinu'u Peninsula, when Williams arrived with the first 
quota of European missionaries.36 
Vaiinupo's status would have sky-rocketed with the arrival of five 
missionaries, compared to his rival's one missionary, but Vaiinupo's expectation 
of having all five missionaries reside at Sapapali'i was quickly quashed. 
Williams decided to divide the missionaries, as well as the teachers, among the 
leading districts of Upolu, Savai'i, and Tutuila.37 The move proved significant for 
Williams as the LMS immediately attracted many Samoans into the Christian 
faith. It was also positive in the sense that it attracted other notable chiefs into 
the LMS fold, although Vaiinupo's authority and status was still intact. 
The existence of the so-called 'party spirit'38 began soon after as the LMS 
missionaries began to settle in their various districts. Turner and later Mathew 
Wilson (who arrived a few years later), were at first, not an issue with the 
Samoans, as the Samoans did not distinguish between the WMMS and the 
LMS. The Samoans had been led to the understanding that Williams, Barff, 
34 Woods, 259; see also 111omas Heath to Turner, 11 Jan, 1837, SSL; Heath to Turner, 2 Sept, 1836, SSL; 
Heath to Ellis, 1 Dec, 1836, SSL 
35 Moyle, 67 - 71; Gunson (1978), 344-351. 
36 Murray, 100-102; Journals of Charles Barff, 6 Apr-4 Sept, 1836, SSJ; Hardie to Tidman, 9 Feb, 
1842; SSL. 
37 Reverend A. W. Murray and Reverend George Bamden were stationed at Tutui!a, Reverend 111omas 
Heath was stationed at Manono, Reverend William Mills was stationed at Apia, Reverend Charles Hardy 
was stationed at Sapapali'i. Reverend Alexander MacDonald arrived in 1837 and was stationed at Safune. 
John Williams decided to reside at Fasito'otai {A'ana) from 1838 with his family and use It as a base for the 
expansion of Christianity to other islands west of Samoa. See Faletoese, 17; Gunson (1978). 344- 351. 
38 William Mills to Ellis, Apr, 6, 1837, SSL; Buzacott to Ellis, Visitation Report' Jan, 4, 1837, SSL 
12 
Turner, and the Tahitian and Aitutakian teachers were all from the same lotu. 
But, as mission enterprises began to widen from village to village and district to 
district, Samoans quickly realised that the lotu Turner represented was not the 
same lotu Williams had brought to Samoa under the LMS banner.39 
The differences in the missions, at first. seemed minute for the Samoans 
but they were a cause of contention for the LMS and WMMS. The Samoans 
learnt about the differences as they were slowly drawn into the conflict, and it 
did not take long for the Samoans to attain a taste for it, as each side supported 
their own mission's attitude. The verbal abuse turned to hatred, and was soon 
translated into physical abuse, which ultimately led to physical confrontation that 
resulted in injury to people and destruction of property.40 
The LMS missionaries in Samoa made a strong plea to London, pointing 
out the comity agreement made between Williams, Cross and Nathaniel Turner, 
in Tonga in 1830.41 The LMS Directors presented their case to the WMMS 
mission board, and they agreed for the sake of harmony to reprimand the 
actions of its missionaries. Turner and his Tongan teachers were ordered to 
vacate Samoa. The news was a bitter blow to Turner's ego and to the WMMS 
pride.42 The WMMS in the Pacific protested against the decision with emotional 
commitment. Turner eventually left Samoa in 1839, but the Tongan teachers 
refused to abide by the WMMS decision and remained in Samoa to continue the 
WMMS tradition. The Tongan teachers not only proved to be a thorn in the side 
of the LMS efforts, but a catalyst in the continuation of the 'party spirit. '43 
The removal of Peter Turner, despite the insistence of the Tongan 
teachers for him to stay, was a morale boost for the LMS as it looked forward to 
controlling the spiritual welfare of the Samoans. Then in the same year, with the 
LMS mission at the brink of turning Samoa into its greatest mission 
39 LMS Missionaries to Turner, Buzacott (Cooks 1836 - 1837 May 30 - Mar 10) Rarotonga to Navigator 
Islands, London Missionary Society, South Seas Archives, South Seas Journal (henceforth SSJ). 
40 Heath to the LMS, Jun, 11, 1837, SSJ; Heath to Turner, Sept, 2, 1836, SSL; Platt to the Committee in 
London, Jul, 27, 1836, SSL; Heath to Ellis, Oct, 21, 1839, SSL. 
41 The LMS claimed prior agreement with the WMMS in Tonga - Samoa to the LMS, and Fiji to the WMMS. 
See A. Buzacott (Cooks 1836-1837, May30- Mar 10), Rarotonga to Navigators Islands, 1837, SSJ; 
George Platt to Rev. Thomas (Vavau), 7 Jan, 1836, SSL; Heath to Turner, 12 Jan, 1836, SSL; Peter 
Turner to the LMS Missionaries, 24 Jun, 1836, SSJ; Peter Turner to Barff and Others, 24 Jan, 1836, SSL; 
Wilfiarns, 79. 
"" Decision of the Committee of the Wesleyan Missionary Society, Regarding P. Turner and the Conflict in 
the Navigator Islands, Dec, 6, 1837, SSL. 
43 MacDonald to Ellis, Nov, 28, 1840, SSL; Pratt to Tidrnan, Sept, 9, 1841, SSL; Hardie to !he Secretary of 
the LMS, Sept, 9, 1841, SSL; Pratt to Tidman, Dec, 1, 1842, SSL; Hardie to Tidman, Sept, 13, 1843, SSL; 
Powell to Tidman, Oct, 9, 1846, SSL; Pratt to Tidman, Aug, 7, 1858, SSL; See also Martin Dyson, 0 Lau 
Ta/a a le Lotu Metotisi Samoa; John Blacket, Missionary Triumphs, London: Charles H. Kelley, 1914, 153. 
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achievement, news of Williams' death at Eromanga, Southern Vanuatu, 
reached Samoa. Williams' death was a heart-rending reminder of the dangers 
involved with each new mission enterprise,44 and those who knew him were 
greatly saddened by his death, including Vaiinupo who wept when he heard the 
news.45 But, the death of Williams was more than just a martyr's death for the 
LMS. On one hand, Williams' death rekindled the spirit of mission as the 
Samoans called for a return to Southern Vanuatu. On the other hand, Williams' 
death also marked the beginning of LMS missionary and Samoan leader 
dialogues that would challenge the LMS mission throughout the ensuing years. 
The decision to continue the mission to Southern Vanuatu was at the 
insistence of the Samoans, including Vaiinupo, which the LMS missionaries 
reluctantly agreed to support. The LMS missionaries were forced to agree; in 
order to paint a glorious picture of courage, co-operation, and love for Christ at 
all cost, which had been the message preached when the Samoans 
accompanied Williams to his death in 1839.46 The frailty of the LMS 
missionaries was exposed as they quarrelled among themselves as to who 
would lead the mission to Southern Vanuatu. The Samoans were ready with the 
manpower and willing to proceed immediately. Eventually, the LMS 
missionaries appointed Thomas Heath despite his protest at being forced to 
go.47 The Samoans had forced the hands of the LMS missionaries and found a 
weakness in their personal relationships, which the Samoan church leaders 
would exploit often in future confrontations. The mission to Southern Vanuatu 
eventually got under way and it gave the LMS missionaries some credibility in 
the eyes of the Samoans. 
Disaster again struck the progress of the LMS mission with the death of 
Vaiinupo in 1841.48 Vaiinupo's death, like Williams, had a huge impact on the 
44 Williams' arrogance and his unwillingness to listen to advice may have contributed to his death. See 
discussion in Featuna'i Uuaana, "Errand of Mercy," in The Covenant Makers, ed. D. Munro & A. Thomley, 
Suva: Pacific Theological College/University of the South Pacific, 1996, 41-79. 
45 Ebenezer Prout, Memoirs of the Life of the Rev. John Williams, Missionary to Polynesia, London: J. 
Snow, 1843, 587; A. W. Murray, Pagopago Journal, 1840, SSJ; George A. Lundie, Missionary Life in 
Samoa, Edinburgh: W. Oliphant & Sons, 1846, 79; Murray, 145, 
"'"Williams Last Journal, 1839," SSJ, NLA; see also Ebenezer Prout, Memoirs of the Life of the Rev. John 
Williams, Missionary to Polynesia, London: Snow, 1843; 578 - 582; A. W. Murray, Missions in Wes/em 
Polynesia, Being Historical Sketches of These Missions From Their Commencement in 1839 lo the 
Present Time, London: James Nisbet, 1863; 195 -208; A. W. Murray, Martyrs of Polynesia, Memorials of 
Missionaries, Native Evangelists and Native Converts ... 1799 - 1871, London: London Missionary Society, 
1885, 89; George Turner, Nineteen Years m Polynesia: Missionary Life, Travels and Researches in the 
Islands of the Pacific, London: Snow, 1861, 383 -385, 486-487; 
47 Mills to Ellis, 3 Apr, 1840, SSL; Hardie to Ellis, 3 Apr, 1840, SSL. 
40 Hardie to 1idman, 9 Feb, 1842, SSL. 
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future of the mission. Vaiinupo was still the most powerful protector of the LMS 
mission, but it was his mavaega (farewell or departing will) that was crucial for 
the future of the LMS mission, especially over his successor to the tafa'ifa. The 
LMS, Vaiinupo's family and matai from the districts who owned the titles 
pertaining to the tafa'ifa, gathered in anticipation for the next tafa'ifa, but 
Vaiinupo failed to satisfy the curiosity and the expectation of his family and 
peers. He requested that the tafa'ifa be made redundant after his death. He 
then began to distribute the titles of the tafa'ifa back to their respective districts. 
The Tuia'ana title went to To'oa Sualauvi, the Tuiatua title went to Mata'afa 
Fagamanu, and the Malietoa, Gato'aitele, and Tamasoali'i titles, went to his 
brother Taimalelagi.49 Vaiinupo's distribution of the titles had intended to honour 
all the tama-a-aiga (sons of the families). For instance, the Tuia'ana title 
returned to the A'ana district, which was also the stronghold of the 
Tuimaleali'ifano family. The Tuiatua title returned to the Atua district, which was 
the stronghold of the Tupua family, while the Tamasoali'i and Gato'aitele titles 
returned to Tuamasaga, which was the stronghold of the Malietoa family. 50 
The LMS welcomed the wisdom of Vaiinupo's mavaega as all the 
recipients were LMS adherents,51 and hoped they would encourage growth for 
the LMS throughout the districts. Most importantly, so it seemed to the LMS, the 
political decision-making process was no longer the prerogative of a single 
matai, which in the past had tended to hinder mission progress. It gave 
confidence to the LMS to distribute its missionaries and teachers without 
constraint and interference as experienced with Vaiinupo. 
A year after Vaiinupo's death, those whom the LMS expected to 
strengthen its position, surfaced to challenge it. In 1842, Malietoa Taimalelagi 
isolated himself from the LMS after the death of his son Taupapau. Taupapau, a 
member of the church at Sapapali'i, had died while living with a new wife, which 
the LMS had condemned. Taimalelagi asked the LMS missionaries to absolve 
the sins of his son but the request was refused. Taimalelagi lost control of his 
senses, and in the presence of the LMS missionaries performed sexual 
intercourse with his son's new wife. Taimalelagi and his family then left 
••Gilson, 117-119; Meleisea (Modern Samoa), 28-29. 
50 Westem Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2/15. 
51 Mata'afa Fagamanu later became a Roman Catholic. Gilson, 117-118. 
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Sapapali'i to reside on the island of Manono.52 Taimalelagi's rejection of the 
LMS was further exposed when he placed himself under the spiritual guidance 
of Penisimani Latuselu, a WMMS Tongan teacher. For Latuselu, the fall-out 
between the LMS and Taimalelagi provided an opportunity to further WMMS 
efforts in Samoa, especially with the strength of Taimalelagi and Manono's 
status as the ma/o.53 
The LMS continued its work at Sapapali'i with the comforting thought that 
the rest of the Malietoa family still supported the mission. The fall-out with 
Taimalelagi had boosted WMMS activities and revived WMMS sympathy 
among Samoans. It also rekindled the evangelical spirit of the Tongan teachers 
to continue their mission activities in Samoa. Taufa'ahau, the paramount and 
ruling chief of Tonga at the time, also fully supported the presence of the 
Tongan teachers in Samoa despite the call by the WMMS mission to vacate 
Samoa. Taufa'ahau not only encouraged the Tongan teachers to remain in 
Samoa but campaigned vigorously for the WMMS mission in Australia to allow 
missionaries to return to Samoa. The Tongan teachers remained obstinate as 
they continued to strengthen WMMS efforts in Samoa.54 
The LMS's vision of uniting the Samoans under its banner was further 
shattered with the arrival of the Lotu Pope (the Pope's church or Roman 
Catholic Church) in 1845.55 The Catholics, like the LMS and WMMS, relied on 
Samoan family connections for a favourable reception among the Samoans. 
The Catholics had left Wallis and Futuna with three missionaries, Fathers 
Gilbert Roudaire, Theodore Violette, and Brother Jacques Peloux, and two 
Samoan catechists, Kosetatino (Constantine) and loakima (Joachim), and their 
wives, as interpreters and guides.56 They anchored off Matautu, Savai'i, but 
52 
"Hardie to the Foreign Secretary to the LMS, Sept, 26, 1843," SSL, NIA; Samoan Reporter, Mar, 1849. 
53 T. Folasa, Amataga ma le Fa'avaega o le Ekalesia Metotisi Samoa, 1827-1968, Apia: Ekalesia Metotisi, 
1970, 20; Gilson, 118-125. 
"' Heath to the Directors of the LMS, May 30, 1841, SSL; see also Wood, 284; Gilson, 125-126. 
55 The Roman Catholic Mission in Samoa was carried out by the Society of Mary, commonly known as the 
Marists. Both Maris! Fathers and Maris! Brothers represented it. See Kenneth S. Latourette, Christianity in 
a Revolutionary Age (vol. 1), 1gfi' Century Europe, New York: Paternoster, 1958, 338; Ralph Wiltgen, The 
Founding of the Roman Catholic Church in Oceania 1825 to 1850, Canberra: Australian National 
University, 1981, 121-129; Gunson (1978), 219; Pat Gallagher, The Marist Brothers in New Zealand, Fiji 
and Samoa, 1876 - 19 76, Christchurch: New Zealand Maris! Brothers Trust Board, 1976. Recently a book 
was written to commemorate 150 years of Roman Catholicism in Samoa. Much of the history is told from 
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could not land there due to strong LMS opposition. They decided to try 
Lealatele, another village near Matautu, and were duly accepted and welcomed 
by Tuala Taetafe, who was related to loakima. Tuala, at the time, was not 
attached to either Protestant mission, although he had adopted some of the 
beliefs of the Siovili cult. Tuala's acceptance of the Catholics led to a barrage of 
derogatory remarks and abuse from the LMS supporters. The LMS gave him 
the title Talipope (receiver of the Pope) as a mocking gesture, but Tuala was 
unperturbed and gladly witnessed the first Lotu Pope mass being conducted on 
Samoan soil at his village.57 
The Catholic missionaries then set sail for Upolu via Salelavalu, where 
they were welcomed by Su'a, a chief of Kosetatino's family. They were treated 
well and did not receive the same abuse accorded them at Lealatele. Salelavalu 
and Salelologa villages, at the time had ex-WMMS adherents but there was no 
strong LMS presence. They sailed to Upolu and anchored off Faleata, where 
Faumuina favoured their presence, and invited them to his house at Lepea. 
However, strong opposition once again from LMS supporters, and Faumuina 
being vetod by his fellow LMS chiefs, forced the Catholics to move on. The 
Catholics then sailed for the Mulinu'u Peninsula where strong LMS opposition 
also threatened to prematurely end their efforts to establish a strong foothold in 
Samoa.58 
Mata'afa Tuiatua Fagamanu, an ex-WMMS adherent turned LMS 
supporter, was present at the Peninsula when the Catholic missionaries tried to 
land. He intervened on their behalf and granted the missionaries permission to 
land. It turned out that the missionaries had a letter for Fagamanu from Lavelua, 
the chief of Wallis.59 Lavelua exhorted Fagamanu to protect the Catholic 
missionaries and provide them land to begin a mission in Samoa. Fagamanu 
honoured Lavelua's request and gave the Catholics permission to stay on a 
piece of land on the Peninsula. The Catholics officially set up their mission base 
on land bought near Apia, and began to pursue their ambition of converting 
Samoans to Catholicism. Roudaire and Peloux remained in Apia while Violette 
57 Monfat, 223 - 259; see also Prattto Tidman and Freeman, 13 Sept, 1845 SSL; Pratt to Tidman, 8 Jan, 
1850, SSL; W. Laws to Tidman, 18 Aug, 1852, SSL; Samoan Reporter, Sept, 1845. 
58 Pratt to Tidman and Freeman, 13 Sept, 1845 SSL; see also Monfat, 223 -259; Samoan Reporter, Sept, 
1845. 
59 It seems in the previous year, Mata'afa Fagamanu had been blown to Wallis and Futuna by strong winds 
while on his way to Tutuila. Lavelua hosted Fagamanu and later provided a boat for Fagamanu and his 
people to return to Samoa. See Gilson, 169-170; Heslin, 25. 
was sent back to Lealatele to look after Tuala and his people, despite LMS 
hostility.60 
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The LMS was unable to focus on its objectives due to the new 
competition.61 The LMS was confident it could handle the reluctant Tongan 
teachers, but the uncooperative Marist priests stretched LMS irritability to the 
limit. The LMS fear of Catholicism was highlighted in its efforts to warn the 
Samoan people of the danger it represented. Tracts containing various attacks 
and condemnations of the Papacy were produced. Many observers at the time 
felt the criticism of the Catholics breached the canons of good taste. For 
instance, the American explorer Lieutenant Charles Wilkes condemned a tract 
entitled 0 le Ta/a i Lotu Eseese (The Story of Different Religions). He observed 
that its sole object "was to prepossess the minds of the natives against the 
missionaries of the Papal Church, in case they should visit these islands."62 The 
Reverend John B. Stair, the missionary in charge of the LMS printing press, 
defended the tract as nothing more than advice to the Samoans to counter 
teachings that were detrimental to their religious welfare.63 
Stair himself wrote and published Footsteps of Papery, which was a cruel 
attack on the Catholics. Stairs' own colleagues questioned its validity and good 
taste, and they eventually rejected it.64 The Reverend George Pratt also 
published the anti-papist booklet Hindrance to the Work in Samoa, while the 
LMS's Malua Seminary prepared a booklet for lectures entitled The Manual of 
Popery.65 The Catholic mission was condemned as the "enemies of light and 
truth," "Jesuits," "wolves in sheep's clothing," and "poison."66 The propaganda 
indoctrinated many of the LMS adherents, especially the chiefs, who in turn 
60 Heslin. 24 ..: 26. 
61 
"Slatyerto Tidman and Freeman, May 28, 1845," SSL; "Drummond to Freeman and Tidman, Sept, 19, 
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62 Wilkes quoted by N. A. Rowe, Samoa Under the Sailing Gods, London: Putman, 1930, 59. See also 
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63 Louis Wright and Mary Fry, Puritans in the South Seas, New York: Henry Holt, 1936, 222; Gilson, 151 -
157. 
64 
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65 
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66 Stair to Freeman, Apr, 14, 1843, SSL; Pratt to Tidman, Sept, 13, 1845, SSL; Bullen to Tidman and 
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forbade many of their family and village members to join, or even accommodate 
any Catholic missionaries.67 
The Catholic missionaries were not passive. They also embarked on a 
campaign to discredit Protestant efforts, although not on the same scale as the 
LMS. The Catholics issued pamphlets, such as True Principles of a Catholic, to 
point out the falsity of the LMS and all Protestant teachings.68 The Catholic 
missionaries taught their adherents that the Protestant faith was false and that 
Catholicism was the only true religion. The competition for members was an 
underlying factor for most of the animosity between the missions - unfortunately 
it led to inter-denominational violence.69 
When the WMMS returned to Samoa in 1857, it appeared that it would 
only create further animosity between the two Protestant missions. The 
Reverend P. G. Bird expressed the anger of the LMS missionaries in Samoa 
when he wrote that it was "the opinion of all the Brethren that one Wesleyan 
only is a greater obstacle to our work than ten priests."70 The Reverend James 
Mathieson, a WMMS missionary, replied to the LMS that "outside the pale of 
Wesleyan ism there is no salvation. "71 But, under the able leadership of the 
Reverends George Brown and Martin Dyson, the Methodists regained lost 
ground very quickly, and bridged the gap of friendship with the LMS.72 The two 
Protestant missions worked closely against the Lotu Pope, with the LMS finally 
realising that the WMMS was in Samoa to stay, and would be a useful partner 
in mission.73 Brown, for example, realised the importance of working together 
when he remarked to the Reverend Archibald W. Murray, "I feel deeply that we 
are suffering now for the acts of others who years ago made a fatal mistake."74 
67 Stair, Minutes of the Meeting held at Apia. Feb, 3, 1841, SSL. See also Gunson, (1978), 179. 
68 Pratt to Tidman and Freeman, Jan, 24, 1846, SSL; Pratt to the Foreign Secretary of the LMS, Jun, 18, 
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forty-five years earlier when Roman Catholic followers burnt the LMS mission house in Falealupo. See 
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70 Bird to Tidman, 17 May 1862, SSL; see also Wood, 283-284; Garrett (1974), 65-80. 
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The unstable relationship between the missions became entwined in the 
renewed political unrest in the latter half of the nineteenth century.75 The 
unstable political climate began in 1847 with a resurgence of district warfare 
between old rivals Manono and A'ana.76 Manono had watched the fortunes of 
A'ana improve under the guidance of Christianity. Williams chose Fasito'otai to 
build a mission house, which later became the permanent residence for LMS 
missionaries. A'ana also became the site for the first printing press in Samoa 
under the management of Stair. A'ana's new lease of life re-established 
alliances with various other districts and villages in Upolu and Savai'i, especially 
the districts under mission influence. 
Manono probably construed A'ana's sudden elevation of status as a 
challenge to its own strength and superiority. Manono was still dominant and 
very powerful and with Taimalelagi still influential, the combination was still 
lethal for A'ana and, to some extent, for the progress of the LMS mission. A'ana 
never had the manpower and the resources to engage Manono in war. A'ana 
still harboured some fear of their old enemy, and this fear was further enhanced 
with rumours of Manono making preparation to attack its old foe. The rumours 
made A'ana uneasy and suspicious of Manono, and that suspicion soon led to a 
misunderstanding. 
It began when Manono warriors visited Tuamasaga and A'ana placed 
men along the shoreline to monitor Manono's activities. Manono warriors 
passed on without incident, but were later informed of A'ana's actions. Manono 
took A'ana's action as an act of aggression, and prepared to punish its old rival. 
Manono's aggression fulfilled the yearning to reassert political dominance, over 
the growing influence of other districts, such as A'ana, threatening their status 
as the ma/o. A'ana, realising the daunting task ahead, took refuge in other 
districts, such as Tuamasaga and Atua, who were prepared to offer support.77 
The Manono -A'ana conflict also led to closer relations between the 
warring parties and several European settlers and beachcombers. Manono and 
A'ana took advantage of the Europeans' boat building skills, weaponry skills, 
75 The correspondence in the latter half of the nineteenth century highlighted the conflict between the 
missions in the 1850s. For example see Broyer Correspondence, 1897, Pamphlet 'Silasila Samoa Uma o e 
Atamai,' 20 Jun, 1898, Maris! Archives of Samoa and Tokelau (henceforth MAST); Newell to Thompson, 
Oct, 10, 1887, SSL; Huckettto Cousins, Feb, 20, 1899, SSL. 
76 J.C. Williams to Mrs Williams, 15 Jun, 1848, SSL; Samoan Reporter, Mar, 1849, Nov, 1849, Jul, 1850, 
Jan, 1854, and Jan, 1857. 
77 Samoan Reporter, Sept, 1847. 
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fort building skills, and expertise in general warfare, to strengthen their 
positions.78 The style of Samoan warfare also changed as Samoan primitive 
weapons were replaced with European guns, bush-knives, gun-ships, and 
dynamite, making close combat fighting a thing of the past. A'ana built forts at 
Lufilufi (Atua) and Siumu (Tuamasaga), while Manono built a fort and blockade 
at Mulinu'u. The availability of such powerful weapons contributed to the 
increased number of Samoans being killed over the next 100 years.79 
The missions worked together and eventually negotiated a truce between 
the warring factions. The truce left the two sides at a stalemate for neither side 
had won. Manono's claim as the ma/o had been diminished, while A'ana was no 
longer labelled vaivai (conquered side). The truce failed to achieve final peace, 
and A'ana remained in exile as small skinnishes continued to occur between 
the two factions. However, in 1858, Taimalelagi died and Manono lost most of 
its authority and prestige. Taimalelagi had mesmerised Manono matai into civil 
war to satisfy his own ego and, to a large extent, discharge his anti-LMS views. 
A'ana people took the opportunity to return to their own district, but most 
importantly, Vaiinupo's son, Meli, took over the title Malietoa, and peace was 
eventually restored to the satisfaction of Europeans and Samoans. The LMS 
also found Meli a blessing for the mission, as he strongly voiced his support for 
the LMS. But, good fortune never seemed to last for the LMS, as Moli died 
suddenly in 1860.80 
The peace that Moli had established placed Samoa in the limelight of 
multi-national interests. The port of Apia attracted trade and commerce, such as 
the giant Gennan finn of Godeffroy and Sohn, and wild unruly characters, who 
later contributed to the obnoxious reputation Samoa acquired.81 Samoa was 
hailed from being "God's best, at least God's sweetest work" to being dubbed 
as the "hell hole of the Pacific."82 On the political front, the three powers, 
78 Gunson, (1970), 9. 
79 Thomas Trood, Island Reminiscences, Sydney: Mccarron and Stewart, 1910, 34 - 61. 
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America, Britain, and Germany began to dominate Samoan politics and the 
Samoan way of life. The call for a centralised government intensified to address 
European interests, and a government under the guidance of the three powers 
was perceived as the only alternative to satisfying European frustration.83 
Meanwhile, the death of Moli provoked family rivalry over the Malietoa 
title. Eventually, the title was given to the two claimants, Malietoa Talavou and 
Malietoa Laupepa. Laupepa was younger than Talavou and more favoured by 
the Europeans and the LMS mission, while Talavou had been an ally of 
Taimalelagi and was affiliated with the WMMS. Laupepa had attended the 
newly established Malua Seminary and was considered a faithful Christian and 
an asset for the LMS. The Malietoa title dispute, however, prompted 
Tuamasaga to bestow the Gatoa'itele and Tamasoali'i titles on Tuia'ana To'oa 
Sualauvi, a nephew ofVaiinupo, with the condition that they would be returned 
to the Malietoa family in the future.84 Consequently, Sualauvi held three of the 
tafa'ifa titles, which gave him much respect and authority. However, Talavou 
and Laupepa were the acknowledged political kingpins, as Sualauvi was not 
politically active, while Fagamanu remained in Atua and had little contact with 
the political conflicts in Apia. 
Laupepa instigated a new government at Matautu, near Apia, and called 
it the faitasiga (confederation), where a representative from each district formed 
the core of the government. Talavou's supporters retaliated by setting up a rival 
government, called the faitasiga (Union), at Mulinu'u, near Apia. The British 
consul, John C. Williams supported Laupepa's claim on the grounds that many 
Europeans supported him. He also felt Laupepa had more support from his own 
people in Tuamasaga, and from other villages in Upolu and Savai'i.85 
The conflict between Talavou and Laupepa resulted in the 1869 faitasiga 
war. Lau pep a was badly defeated but managed to escape under the guidance 
of Lauaki Namulau'ulu Mamoe.86 During the conflict, the Unionists damaged the 
British Consulate and tore down the Union Jack. Talavou immediately offered 
"'Stallworthy to Tidman, 5 Aug, 1857, SSL; Tmaty of Friendship Between Germany and Samoa, 1871-
1881, 37; Trood, 38, 79; Paul Kennedy, The Samoa Tangle: A Study in Anglo-German-American 
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""Dr. G. Turner Report, 9 Oct, 1869, SSR; Turner to Mullens, 24 May 1869, SSL; Trood, 60. 
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Australian National University, 1970. 
an ifoga (act of apology)87 for his warriors' waywardness, but was rejected by 
the British Consul. Talavou took exception to the Consul's action, and viewed 
him as ally of Laupepa and part of the vaivai side. 
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Talavou took control of Apia and sold off land belonging to Laupepa and 
his supporters; much to the delight of the Europeans. 88 Perhaps, most 
significantly, the war disclosed the nominal Christian character of the Samoans. 
The first shots were fired "on the night of Good Friday, 1869, and for three days 
and nights afterwards the battle raged around town."89 Easter was just another 
day as Samoans exposed their lack of spirituality and Christian maturity, and it 
was a concern for the missions. 
The British and Americans initiated further calls for a stable government 
to protect European interests, but not all Europeans agreed with their 
sentiments. Apia's European population by 1870 had increased dramatically 
with the arrival of other nationalities such as Swedes and Germans, which 
meant the British and Americans were no longer dominant. Germany had other 
ideas, and refused to support British and American efforts to meddle in Samoan 
politics. The German attitude pointed to a messy European political struggle in 
the future that would eventually trap the Samoans at its core. 
As nationalities argued over the right to meddle in Samoan politics, 
another violent clash between Laupepa and Talavou resulted in a nauseating 
aftermath. Trood (later became British Consul) described "bodies half buried left 
to be torn to pieces by the dogs, arms and limbs partly covered with soil, partly 
stretched out above it, the conquerors making brutal jokes at the spectacle."90 
Many European properties were damaged and the Germans fined the Samoans 
for "depredation committed on German property."91 The Samoan leaders, 
Taliaoa, Tupa'i and Alipia, protested and demanded a meeting with Theodore 
Weber, the acting German Consul. Weber threatened the Samoans with 
B
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warships if they refused to pay for German property damages. Weber forced the 
Samoans to sign papers to that effect by placing their hands on his, as he 
signed on their behalf.92 
In 1873, after constant European pressure, the conflict between Talavou 
and Laupepa finally ceased and the formation of a new government was 
implemented.93 The peace created gave the Europeans and Samoans time to 
return their lives to more productive enterprises. It was also a blessing for the 
missions, especially the LMS, who had lost many adherents in the conflict. It 
ensured the continuation of mission work without hindrance, for awhile at least, 
with the hope of encouraging back young Samoans to the Gospel.94 
Europeans influenced the newly formed government and it had no place 
for either Talavou or Laupepa. A council of Ta'imua (literally one who leads) and 
a council of Faipule (literally one who rules), were established to work together 
to address Samoan and European issues, but the new arrangement quickly 
became unsatisfactory for many Europeans, especially over the Samoan 
government's stance on land ownership. The Ta'imua and Faipule ruled that all 
lands obtained by Europeans during the Talavou - Laupepa conflict were illegal. 
It also found that all land sold by the Unionists without the authority of their 
rightful owners, was illegal and must be returned. It was a massive blow to 
European land interests, as most of the lands owned by Europeans were 
obtained in 1873 during the faitasiga war. The Europeans felt cheated by the 
government's action. Nevertheless, the lands in questions were returned with 
qitterness and regret. 95 Peace remained intact but European greed and 
dissatisfaction threatened to destroy it. 
Soon after the set up of the new government, an American named Albert 
B. Steinberger arrived in Samoa with gifts and a letter from the President of the 
United States. The Samoan government received with joy the gifts, but was 
more impressed with the American warship, the Tuscarora, that carried 
92 Ta'imua and Faipule to Genman Consul, 16Apr, 1874, A. Poppe. Genman Consul. Correspondence, 
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93 King to Mullens, Aug, 4, 1869, SSL; Pratt to Mullens, May 11, 1871, SSL; Whitmee to Mullens, Jan, 5, 
1872, SSL; Nisbet to Mullens, Oct, 30, 1873, SSL. 
94 H. Nisbet, Report of the Samoan Mission Seminary and District, Oct, 17, 1871, London Missionary 
Society, South Seas Archives, South Sea Report (henceforth SSR); 28"' Annual Report of the Samoan 
Mission Seminary, Oct, 21, 1872, SSR; S. J. Davies to Mullens, Oct, 29, 1872, SSR. 
95 See Stewart Firth, "German Firms in the Western Pacific Islands, 1857-1914," Journal of Pacific History 
8 (1973), 10-28; Meleisea (Modern Samoa), 34-36. 
24 
Steinberger to Samoa. After meeting Steinberger, the Samoan government was 
left with the impression that an American protectorate was forthcoming. For the 
Samoan government, such a relationship would not only reduce European 
criticism, but assist in stabilising Samoan authority and self-government. 
Several Europeans felt such a protectorate would probably favour them in their 
struggle with the land issue.96 
Samoans' expectations of a protectorate received a boost when 
Steinberger drafted a constitution, and began to restructure the existing 
government. The Ta'imua and Faipule councils were retained, with the addition 
of a tupu (king) and sui-tupu (vice-king).97 The kingship idea was foreign to the 
Samoans, and even ifthe Samoans had knowledge of European monarchies, 
the Samoans had no equivalent concept. The nearest Samoan concept of a 
monarchical system was the tafa'ifa model and the Samoans probably accepted 
Steinberger's kingship proposal with this understanding. The struggle for 
absolute control and power under the kingship concept contributed to the revival 
of Samoan protocol, such as the tafa'ifa, in the ensuing years. 
The Malietoa family supported Steinberger's new government structure, 
especially with Laupepa as king, except for his choice of sui-tupu, Tupua 
Pulepule.98 Steinberger probably wanted to strengthen the new government, 
and get rid of the divisive forces that had worked against previous attempts to 
form a stable government. At the same time, it was a timely suggestion to the 
Malietoa family that they were no longer the only family capable of ruling the 
malo. Furthermore, it impressed on the Samoan people the need to work 
together, live together, and to govern together in peace and harmony. However, 
the Malietoa family, and many supporters who preferred traditional politics, saw 
the inclusion of the Tupua family in Steinberger's proposals as a recipe for 
war.99 
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Steinberger, from the start, had the support of all the consuls, mission 
societies, and various sectors of the European community. The three mission 
societies offered Steinberger their blessings. The Reverend George Turner of 
the LMS assured Steinberger that he had the cooperation of the LMS mission, 
while George Brown, offered similar assurances on behalf of the WMMS. The 
leader of the Latu Pope, Bishop Louis Elloy, felt the providence of God had 
given the United States the opportunity to bring about peace as it had the 
welfare of the Samoans at heart.100 
However, attitudes began to change as the impact of Steinberger's new 
constitution was fully realised. The constitution banned Samoan customs, such 
as tattooing, and the wearing of scanty clothing by women, which infuriated 
many Samoans. European traders also criticised Steinberger over regulations 
and laws prohibiting the sale of liquor and other goods. The constitution also 
created friction between the mission societies. Elloy rejected much of the 
wording and content of the constitution, and blamed it on a conspiracy between 
Steinberger and the LMS missionaries. Elloy believed many of the restrictions 
reflected teachings expounded by the Protestants, especially the LMS. Some of 
the other issues, such as compulsory military duties for Samoan males between 
the age of eighteen and forty-five years, also met with mission disapproval.101 
Steinberger returned to America in 187 4, and arrived back in Samoa in 
April 1875 with more gifts but no protectorate proposal. Steinberger met the 
Samoan government, but failed to disclose that he was no longer an official 
representative of the American government. Steinberger also failed to disclose 
the fact that he was in Samoa to fulfil his own personal interests, as well as 
working to obtain land and setting up German business ventures. To achieve 
his aims, Steinberger set himself up as Premier of the Samoan government.102 
The rumours regarding Steinberger's personal activities and German 
affiliation soon found their way into the community and received little support 
among the papalagi. The American consul, Samuel S. Foster, found little to be 
enthusiastic about Steinberger's treatment of American issues, especially with 
Steinberger's failure to inform Foster on matters relating to American citizens. 
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101 Steinberger's Letter, M.S., 1875, MAST. 
102 Cyclopaedia of Samoa (Illustrated), Sydney: Mccarron, Stewart, 1907, 15; Sewall, 14-15; Brookes, 
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Steinberger's lack of recognition and respect for Foster's position as official 
American Consul prompted Foster to call for Steinberger's removal. 103 
26 
The mission societies also lost interest and worked closely with Foster to 
influence Steinberger's deportation. The mission societies, especially the 
Catholics, were dissatisfied with Steinberger's handling of issues relating to 
mission activities and welfare. Elloy, especially, condemned the lack of 
communication between the government and the church in matters regarding 
the welfare of the Catholic Church. For instance, the taking of Roman Catholic 
land for government barracks without notifying the church, making marriage 
laws too loose and more complimentary to the Protestant missions, and giving 
too much power to the district governors to evict people from their land without 
just cause.104 While the majority of Europeans disassociated themselves from 
Steinberger, the Samoans continued to embrace him. Steinberger's close 
relationship with the Samoans did not help deter European anger towards him. 
At the beginning, the Europeans had supported Steinberger in anticipation of 
favourable treatment on conflicting issues involving Europeans and Samoans, 
but as Steinberger took control of the Samoans, he became more concerned 
with Samoan welfare than European interests. 
Constant European and Consular pressure, and the influence of the LMS 
missionaries, led to Steinberger's demise. The LMS missionaries, on behalf of 
European interests, twisted Laupepa's arm to order Steinberger's 
deportation.105 Steinberger left in February 1876, and the Samoans fumed with 
anger. In response to Steinberger's dismissal, the Ta'imua and Faipule deposed 
Laupepa as tupu. The American Consul, Foster, was recalled, and his British 
counterpart was reprimanded by his country. An American protectorate over 
Samoa never eventuated.106 The Ta'imua and Faipule continued to function as 
the Samoan government under the leadership of Tamasese Titimaea. The 
103 Steinberger's Correspondence, Campbell (Secretary of State Office) to Samuel Foster, Jan, 12, 1876, 
MAST; see also Treaty of Friendship Between Gemiany and Samoa, 1871-1881, 32; Treed, 78; Gilson, 
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104 Elloy Letters, 1875-1876, Elloy to Steinberger, Sept, 6, 1875, MAST; Elloy Letters, 1875-1876, Elloy to 
Steinberger, Sept, 15, 1875, MAST; Elloy Letters, 1875-1876, Elloy to Steinberger, Oct, 2, 1875, MAST; 
Elloy Letters, 1875-1876, Elloy to Steinberger, Dec, 15, 1875, MAST; Elloy Letters, 1875-1876, Elloy to 
Steinberger, Jan, 1, 1876, MAST; see also Niel Gunson, "Missionary Interest in British Expansion in the 
South Pacific in the Nineteenth Century," Journal of Religious History 3 (196411965), 306. 
105 Ta'imua and Faipule Documents, 1875, Foster (US Consul) to Ta'imua and Faipule, Sept, 12, 1875, 
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106 Samoa Times, Jan, 11, 1879; Elloy (Tipasa) Correspondence, 1875-1876, Ta'imua to Tipasa (Elloy), 
Feb, 9, 1876, MAST; Whibneeto Mullens, Mar, 3, 1876, SSL; Treaty of Friendship, 79-81; Cyclopaedia, 
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Ta'imua and Faipule continued to pass laws to stop the selling of Samoan 
lands, which continued to anger European speculators. 
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The Germans, who were silent over Steinberger's dismissal, and over 
their own contribution to the debacle, were not restricted to act in Samoan 
matters compared with their British and American counterparts. The outcome of 
the Steinberger affair did not agree with German intentions. They defied the 
newly enacted land laws, and began to put pressure on the Samoan 
government to rectify German land claims. The Germans had recently formed a 
huge plantation company called Godeffroy and Sohn, a company once 
described by Robert Louis Stevenson as the "Gulliver among the Lilliputs."107 
Theodore Weber was given the task to rectify and sanction all German 
land claims, especially Godeffroy and Sohn interests. Weber was once 
described as "the head of the boil of which Samoa languishes," and was 
considered a cruel man concerned only with German interests.108 Weber even 
went as far as arranging three German warships to visit Apia harbour to 
pressure the Samoan government into settling German claims. The warships 
had the effect Weber intended, and the Samoan government not only allowed 
the Germans access to build a harbour at Saluafata, Upolu, but also recognised 
all German land claims. The Samoan government also guaranteed to protect 
German commercial activlties, allow concessions for German companies, allow 
Germany the right to recruit and import labour to Samoa, and guarantee 
German autonomy from Samoan jurisdiction.109 
The Germans opened the way for favourable settlement of other 
European land claims. The European community, with Elloy acting as 
interpreter, also took advantage of the situation to draw up several resolutions 
for endorsement by the Samoan government, which were mainly aimed at 
restricting Samoan activities. They prohibited Samoans carrying guns on 
government roads, they ordered the Samoan government to implement new 
laws and tidy up old laws to protect European interests, they directed Samoans 
107 Robert L. Stevenson, A Footnote to History, New York: C. Scribner's & Sons, 1892, 28. For Information 
on Godeffroy and Sohn see also Florence Spoehr, White Falcon, Palo Alto: Pacific Books, 1963; Western 
Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2115. 
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• stevenson, 28; see also Gordon Le Sueur, Germany's Vanishing Colonies, London: Everett, 1915, 35: 
K. L. P. Martin, Missionaries and Annexation in the Pacific, London: Oxford University, 1924, 180. 
109 Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2/15; Meleisea, (Modern Samoa), 38. 
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to be good to Europeans and to each other, and for all Samoans to pay tax. 110 
Etloy's presence implied a closer working relationship between the Germans 
and the Catholics. The lack of representation from the Protestant missions was 
probably an indication of how the Germans, and other members of the 
European community, had detested the close relationship between the Ta'imua 
and Faipule and the Protestant missions. Pressure was put on the Samoan 
government to fulfil all European demands, while maintaining its stability. 
Laupepa did not help ease the situation by forming a rival government, 
the puletua (rural rule), at Malie,111 which the Germans and many Europeans 
supported. The British vice-consul at the time, William Churchward, outlined the 
motive for the support given to Laupepa. 
Having no interest in the country, beyond filling their pockets 
anyhow, and caring nothing who lost, as long as they held some 
sort of position whereby dollars could be ever so doubtfully 
obtained, they were ever at work inciting international animosities 
and ill-feeling.112 
In 1877, the Samoan government clashed with the pu/etua, and 
Laupepa's warriors were crushed and forced to take refuge in the British 
consulate. The Ta'imua and Faipule reasserted their right to rule, but increasing 
pressure from every conceivable comer of the community, the Europeans 
especially, continued to plague the Samoan government. For instance, the 
British consul, Edward Liardet, slapped a $40,000 fine on the Samoan 
government for abusing British citizens and damaging British properties during 
the conflict with Laupepa. Liardet held Samoa as security for the fine. The 
British government later reprimanded Liardet for his action.113 The pressure 
finally forced Ta'imua and Faipule to disband in 1877, although they never left 
the political arena. They continued to remain active under the leadership of 
Titimaea, and waited for a chance to return as leaders of the Samoan people. 
Talavou, who had remained passive through out the conflict, exploited 
the misfortune of Ta'imua and Faipule to set up a new government in Mulinu'u 
called the pulefou (new rule). Talavou claimed the kingship, and made his 
nephew, Laupepa, sui-tupu. Europeans, again, shifted their allegiance to the 
110 John C. Williams, British Consul, Correspondence, Feb, 1872-Apr,1876, Ta'imua to Tipasa (Elloy), Apr, 
11, 1876, MAST. 
111 Western Samoa, Historical Notes. IT 1 Ex 2115; Gilson, 343-344; Ellison, 83-86. 
112 Wilf!am Churchward, My Consulate in Samoa, London: Dawson of Pall Mall, 1971, 76. 
113 Treaty of Friendship, 73-96; see also liardet to Ta'imua and Faipule, Roman Catholic Church. 
Miscellaneous Papers, 1846-1920, PMB 188. 
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newly formed pulefou party.114 But perhaps the most significant episode of this 
whole charade, was the decision by Mata'afa losefo, a nephew of Fagamanu, 
and strong supporter of the Catholics, to support Talavou. He had been 
observing the political pendulum for a few years. He was ambitious and very 
capable of leading a Samoan government, but did not have enough support to 
fulfil his desire. Furthermore, the Ta'imua and Faipule had opted for Titimaea as 
leader, and the non-recognition of losefo may have prompted his decision to 
side with Talavou. Many felt losefo had made the right move when Talavou died 
in 1880, as many expected losefo to succeed Talavou. But, the consuls 
favoured Laupepa and, consequently, losefo withdrew his support and joined 
the Ta'imua and Faipule party.115 
The latest conflict between Laupepa and Ta'imua and Faipule hindered 
the work of the missions, especially the LMS. In Savai'i the LMS mission was 
concerned at the large number of LMS men joining Laupepa and taking up 
arms. Turner (the LMS missionary) in Upolu also blamed the conflict for the 
decline in spirituality of the Samoan people. He called upon the consuls of 
Britain, America, and Germany, to find an end to the hostilities.116 But the call 
for help received little attention, as the relationships between the three powers 
themselves were deteriorating. 
The British and Germans drew up their own sets of laws to govern their 
own people, as each refused to be governed by Samoan laws The Americans 
did not follow the British and German example, but they refused to be guided by 
laws drawn up by another power. 117 The call for peace could not be 
implemented because the three powers would not cooperate. Instead, each 
wanted to influence the Samoan government directly for its own ends. This led 
to Samoan opposition governments being set up and supported by one of the 
three powers. 
For instance, when Laupepa failed to endorse German proposals in 
1887, including the Treaty of Equality,118 the Germans abandoned Laupepa and 
supported a joint German - Samoa government under the leadership of 
114 Samoa Times, Dec, 22, 1879; see also Newell to Thompson, Mar, 20, 1885, SSL; Phillips lo 
Thompson, May 30, 1885, SSL. 
115 Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2115. 
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118 Newell to Thompson,10 Oct, 1887, SSL; see also Churchward, 374-376; Stevenson, 46-48. 
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Titimaea and Eugen Brandeis. The Germans accused the American and British 
consuls of influencing Laupepa. In August 1887, the German backed 
government clashed with Laupepa's forces, and a well-armed Titimaea -
Brandeis army crushed Laupepa's forces. Laupepa surrendered and was later 
exiled. 119 
Germany's chance to dominate Samoan politics was short lived. losefo 
decided to take up the leadership left vacant by Laupepa, and began to offer 
resistance to the Titimaea - Brandeis government. For two years, the two 
warring factions continued to create political uncertainty. The political turmoil 
also disrupted mission efforts, as Samoans flocked to join the war parties. The 
Reverend A. E. Claxton wrote to his superiors in London that nearly all LMS 
men had gone to war. He remarked, "surely our work is destined to collapse if 
we do not have ... a miracle."120 
The endless wars continued to March 1889 with many Samoans, 
including people from Tutuila, joining the war camps.121 The Germans lost many 
soldiers in the bush, and tried to compensate by using Germans warships, the 
Erber and the Olga to shell villages belonging to losefo and his supporters.122 
Warships belonging to America and Britain soon gathered in Apia harbour 
creating an impasse. The warring factions waited and contemplated each others 
moves as they kept a close watch on the activities offshore. But then a powerful 
hurricane struck Samoa without warning. The warring factions forgot ail about 
their bitterness and banded together to save sailors drowning in the harbour. 
Out of the seven warships anchored in Apia harbour, only the lone British 
warship, Calliope, escaped.123 The Samoans waded through rough seas and 
strong winds to rescue German and American sailors, and European friends, 
and foes, without thinking about their own lives. The hurricane, in the end, took 
the lives of ninety-two Germans and sixty-three Americans. The Americans later 
119 Review of the Samoa Mission 1880-1890, SSR; Newell to Thompson, Oct, 10, 1887, SSL; see also 
Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2115; Moors, 49-57; Robert Watson. History of Samoa, 
Wellington: Whitcombe & Tombs, 1918, 69-76; Trood, 81)..85. 
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presented a boat to the Samoan government as a gesture of appreciation. The 
Germans showed their appreciation by paying the Samoan government three 
dollars per German saved. 124 
The Germans then did the unexpected and returned Laupepa from exile. 
The Germans were dissatisfied with Titimaea, and were probably looking at 
Laupepa to counter losefo's strong anti-German stance. Laupepa, however, 
returned with the hope of supporting losefo.125 In a meeting in Berlin, the three 
powers reinstated Laupepa as tupu. At first Laupepa and losefo took the 
decision well and there were no signs of animosity between the two leaders,125 
but peace did not last. The supporters of losefo soon declared that the decision 
to make Laupepa tupu was unlawful. They claimed that the Berlin Act, 1889, 
gave the Samoans the right to choose their own tupu. The wording losefo and 
his supporters took to heart stated that, 
The three powers recognise the independence of the Samoan 
Government, and the free right of the natives to elect their Chief or 
King and choose their forms of government according to their own 
laws and customs. Neither of the powers shall exercise any 
separate control over the islands or the government thereof. 127 
Therefore, as far as losefo's supporters were concerned, the appointment of 
Laupepa was temporary. They also took heart at the wording of the section to 
mean self-government, and even the right to be independent one day. 
The three powers pointed out that the Act specified that a Chief Justice 
had to be appointed in order to initiate such an election. The Samoans pushed 
for the immediate appointment of a Chief Justice, but it was not until 1891 that 
Baron Cedarkrantz was officially appointed. Cedarkrantz did the unthinkable 
and told the Samoans that their right to choose a tupu had been revoked, and 
reaffirmed Laupepa's appointment. losefo and his supporters went into a 
rage.12a 
A few months later Titimaea died, and the Tuia'ana title was bestowed on 
losefo, and with the Tuiatua, Gatoa'itele, and Tamasoali'i titles also bestowed 
on losefo, he was entitled to be recognised as the tafa'ifa, the first since 
124 Western Samoa. Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2/15; J. Jefferey, Samoa: A Pean From the Pacific Wl>efe 
Everything is Diffefflnt, Dunedin: J. Wilkie, 1914, 22; Wilson, 20. 
125 Samoa Times, "The Samoa Civil War of 1893"; Moors, 74; Stevenson, 200; Fanny and Robert Louis 
Stevenson, Our Samoan Adventure, ed. Charles Neider, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1935, 180. 
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Vailnupo. 129 Laupepa and losefo remained passive, but European counsel and 
stimulation forced them into a confrontation. According to the Reverend James 
Newell, of the LMS, both men were "distressed at the necessity of war. "130 
In preparation for war, both men received help from Europeans in 
building boats and obtaining guns and ammunition. losefo found It hard to 
obtain arms due to an arms embargo relating to !osefo's forces. losefo had to 
rely on the generosity of Europeans who supported him to smuggle arms into 
Samoa on his behalf. One such shipment arrived in a British ship, the 
Richmond, with the compliments of the European trader Harry J. Moors.131 The 
Germans, on the other hand, supplied Laupepa with dynamite and other 
weapons of destruction.132 
The wars began in 1893 at the cost of many Samoan lives, including 
women, who were fulfilling their traditional role of following their men folk into 
battle. The taking of heads as battle trophies also returned to the nature of 
Samoan conflict. 133 losefo's forces suffered heavy casualties, and they were 
forced to move from their villages in fear of bombardment and further fatalities. 
losefo finally surrendered in July 1893 to a German warship anchored off 
Manono. He was imprisoned with several of his leading matai on board a 
German warship, while the rest of his men were flogged through the streets of 
Apia on their way to prison.134 losefo and some of his men were later exiled to 
Jaluit, Marshal! Islands. On his departure, his European friends farewelled him 
with gifts. Father Eugene Didier, of the Latu Pope, presented him with a crucifix 
and a piece of cloth. 135 Laupepa governed Samoa in relative peace, with the 
only opposition coming from Tamasese Lealofi, a son ofTitimaea, who had 
established a rival government in Leulumoega, in 1894, but in a short battle that 
129 Gilson, 419. 
130 Newell lo Thompson, Jun, 19, 1893, SSL 
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ensued, Lealofi was forced to surrender and later offered Laupepa an apology 
and his support.136 
In December 1897, Laupepa was confined to bed with a form of 
paralysis. As he lay dying, Samoans, including the Catholics, rallied and 
pressed the Germans for losefo's return from Jaluit Laupepa also requested 
the German Consul, Herr Rose, to release losefo. The German consul yielded 
to Samoan pressure and granted losefo's release in July 1898 with the 
condition that losefo treat German interests more favourably.137 losefo arrived in 
Samoa a few weeks after Laupepa's death.138 Samoans felt the time was right 
for losefo to unite all Samoans under his leadership, but losefo did not share 
the same enthusiasm. He wanted to stay away from politics and live out the rest 
of his life in peace by doing work for the Catholic Church, 139 but Samoans and 
Europeans alike pressured him to take up the vacant kingship. The Catholics 
also did their best to promote losefo as king. Bishop Pierre Broyer promised 
that a government under losefo would not interfere with the practice of 
religion.140 
On 12 November 1898, losefo's supporters declared him tupu at 
Mulinu'u. The three consuls also recognised his kingship and gave their 
approval.141 However, the LMS missionaries and their supporters rejected 
losefo's kingship.142 Malietoa Tanumafili, a son of Laupepa, also disputed 
losefo's right to succeed to the throne. Lealofi and many Europeans supported 
Tanumafili's claim. losefo reacted by calling Tanumafili "a boy" ill-advised by 
white men.143 The kingship issue went before the Supreme Court, and on 31 
December 1898, Chief Justice Chambers found in favour of Tanumafili as tupu 
136 Newell to Thompson, Oct, 9, 1894, SSL 
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and Lealofi as sui-tupu. 144 losefo and his supporters reacted angrily, and called 
Chambers all kinds of derogatory names. losefo defied the court's decision and 
set up a rival government in Mulinu'u with the assistance of three German 
government officials, Dr Raffel, the German consul, Herr Rose, and his 
assistant Wilhelm van Bulow. Within twenty-four hours, Samoa braced itself, 
once again, for civil war. 145 On New Years Day, 1899, the two sides clashed 
without casualty. 
The American consul interpreted losefo's action as a revolt against the 
Chief Justice, and advised him to abide by the court's decision. losefo 
refused.146 Consequently, losefo's village, and the dwellings of those who 
offered him refuge, were shelled and bombarded by British warships. Casualties 
were high.147 But it did not stop losefo's supporters from attacking, burning, and 
pillaging villages belonging to Tanumafili's supporters. They also looted the 
LMS mission house in Apia, and while seeking medical help and refuge at the 
LMS Malua Seminary, losefo's men threatened students and plundered their 
plantations.148 When Easter Sunday dawned, Captain Sturdee of the Porpoise 
was remorseless as he continued to bombard losefo's strongholds. A reporter 
on board the Porpoise described how Sturdee could plot the movement of his 
men by the smoke of burning villages, and in his delight for the destruction, he 
thanked God for the actions of his men, and the privilege of fighting with 
them. 149 
The Germans could not answer the wrath of the British and American 
warships, as they abandoned losefo in his time of need. The Germans could 
only voice their condemnation of British and American actions, but could offer 
no physical assistance. losefo could only write a letter, entitled "The Cry of 
Mata'afa For His People to the Three Great Powers,"150 to highlight the enormity 
of the horror that he and his supporters had to endure. The letter eventually 
144 Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2115; Trood, 108. 
145 Mata'afa, 5-8; General Situation of Samoa, M.S., 1899, MAST; S. A. Beveridge to Thompson, Feb, 3, 
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Huckett to Cousins, Feb, 20, 1899, SSL; Newell to Thompson, Apr, 17, 1899, SSL; see also Trood, 109, 
113. 
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raised awareness in the United States and Britain of the treatment of the 
Samoan people by military personnel under their control. Consequently, both 
countries condemned the actions of their consuls, and had them both 
reprimanded. The United States also, reluctantly, apologised to the German 
government. 151 
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The fighting was finally over, but there were no winners. The Samoans 
had not regained control of their own country. The three powers had not given 
Samoa what she wanted because of their own political ambitions and economic 
greed. The mission societies failed to utilise the influence of the three powers, 
and Samoan differences, to gain supremacy over one another. In the end, on 2 
December 1899, after deliberation by the three powers in Washington, 
Germany was given [Western] Samoa (Upolu and Savai'i) to rule as a colony. 
The United States took control of Eastern Samoa (Tutuila and Manu'a) only 
because of its beautiful harbour, while Britain renounced all claims on Samoa in 
exchange for rights in Vanuatu and New Guinea. 152 The realisation that for the 
first time someone else would rule while Samoans obeyed and no longer had 
the right to make decisions and practice their own unique politics, only impelled 
the Samoans to react with more conviction to win back their prerogative at all 
cost, and by any 'God-given' means. 
151 Cyclopaedia, 24. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A GERMAN PLANTATION 
AND SAMOAN ASPIRATIONS 
36 
The chaotic ending to the nineteenth century, left Samoa without a 
workable government. As the Samoan leaders pondered upon their political 
future, their confusion turned into shock and disbelief as the news of the 
partitioning of Samoa arrived. To rub salt into Samoan pride, Germany, instead 
of Britain or America, was given the administration of Samoa. In a letter to the 
LMS Secretary, Elizabeth Moore mentioned that the Samoans felt that 
Peretania (Britain) had deserted them. 1 The Samoans began the twentieth 
century with little excitement, and a future that was uncertain and insecure. 
The German flag was raised on 1 March 1900 at Mulinu'u Peninsula. The 
government representatives of America and Britain were present, The two 
countries had continued to meet with the German administration, giving advice 
on various matters pertaining to the welfare of the Samoans, while recognising 
and committing themselves to the aims of the German administration.2 The 
missions were also well represented. The LMS school students marched in a 
procession from Apia to Mulinu'u. In addition, the LMS schools sang a German 
chorale (Lobe den Herm der machtige ... ) and the German National anthem, and 
gave the new administrator, Dr Wilhelm Solf, a bible as a gift.3 Many German 
citizens were impressed with the LMS's participation.4 Solf also wrote to the Au 
Fa'atonu (Samoa LMS missionaries) to demonstrate his appreciation. 
After having seen the exceedingly well organised procession of 
your teachers and schools I am better able to understand and 
appreciate the attempts expressed in your address: to make the 
London Missionary society a powerful factor in conserving loyalty, 
peace and civilisation in Samoa. A mere glance into the history of 
the L.M. Society ... shows ... that you have understood the 
patriarchal instincts and tendencies of the people, and gradually 
1 Lizzy Moore to R. W. Thompson, 29 Nov, 1899, London Missionary Society, South Seas Archives, South 
Sea Letters (henceforth SSL). 
2 Minutes of a Government Meeting, 3 Feb, 1900, British Consulate Samoa (henceforth BCS): Grunow 
(Acting Consul of Germany) to Hunter, 27 Feb, 1900, BCS; Western Samoa Historical Notes, 1935, Island 
Territories Archives, National Archives (henceforth ID. 1 Ex 2/15. 
3 Samoa District Committee (henceforth SOC), Minutes of Meeting, Apia, 24 Feb, 1900, SSL: SOC, 
Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 13-18 May 1901, SSL: see also Self to Brayer, 3 Mar. 1900, Maris! Archives of 
Samoa and Tokelau (henceforth MASD: Brayer to Self, 5 Mar. 1900, MAST. 
4 Testimony from Dr Self to the LMS (Quotation from a letter from a trader in Samoa), Mar, 1900, SSL. 
prepared them to receive willingly from any subsequent 
Government the legislation necessary to their welfare.5 
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The LMS saw the compliment as a catalyst in creating a solid platform for future 
positive dialogue,6 although the latter part of the letter revealed German 
expectations that the LMS would encourage the Samoans to accept German 
rule peacefully. For the Samoans, however, the praise accorded Solt did not 
take into account his insensitive attitude to the real needs and expectations of 
the Samoan people. 
The Au Fa'atonu described Solt as a good man, and "extremely affable & 
courteous & whenever opportunity has offered, he has been willing to assist our 
mission publicly, ever drawing some censures upon himself from certain 
quarters."7 However, the chance of a rosy relationship never eventuated. The 
Au Fa'atonu annoyed Solt over a number of issues, therefore giving Solt ample 
excuses and opportunities to ridicule the LMS mission. Thus, from the 
beginning, it never was an easy matter for the LMS to have a good relationship 
with the German administration. But, the LMS had two astute and experienced 
missionaries in James Edward Newell, and Franzeska Louise Valesca Shultze, 
whose work gave the LMS some credibility. 
Newell had been in Samoa since 1880, and was present during the 
crucial events leading up to the German take-over of Samoa in 1900. Newell 
maintained the LMS was .neutral during the kingship struggle. In a letter to the 
Au Matutua (LMS directors), Newell advised them not to meddle with Samoan 
politics, as it would be detrimental to the LMS.8 Newell maintained that he could 
not be made responsible for the actions of the Samoans and British soldiers 
who took up arms against Mata'afa losefo, nor for the misguided actions of 
some colleagues. Newell maintained that his only function in the dispute was 
one of mediator. The Samoan pastors wrote to R. W. Thompson, the Secretary 
of the LMS, expressing their concern at the charges implicating Newell as the 
cause of all the trouble in Samoa. In the letter, pastor Alama wrote "e toe ina oo 
lima o nisi e toatele ia Neue/i, atoa ma i matou [people nearly caused violence 
5 Dr Solito J. Hills, Feb, 1900, SSL. 
6 Shultze to Cousins, 22 Mar, 1900, SSL; SOC, Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 13-18 May 1901. 
7 Barradale to Thompson, 9 Jan, 1901, SSL; Huckett to Thompson, 17 May, 1900, SSL. Many other 
scholars have described Soll in their own words, such as J. W. Davidson, Samoa mo Samoa: The 
Emergence of the Independent State of Western Samoa, Melbourne: Oxford University, 1967, 76; Peter J, 
Hempenstall, Pacific /slanders Under Gennan Rule: a Study in the Meaning of Colonial Resistance, 
Canberra: ANU, 1978, 32. 
8 J. E. Newell to R.W. Thompson, 31 Oct, 1898, SSL. 
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to Newell and us]."9 In the aftermath of the kingship struggle, Newell was invited 
by the special commission set up to resolve the crisis to advise on what action 
to take.10 
When the news of Germany ruling Samoa broke at the end of 1899, 
Newell was away on a visitation trip to LMS mission stations in other parts of 
the Pacific. Newell was also absent from the German flag hoisting ceremony. 
He had left Samoa for England for an extended furlough in February. During 
this time, Newell visited Germany and tried to clear up any misunderstanding 
the Germans may have had regarding the LMS's role in the recent kingship 
controversy. But most importantly, Newell had the chance to personally meet 
Solf and other government dignitaries, as well as meeting several German 
Mission Boards and independent church denominations who were willing to 
participate in mission enterprise in Samoa. Newell explained the LMS's position 
with regard to Sabbatarianism, freewill contributions, German donations to 
schools, erection of expensive church buildings, recruitment of Samoans for 
hired labour, church marriage as against civil marriage, and so forth. 11 
Newell wanted to implement German policies within LMS mission 
schools as soon as possible. It was one way of proving LMS support to Solf and 
the new German administration. Obtaining German missionaries proved 
fruitless, although several of the missions preferred to take-over the work of the 
LMS in Samoa. Nevertheless, Newell had high hopes of acquiring missionaries 
in the future. Meanwhile, Newell was confident that the existing LMS staff in 
Samoa could fulfil Solfs policies regarding education and other matters. 
This leads us to the LMS's other great asset during the German 
occupation, Franzeska Louise Valesca Shultze. Shultze founded the LMS 
Papauta Girls School in 1890. She was present with the Au Fa'atonu in 
welcoming Solf and the new German regime to Samoa. Shultze at the time was 
preparing to move to Tutuila, but the LMS felt that she was "an advantage to the 
9 See Pastor Alama to Tomasone (R. W. Thompson), 26 Jan, 1901, SSL 
1
° C. N. E. Elliot (Head of Commission) to J.E. Newell, 9 Jan, 1899, SSL; Capt. Sturdee to W. Huckett, 8 
Jan, 1899, SSL; E.G. B. MaxsetoW. Huckett, 10Jan, 1899, SSL; Mrs BevanWockeyto R. W. 
Thompson, 16 Apr, 1899, SSL 
11 Newell's Diary, Newell Papers, London Missionary Society, South Seas Archives, South Sea Odds 
(henceforth SSO); Huckett to Thompson, 9 Sept, 1901, SSL, NLA; Marriott to C. Cousins, 22 Aug, 1903, 
SSL; Huckett to Thompson, 23 Sept, 1903, SSL The Catholics in later years also had a problem with New 
Zealand over the Sabbatarian issue. See Father J. Deihl to Capt. Cotton, 19 Jan, 1920, MAST. Deihl to 
Tate, 9 Jul, 1921, MAST. 
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mission in its relation with the German government."12 Soon after the official flag 
raising, Shultze began to teach the German language and German history to 
the girls at Papauta School but, according to Joliffe many of the girls were 
reluctant to learn as they were expecting England to return and take over 
Samoa again. 13 The girls soon got over their wishful thinking and settled into 
learning German. 
Shultze quickly pushed through the Germanisation of Papauta despite 
Solfs advice to continue teaching in the Samoan language, until policies could 
be implemented. Solf felt that by teaching in the Samoan language the 
Samoans would remain Samoans. Solf contemplated using the German 
language only at court. 14 But, Shultze had other ideas. In a letter to the LMS 
Secretary, Shultze outlined the need to expand Papauta as Samoans were 
crying out for education. She wrote that "never have I known Samoans more 
eager for education as they are now .... they are very eager now to learn 
German."15 Shultze was a proud German and was doing all she could to 
promote German interests. She obviously contemplated a long association 
between the Samoans and Germany, something that the rest of the Au 
Fa'atonu also learnt to accept. Shultze also proudly supported Solfs proposal 
for all missions and schools to be under the control of the German governor in 
all German colonies.16 
From the beginning, Samoans felt Solf was the right man to establish 
and guide a Samoan government capable of governing its own people. The 
Samoans were confident as Solf did not change much of the way Samoan 
politics functioned from the previous government. In fact he advocated an 
administration that favoured Samoan traditions, whereby the Samoans would 
govern themselves according to the fa'asamoa. Solfs address to the Samoan 
people on 11 April 1900 would have suggested nothing else to the Samoans. 
Solf promised: 
... to respect old traditions as far as these are not against the laws 
of Christianity and the welfare and security of the individuals. The 
Government has confidence in the Samoans, that they will be able 
12 SDC, Minutes of Meeting, Papauta, 13-14 Dec, 1899, SSL. 
13 Joliffe to Thompson, 9 Jul, 1900, SSL. 
14 Shultze to Thompson, 6 Sept, 1900, SSL. 
15 Shultze to Thompson, 6 Sept, 1900, SSL. 
16 Shultzeto Cousins, 6 Aug, 1904, SSL; Newell to Thompson, 13, Aug, 1904, SSL; Newell to Thompson, 
13 Aug, 1904, NP. 
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to govern themselves, subject to its control and promises to make 
such laws, and issue such orders as shall be for the benefit of the 
country and in conformity ... with Samoan ideas. 17 
Samoan expectations went closer to reality with the appointment of 
Mata'afa losefo as Ali'i Sili.18 This was expected by the Samoans as the first act 
towards revitalising Samoan traditional rule. Solf also decided to recognise the 
paramount descent groups in Samoa, namely the tama-a-aiga by designating 
Tupua Tamasese Meaole I, Tuimaleali'ifano, Saipa'ia (Sa Tupua family), and 
Fa'alata (Sa Malietoa family), as Ta'imua, and he selected twenty-eight matai as 
Faipule. This kept alive the old Ta'imua and Faipule aspect of the previous 
Samoan government.19 losefo was given the task of appointing Samoans to 
various government offices, such as councils, district chiefs, district judges, 
village mayors, district clerks, and constables. This act by Solf was seen by the 
Samoans as another step towards legitimising losefo's authority to rule Samoa 
under German protection.20 
However, early Samoan participation in setting up the new German 
administration gave the Samoans a false sense of security that Germany had 
their best interests at heart. In fact, there were even suggestions that Germany 
was setting up the administration of Samoa in similar fashion to the way Britain 
had given the Tongans their right to rule under a British protectorate. There was 
no mistaking how losefo perceived the situation painted by Solf at the 
beginning. He was confident Solf had given him power and authority to govern, 
and he acted accordingly. 
For instance, soon after the flag raising ceremony, losefo and his 
supporters went to various villages in Anoama'a, F aleata and Tuamasaga, and 
destroyed the plantations and possessions of the villagers, in an effort to show 
that he had absolute authority. Solf took exception to losefo's action and asked 
him to cease all aggression.21 In another show of power, losefo issued a 
17 Solrs Address, 11Apr,1900, German Administration of Western Samoa (henceforth GAWS). 
16 Mata'afa losefo's title of Ali'i Sili was officially bestowed on 14 August 1900. See Order by Soll, 14 Aug, 
1900, GAWS; Report of Dr So~ to the Imperial Office, Berlin - Unforwarded, 1907 (copy in author's 
possession). 
19 List of Malo, 1904, German Secretariat Archives (henceforth GSA). The list includes Moefaauo, 
Mata'afa, Leiataua, Tusa, Toelupe, Lauaki, Tafua, Tatootoo, Liumaauga, Talc, Fonoimoana, Maumalo, 
Molioo, Lealamisa, Fue, Sagapolu, Tuiatua, Vala, Autagavaia, Le Tagaloa, Asiata, Fauatea, Laufa, Tuliatu, 
Tufuga, Gale, Soloia, and Taueetua. See Western Samoa Historical Notes, 1935, IT 1, Ex 2115. 
20 Mata'afa to Soll, 17 Mar, 1900, GAWS; Minutes, Soll, 31 Mar, 1900, GAWS; Mata'afa to Soll, 1 May 
1900, GAWS; Mata'afa to Soll, 26 May 1900, GAWS; Soll to Mata'afa, 24 Jul, 1900, GAWS; Huckett to 
Cousins, 11 Jun, 1900, SSL; Shultze to Thompson, 6 Sept, 1900, SSL 
21 Tuisamau and Amituanai to Hunter, 6 Mar, 1900, BCS; Soll to Hunter, Mar, 1900, BCS. 
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proclamation, without Solfs knowledge, ordering all missions to conduct 
religious services on 24 April 1900, to commemorate Samoa's preservation 
during the 1899 war, and to give thanks that "the authority of Samoa remains in 
customs & practices of Samoa."22 Self issued a counter proclamation, and 
wrote letters to the various missions, making Josefa's orders null and void. 23 
losefo also tried to interfere with Judge Knipping's administration by issuing an 
order to release one Tuaifaiva, who had been sentenced by Knipping to prison. 
Solf told Josefa never to interfere with the work of Knipping.24 Furthermore, 
during the instalment ceremony of various matai to government appointments, 
Josefa remarked to Franzeska Louise Valesca Shultze at Papauta, that ''things 
will undergo a great change & only have to do it slowly to avoid trouble."25 In 
June, Josefa ordered the Faipule and soldiers to Mulinu'u without Selfs 
approval. Self believed losefo had gone too far, and wrote to him pointing out 
who had real power and authority in Samoa. 
All these circumstances compel me to believe that you are 
inclined to exceed the powers attaching to the position as Alii Sili 
granted to you by the Imperial government.. .. ! trust that you will 
give me proof by complying with my wishes that you are now fully 
aware that there is only one Pule [rule or authority] in Samoa, 
namely the Pule of the Kaiser, whose representative I am.26 
The taligatoga ceremony that followed awakened losefo to the reality of 
his situation. losefo and his family wanted to give gifts of ie toga (fine mats) to 
matai of various districts who honoured and recognised his position as Ali'i Sili. 
It soon became clear to Josefa that Selfs permission was required in order to 
carry it out. It was quite a shock that a Samoan traditional ceremony needed a 
papalagi's permission for its fulfilment. Furthermore, Solf intervened and 
instructed Josefa on how to distribute the ie toga.27 Self decreed that every 
matai should receive the same amount of ie toga incase one would feel he was 
superior to the other. Selfs action brought every matai to the same level, status, 
and rank. losefo had intended to give more to the higher ranking matai, 
22 Minutes, Soll, 19 Apr, 1900, GAWS; Mata'ala to Newell. 17 Apr, 1900, SSL; Mata'afa to J.E. Newell, 19 
Apr, 1900, SSL; Pule & Tumua to Mosiniolo, 17 Apr. 1900, MAST. 
23 Soll to Huckett, 21 Apr, 1900, GAWS; Soll to Brayer, 21 Apr, 1900, GAWS; Brayer to Solf, 23 Apr, 1900, 
GAWS. 
24 Mata'ala to Soll, 11Jun,1900, GAWS; Imperial Judge (Knipping) to Soll, 12 Jun, 1900, GAWS. 
25 Shultze to Thompson, 6 Sept, 1900, SSL. 
26 Soll to Mata'ala, 26 Jun, 1900, GAWS; Mata'ala to SoW, 27 Jun, 1900, GAWS. 
27 Proclamation, SoW, 31May1901, GAWS; Minutes, Soll, no date, GAWS; Soll to Mata'afa, 24 Jun, 1901, 
GAWS; Minutes, Soll, 25 Jun, 1901, GAWS. 
42 
especially Tumua and Pule, and less to the lesser-ranked matai. losefo wanted 
to keep Tumua and Pule on his side as they were considered the real king-
makers in Samoan politics. Solfs action was an insult to losefo and to Tumua 
and Pule. It was beyond any Samoan's imagination. For losefo and his family, 
and forthe mataiwho attended, Samoan culture had been denigrated.28 Solf 
had made a mockery of losefo's intention to show-off his prestige and power. 
For Solt, it was huge psychological victory. losefo was given a clear 
message regarding his status and position within the new German 
administration, while the whole of Samoa was given a dress rehearsal of what 
to expect in future.29 The lowering of Tumua and Pule status by virtue of 
receiving the same ie toga as all other matai, was Solfs way of telling such 
powerful groups that they had no power and authority in a German Samoan 
government.30 Solf deliberately sought to destroy the dignity and pride of Tumua 
and Pule. Solt claimed it was something he had always planned to do. In a 
letter to the Colonial Office in Berlin, Solf clearly outlined his intention and aim 
for Samoa's future. 
The appointment of the Alii Sili is difficult to unite with my own 
plans for an enlarged future Samoa self-government. I have 
appointed Mataafa Alii Sili against my conviction .... Also at the 
time when the flag was hoisted Tumua and Pule had their powers 
geared for war. To maintain peace, I was forced to compromise 
Mataafa, and by not recognising his Tupu, I had to give him the 
title and appointment of Alii Sili instead. The government's aim 
must be to get rid of the central Government in Mulinuu, and to 
confine the Samoa self-government to districts and villages. 31 
Solf subsequently reiterated his real intention for Samoa by forcing 
losefo to give a speech to the Samoan people on 14 August 1900. The day in 
question was the day losefo was officially bestowed with the title Ali'i Sili. The 
26 There were 1899 fine mats distributed. The Kaiser received one, with 4 more to German officials, and 
five fine mats to the missionaries, including the nuns. See list in Note by J. Sooalo Tole, MN, 22 Jul, 1901, 
Gilson Papers - Pacific Manuscript Bureau (henceforth PMB) 479; see also Ali'i and Faipule of Fasito'otai 
and Faleseela to Soll, 3 Sept, 1901, GAWS; Proclamation, Mulinuu, 29 Mar, 1901, PMB, 479; 
Samoanische Zeitung, 22 Jun, 1901, PMB 479. 
29 Tamasese Meaole I and his family also had to obtain permission from Soll to hold a la'alo/o. Soll gave 
permission because it was not political, and told Tamasese not to invite too many people, and to finish 
early. See Solfto Tamasese, 8 May 1900, GAWS; Minutes, Schnee, 17 Jan, 1902, GAWS; Memo by C. 
Taylor, 30 Nov, 1903, GSA 
30 Note that in 1907, Mata'afa losefo and Tumua and Pule chiefs petitioned Solito reinstate Tumua and 
Pule. Soll denied the request, and told the Samoans that it was a thing of the past. See Memo by Taylor, 
28 Feb, 1907, GSA; Soll, Minute, 1 Mar, 1907, GSA; Trood to Secretary of Pule Aiga - Tuamasaga, 
undated, BCS. 
31 Soll to Auswartige Amt, 6 Feb, 1901, GAWS; Minutes, Soll, 2 Sept, 1901, GSA; Cable From Soll in 
Rotorua, NZ, to Samoa Gov1, 13 Nov, 1909, GSA; Solito Secretary of Stale, Colonial Office, 12 Dec, 
1909, GSA; see also Soll to Amtmann, Gilson Papers -Amtmann, Savai'i, XVII. C.1, PMB 479; Soll to 
Secretary of Colonial Office, 12 Dec, 1909, XVII, A.2, PMB 479. 
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speech, written for losefo by the German administration, advised the people of 
Samoa that the days of Tumua and Pule were gone, and so were the laws and 
customs of Samoa. losefo also openly declared that his Ali'i Sili was bestowed 
by the Kaiser, who was greater than he was, and the only ruler of Samoa. 32 
losefo and his supporters had not expected such a complete and hasty 
change to Samoan traditional rule. losefo, for a while tried to defy the German 
administration by refusing to obey Solfs orders and refusing to carry out his 
government duties. He even tried to set up a fort at Leulumoega with the idea of 
ruling Samoa with the help of either Britain or America. losefo soon accepted 
the fact that Germany had complete control and that the old days of having 
another nation interfering were no longer possible. He could only accept his 
circumstances with sadness and humility; a trait that the German government 
continued to admire in losefo, and for which he was rewarded accordingly.33 
The damage done to Samoan pride was due to the Samoans' own lack 
of political perception. The Samoans failed to perceive the true significance of 
Selfs earlier address in April. Self had clearly told the Samoans that from the 
onset of any Samoan • German relations, Samoa would have no power and 
authority, but Germany would control all. In short, German interests needed to 
be addressed first over and above any Samoan welfare. 
A strong Christian government and the welfare of the individual were two 
important aspects of the German administration, which went against Samoan 
traditions, and the idea of communal aspirations promoted by the fa'asamoa. 
Samoan traditional government was always based upon warfare and the 
enticement of matai support from various districts to elevate one individual to 
lead the ma/o. In the nineteenth century, much of the conflict in Samoa was 
precisely caused by the rivalry for kingship or for paramount authority. However, 
such rivalry was not all in response to Samoan political fervour but in the main 
to satisfy the greed and selfishness of various papa/agi, in which Christianity not 
only played a very manipulative role, but also had a strong sanctioning affect.34 
The Samoans themselves also learnt to play both the missions and the German 
32 Order by Solf, 14 Aug, 1900, GAWS; Proclamation, Mulinuu, 29 Mar, 1901, PMB 479; Excerpts From 
Annual Report, 1900..1901, PMB 479. 
23 J. E. Newell to R. W. Thompson, 24 Jan, 1900, SSL; Huckell to Cousins, 22 Mar, 1900, SSL; Solf, 
Auswartige Amt, Beriin, 14 May 1900, GAWS; Auswartige Amt (Colonial Dept.) to Solt, 31 Oct, 1900, 
GAWS. 
""W. Huckett to R.W. Thompson, 1 Sept, 1898, SSL; J.E. Newell to R.W. Thompson, 31Oct,1898, SSL; 
W. Hucketl to R.W. Thompson, 20 Mar, 1899, SSL 
administration against one another for their own benefit, although at times it 
caused more pain then gain. 
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When Solf toured the islands of Upolu and Savai'i in 1900, he realised 
just how much the missions had affected the lives of the people.35 The mission 
had implanted itself in the fa'asamoa and had educated many Samoans to 
become useful in Samoan society. Solf admitted these people would eventually 
become helpful informers, interpreters, and mediators for his administration. 
Thus, Solf recognised early the importance of the work done by the missions in 
Samoa. He knew that with their help in continuing to teach Christian ideals, he 
could develop Samoa as a profitable German colony. Solf believed the work 
done by the missions was for the good of the country, and it was their 
contribution to 'Germany's God-given' task of developing Samoa. The 
relationship between the missions and the German administration was not 
always complementary. Nevertheless, the missions accepted their fate in the 
hands of the Germans. 
The relationship between the missions themselves was also unpleasant. 
During the period of German administration, one mission would try to gain the 
favour of the government at the expense of the other; depending on the issues 
and events transpiring at any given time. The two missions that caused the 
most agitation in state and church relations were the LMS and the Lotu Pope. 
As will be seen later, they took every opportunity for censuring, condemning, 
and insulting each other.36 In their effort to 'do the Christian thing' both missions 
would drag along their Samoan adherents to the extent of encountering the 
wrath of the German administration.37 The WMMS and the newly arrived 
Mormon Church (LOS) also contributed to the disharmony of the missions and 
Samoan people. 
The WMMS remained small and modest, but was still strongly active 
under the leadership of the Reverend Ernest G. Neil. They did not like the 
Catholics because of their strong Protestant bias, but they were also at odds 
35 Report of Selfs Tour of Savai'i, Samoa Zeitung, 3 Aug., 1901, PMB 479; Record of Malaga to Savai'i, 18 
Jul, 1901, PMB 479. 
36 Shultze to Thompson, 6 Sept, 1900, SSL. 
37 An example is the case concerning the LMS pastor Liuvao and a story he had told about the retention of 
the cup in the case of the laity in the Roman Catholic tradition. Bishop Breyer took tt as an insult to him 
and the church. The issue became a debate on beliefs between the LMS and the Roman Catholic. In the 
end the Chief Justice got involved. Liuvao was jailed for one month. The conflict took almost six months to 
resolve. See Hills to Thompson, 19 Oct, 1910, SSL; Hills to Thompson, 10 Dec, 1910, SSL; SDC -
Minutes of Meeting, Leulumoega, 21-23 Dec, 1910, SSL; Hills to Thompson, 16 Jan, 1911, SSL; Hills to 
Thompson, 14 Feb, 1911, SSL. 
45 
with the LMS over doctrinal and administrative matters.38 The LMS maintained 
that the WMMS should not have returned to Samoa, and was further infuriated 
by the WMMS effort to begin a mission in Tutuila. As far as the LMS was 
concerned, the WMMS was adding to its problem with the Latu Pope and LOS 
in Tutuila. 39 In Upolu, the Reverend John G. Hawker of the LMS, complained 
that a WMMS missionary went to one of the LMS villages and, in the absence of 
the Samoan pastor, used the LMS church to marry a matai to a woman he had 
being living with for two years. The problem was, the same matai has been 
married to another woman by the Samoan pastor some four years earlier.40 In 
1909, a conflict between the LMS in Afega and the WMMS in Malie, over the 
inauguration of a new WMMS church in Afega, not only involved the pastors 
and congregations but Samoan government officials.41 The animosity between 
the two Protestant rivals continued to thrive in a very subtle way, throughout the 
first half of the twentieth century, 
The LOS caused a few headaches for the other missions,42 especially 
the LMS. They were especially active in American Samoa and became very 
prominent in Samoa during the German administration.43 The Mamona 
(Mormon missionaries) proselytising work among Samoans already committed 
to other denominations led to hostility and, at times, violent reactions from the 
Samoan community. For instance, in the village of Suipapa, Lepa, the matai 
Sagale gave the Mamona permission to hold a church service, but the LMS 
pastor and congregation retaliated and beat up the Samoan Mamona 
missionary and threatened his European colleague. Nevertheless, the Mamona 
continued to persist in Suipapa as they had the support of another matai named 
38 Huckett to Thompson, 2-10 Jul, 1903, SSL. 
39 Hawker to Thompson, 15 Jan, 1904, SSL; Hawker to Thompson, 5 Feb, 1904, SSL; Hawker to 
Thompson, 23 Jul, 1904, SSL; Hills to Thompson, 14 Oct, 1904, SSL; Newell to Thompson, 25 Nov, 1904, 
SSL. 
40 Hawker to Thompson, 15 Dec, 1904, SSL. 
41 Mamoe (F.S. -Afega), Ole Tala i le Mea Sa Tupu i le Nuu o Afega i leAso 15 Aukuso, 1909, 4 Sept, 
1909, South Seas Special Personals (Newell Papers) [henceforth NP]; lerome (Wesleyan Pastor at Malie) 
to Mamoe (F.S. -Afega), 4 Sept, 1909, NP. 
42 There are several records of the LDS in their Journals, pamphlets, and magazines, published in the 
early 1900s. For example see Improvement Era, PMB 589; Soll en den Deutechen ... , Jun., 1899, PMB 
589; General Conference, PMB 115; Samoa Bulletin, PMB 115; Samoan Mission, PMB 114. 
43 Hawker to Thompson, 16 Mar, 1902, SSL; Huckett to Thompson, 26 Apr, 1902, SSL; Hawker to 
Thompson, 5 Feb, 1904, SSL; Hawker to Thompson, 23 Jul, 1904, SSL. 
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Tupua. 44 The LOS had thirty to forty missionaries and teachers in Samoa. They 
had stations at Malaela, Manunu, Pesega and Sauniatu in Upolu.45 
In Savai'i the LOS grew in numbers at Falelima, Tuasivi, and Vaiola. In a 
report in 1910, Elder W. E. Tangreen, wrote about the work of the LOS in 
Falelima. He records how the other denominations worked to poison the minds 
of the people with false stories about the Mamon a. He also mentioned how a 
number of people were made to take oaths not to join the LOS.46 While the 
Falelima branch of the church was the largest in Savai'i, the report stated that in 
other villages, "it needed only a little work in some villages to give them prestige 
enough to establish a branch of the church.'.47 Tangreen also described the 
problems faced by the Mamona as they tried to establish a branch in 
Lalomalava. At first, Self had forbidden the Mamona from invading strong 
Protestant villages, but, the decision was later reversed and Self told the people 
of Lalomalava not to interfere with the Mamona.48 The LOS were very 
successful at utilising their schools as an effective way of spreading their 
message. They also offered relief for poor families, as well as promoting talent 
through their choir. 
At the beginning of 1900, there were some 1, 100 Mamon a and twenty-
two schools in Samoa. According to Elder Wood, the LOS's success was also 
due to its evangelisation method. 
He [Mormon missionary] must speak strait to the souls of these 
natives; and there is no hypocrisy among them in religion. They 
look at the very soul of an Elder, and the Elder must get down and 
talk as if to a child, and yet not be a child himself. He must instruct 
these people and yet retain the dignity of his calling. 49 
The Mormons' arrogance made the LMS very unforgiving, especially when they 
tried to discredit the work done by other missions. Elder Edward W. Little felt the 
Mormons were far superior. 
Wherever we went we were the centre of attraction and the people 
hung upon our words and praised the actions and ability of our 
44 Minutes, Shultz, 4 Oct, 1904, German Administration Papers (henceforth GAP). 
45 Shultz to Soll, 22 Apr, 1905, (Report of trip to Aleipata on 19-21, Apr, 1905), GAP; Jolliffe to Thompson, 
9 Jul, 1900, SSL; Huckett to Thompson, 30 Sept, 1900, SSL. 
46 Article Relating to the Pacific Islands From the Improvement Era, vol. 1 - 72 91898 - 1969), PMB 110, 
vol, xiii, Oct, 1910. 
47 Article Relating to the Pacific Islands From the Improvement Era, vol. 1 - 72 91898 - 1969), PMB 110, 
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boys as though instead of our being human beings and Faifeau 
Momanos [Mamona], as they term us, we were something 
superior to those who had been labouring among them for years.50 
The Samoans called the Mamona missionary, Mamona ma le ato pa'u 
(Mamona with a suitcase) as they became an eyesore for the LMS and other 
missions. The LOS also took every opportunity to discredit the LMS and other 
missions with unfounded accusations,51 But, every effort to rid themselves of 
the Mormons failed. Instead, the Mormons continued to thrive, buying up large 
quantities of land for their mission schools and other special projects, as 
Samoans continued to embrace their materialistic approach.52 
The Latu Pope was not really concerned over who administered Samoa. 
Germany was a predominantly Protestant nation, and Solf was an adherent, 
even if it was only by name. The centuries old conflict between the Protestant 
and Roman Catholic Church was slowly vanishing, as the Pope's influence 
gradually re-established Catholic traditions in Germany through the Catholic 
dominating political group called the Central Party. They had the power to 
influence the ruling government to assist Catholic missions anywhere in the 
world, including Samoa. For the Catholics in Samoa, the German administration 
may have been pro-Protestant but the changes in the religious environment in 
Germany was more favourable for the Catholics. This became even more 
significant with the establishment of a Marist Order in Germany itself. It meant, 
the Catholics in Samoa could obtain German speaking missionaries to 
implement Selfs policy of teaching German subjects within all mission schools. 
The Catholics also felt more comfortable with their relationship with the German 
administration because of losefo's influence, and being Latu Pope and Ali'i Sili, 
he was expected to use his influence to benefit his church. 
The LMS should have been more joyous with the German administration, 
but sadly no. The LMS had a monopoly on mission work in Samoa, and clearly, 
had expected Samoa to become a British colony. In a letter to England, 
Elizabeth Moore contemplated the outcome of the LMS work in Samoa. 
We thank God that the Samoans have been grounded in the 
faith ... if a testing time is coming, it may serve to strengthen and 
establish them. One thing we rejoice over, that it is a Christian and 
50 Deseret Evening News, 17 Mar, 1900, PMB 114. 
51 Hawker to Thompson, 15 Dec, 1904, SSL. 
52 Millennia/ Star, 23 Oct, 1904, PMB 114; Liahona, vol. 18: 400, 12 Mar, 1921, PMB 114; Native Affairs, 
Tuamasaga, vol. 10, 1912 -1913, GAP. 
a Protestant nation, which is to have control over our beloved 
Samoans; but oh how we wish it had been England.53 
Thus, the advent of a German government was not a stumbling block, but a 
setback, in LMS efforts to increase and expand its work in Samoa. The LMS 
realised the big advantage the Latu Pope had over them in terms of German 
missionaries. In order to fulfil German policies, the LMS had to work much 
harder in obtaining German missionaries for Samoa. The LMS was also at a 
disadvantage politically. In the previous conflict in 1898 and 1899, the LMS 
supported Malietoa Tanumafili I against losefo in the kingship issue. The 
Germans had supported the latter. Thus, as far as the Germans were 
concerned, the LMS was not an ally of Germany. 
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Nevertheless, the LMS was willing to work closely with the German 
administration, especially after being reassured of the freedom to carry out 
mission work without hindrance.54 But, high on the LMS agenda was the desire 
to re-establish the good association it had first enjoyed with the German 
administration. As mentioned earlier, the LMS was on the receiving end of Selfs 
anger many times. The most stinging attack faced by the LMS related to 
charges of disloyalty to the German administration. The most serious included 
'interfering with native conduct' and 'lack of respect shown on the occasion of 
the Kaiser's Birthday.'55 Self wrote to the LMS stating his outrage at Newell's 
action in stopping the Samoans' ta'alolo (presentation of gifts including ie toga) 
to honour the Kaiser on Sunday. For Self this was proof enough of disloyalty.56 
For the LMS it was a blatant violation of the 'Sabbath Law'. The incident not 
only became a catalyst for attacks on the LMS by the Germans, but also 
provided an avenue for other factions in the community to criticise the LMS.57 
Self used the opportunity to attack the LMS, calling upon them to "meet 
the wishes and aims of the government, and adapt themselves to the changed 
needs of this colony."58 Self then took the opportunity to point out there was a 
need for reform in the LMS's contributions, excessive church building, and 
53 Lizzy Moore to R. W. Thompson, 29 Nov, 1899, SSL 
54 Marriott to Thompson, 8 Jan, 1902, SSL. 
55 SOC, Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 13-18May1901, SSL 
56 Hills to Thompson, 24 Jul, 1901, SSL. 
57 For an example, a German in Savai'i named van Hayderbrent falsely accused the LMS missionary 
Beveridge of refusing to use German coins. He was later prosecuted for lying. See Huckett to Thompson, 
9 Sept, 1901, SSL; Interview with the Governor Dr Soll, 18 Apr, 1904, SSL. 
58 Soll to Hills, 12 Jun, 1901, SSL. 
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Sunday observances. Solf requested the LMS to adapt religious methods and 
observances to the German model in both religion and festivity. He also asked 
them to limit the cost of churches, and to urge the villages to combine to build 
one church for the use of several villages. On church contributions, Solf ordered 
that all such contributions be kept in Samoa.59 
The LMS felt threatened by Solf and, at the same time, was concerned at 
how the Samoans would respond if Solf carried out his proposed reforms.60 The 
LMS wrote to Solf and explained its position, and after some lengthy soul 
searching Solf exonerated the LMS of all charges and wished that both parties 
would maintain a close working relationship. Regarding Solfs attitude to annual 
contributions and church buildings, the LMS remained optimistic it was only a 
passing remark. 61 But German slanderous accusations about the LMS did not 
cease in Samoa and in Germany itself. One such attack in a newspaper in 
Germany almost destroyed German - LMS relations, but Newell's visit to 
Germany, where he met up with Solf, quickly restored peace.62 
The LMS went to great lengths to refrain from provoking the Germans. 
They went as far as making sure that Au Fa'atonu, as well as Samoan pastors, 
refrained from anti-German gestures. For instance, the Samoan pastors 
returning from Northwest Outstations were warned "to be careful not to draw 
comparisons between British officials in the Northwest Outstations and German 
officials in Samoa."63 Barradale also advised the pastors in each district of 
Samoa 
... to be loyal to the new government & to influence the people of 
their villages to yield a cheerful & ready obedience. They had long 
been asking God to give their land a settled government & now 
their prayers were answered. Let them be true to their Christian 
profession & above all things exercise a wise caution, so as not to 
59 Annual Report, Apia, Feb, 1902, SSR. 
60 Soll to Hills, 12 Jun, 1901, SSL; Marriott to Cousins, 26 Jul, 1901, SSL; Hills to Thompson, 7 Sept, 
1901, SSL. 
61 Huckett to Thompson, 9 Sept, 1901, SSL; Marriott to C. Cousins, 22 Aug, 1903, SSL; Huckett to 
Thompson, 23 Sept, 1903, SSL. 
62 A Lieut. Decker published a book in Germany, which mentioned the LMS had a negative attitude against 
German authority in Samoa. See Hills to Thompson, 20 Feb, 1902, SSL; Copy of Protest Send to German 
Newspaper, 17 Feb, 1902, SSL; Hills to Thompson, 6 Apr, 1902, SSL. 
63 SDC, Minutes of Meeting, Papauta, 2-5 Dec, 1901, SSL. Note: The term 'Northwest Outstation' was the 
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the LMS, primarily through the work of Samoan and Cook Island teachers. The islands included Kiribati 
and Tuvalu. 
create any circumstances that would hinder the work offered in 
Samoa.s4 
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But, despite the efforts by the LMS and the German administration to maintain 
peaceful working relationships, the two sides always managed to stumble 
across an insignificant issue that would provide a reason to continue animosity. 
For instance, the different attitudes towards Sunday observance prompted 
many arguments. 
The LMS missionaries were very strict observers of the 'sabbath law' -
keep it holy and no work or play on Sunday. The Germans, on the other hand, 
had a very different attitude to Sunday observance. They believed that the LMS 
observed the British Sunday and the Germans observed the German Sunday. 
The difference was that, the Germans took the attitude that Sunday finished at 
12.00pm in the afternoon, and Sunday afternoon was free for pursuing personal 
entertainment and recreation.ss The LMS soon began to experience problems 
with Samoans, especially afakasi (part-Europeans), attending German horse-
racing and dances held on Sundays. The LMS felt it was an attempt by the 
Germans to entice Samoans away from the church and "give the place a 
German atmosphere."ss It was not just an LMS problem, but one that held fears 
for all the missions. However, it was a problem the Germans were not going to 
compromise on. Solf pointed out that quiet Sabbaths were not familiar to 
Germans. The LMS maintained their stance and remarked that "Solf should not 
expect missions to be senile."s7 
The conflict over who had the right to use the Apia Protestant Church 
became an issue over who owned the same. It was a conflict that could have 
been avoided with a bit of diplomacy on both sides. It all started with a simple 
request from the German community to use the Apia Protestant Church for their 
services since they had obtained the services of Herr Beuteumuller, a German 
missionary.ss Newell felt he had to ask for advice from the Au Matutua (LMS 
directors) in London, because he believed the land was freehold and the church. 
64 V. A. Barradale to R. W. Thompson. 10 Jan. 1900, SSL. 
65 Marriott to C. Cousins, 22 Aug, 1903, SSL; Huckett to Thompson, 23 Sept, 1903, SSL. 
66 Huckett to Thompson, 2-10 Jul, 1903, SSL; Marriott to C. Cousins, 22 Aug, 1903, SSL; Huckett to 
Thompson, 23 Sept. 1903, SSL. 
67 Hills to Thompson, 28 Mar, 1903, SSL. 
68 Newell to Thompson, 14 Nov, 1903, SSL; Newell to Thompson, 15 Nov, 1903, SSL; Newell to 
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was bullt with no German contribution.69 But, Dr Erich Shultz, the German 
administration secretary and acting-Consul, pointed out that the church was 
built on Native land and all foreign nationalities in Apia contributed to its 
construction when it was under the Seamen's Foreign Mission. 
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Furthermore, the Germans claimed that the reference to the church as 
the 'Apia Foreign Church' suggested that the word 'foreign' applied to all foreign 
nationalities. The LMS, however, disagreed and took the word 'foreign' to mean 
'English Foreign Church.'70 The Reverend Walter Huckett also refuted Shultz's 
claim by writing a letter to the German newspaper Samoanische Zeitung. 
Hackett pointed out that the LMS had bought the land and the LMS contributed 
30,000 marks of the 32,000 marks total cost of the building. Solf became very 
angry at Huckett's comments being published in the newspaper and not shared 
with him personally first. Solf admitted the land did belong to the LMS, and that 
was the reason why they had asked for permission in the first place. Solf then 
told the LMS the Germans would use the church with or without LMS 
permission.71 Meanwhile, the Au Matutua approved the usage of the church by 
the Germans, although Huckett felt "the business is not quite as straight as we 
should like it to be, nor have the Germans shown that gentlemanly behaviour 
we expected."72 LMS missionary prejudices showed up plainly for all Germans 
to see. 
The conflicts between the LMS and the German administration were, at 
times, due to the Au Fa'atonu's lack of tact. The Apia Protestant Church issue is 
one example. But, there were also other issues, such as the German 
administration efforts to put all missions in German colonies under the control of 
the governor of the colony, even to the extent of removing missionaries, 
shutting up missions, and to controlling all mission schools. The proposals also 
suggested that if the locals retaliated, the missionaries would not remain neutral 
but take the side of the government.73 While Solfs proposal may have been 
harsh, it seems the missions, especially the LMS, indirectly contributed to Solfs 
radical plans of action. Earlier, Solf had written a stern letter to the Au Fa'atonu 
in Apia, pointing out the continuing interference of the Samoan pastors with the 
63 Newell to Thompson, 5 Feb, 1904, SSL. 
70 Huckett to Thompson, 23 Dec, 1904, SSL. 
71 Ridell to Huckett, 2 Mar, 1904, SSL 
72 Huckett to Thompson, 27 Feb, 1904, SSL. 
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duties of the Samoan government officials, especially those of the native 
magistrates. Solf points out that "the faifeau was so mamalu (influential) that the 
people would not testify against them. "74 Solf wanted the LMS to stop giving 
Samoan pastors titles of authority, and refrain from giving them any form of 
power and authority. Solf believed Samoan pastors were interfering too much 
with the daily work of the German administration. 
The LMS also angered the German administration by publishing an 
article in the church magazine, 0 le Su/u Samoa, which mentioned an outbreak 
of heresy in the German protectorate of South West Africa, now known as 
Namibia. Solf could only take the LMS action as a further attempt to make his 
administration look bad. The LMS, through Newell, apologised but it left a large 
scar in friendly relations. 75 Solt, at times, would retaliate by putting some 
restriction on LMS activities. For instance, Solf decided to recognise the fact 
that all Samoans were German citizens, and refused to allow any Samoans to 
leave the territory without special permits from Berlin. This affected the 
movement of Samoan missionaries throughout the Pacific. Solf commented that 
Samoans were dying in New Guinea and travel to such places needed 
regulating. He was quite happy for Samoans to travel to Tuvalu and Kiribati, as 
they were healthier.76 The LMS complained and pointed out that the regulations 
interfered with the work of the LMS, something that the German administration 
had promised not to do. Solf told Newell that he had the right and power to 
prevent any native leaving Samoa. He was concerned for the Samoans' health 
and safety. In the end, Solf conceded to pressure, especially after he was 
criticised for being anti-mission in failing to support efforts to propagate the 
gospel. Reluctantly, he allowed the LMS Samoan missionaries to travel to their 
mission stations without permits.77 Solf later explained his position more clearly 
to the various missions, especially to the WMMS and LMS. In a letter to the 
Reverend John W. Hills, he remarked that, 
74 Interview with the Governor, Dr. Solt, 18 Apr, 1904, SSL. 
75 Huckett to Thompson, 12 Apr, 1904, SSL. 
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... [he was] not in favour of the emigration of Samoans to countries 
with malaria fever like New Guinea and ... I had spoken already 
with one of the members I believe of the Wesleyan mission to the 
same effect. But I never went as far as to prohibit principally the 
propagation of the Christian creed by the Samoan teachers in 
foreign lands.78 
By the beginning of 1901, the German language was compulsory in all 
mission schools. In some cases, English was banned from the curriculum, 
although concessions were allowed for the teaching of English to students from 
islands under the control of English speaking governments. 79 The LMS began to 
bulk order German readers and literature for their schools. It was also decided 
to begin putting together a Samoan-German, German-Samoan dictionary, an 
undertaking that was gladly taken up and completed by Shultze in March 
1902.80 Towards the end of the year, the German community acknowledged 
Shultze's efforts at Papauta by attending an exhibition day at the school. The 
Papauta girls sang and recited German songs and literature to the delight of the 
German audience present.81 
The successful work done at Papauta by Shultze was a feather in the 
cap for the LMS. It was Papauta that the German authority could cite to confirm 
LMS support for German policies. The LMS's other major educational centre, 
the Malua Seminary, was also doing it's best to conform but did not have any 
German missionaries in the mould of Shultze. The Seminary relied heavily on 
the experience of Newell to carry out the German part of the curriculum. Self did 
his best to put pressure on Newell to obtain the services of a German 
missionary for Malua.82 In 1904, the Reverend Ernst F. W. Heider arrived in 
Samoa to teach and provide German instruction at Malua.83 Heider's 
appointment was welcomed by the LMS for it provided the German 
administration with further evidence of the LMS's effort to fulfil German policies. 
Self was so delighted with Newell's effort that he made Newell a close 
confidante. This relationship soon developed into one of trust, which not only 
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helped the LMS operate smoothly in Samoa, but also shaped Solrs own 
conviction that Samoans would be better Christians if guided sympathetically. 
Heider's effort in Malua helped develop and prepare Samoans to eventually 
teach the German language to students of the seminary at an elementary level. 
This took a load off Heider and Newell, allowing them to pursue other important 
matters.84 
However, by the beginning of 1910, maintaining the status quo was the 
real challenge for the missions. As German policies demanded more effort on 
the part of the missions with regard to education, the LMS contemplated 
reducing its mission activity in the Pacific. The proposal did not help the strained 
relationship between the LMS and the German administration. Hills had written 
a strong letter some years earlier, reminding the Au Matutua of the mission's 
need in Samoa. It seemed his plea fell upon deaf ears. Hills wrote, 
We have reached now the stage when we feel that our case is 
getting desperate and we can afford no longer to allow no 
representation as to our need to be informed in the fashion which 
has obtained hitherto. 85 
The Latu Pope succeeded in their efforts to fulfil German policies, and 
received the gratitude of the German administration. They opened a new school 
in Apia, to coincide with German expectations and, consequently, pressed the 
LMS to do likewise. Furthermore, the LMS could not sit back and allow many of 
the children of LMS adherents to attend a Latu Pope school because there was 
no similar Protestant school. The LMS missionary, John G. Hawker, was 
"disgusted" when he found out that the Malua tutor, Sa'aga, had enrolled his 
son Ropati at the Latu Pope school.86 In response, the LMS built a new school, 
but by the time it opened it had not found a German schoolmaster. There was a 
shortage of volunteers in Germany. Heider offered to help until a suitable 
person could be found, but it was a short-term solution, as Heider was also 
needed at Malua.87 
Hawker suggested getting a "German speaking British."88 The Reverend 
Perez Hall was eventually chosen but to the resentment of the German 
64 Newell to Thompson, 16 Apr, 1907, SSL. 
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administration. Dr Shultz, the new German Governor in place of Solf, sent for 
Hawker, Hills, and the Reverend James W. Sibree, to personally vent his 
frustration and disappointment at them choosing an Englishman. According to 
Shultz, it was "not at all in accordance with his sense of fitness ofthings."89 
Shultz believed that the appointment of Hall was an attempt by the LMS to 
"anglicize the Samoans."90 Shultz was also disappointed with Heider "for not 
better upholding German prestige in the colony."91 Shultz pointed out, as an 
example, the great work that the Catholic mission was doing in fulfilling German 
policies. Shultz then called upon the LMS to show a bit more loyalty to the 
German government and its policies and appoint a German pastor as 
schoolmaster. 92 
Shultz also told the LMS that it had no official status as a mission society 
under German law. Shultz commented that, "in their colonies all recognised 
Missionary bodies shall have liberty of conscience and permission to carry out 
their work. But. .. the LMS does not appear [in the official list of the German 
Administration], while the Roman Catholic Church does."93 Shultz had found a 
loophole to blackmail the LMS into conformity with German policies. The LMS 
told Shultz it was doing exactly the same thing as the Lotu Pope, and yet it 
escaped the administration's criticism. The LMS argued that the Lotu Pope was 
registering its schools as foreign schools and, therefore, was entitled to recruit 
any schoolmaster, receive Europeans, Samoans and part-European children, 
and could teach two foreign languages. On the other hand, if a school was 
registered as a Samoan school, then it must appoint a German schoolmaster, 
and could only receive Samoan children, and it was compulsory to teach 
German only as a foreign language. The LMS contested that the Lotu Pope had 
bypassed the requirement for a German schoolmaster for years. Shultz told the 
Au Fa'atonu to abide by the law, while he investigated the charges against the 
Lotu Pope.94 
89 Hills to Thompson, 23 Jul & 27 Aug, 1912, SSL. 
90 Hawker to Thompson, 23 Jul, 1912, SSL. 
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56 
Hills endorsed Shultz's suggestion and asked the Au Matutua to seek a 
missionary from the Rheinish Mission Society in Germany.95 Hills was also 
concerned that a Samoan school for Savai'i was also nearing completion and 
would also face the same staff shortage as the Maluafou school in Apia.96 The 
Au Matutua continued negotiations for one Herr Heiss but administration 
setbacks delayed his arrival.97 By the middle of 1913, the Maluafou School had 
obtained the services of one Herr Sawade, 96 but the Savai'i schools remained 
without German schoolmasters. It was a situation that prompted Sibree to write 
to London pointing out that the Catholics had German staff and the LMS efforts 
were laughed at.99 He pointed out that the LMS also faced a diminishing 
attendance role at their new school, due to the lack of white teachers at the 
school. 
Heider also tried to recruit teachers through private correspondence with 
suitable people in Germany. Heider in his efforts revealed that, perhaps, the Au 
Matutua was not trying hard enough. Heider pointed out that many Germans 
were willing to work in Samoa but the directors were rejecting their applications. 
Heider also believe that the German people were not informed widely by the 
LMS regarding their need for missionaries. Heider pointed out that Germany 
was at its height in mission activity especially in German colonies, and there 
was a strong lay movement for mission work. There was also strong support for 
mission from the Student Volunteer Movement, and the Teachers Mission 
Union, with some 6000 members. Heider believed the LMS was relying solely 
on prayers and advertising, and no action. In short, Heider believed the LMS 
was contributing to its own demise.100 Heider's premonition regarding the LMS's 
attitude towards Germans was not wrong. For as far back as 1904, the LMS 
missionaries in the mission fields had set up various criteria, which limited the 
scope for obtaining German missionaries. For instance, the LMS wanted all 
95 The Rhenish Missionary Society was very active in Papua New Guinea in the late nineteenth century. It 
was one of three German mission societies active during this period. The other two mission societies were 
the Neuendettelsau Mission and the Society of the Divine Word. For a good background on these German 
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the South Pacific: Emetyence in the Twentieth Century, Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1982. 
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German missionaries obtained to be subordinate to all English missionaries, 
and to select only Germans who were sympathetic to the LMS.101 
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Moreover, the LMS effort was not helped by the efforts of the Germans to 
entice Herr Sawade to serve at the new German school built opposite 
Maluafou.102 The school, according to the German administration, was built to 
cater for sons of matai. But, as far as the LMS was concerned, the German 
school was set-up to compete, and to eventually destroy LMS efforts.103 The 
LMS lost many of their children to the German and Lotu Pope schools. To make 
matters worse, the Mormons also opened a new school near Apia under a 
German American.104 The LMS eventually had to dismiss Herr Sawade, and 
engaged a German woman, Fraulein Haslermann, to assist them in the running 
of the school while negotiations were completing for the services of Herr Doll 
and Herr Muller.105 Herr Muller eventually got to Samoa after being stranded in 
Sydney because of the outbreak of war. 106 
Germany declared war in Europe and New Zealand troops arrived in 
August 1914, to secure Samoa. The German school was closed immediately 
and Sawade was taken prisoner. He was later released and he sought 
employment with the New Zealand administration. Colonel Robert Logan, the 
officer in command of the New Zealand Forces, refused him work on the 
grounds that he was untruthful, and told him to seek occupation with the LMS. 
Sawade left Samoa soon after. 107 
The outbreak of war meant the LMS eventually had to decide on what to 
do with their German missionaries, namely Carl A. A. Muller, Heider, and 
Shultze. Muller and his family were moved to Apia from Savai'i under New 
Zealand orders but, Heider was arrested and brought before Logan to answer to 
the charge of 'inciting the natives.' He was released after he had declared his 
intention of leaving Samoa and retiring from the LMS. 108 Hills wanted to retain 
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Heider, as he acknowledged his worthiness as a kind of 'government chaplain' 
during the German administration, but Heider became bitter and anti-British. He 
had been with Governor Shultz just before the Germans surrendered, but soon 
after, according to Hills, Heider seemed to have "lost his balance completely."109 
Hills wrote that Heider left Samoa soon after because of "the total collapse of all 
his hopes concerning the German language. He (had) worked prodigiously to 
make the teaching of German a success. At a moments notice it [was) swept 
away, and naturally [felt) very sore. "110 
Some of the LMS English missionaries wanted to retain their German 
colleagues in case Samoa reverted back to Germany after the war. This was 
the impression among many Samoans as well, whether Germany won the war 
or not. Hills warned the LMS not to "whitewash the German Governor" in its 
magazine, The Chronicle, just in case.111 But others, like Sibree, wanted his 
German colleagues deported. Sibree was the first to celebrate when Shultze 
left. 112 For a while, Heider was free to do as he pleased. But out of the blue, his 
house and possessions were thoroughly searched, and Heider and his friends 
were later interned in New Zealand. According to Sibree, Heider was expelled 
from Samoa because "his influence over the Samoans was not to the 
advantage of the ... Administrator."113 In New Zealand, Heider sought help from 
the Au Matutua to secure his release. He asked the LMS to consider his ten-
year service with them, especially his work for the LMS during the German 
administration. 114 The directors sought clarification of Heider's internment from 
the New Zealand administration in Samoa as the "Society naturally wished to 
know if he [Heider] had acted in such a way that would affect his relation with 
the Society."115 Logan pointed to Shultz's diary, which implicated Heider as part 
of a group that had met just before the arrival of New Zealand troops in Samoa. 
Logan wrote to the directors, "Heider's influence on the Samoans was after 
109 Hills to Lenwood, 27 Sept, 1914, SSL. 
110 Hills to Lenwood, 27 Sept, 1914, SSL. 
111 Hills to Lenwood, 5 & 13 Mar, 1915, SSL; Hills to Lenwood, 3 Apr, 1915, SSL. 
112 In a written note, Shultze remarked that "it was so hard to leave my 120 beloved girls ... ", See Miss 
Shultze, Note, 14 Sept, 1919, London Missionary Society South Seas Archives, South Seas Personals 
(henceforth SSP). 
113 Sibree to F. H. Hawkins, 20 Dec, 1915, SSL. 
114 Heider to Lenwood, 10Apr, 1916, SSL. 
115 Sibreeto Hawkins and Lenwood, 17 Jun, 1916, SSL. 
careful observation detrimental to British rule, and subversive to the peaceful 
government of Samoa."116 
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The war took its toll on German resources and there was talk that it 
would soon be over. The LMS used the turn of events to discuss its future in 
Samoa, especially in relation to staff. Sibree maintained his stance of not 
allowing Shultze and Heider to return.117 As for Muller, Sibree would have liked 
to see him deported as well. Sibree pointed out that he was not anti-German. 
He felt Shultze was no longer young and had served long enough for the LMS, 
while Muller was only appointed for a special task and his services were no 
longer required.118 But Sibree's motive was racial. He was a British nationalist 
and wanted nothing to do with Germans. He wrote to Lenwood stating that "it 
has been one constant jarring of nerves and feeling and the engendering of 
unchristian thoughts. You give a German an inch and he will take an ell. He is 
forever on the lookout for slights, and forever finding faults."119 Earlier, Sibree 
had condemned the petition by several planters and Europeans to prevent 
Samoa from being governed by New Zealand, preferring to keep it German.120 
Lenwood openly criticised Sibree and other LMS missionaries for the 
lack of forgiveness of their German missionaries, but Sibree defended himself 
by pointing the finger at the Germans themselves for "endangering our work 
and our future relations with the Administration."121 Sibree also pointed out that 
his premonition regarding his German colleagues was correct when they were 
arrested by the New Zealand Administration. Sibree represented the intolerant 
side of a small number of LMS British missionaries, as well as the attitude of 
some LMS directors towards German missionaries, but there were people, such 
as Hills who represented a small group who had some compassion and 
sympathy for their fellow workers in Christ. 122 Lenwood did not openly criticise 
the German staff of the LMS, but nevertheless, he had a dislike for them. In a 
letter to the Reverend Francis. H. Hawkins, he betrayed his feelings by pointing 
116 Sibree to Hawkins and Lenwood, 17 Jun, 1916, SSL. 
117 Sibree to Lenwood, 31Aug,1917, SSL; SOC, Minutes of Meetings, Malua, 29 Apr-8May1920, SSL. 
118 Shultze to Lenwood, 26 Dec, 1917, SSL; Sibree to Lenwood, 21 Feb, 1918, SSL. 
119 Sibree to Lenwood, 21 Feb, 1918, SSL. 
120 Sibree to Lenwood, 28 Jan, 1916, SSL. 
121 Sibree to Lenwood, 4 Apr, 1917, SSL; Sibree to Hawkins & Lenwood, 17 Jun, 1916, SSL; Logan to 
Sibree, 16May1916, SSL. 
122 Sibree to F. H. Hawkins, 20 Dec, 1915, SSL; Hills to Lenwood, 27 Sept, 1914, SSL; Sibree to 
Lenwood, 4Apr, 1917, SSL. 
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out that all German staff, except Shultze, were patriotic and discussed the war 
"with a good deal of bad temper."123 Lenwood wanted to make it clear that he 
did not want any Germans on the LMS staff. 
The LMS's German missionaries in Samoa were officially relieved of their 
services after it became known that Samoa would no longer be under German 
administration in 1918. At a meeting of the Au Fa'atonu in Malua, the services 
of Muller, Heider, and especially Shultze, were fully acknowledged. 124 Shultze 
had left sometime after New Zealand's occupation of Samoa on her own 
accord. She wrote to the Secretary of the LMS, outlining just how strongly she 
felt for her country, and how she sympathised with her country during the war 
crisis. She pointed out that England had "not entered this war out of purely 
disinterested motives; and that Germany and our Kaiser did not want the war 
but that they were forced to it."125 Shultze felt her work in Samoa was a priority 
and it was hard to leave the girls at Papauta. However, she did have great 
concern for her family back in Germany. In the end, Shultze's passion for her 
country, and great fear for her family, finally persuaded her to leave Samoa in 
1915.126 
Heider on the other hand returned to Germany in October 1916. Heider 
was paid in advance a year and a halfs' salary, while Shultze received only her 
normal salary while she remained outside Germany. 127 Muller, on the other 
hand, was the last to leave Samoa. He had arrived just as Germany declared 
war in Europe. He had left his family back in Germany, and they had only 
managed to join him after several pleas to the Au Matutua. And even then, two 
of his children were too old to accompany Muller and had to be left behind in 
Germany.128 He worked wherever the LMS appointed him. The Au Fa'atonu had 
never liked him although he was accepted in December 1915, as a bona fide 
LMS member.129 He continued to work in Apia for the LMS doing all kinds of 
123 Lenwood to Hawkins, 24 & 27 Oct, 1915, SSL 
124 SDC, Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 29 Apr - 8 May 1920, SSL. 
125 Shultze to Lenwood, 15 Jan, 1915, SSL 
126 Miss Shultze 'Note', 14 Sept, 1919, SSP. 
127 Shultze died in Germany in 1935 and the Papauta School erected a house in her honour and called it 
'O le Fale Sulesa.' See, Muller to Lenwood, no date, SSL; Sarai (Acting Principal), 'The Story of Papauta,' 
in News From Afar, Nov, 1945, SSP. 
128 Muller to Lenwood, 31 Dec, 1914, SSL; Muller to Lenwood, 15 Mar, 1915, SSL; Sibree to F. H. 
Hawkins, 20 Dec, 1915, SSL; Muller to Lenwood, 26 & 27 May 1916, SSL; Sibree to Bradford. 23 Aug, 
1917, SSL; Lenwood, Journal no. 6, Fiji, 29 Jul, 1915, Frank Lenwood, Journal Letters on Deputation, 
South Seas and Papua, 1915-1916, [copy in possession of Dr. Niel Gunson]. 
129 Hills to Lenwood, 23 Mar, 1915, SSL; SDC -Minutes of Meeting, Papauta, 14-17 Dec, 1915, SSL. 
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tasks. In January 1919, Muller wrote to the directors to reconfirm his position as 
an LMS missionary in Samoa as his contract was due to expire. Muller wrote, 
I am not working as a German in the mission, but as an 
International being, which is not influenced by wars or politics. I 
just want to do my work for Christ and serve the mission faithfully, 
and I expect just to be judged whether I am qualified for the work 
or not.13b 
Muller's request was never acknowledged. Instead. he found out his fate 
when the New Zealand government ordered all German citizens to leave 
Samoa. 131 He left Samoa in the SS Main in June 1920, receiving only his basic 
salary until he reached Germany.132 Muller wrote to Hough to spare him the 
indignity and embarrassment. He wrote, "we don't want to be sent away like 
criminals and that our committee and society should protest against it."133 Muller 
had arrived in Samoa a free man and had served the LMS faithfully, and he 
expected full support from the LMS, but the best the LMS could do for Muller 
and his family was to pay the extra £26 (pounds) for their first class travel in the 
SS Main. 134 The Au Fa'atonu in Samoa was relieved to see Muller depart from 
Samoa. He was the last of any German reminder of the LMS mission, the last 
hurdle to negotiate in order to return the LMS mission to British domination. 
The LMS 's problems were not restricted to internal issues. As we have 
seen, the society continuously came into confrontation with the German 
administration. But, that was not all. The LMS also had to defend itself, and deal 
with charges and allegations raised by the Lotu Pope. The conflict between the 
two missions in the twentieth century was a consequence of mission 
confrontation during the nineteenth century. The promotion of a single 
government did not help to abate hostility. Instead, it provided an environment 
for promoting self-interest at the expense of the other. The installation of losefo 
as Ali'i Sili may have helped to unite the Samoans politically but it created a rift 
among the Samoans religiously. The LMS held the opinion that losefo would 
wield his influence on the German administration to gain favoured status for 
Catholics in matters of religion. German administration records of Samoa during 
130 Muller to Lenwood, 25 Jan, 1919, SSL. 
131 Muller to Lenwood, 25 Jan, 1919, SSL. 
132 The LMS missionaries in Samoa had earlier complaint about LMS's proposal of paying all of Mulle~s 
expenses to Germany. It never eventuated. See J. H. Morley to Bradford, 10 Mar, 1915, SSL. 
133 Muller to Hough, 31 May, 1920, SSL. 
134 Joseland to Bradford, 19 Jun, 1920, SSL. 
1900 - 1914 reveal many conflicts between the LMS and Catholic adherents, 
which were either instigated by losefo, or he was seen to interfere with its 
development and outcome. 
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For instance, a religious disagreement between the Catholics and the 
LMS at the village of Solosolo started over a "disrespectful" remark by a Lotu 
Pope tu/afa/e (matai orator) regarding the amounts of food apportioned to the 
LMS faifeau (pastor) and Catholic priest. The tulafafe had charged the LMS with 
giving their priest a smaller portion. He also remarked on the unwillingness of 
the LMS to work together by failing to invite Catholic adherents to help in the 
building of the LMS church. The LMS refuted the claims and charged the 
Catholics with failing to take part in the LMS ta'a/o/o.135 The villagers settled 
their own dispute and Solf accepted their reconciliation efforts, but losefo raised 
the matter with Solf again, putting the blame wholly on the LMS. losefo asked 
Solf to dismiss Seiuli, a government pu/enu'u, and an LMS member, for the 
disturbance.136 Solf did not respond to losefo's request. He wrote later that 
losefo's judgement had been clouded by his favouring the Lotu Pope, and was 
not based upon the facts. 137 
losefo's interference had rekindled the conflict and the villagers were 
pressed to find a solution. The matai Pulepule was at the centre of reconciliation 
efforts. By July, Solt was advised that the Solosolo people had reconciled their 
religious differences, 138 but the religious conflict continued to surface often, 
especially when government officials were at odds with one another. For 
instance, Napoleone, one of the pufenu'u lodged a complaint with Shultz 
regarding efforts by LMS pulenu'u to stop him from attending mass. The 
charges were later proven false and Napoleone was exiled from Solosolo.139 
The Catholic - LMS conflict at Sam usu regarding the building of an LMS 
pastor's house was also initiated by losefo. He claimed ownership of the land in 
question. Solt advised both parties to seek the guidance of the Lands and Titles 
Commission to resolve their dispute.140 A similar dispute also involved fosefo 
135 Memo by Te'o Tuvale, 11May1905, GAP. 
"'" Solf lo Ali'i & FP Solosolo, 10 Jun, 1905, GAP; LMS Aii"i & FP Solosolo to Solf, 27 May 1905, GAP; 
Ma!a'afa to Soll, no date. GAP. 
137 Minutes, Solf, 10 Jun, 1905, GAP. 
138 Pulepule to Solf, 27 Jun, 1905, GAP; Pulepule to Solf, 19 Jul, 1905, GAP. 
'
30 Napoleone to Shultz, 18 Nov, 1906, GAP. 
140 Solf to Mata'afa, 1 Sept, 1905, GAP. 
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terminating the building of a pastor's house at Tufutafoe. He also claimed the 
house was built on his land. He ordered the LMS pastor to leave, but the pastor 
refused, and refuted losefo's claim.141 In another matter, !osefo found himself in 
dispute with the Gautavai LMS. Tagaloa, the paramount matai of the village, 
and the rest of the LMS clan, were incensed at losefo introducing a Catholic 
catechist to Gautavai. Tagaloa claimed that Gautavai matai in the past had 
passed a law to promote only LMS affairs within their village. 142 Solf wrote to 
Tagaloa to express his concern at losefo's action and to reassure Tagaloa that 
the German administration would honour the law already passed by Gautavai. 
Solf also wrote to losefo and informed him not to use his position as Ali'i Sili to 
"promote Roman Catholic propaganda."143 
losefo never missed an opportunity to exercise his authority, whether it 
be through the political arena or the church. By 1910, he was still involved 
politically and religiously in matters out of his jurisdiction. In 1911, he was at the 
centre of a controversy over boundaries of the various villages in Aleipata. 
losefo had made a decision favouring his own interests in Amaile village.144 
Shultz investigated the various claims later and found losefo to have misled the 
Samoans and German administration regarding the boundaries, but his actions 
also created animosity between Catholics and LMS members involved in the 
dispute.145 losefo was very much a puppet in the hands of the Lotu Pope. The 
German Pastor, Herr Holzhausen, observed that losefo was "entirely in the 
hands of Dr. Broyer ... [and he] allows himself to be led by the Roman 
Bishop. "146 
Samoan customs became the centre of much controversy between the 
German administration, the missions, and Samoan people. The Samoans 
wanted to keep the status quo, the missions wanted to Christianise everything, 
while the German government just wanted to be rid of it totally. The most 
debated issues included marriage and divorce laws, which the German 
141 Memo by Taylor, 20 Apr, 1905, GAP; Mala'afa to Ali'i and FP LMS Tufu, 2 Jan, 1905, GAP; Mata'afa to 
Taele, lsaia, Amituanai and Tuisafie, 23 Mar, 1905, GAP; Mata'afa to Sibree, 5 Apr, 1905, GAP. 
142 Tagaloa to Solf, 9 Mar, 1903, GAP. 
143 Soll lo Tagaloa, 19 Mar, 1903, GAP; Solf to Mata'afa, 19 Mar, 1903, GAP; Annual Report of the 
Matautu and TuasM Districts, 1903, SSR. 
144 Mata'afa to Shultz (Act-Gov.), 28 Oct, 1910, GSA; Shultz to Ali'i & Faipule of Amalle, 14 Nov, 1910, 
GSA. 
145 Shultz to Mata'afa, 12 Mar, 1911, GSA. 
146 Newspaper Article by Pastor Holzhausen in Reichshote, Berlin, 28-29 Jul, 1901, NP. 
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government tried to unify under the German system. The interpretation of the 
new rules and regulations was diverse, and it covered religious marriages, civil 
marriages, mixed marriages, and the Samoan custom of avaga (eloping).147 
The other pressing issue was in relation to land alienation, which looked 
at legitimising land claims by Europeans, traders, as well as scrutinising land 
applications for trade and commercial purposes by outside interests.148 The 
Germans also looked at ways of protecting the lands still in Samoan family 
ownership. Solf was quite severe in his comments on people who tried to take 
advantage of the Samoan land situation. Although, it was a never an issue with 
regard to his dealings with Deutsche Handel and Plantagen Gesellschaft 
(DHPG) land claims.149 There were also the issues of burial locations,150 
Samoan protocol in relation to fa'alupega (honorary title designations) and gafa 
(family generations),151 and borrowing using a credit system. 152 The credit 
system, usually guaranteed with the next copra harvest, led to a lot of problems. 
For the Samoans, non-repayment of credits led to the loss of family land. For 
the missions, it meant receiving very little in terms of contributions and very little 
funds available for new church building projects. For the German administration, 
it caused a lot of headaches as Samoans asked for loans to prevent traders 
possessing their land.153 The credit system was the easiest way for a Samoan 
to incur debt. The LMS missionary Harry S. Griffin remarked, 
147 For examples, see Huckett to Thompson, 2-1 o Jul, 1903, SSL; Mata'afa to Schnee, 13 Aug, 1902, 
GAWS; Memo by Taylor, 1 Aug, 1904, GSA; Memo by Taylor, 16 Aug, 1904, GSA; Minutes of Solt, 7 Oct, 
1904, GSA; Abuse of Power by Suatele, no date, GSA; Suatele to Solt, 17 Aug, 1901, GSA; Solt to 
Mata'afa, 19Aug, 1901, GSA; Memo by Taylor, 13 Feb, 1911, GAP; Memo byTolo, 3Sept,1910, GAP; 
Stockicht to Shultz, 10 Sept, 1910, GAP; Villiers to Trood, 4 Mar, 1901, BCS; Langley (Foreign Office) to 
Trood, 19 Jul, 1901, BCS; Huckett to Hunter, 29 Apr, 1900, BCS; Trood to Schlettwein (Imperial Judge), 
24 Dec, 1910, BCS; Newell to Dr. Kurze, 21Jul,1902, NP. 
148 Shultz to Solt, 11 Jun, 1903, GSA; Lands and Trtles Commission, xvii, A.3, 1903-1914, GSA; Solt to 
Mata'afa, 2 Dec, 1900, GAP; Solfs Minutes, 8 Nov, 1904, GAP; Auelua to Solt, 15 May 1905, GAP; 
Agreement sign by Mata'afa and Solf, 15 Jan, 1908, GAP; Ali'i and Faipule of Samusu to Solf, 23 Nov, 
1910, GAP. Note: Solf issued a proclamation in 1907 forbidding the sale of Samoan land. See Solfto AA 
(Berlin), 4 Mar, 1907, GAP; see also Hunter to Goodwin (Rarotonga), 23 May 1900, BCS. 
149 This was the biggest German company in Samoa. It was originally known as Godeffroy and Sohn. See 
Skeen to Walter Coumbe, 2 Nov, 1900, BCS; Solfto Trood, 27 Nov, 1900, BCS; Wulff (Samoa Estate Ltd) 
to Trood, 11 Jan, 1901, BCS; Weaver (Samoa Estate Ltd) to Trood, 26 Jan, 1901, BCS; Solf to Weaver, 
22 Jan, 1901, BCS; Solfto Trood, 17 Aug, 1901, BCS. 
150 Samoa Grave Yards, xvii, A.9, 1911-1914, GSA. 
151 The debate over who had authority in Samoa was finally put at rest when the Germans changed 
Samoa's fa'a/upega from one which gave honour to the tama-a-aiga to one which honoured the Kaiser and 
the German government See New Faalupega of Samoa, 12 Jun, 1913, GSA. 
152 Statement by Solf to AA (Berlin), 23 Nov, 1905, GSA; Bayerlein to Solt, 29 Jul, 1907, GSA; Statute 
Drafted and Sent to Ali'i & Faipule of Villages, no date, GSA; DH&PG to Shultz, 21 Feb, 1908, GSA; 
Williams to Shultz, 4 Feb, 1910, GSA. 
153 Sagapolutele (PN Saluafata) to Solt, 14 Nov, 1907, GSA; Moors to Solf, 16 Nov, 1907, GSA; Gilson 
Papers, vol 8, 1912, GAP; Memo by Laupe T., 24 Feb, 1912, GAP; Hough (I.MS) to Shultz, 14 Feb, 1912, 
GAP; Morley to Shultz, 21Oct,1913, GAP. 
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He [Samoan] has no conscience in such matters .... Childlike, the 
Samoan wants everything he sees; the price and where he is to 
raise it, troubles him but little as long as he gets his desire. The 
inducements to run up debts become greater as the competition 
among traders becomes keener and in many cases the prospect 
of paying back are remote indeed.154 
German administration to 1914 did not satisfy Samoan aspirations, nor 
did it fully accomplish mission expectations. In the end, the Samoans accepted 
the existing conditions and hoped for a better deal from the Germans. The LMS 
remained British in its efforts to Christianise the Samoans, but was well aware 
of its commitment to the German regime. When Solf left Samoa in 1910, the 
LMS congratulated Solf for the work he had done for Samoa. In an address 
given in German, English, and Samoan, the LMS expressed their satisfaction 
"with the work over the last 1 O years on the development of the people and the 
general progress of the colony."155 Most of all, the LMS expressed their 
gratitude to Solf for the religious liberty enjoyed by all missions in Samoa, and 
especially the German government for recognising the "uplifting influence of 
religious institutions upon the native character, and has sought to encourage 
the growth and development of native sentiment and native customs on 
enlightened lives. "156 
During Shultz's time as governor the same issues continued, which 
previously besieged the Solf administration. Samoan officials remained arrogant 
and continued to make decisions contrary to the welfare and interests of the 
Samoan people, in order to promote their own self-esteem and self-interest. 
The LMS continued to face hostility from the Latu Pope, and vice versa. Shultz's 
administration continued to put into practice more rules and regulations, 
supposedly for the welfare of the Samoans. The laws and regulations regarding 
the keeping of pigs enclosed, dogs muzzled, the usage of firearms, intoxication 
laws, gambling laws, and the use of common burial grounds, kept the Samoans 
busy. Most of the time the Samoans spent their time working off a fine, or 
spending time in prison, for breaking such laws and regulations.157 The 
154 H. S. Griffin to Thompson, 19 Feb, 1907, SSR. 
155 Address by LMS to Soll on Completion of 10 years Rule in Samoa, no date, PMB 143; see also LMS to 
Soll, 1910, NP. 
156 Address by LMS to Soll on Completion of 10 years Rule in Samoa, no date, PMB 143; see also, Newell 
to Herbert Newell, 14 Mar, 1910, NP. 
157 For examples, Order by Soll, 1 Sept, 1901, GSA; Shultz to Fries, no date, GSA; Soll to Fries (Police 
Inspector), 10 May 1904, GSA; Soll to Ali'i & FP Levi, 30 May 1904, GSA; Draft Amendment to Pig 
Ordinance, Jun, 1904, GSA. 
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Samoans, however, complained that the laws and regulations were aimed at 
them, as papalagi did not seem to abide by them.158 Shultz also received 
complaints of favouritism towards Samoans by Samoan officials in cases 
between Europeans and Samoans. Samoan officials were also alleged to over-
charge Samoans in fines for offences committed. The German administration 
was, at times, found wanting in enforcing its laws and regu!ations.159 
When New Zealand took over Samoa in August 1914, the relationship 
between the German administration, the LMS, and the Samoans, was one of 
familiarity but full of contradictions. All sides remained committed to their own 
aims and aspirations, but were not really fulfilling them to a degree of complete 
satisfaction. They all had good intentions but none achieved anything because 
of the animosity and selfishness of each side. The occupation of Samoa took 
away Germany's chance of improving its prestige. The Australian statesman, 
Alrfed Deakin, best summed up Germany's failure some years before the 
German administration fell. He wrote that Samoa was still "far removed from 
other German interests in the Pacific, and merely as planting and trading 
stations, they can never become so valuable as to make their retention a matter 
of great moment to Germany."160 Deakin was probably right. If Germany had 
failed in Samoa, it was because Samoa was just an enormous plantation rather 
than a proud possession. 
Notwithstanding Germany's unexpected demise, New Zealand's 
presence gave the Samoans, and the LMS, a chance to begin afresh the 
struggle to fulfil their aspirations and expectations, under a familiar, although 
insignificant, ally. For the Samoans, the deeds of Lauaki Namulau'ulu 
Mamoe, 161 and other revolutionary thinking matai during Solfs reign, personified 
the ultimate aspirations of all Samoans - the desire to be self-governing, the 
longing to be economically self-sufficient, and the expectation of fully restoring 
Samoan etiquette. The Oloa controversy and the Mau-a-Pule conflict were two 
significant events in the Samoan people's struggle to achieve its aspirations. 
158 For examples. Solfto Krauss, 12Apr, 1904, GSA; Fries to Government, 7 Jun, 1904, GSA; Solf to 
Scanlon, 20 Jun, 1904, GSA; Kauffman to Solf, 6 Nov, 1904, GSA; Solt to Stockicht, 11 Nov, 1904, GSA. 
159 Minutes, Solf, 19 Dec, 1903, GSA 
""'Allred Deakin to Governor - General Office, 23 Dec, 1907, Archives of the Great Britain Foreign Office. 
151 Lauaki Namulau'ulu Mamoe was one of the most significant figures in Samoa politics. His political 
endeavours will be discussed in Chapter Three and more fully in Chapter Four of !his study. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE OLOA KAMUPANI CONTROVERSY 
The Samoan (LMS) Church failed to function to its capacity as it got 
bogged down with Germany's administration policies. We saw in the previous 
chapter the relationship between the administration and the LMS was cordial 
but inflexible. As the LMS fought to maintain its mission status and spirituality, 
Samoans were more interested in exploring ways to avoid and reverse Selfs 
political and social agenda. The Samoan leaders found little assistance from the 
missions as they were having their own problems with the Germans. It was left 
to the Samoans themselves to explore avenues to vent their frustration and fulfil 
their aspirations. During the German administration the Samoan political 
leaders exploited two such opportunities, the Oloa Kamupani and The Mau a 
Pule. The Oloa Kamupani is the focus of this chapter.1 
The end of the nineteenth century found Samoa developed economically 
as more and more planters, traders, and merchants arrived to accomplish their 
purposes. Under a government that promoted large-scale business ventures, 
Samoa became one of Germany's most lucrative South Sea possessions. The 
Samoans slowly became aware of the wealth that was slipping through their 
fingers to European pockets and soon worked out that having plenty of money 
carried with it prestige and power. Therefore, it was not surprising that some 
Samoans in 1905 contemplated starting a company for the benefit of Samoans. 
Economic benefit, however, was not the only motive behind the business 
venture. The Samoans, especially losefo and the powerful Tumua and Pule, 
had major aspirations to fulfil. Although they had yielded to German rule, they 
continued to seek avenues to achieve their hopes and dreams. In order to 
understand the passion of the Samoans to succeed in such a business venture, 
we need only refer to the climate of political delusion.2 
1 The Mau a Pule will be dealt with in Chapter Four. The Samoan (LMS) Church also had problems with 
the LMS itself during the German administration, and these conflicts will be dealt together with other issues 
relating to leadership and authority in Chapter Ten. 
2 The kingship conflict from 1898 resulted in Samoans being condemned as the catalyst of all the troubles 
in Samoa, and led soon after to the abolition of the kingship office, in place of a more stable government, 
which in 1900 was fulfilled by Germany. See Chapter One for discussion. See also Western Samoa, 
Historical Notes, Apr, 1935, Island Territories Archives (henceforth IT), IT/1, Ex 2115. 
When Germany took over Samoa in 1900, the Samoans felt that Solf 
was appointed by the Kaiser to govern Samoa together with losefo, and the 
thirteen Faipule representing Tumua and Pule. In a letter written to the Kaiser 
by losefo, he reaffirmed this point. He wrote, 
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I rejoice greatly to obey your Majesty, because the Tumua and 
Pule have assigned to me the rule (pule) according to Samoan 
customs, and I alone - the High Chief - am able to make Samoa 
obey my commands, and, consequently, to make it possible for all 
persons (including myself), to obey your Majesty's commands.3 
losefo also wrote to Solf, asking him "to order that the laws for the 
Samoans be made in conformity to the rules and customs of Samoa."4 In the 
letter he reaffirmed that Tumua and Pule gave him the authority and right to 
pule. However, Solfs speech on 17August 1900 to the Faipule in Mulinu'u, laid 
to rest any doubts as to who ruled. Solf clearly stated his position and the 
position of Germany. 
Nobody may rule in the country except the Governor; his power 
extends over the white inhabitants of the islands and over you 
Samoans. It is not the intention of the German Government to 
force you to adopt our morals and customs: the Government has 
regard for your old traditions, and respects them in as far as they 
do not offend against the precepts of Christianity, or the well-being 
and safety of any individual. The Government reposes confidence 
in you that you are able to administer your own affairs under the 
supervision and control of the Governor. .. 5 
Solf had carried out the organisation of the government as he intended, 
reconciling the various Samoan factions, abolishing the kingship, and breaking 
up the power of Tumua and Pule.6 Solf got losefo to accept some of his rival 
matai as government officials. He also spoke to the head of the Lotu Pope, 
Bishop Pierre Breyer, "who had long been losefo's confessor, to convince the 
High Chief of the impossibility of the tupu [king] idea, and to impress upon him 
the injustice of one-sided party politics."7 
losefo took the disappointment humbly and satisfied Solf with his 
personal assurance to conform. However, he continued to seek advice and 
guidance from Tumua and Pule, while playing cat and mouse with the German 
3 A Report of the Governor Dr. Soll to the Colonial Office in Berlin, 19 Apr, 1900, Grattan Papers, MS-
Paper 4879 (henceforth GP). 
4 Mata'afa losefo to Self, 9 Mar, 1900, GP. 
5 Address of the Governor to the Samoan Chiefs in Mulinuu on 17 August, 1900, GP. 
6 Report of Governor Soll, 4 Sept, 1900, GP. 
7 Report of Governor Solt, 4 Sept, 1900, GP. 
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administrator. losefo cunningly wove his way out of mayhem with Solf. He used 
his wit and fa'asamoa to manipulate every conceivable avenue to maintain his 
German given powers, or better still, regain his Samoan authority. losefo, 
nevertheless, relied on Tumua and Pule to maintain his traditional authority. 
Tumua and Pule, on the other hand, needed losefo as the vehicle for 
expressing pule in Samoa. At times, losefo would backslide and seem to 
relinquish his nonconformist spirit to the continuous provocation of the German 
government. Tumua and Pule would continually recharge losefo's interest, and 
keep him on track of their political design. 
By the end of Solfs third year in office, losefo had resigned himself to 
fulfilling his position as Ali'i Sili in the manner expected of him. Solf from time to 
time rewarded losefo for his loyalty by granting him special privileges and he 
tried to keep him honest through monetary and personal gifts.8 It was also 
during this time that Solf began to discern the intricate, but strong and firm 
relationship between losefo and Tumua and Pule. In particular, Solf singled out 
two matai, Moefa'auo and Lauaki (known also as Lauati). The former, Solf 
described as being "too well known to the Samoans in general, and his words 
have little effect.. .. a man always hankering after money."9 Solf, however, was 
more concerned about Lauaki Namulau'ulu Mamoe. He referred to him as "a 
grand; eloquent speaker, [who] carries much weight in the eyes of the 
Samoans. Hence he has many followers."10 Political antics and his forceful 
demeanour fuelled Lauaki's popularity among the Samoans. Although he was 
an LMS adherent, he also fostered good relationships with Catholic adherents 
because of his relationship with losefo. Lauaki was able to command respect 
and support from many Samoans. 11 
Solf met losefo at Moto'otua in November 1903, and informed him of his 
concern regarding the power and authority that Tumua and Pule seemed to 
have usurped. Solfwas also concerned at losefo's lack of action to control 
8 Solt. Auswartige Amt, Berlin, 14 May 1900, series 1- 4, Gemian Administration of Western Samoa 
(henceforth GAWS); Auswartige Amt (Colonial Dept.) to Solt, 31 Oct, 1900, GAWS. 
9 Memo of Conference Between Governor Solt and High Chief Mataafa, Moto'otua, C. Taylor, 27 Nov, 
1903, GP. 
10 Memo of Conference Between Governor Solt and High Chief Mataafa, Moto'otua, C. Taylor, 27 Nov, 
1903, GP. 
11 Lauaki's role in the Oloa Kamupani was important, but he was just part of a group of Faipule and ex-
Faipule working with Mata'afa to achieve a variety of aims. Lauaki was at the forefront of the Mau a Pule. 
Lauaki's biography and achievements, including his LMS connections, will be discussed fully in Chapter 
Four. 
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Tumua and Pule. Solt told losefo that he had "at last found the real mischief 
makers in Samoa"12 in Lauaki and Moefa'auo. Solf told losefo that he was 
concerned about the rumours that Lauaki had been spreading among the 
Samoans. According to Solf, the rumours had started after a meeting with the 
Samoan officials at Mulinu'u regarding Suatele's resignation as the Samoan 
Fa'amasino Sili (Samoan Chief Justice). Solf decided not to seek a 
replacement. 13 Lauaki argued strongly and forcefully with Solt to retain the post, 
but give it to a stronger Samoan matai. Perhaps Lauaki had himself in mind. 
Solt remained firm and dismissed Lauaki's motion without further deliberation. 
Lauaki accused Solt of poisoning Samoan minds by saying: 
Oh, the Governor is a very good man, but he is too tricky. At first 
he cuts up all the different districts so as to weaken them, and 
gradually takes away the power from the Taitai /tu (district 
officers), and lastly, he deprives the Samoans of the high position 
of Faamasino Sili. After this the Governor will even take away the 
position of Le Alii Sili, so that no higher office remains for the 
Samoan people.14 
Lauaki taunted Solf with his antics. Lauaki told the people at Lealatele, 
Savai'i, who were mainly Lotu Pope, not to obey Solf, and that in him alone "all 
the powers of the good old faa-samoa are vested."15 In 1902, he took matters 
into his own hands and stopped Samoans working on government projects until 
they received fair wages and adequate food rations.16 
Solf would have been threatened by Lauaki's actions. Solf believed 
Lauaki was capable of instilling fear in the hearts of every Samoan, including 
losefo. Solf also understood that losefo knew very well that Lauaki, the man of 
'a thousand tongues,' conducted himself in such a manner in order to 
undermine German authority. 17 Solt also told losefo in their meeting that he had 
12 Memo of Conference Between Governor Solf and High Chief Mataafa, Moto'otua, C. Taylor, 27 Nov, 
1903, GP; Memo for H. E. by C. Taylor, 27 Nov, 1903, German Secretariat Archives (henceforth GSA). 
13 Report by the 'Condor' Commander, 30 Mar, 1904. GP. 
14 Memo of Conference Between Governor Solf and High Chief Mataafa, Moto'otua, C. Taylor, 27 Nov, 
1903, GP; Memo for H. E. by C. Taylor, 27 Nov, 1903, GSA. 
15 Memo of Conference Between Governor Solf and High Chief Mataafa, Moto'otua, C. Taylor, 27 Nov, 
1903, GP; Minute, Solf, 5 Sept, 1900, Gilson Papers - Saleaula, XVII. C.3., Gilson - Pacific Manuscript 
Bureau (henceforth PMB) 479; Minute, Solf, 3 Nov., 1900, PMB 479; Report by Sooalo Tolo on the 
Lealatele Affair, 10 Jun, 1901, PMB 479; Tuala Silivelio to Schnee, 8 Apr, 1901, German Administration 
Papers (henceforth GAP); Account Of Reconciliation of the Lealatele People, 7 Feb, 1901, GAP; Minute, 
Solf, 1Oct,1900, GAP; Solfto People of Safotulafai, Lealatele, Amoa, and Salago, 2 Oct, 1900, GAP. 
16 Stunzer to Schnee, 19 Jun, 1902," German Administration Of Western Samoa (henceforth GAWS); 
Schnee, Minutes, 8 Jul, 1902, GAWS. 
17 Memo of Conference Between Governor Solf and High Chief Mataafa, Moto'otua, C. Taylor, 27 Nov, 
1903, GP; Memo for H. E. by C. Taylor, 27 Nov, 1903, GSA. 
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been informed by the British Consul, Hamilton Hunter, that Lauaki had even 
offered his service, and that of the Malietoa side, to the British if they required it 
to defeat the Germans.18 
losefo pretended that he knew nothing of Lauaki's activities, and 
promised Solf that Lauaki would be punished as "an example before the face of 
all the people."19 In the end, losefo was warned to keep his Samoan officials 
loyal to the government, while Lauaki continued to gain influence and 
popularity. The lack of action regarding Lauaki was perceived by Samoans as 
weakness on Solfs part. But more importantly, Lauaki's action was perceived to 
be the 'communal' reaction against the continuous deprivation of Samoan 
honours and dignities, and lack of respect for Samoan protocol. It was a 
reaction that went unanswered and unpunished. 
The rest of 1903 continued smoothly, but with unconfirmed rumours that 
Germany was considering giving up Samoa. The Samoans were also 
complaining about the poll tax, and other economic and general policies of the 
government. The news of the fall of price in copra to as low as two cents a 
pound, further dampened Samoan hopes of gaining prosperity.20 The Samoan 
grievances began to foster anti-government reactions among the afakasi, and 
papalagi small-scale planters, who were feeling the weight of Solfs economic 
policies, and the uncertainty of world market prices for their commodities. The 
fact that Solf supported and preferred to advocate large-scale firms such as 
DHPG also contributed to the growing dissatisfaction.21 For the Samoan 
leaders, the fear of Samoa being left without any financial support when 
Germany withdrew played heavily on the minds of the Samoan leaders. The 
arrival of an afakasi (part German - Samoan) entrepreneur in the beginning of 
1904 took the Samoans on an unlikely path in achieving their political 
ideology.22 In this climate of political delusion, and political enigma, the Faipule 
at Mulinu'u began to toy with the idea of starting a Samoan trading company. 
18 Memo of Conference Between Governor Soll and High Chief Mataafa, Moto'otua, C. Taylor. 27 Nov, 
1903, GP. 
19 Memo of Conference Between Governor Soll and High Chief Mataafa, Moto'otua, C. Taylor, 27 Nov, 
1903, GP. 
'° Felix David and Trader to Soll, 1 Jun, 1904, GSA; Gebauer to Soll, 30 Aug, 1904, GSA. 
21 Skeen to Walter Coumbe, 2 Nov, 1900, British Consulate Samoa (henceforth BCS); Soll to Trood, 27 
Nov, 1900, BCS; Wulff (Samoa Estate Ltd) to Trood, 11 Jan, 1901, BCS; Weaver (Samoa Estate Ltd) to 
Trood, 26 Jan, 1901, BCS; SolftoWeaver, 22Jan, 1901, BCS; Solfto Trood, 17Aug,1901, BCS. 
22 Untitled Article, Samoanische Zeitung, 3 Dec, 1904, GP. 
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The German government did not think highly of Europeans with Samoan 
blood, the so-called half-Europeans, commonly known as afakasi. Herr Pullack, 
a son of a Samoan mother, arrived with the idea of setting up a trading firm on 
behalf of the Samoans. Pullack, who had received some education in America 
before returning to Samoa, arrived with no money and no prospect of obtaining 
employment.23 Pullack raised the idea of starting a Samoan operated company 
to produce and market Samoan copra. The co-operative was to be called the 
Oloa or Kamupani. It seemed Pullack had offered the Samoans four cents a 
pound for copra, twice that offered by the German firm DHPG, and other 
traders, if the Samoans cut out the traders or middle-men.24 In addition, Pullack 
also proposed to purchase a full-rigged ship for the Samoan company capable 
of carrying enormous tonnage of copra. It seemed Pullack had told the Faipule 
in Mulinu'u that the cost of the ship was only $5000-00, a small outlay for an 
expected higher profit from the world market.25 
The German community reacted with animosity The Inspector of Police 
at the time, A. L. Braisby, felt that educated half-castes were "a dangerous 
acquisition should [they] return to [their] native Samoa", and such danger was 
"manifested by a ridiculous consciousness of self importance and a dangerous 
amount of cunningness."26 The Samoan newspaper, Samoanische Zeitung, 
was just as severe in its attack on Samoans and afakasi. 
We can expect a Samoan to propose a childish and ridiculous 
scheme such as this, they are, metaphorically speaking, children 
and knaves, with few exceptions; but we expect a young man of 
half European descent, educated in Europe, and travelled, to be 
mentally superior to the Samoans, even though he has native 
blood in his vain.27 
The newspaper went on to attack the actions of the Faipule. It compared its 
involvement in the scheme to the case of 'the tail wagging the dog.' It seemed 
the Samoans wanted to wag the government. The newspaper called upon the 
government that it was time for the government to wag the Samoans, "and it 
should be in no meanhearted way.''28 
23 Dr. Shultz, The Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 44., 18 Feb, 1905, GP; Minutes of Soll, 22 
Nov, 1904, GSA; Western Samoa Historical Notes, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2/15. 
24 Minute of Soll, 22 Nov, 1904, GSA. 
25 Untitled Article, Samoanische Zeitung, 3 Dec, 1904, GP; Dr. Shultz, The Imperial Government of 
Samoa, Report No. 44., 18 Feb, 1905, GP. 
26 A.l. Braisby, Introductory Note, Lafoga - Olea, 1905, GP. 
27 Leader, Samoanische Zeitung, 17 Dec, 1904, GP. 
28 Leader, Samoanische Zeitung, 17 Dec, 1904, GP. 
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The Faipule were easily swayed by Pullack's proposal, especially with 
the prospect that the company would receive a huge profit. There was no doubt 
that there was some merit in the proposal.29 The chief product of Samoa was 
copra, and the estimated output for the year was 10,000 tons of copra. Almost 
55% of the total tonnage was provided by Samoans, 26% by the D.H.&P.G., 
and the rest, some 19%, by the smaller plantations. In light of this, the Faipule 
decided to start the company on 14December1904. They began a campaign 
through their district representatives, enticing people to participate and support 
the new venture.30 The Faipule quickly worked out the finance for the new 
venture. They proposed to levy a /afoga o/oa (company contributions) of eight 
marks {about 2 cents) for each family head, and four marks each {about 1 cent) 
for all other adults in the family. The proposed /afoga oloa was intended to raise 
$30,000 within a few months.31 
Solf had always maintained that Samoans had no finesse for business 
enterprises.32 Samoans were more inclined to receive things, if they could, 
without 'raising a sweat'. A Samoan would not do a days work if he felt it would 
not benefit him and his family directly. Therefore, when talk of a Samoan trading 
company was first initiated no one but a few Samoans took it seriously. This 
was the general feeling also among the papalagi as reported in the 
Samoanische Zeitung on 3 December 1904. It said: 
We had hoped that it would have been unnecessary for us to refer 
in our columns to the suggested Co-operative Society for 
Samoans. These visionary schemes, as a rule, evaporate almost 
as quickly as the initial idea is enunciated; but in the present case, 
what appeared at first sight to be a rather foolish joke seems to 
have gained considerable hold on the native mind.33 
According to the article, traders and merchants, and anyone with an 
enlightened mind, would applaud the Samoans for their initiative, but the 
scheme was unworkable. Nevertheless, having said that, the article went on to 
warn the German administration not to be complacent, as such a company 
would be detrimental to the economy, especially "when the natives realise their 
29 Dr. Shultz, The Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 44., 18 Feb, 1905, GP. 
30 Cyclopedia of Samoa, 26; liga Pisa, MS-Paper 4879-077, undated, GP; Shultz to Soll, 8 May, 1905, 
German Administration Papers (henceforth GAP). 
31 Untitled Article, SamoanischeZeitung, 3 Dec, 1904, GP. 
32 Dr. Shultz, The Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 44., 18 Feb, 1905, GP. 
03 Untitled Article, Samoanische Zeitung, 3 Dec, 1904, GP. 
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commercial importance."34 The article further suggested "it is monstrous that the 
legitimate trade of the country should be jeopardised, even temporarily, at the 
whim of a few Faipule and an inexperienced youth."35 The article definitely 
prompted Solf to act. In a letter to H. J. Moors, he stated his intention of 
personally going to Savai'i "to repress some foolish measures put into the 
heads of the Samoans by a half-caste."36 
Solf had met the Faipule at Mulinu'u in November 1904, in relation to the 
proposed Oloa. At that meeting Solf clearly pointed out the disadvantages and 
risks, as well as financial commitment needed, for such a venture. Solf indicated 
to the Samoans, and Pullack, that a working capital of $10,000-00 must be 
shown before contemplating starting the Oloa. Solf prohibited the setting up of 
the Oloa because he felt it was risky.37 Solf was later aware that a meeting had 
taken place at the beginning of December 1904, which was attended by a large 
number of Samoans, to discuss the proposed Oloa. He knew from the 
intelligence he received that the Faipule had used his name to entice the 
Samoans to attend.36 Despite this, Solf was quite calm, although mildly 
concerned, about the Samoans' intention. The Samoans who had contact with 
Solf over the matter took the view that Solf had left it to them to decide. It 
seemed Solf had left that impression on the Samoans. This was the same 
interpretation shared by Tupua Tamasese in a letter to Solf.39 Therefore, the 
article in the Samoanische Zeitung, and Moors' letter, which criticised Solfs lack 
of action, prompted Solfs subsequent action against the Oloa. For the first time, 
Solf began to realise the negative repercussions if the Samoans were allowed 
to fulfil their aspirations. 
Consequently, Solf went on a malaga (visitation tour) to Savai'i. He 
discovered for the first time, so he said, that a letter from the matai in Mulinu'u 
had been circulating, ordering people to contribute towards the Oloa. In a 
stinging letter to the matai in Mulinu'u, Solf clearly stated he had never given his 
permission to start an Oloa. Solf went on to chastise verbally the Samoans 
responsible, losefo and the Faipule. 
34 Untitled Article, Samoanisohe Zeitung, 3 Dec, 1904, GP. 
35 Leader,' Samoanische Zeitung, 17 Dec, 1904, GP. 
36 Solfto Moors, 3 Dec, 1904, GP. 
37 Minutes of Solf, 22 Nov, 1904, GSA. 
38 Solf to the Malo in Mulinu'u, 11 Dec, 1904, GP. 
39 Tamasese to Solf, 21 Feb, 1905, GP. 
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You always call me the Father and Mother of Samoa, and that you 
will always abide with my parental advice; yet you have not shown 
it here. You have listened more to the words of a stranger, who is 
the young man Pullack, whom you have never met or known 
before. I never dreamt that you were so 'pouliuli' [darkness] and 
'faavalea' [stupid]. Is not this a special instance that should keep 
me on my ~ard and harden my ears to all your future flowery 
speeches? 
Solf went on to enlighten the Samoans on how he had saved them from being 
ripped off. He then ordered Pu!lack to stop promoting the scheme. 
On 14 December 1904 an Ordinance was issued, and signed by Solf 
before he left for New Zealand, which officially stated the German 
administrations' position on the matter. It stated: 
The Lafoga-Oloa [store contributions] has to be stopped at once, 
as utterly illegal. No Tulafono [ordinances] or letter, be it printed or 
written, issued by the Malo in Mulinu'u are valid. All Tulafonos and 
letters concerning Malo matters can only be issued by the Imperial 
Government, and will bear in such case my hand and seal, which 
is the Imperial eagle.41 
The ordinance was accompanied by a letter addressed to all Samoans, 
explaining the position of the government, and to "deny to all that the Governor 
and [Shultz] have anything to do with this wrongful and foolish scheme as 
deliberated upon by the Malo in Mulinu'u.'"'2 Furthermore, the German 
administration also issued a clear order to all government officials in Mulinu'u to 
immediately sever any connection with the Oloa. It also forbade all officials 
paying the /afoga ofoa, and to participate in any way in the running of the Oloa. 
All officials who did not comply with the orders were to be dismissed 
immediately.43 
The circular also gave the Samoans an explanation for the 
administration's non-acceptance of the Oloa. Firstly, the way that the company 
had enticed the Samoan people to contribute to the Oloa was illegal, because 
those involved knew they could not fulfil their promises of paying four cents a 
pound for copra. To the German administration the Oloa was guilty of 
embezzlement. Secondly, the Oloa had not been registered as a company as 
required by law. Under the law, a company of such nature had to be properly 
40 Sotfto the Malo in Mulinu'u, 11Dec,1904, GP. 
41 Tulafono, issued by Soff, Kovana Kaisallka, 14 Dec, 1904, GP. 
42 Circular Letter to All Men, 14 Dec, 1904, GP. 
"Circular Letter to All Officials, undated, GP. 
examined by the proper authority, and registered by the court. All such 
requirements were not fulfilled and, therefore, the Oloa was illegal. 44 
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The German administration would have been excused if they felt they 
had forced the Samoans to concede and abide by the ruling given, but Solf and 
his administration had learnt to expect the unexpected, especially when dealing 
with losefo and Tumua and Pule. In a strange twist in the events of 14 
December 1904, losefo and the Faipule did the unexpected. The German 
administration had already informed losefo and the Faipule in Mulinu'u of the 
government's position,45 but as Solf and Shultz were busy delivering the copies 
of the Ordinance, Circular Letter to All Samoans, and the Circular Letter to all 
Faipule, losefo, on behalf of the Faipule, secretly sent a letter on the same day 
to Tuala and Maiava, both district judges in Savai'L The Resident Commissioner 
at Fagamalo, Amtmann Richard Williams, intercepted the letter. The letter, 
signed by losefo, said: 
I make it known again to Your Highness that our Oloa (Company) 
is accepted. We are here in council, I and the alii Taimua and 
Faipule, and we cannot give up our Oloa here at all since it is 
made. Money is collected here by the Taimua and Faipule and 
brought here to Mulinu'u, and I urge you herewith very much. 
Collect quickly your money and bring it to Mulinu'u. I set my hopes 
in your great patriotism, and the Oloa of the Samoans will be a 
success.46 
The content of the letter did not come to Solfs attention until Christmas 
day. But it was too late for him to do anything about it as he was leaving in two 
days for a holiday in New Zealand.47 When Solf left and nothing had been said 
about the letter, losefo felt he was in command, and for the first time was able 
to express his authority without interference from Solf. The letter provided Solf 
with ample evidence of losefo's slyness, although it was losefo's own way of 
declaring his intentions and aspirations. It also revealed his determination to 
function on any given sphere as long as it legitimised his rule. The letter could 
also be taken as a desperate effort to undermine the growing power and 
authority of Solf, while reaffirming and providing needed evidence for the 
Samoans that their own authority had not been weakened or lost 
44 Circular Letter to All Officials, undated, GP. 
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In any event, losefo may have felt confident to challenge Selfs power 
after being assured of the support by all the Faipule. The strong support and 
part played by Lauaki in Savai'i, and Moefa'auo in Upolu, would have also 
encouraged losefo. In the letter, losefo appealed to the Samoans' /otonu'u 
(patriotism), knowing full well in using such a phrase, many Samoans would rise 
to the occasion and join blindly.48 losefo appointed two non-official matai, as a 
precautionary measure, to receive and accumulate the /afoga o/oa. If Self 
questioned the lafoga oloa he could claim ignorance and, at least, had two 
matai as scapegoats. 
The determination that losefo showed in collecting the /afoga o/oa, even 
after Self had given a direct order, suggested he had other alternative motives. 
losefo knew Self had visited Savai'i, and then issued an Ordinance, which 
meant no one would have paid any lafoga oloa to the scheme. Thus, the 
rushing of the letter, scribbled with pencil, to the Savai'i participants, was in 
order to collect the money before Selfs Ordinance and Circulars reached 
Savai'i. But even if the money had been collected, there was no way it would 
have been used for the Olea as Self had banned it. losefo knew Self well and 
would have suspected that the probability of the Olea making a start was very 
remote. losefo had other personal plans for the money.49 
losefo's intentions may have been egoistic, but there were a few matai 
who were determined to see the Olea come to fruition for the original purpose it 
was created - for the welfare of the Samoans; albeit for political expediency. 
The Samoans collected very little revenue for the Olea. It appeared that Lufilufi, 
and a few Faipule of certain districts offered contributions.50 The lack of 
response was due to the quick action by the government, and the contributions 
made by the business sector of the community to discourage the Samoans. The 
missions, including the LMS, also did their best to discourage their members 
from paying the lafoga oloa. The LMS published several notices in their church 
magazine, 0 le Su/u Samoa, to advise their members. The business 
48 See, Memo, Dr. Shultz, 20 Jan, 1905, GP; Dr. Shultz, The Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 
44., 18 Feb, 1905, GP. 
49 Peter Hempenstall and Noel Rutherford concluded that losefo would have used the money to give the 
ma/o prestige, and to reaffirm his authority, if the Oloa scheme failed. See Hempenstall, Peter & Noel 
Rutherford, Protest and Dissent in the Colonial Pacific, Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1984, 26. 
50 Dr. Shultz, The Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 62., 11Mar,1905, GP. 
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community, as well as the missions, had much at stake in terms of trading and 
contributions, if the lafoga oloa had been collected.51 
At the tlme losefo wrote the letter, Solf did not believe losefo was the 
leading agitator of the Oloa.52 He believed losefo was only a pawn in the whole 
affair, and had used his position to influence the Samoans. The real culprit, Solf 
felt, was Lauaki. Solfs conviction was based on the facts that Pullack had 
instigated the whole thing in Savai'i, and that Lauaki's name had been 
frequently mentioned in Savai'i in connection to the scheme.53 Solf returned 
from Savai'i and arranged to meet Lauaki at Moto'otua.54 losefo was not invited, 
thus reaffirming Solfs view that Lauaki was the leader of the Oloa scheme. In 
the presence of Shultz and Dr Krauss, the District Judge, Solf solicited from 
Lauaki a promise to do his best "to persuade the Malo of the nonsense and the 
impracticability of the so-called lafoga o/oa."55 In essence, Solf made Lauaki 
promise to work against the Oloa. On Christmas day, Solf wrote to Lauaki to 
remind him of his promise at their earlier meeting. Solf also told Lauaki that he 
was in possession of losefo's letter of 14 December 1904, which defied his 
orders. Solf told Lauaki he would not allow anyone to go against the German 
government, and even if he was away from Samoa, he had already put in place 
plans to enforce the orders already given.56 
Solf left for New Zealand, and left Shultz to tidy up and put an end to the 
Oloa. Shultz went on a malaga around the districts of Upolu in an effort to 
gauge the feeling among the Samoans regarding the Oloa. At Lotofaga, the 
village of losefo, Shultz was reassured by the Catholic priest that the Ali'i Sili 
had fully conceived the absurdity of the scheme and was fully committed to 
enforcing the will of the govemment.57 Shultz also reported that many Faipule 
had stayed clear of the scheme, with a few still contemplating the idea. But, 
perhaps the most vital information Shultz received from his trip, was the 
realisation that Lauaki was still very active in trying to revive the proposal. 
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According to Shultz, Lauaki had falsely related to the Samoans the content of 
his meeting with Solf at Moto'otua. In all the districts Shultz visited he was told 
of Lauaki's own version of the outcome of their meeting. In a memo, Shultz 
wrote: 
The following rumour was spread on the South Coast of Upolu -
that a short time ago the Governor had held a conference with 
Lauati in the presence of the Chief Judge and the District Judge, 
and asked him to stop the Oloa (Company), which Lauati had 
promised to do, but under the condition that the Governor would 
increase the copra purchase price to 2-1/2 cents, and that the 
Governor had pledged himself to do it.58 
There is no doubt that the rumours were correct. For Lauaki, his status 
would have been reduced to nothing if the Samoans were told that he did not 
bargain and had received some kind of concession from Solf. In his effort to 
save face, Lauaki distorted the outcome of the meeting with Solf. As a result, 
some of the Samoans got the impression that the Oloa was still up and running. 
In such circumstances, Lauaki had no choice but to continue the scheme. For 
Shultz, the previous orders needed to be reaffirmed to the Samoans. Firstly, the 
Oloa must be fa'asa (prohibited) rather than taotaomia or taofiofi (suppressed). 
The latter would give the Samoans the impression that the government was 
non-supportive and trying to disrupt its efforts in favour of papa/agi traders. 
Shultz also wanted to explain to the Samoans the real motive behind the 
scheme, and the fraudulent intention of those involved to use the money for 
other matters. 59 
On his return from Lotofaga, Shultz was given a letter from Savai'i which 
confirmed Lauaki's efforts to continue the Oloa.60 The letter was sent from the 
village of Lauaki, Safotulafai, and stated that Namulau'ulu Siaosi had called a 
meeting on 5 January 1905. At the meeting, Namulau'ulu relayed a message 
from Lauaki to about 500 matai, who favoured the continuation of the Oloa.61 
During the final comments of the meeting, an excited Malaeulu, a matai of Lano, 
jokingly remarked, "if the papa/agi [the Governor] does not consent to the Oloa 
one had to take pipi shells and scrape his body with them."62 The report of the 
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meeting, especially the remarks about Solf, was confirmed by Williams, the 
German Resident Commissioner in Savai'L 
80 
Shultz decided to deal immediately with the most serious matter, the 
insult to Solf. After the celebration of the Kaiser's birthday, Malaeulu and 
Namulau'ulu were both taken prisoner on board the Samoa, the government 
ship, and tried in court on 27 January 1905. Both men were sent to prison.63 
Two days later, on Sunday, Shultz received a letter from losefo requesting the 
release of Namulau'ulu and Malaeulu, as they were only carrying out the wishes 
of the ma/o. losefo also pointed out that papalagi made similar insulting remarks 
about Solf but were still walking about free. Before Shultz could reply to the 
request, he received news that the prisoners had been freed by the Samoans.64 
In a letter to Shultz, Laufa, a Faipule from Safotu, stated that losefo, 
Moefa'auo, and Lauaki encouraged the fono (meeting) to free the two prisoners 
as soon as possible. Laufa stated that some matai had urged the fono to take 
the matter up with the Sui-Kovana (Acting -Governor) first but this was rejected. 
Tamasese was persistent and even offered to do it himself. Tamasese had 
been accused by his peers of being pro-German, and he took the opportunity in 
question to eliminate any such suspicion.65 The prison guards were powerless 
as eight matai, including Tamasese, Moefa'auo, Autagavaia, and Patauleave, 
forced their way in and smashed the holding cell door with stones. The two 
prisoners immediately made their way to Savai'i.66 Shultz was even more 
surprised when a letter arrived from losefo requesting his attendance at a fono 
with the Samoan representatives at Mulinu'u the following day.67 
Shultz attended the fono and gave the Samoans the chance to redeem 
themselves by returning the two prisoners back to Vaimea Prison. The fono 
asked for pardon and promised to abide by the decision, but as Shultz 
retreated, Lauaki and Moefa'auo, tried to change the agreement already made. 
On 4 February 1905, Namulau'ulu and Malaeulu were returned to the Vaimea 
prison. On the same day, the Samoans requested and received an audience 
with Shultz. They expressed their opinion that the two prisoners should not be in 
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prison as they were just following orders of the malo. They also referred to the 
insult to Solf as "a harmless joke."68 Shultz decided to release Namulau'ulu on 
the condition that he remained in Safotulafai to appear before the Governor 
when called upon. Shultz decided to keep Malaeulu in prison "to avoid the 
unpleasant impression it would have made if a Native who had made a verbal 
insult against the highest official in the country, had been left unpunished, when 
violent reparation was indicated fa'a-samoa."69 
The German administration believed that some of the European 
residents of Apia had a hand in the Samoan agitation. Many of the pro-German 
settlers, such as Riedel, Lober, Voight, and Krause, had informed Shultz of this 
fact. The Catholic Bishop was high on the list as he was observed to be rather 
prominent around Apia on the morning of the breakout. Furthermore, his close 
connection with losefo's political interests could only be a huge temptation to sin 
once and awhile. On the day after Namulau'ulu and Malaeulu were returned to 
Vaimea Prison, losefo, and some of the Lotu Pope Faipule went to the Bishop 
at Moamoa and asked his advice on the Oloa. According to Laufa, the Bishop 
had told the Faipule it was a good thing, but only if it was run by a person with 
intelligence and plenty of money. He warned that there was always a danger 
that such a person would disappear with all the money, and Samoans would be 
left to regret their decision.70 
In Shultz's report to Germany in 1905, he wrote, "the Bishop Brayer as 
far as we see has behaved absolutely loyally in the Oloa affair as well as in the 
matter of the Vaimea incident."71 Shultz suggested that because of the 
competition between missions, "the Catholic Mission may be urged on many 
occasions into making compacts with the Native."72 A small time planter in 
Savai'i, named von Heydebrant, who was married to a Samoan woman, was 
particularly disliked. He was reported, by Amtmann Williams, to be an active 
supporter of the Oloa, who at times, acted as a go-between for a small time 
planter named Deeken and another Oloa supporter named Tyszka.73 
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H. J. Moors' name was also mentioned as a corroborator with the 
Samoans. The fact that Moors had no money, and was on the verge of selling 
his station and stocks to the Oloa for a good price, made him a primary target. 74 
Shultz was also very suspicious of the small-scale German planters. The fall in 
copra and other commodity prices had made them rather incensed at the 
governments' lack of assistance and action regarding their plight. Many of them 
silently supported the Samoans in their scheme. Shultz was worried that the 
actions of a planter in American Samoa who petitioned Washington against the 
administration, would be followed by people like Richard Deeken in their efforts 
to discredit the government.75 
While Pullack had been the initial mover of the Oloa scheme, there was 
no doubt that Deeken attached himself immediately to the project, and later took 
over as advisor when Pullack returned to America. 76 losefo and Deeken were 
very close friends. One of the reasons for losefo's distrust of Tamasese, was 
over Tamasese's unwillingness to attend meetings with Deeken at his 
Tapatapao plantation. It was Deeken who had passed on to losefo a letter from 
Pullack in America which contributed to the decision to continue with the Oloa 
even after Solf had made it illegal. The letter invited the Samoans to choose 
whether they wanted a steamer or a sailing ship, for the company vessel. It also 
contained Pullack's recommendation and advice to sanction Deeken as the 
ta'ita'i (manager) of the company.77 Shultz was convinced that Deeken had led 
the Samoans astray and had tried to revive the Samoan passion for playing one 
power against another for personal gain. 
There were also rumours, which caused some excitement among the 
Samoans, and carried Deeken's name, that Solf had fallen into disgrace and 
that the Kaiser had ordered his dismissal.78 The German administration's fear of 
a petition reaching Germany was realised when news was received confirming 
such an act. It was attributed to Deeken and signed mainly by Samoans, 
including Lauaki. A small number of papalagi signed the petition; many were 
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well known merchants in Apia, such as Peemuller, Hoeflich, and Fabricius.79 
The strained relationship between Deeken and the government led to his 
deportation to Germany, a few weeks prior to Solfs return to Samoa. Shultz 
was disappointed later to hear that Deeken was given a pardon back in 
Germany.80 
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Shultz remained calm under all the strain of the past events in the 
absence of Solf. The Samoans had tested Shultz's ability to deal with political 
innuendo and had come through with flying colours. The Samoans were now in 
a good position to compare Shultz to Solf, and no doubt had found Shultz to be 
far more approachable and, in losefo's own words, "a man with a tender heart, 
ever ready to answer the prayers of us and others individually."81 The Samoans 
knew that Shultz had dealt with them respectfully. They also knew that Solf 
would be much harsher under the same circumstances. The news of Solf 
returning to Samoa on 18 March 1905 left the Faipule with an uneasy feeling. 
They had dialogued with Shultz over the Oloa incident, and had accepted the 
charges against Namulau'ulu and Malaeulu over slurring remarks about Solf, 
yet the Faipule could not find any comfort. They contemplated Solfs return 
would not be beneficial for them. They could feel that the Oloa incidents during 
the past months would not be laid to rest. Shultz flippantly diagnosed the 
Samoan disorder as "depression after the frenzy."82 A month away from Solfs 
arrival the first sign of Samoan anxiety surfaced. 
losefo was the first to crack. He knew full well that Solf expected much 
from his leadership while he was away. He also knew that everything that had 
taken place had already been made known to Solf in New Zealand. He knew 
Solf would not concur with Shultz's decision over the matter, and that Solf would 
increase the punishment for those involved. losefo began to soften the blow by 
trying to appeal to Shultz's understanding. He offered an apology on behalf of 
his colleagues, and begged Shultz to assist them by "applying cold water" to 
Solfs heart regarding the insult incident, and the breakout from Vaimea 
Prison.83 He wrote, 
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The Malo and myself depend entirely upon the light which you will 
declare to His Excellency concerning our wrong, in order that we 
are forgiven in our crime; that it will serve as a lesson, and that 
such a thing will never occur again since we are under the control 
of His Majesty and Government. 84 
losefo truly believed that Shultz was the key to appeasing Solfs anger and, 
perhaps, a lighter punishment for all concerned. 
Tamasese also got cold feet and decided to write a letter to Solf, 
although Solfwas still in New Zealand. Tamasese had as much to fear as 
losefo as he was one of the culprits in the breakout incident. Tamasese offered 
an explanation for his action, claiming that it all happened "through the 
ignorance of the Afioga of the Alii Sili and the Taimua and Faipule, who thought 
that the fai/auga (the orators) were confined to jail by reason of the Samoan 
Oloa."85 According to Tamasese, he had no knowledge of the incident whereby 
the two matai in question, Namulau'ulu and Malaeulu, had insulted Solf. If they 
had known at the time, they would not have considered the action they took. ln 
one of Shultz's reports to Germany, he also mentioned that the Samoans had 
freed Namulau'ulu and Malaeulu under the impression they were penalised over 
the Oloa scheme. Shultz was told that the Faipule in Mulinu'u decided to free 
the two orators in order to conceal from those against the scheme, any 
unfavourable reasons for rejecting it. 86 
On 21 February 1905, Lauaki approached Shultz to charm him. He told 
Shultz that he and losefo had agreed to give up the Oloa scheme. Lauaki 
offered to return to Safotulafai and reverse the decision of the fono held on 5 
January 1905. Shultz believed Lauaki changed because of fear, especially at 
the thought of Solfs imminent return,87 but Lauaki was not stupid. He had 
remained aloof from Shultz as he assessed the situation. He realised that he 
would carry the blame alone if he kept his distance from Shultz. Shultz would 
have taken his aloofness as an expression of guilt, but Lauaki's sudden 
appearance before Shultz had a twist to it. In severing his connection with the 
Oloa, Lauaki forced many Samoans who had followed him to return to their 
homes disgruntled, and their hopes of a better return for their coconuts in the 
future were shattered. 
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losefo and Tamasese had only asked for pardon, regarding their role in 
the Vaimea Prison incident. They had never contemplated giving up the Oloa so 
soon. Even if they did, they would have wanted to wait and inform Solf rather 
than Shultz. It would have lightened their guilt, so they felt, in Solfs estimation. 
But, Lauaki wanted to create an impression on Shultz, that he, in taking the 
initiative, was the mastermind of the decision. In doing so, perhaps, Shultz 
would influence Solf to be lenient for his part in the whole mess. Furthermore, 
Lauaki wanted to personally appear before Shultz as an act of faith and, 
therefore, guarantee Shultz personally that he had reformed his ways. If he had 
failed to do so, Solf would have interpreted his absence an affront to his rule. In 
facing Shultz, and taking a stance together with losefo, Lauaki made the point 
that they all shared the burden for all that had happened.86 
The news of Lauaki informing Shultz of the decision to give up the Oloa 
caused a few minor wars of words between losefo and Lauaki. As already 
mentioned, losefo wanted to collect all the money and then do the honours 
himself when Solf arrived. According to Shultz, losefo had wanted to plead with 
Solt, again, for permission to operate the Oloa. He was willing to give it up if 
Solt once again responded in the negative. losefo's pride was damaged. He 
called Lauaki gutu-lua (two mouths), pointing out that the whole Vaimea incident 
had first been raised by Lauaki wanting to set free his brother Namulau'ulu.89 It 
seemed Lauaki and losefo both played to the existing circumstances, especially 
Solfs absence from Samoa, for personal and political advantage. Both men 
lost. But Lauaki headed losefo in the popularity stakes in the eyes of the 
Samoans. Solf's summation and final punishment, however, would determine 
the real winner. 
Solt returned to Samoa and a week later held conference with losefo. 
Solt made it clear to losefo that he was "just as much culpable as the other 
Faipule."90 Solf told losefo that the position of the Ali'i Sili would not be shamed 
in public, with people saying that "the man who is nominated to be the first 
support for the Governor, and who has been greatly honoured by the Kaiser, 
had himself broken his oath of fealty."91 Solf told losefo he would be treated 
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differently from the rest if he severed his connection with the rest of the Faipule. 
If he failed to do so, he would share their fate. Solf went on to condemn the 
Ta'imua and Faipule, saying that they were "once honoured" but were now on 
the "black list of treacherous rebels."92 Solfthen hinted at his course of action. 
If the people in Mulinu'u think that they can make their punishment 
easier by sticking together and pretending to be unanimous, they 
are mistaken entirely! This very attitude of the Mulinu'u people has 
the tendency of threatening, and bears the character of open and 
wilful disobedience .... Now they will soon see what they have 
done. It is too late now for either trickery or sweet words. 93 
The Faipule also tried to reconcile their differences with Solf. Tamasese 
wrote to Solf to explain his involvement. Tamasese did not deny the truth of 
what had been reported, especially the part he had played. He apologised to 
Solf and begged his forgiveness, but Tamasese then went on to "declare 
faithfully" that losefo, and those who followed him, "was the root" of all the 
trouble.94 losefo, sensing the anger of the Governor and realising the extremity 
of Solfs anger, performed an ifoga (public apology) on 17 April 1905. Solf 
rejected it. He told losefo that he was "unable to accept any ifoga having as its 
purport a reconciliation over the violent act in Vaimea and the rebellious words 
of Uo."95 
During the weeks that followed, Solf made several speeches 
condemning the Samoan Faipule, and reasserting German authority.96 In a 
speech to Tumua at Lufilufi, one of the Oloa strongest supporters, Solf 
compared the lack of respect shown by the Faipule for the German 
administration with the analogy of the 'rat placing filth on the head of its 
benefactor - the octopus.'97 Solf also demanded from losefo a copy of the letter 
that he, and the Faipule, had sent to the Kaiser. 98 losefo provided Solf with a 
copy of the letter, which was sent to Germany on 6 January 1905. losefo then 
pleaded with Solfto dismiss Tamasese. Solfs main interest, however, was the 
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content of the letter. The letter appealed to the Kaiser to decide on several 
matters. These included a uniform for losefo suitable for his status of Ali'i Sili, 
uniforms for Ta'imua and Faipule, the re-appointment of a Samoan Chief 
Justice, to stop the inhumane treatment of Samoans sent to jail, to withdraw 
unfair custom duties, and for permission to commence the Oloa. As far as the 
Oloa was concerned, the letter stated that Solf had gone against the company 
in order to please several European merchants. The letter also outlined how the 
matai had defied Solf and told him "we will form a company, as nothing in it 
breaks the law."99 
Solfs reaction was nothing short of rage. In a stinging reply to losefo and 
the Faipule, Solf objected to the letter having been sent in the first place, and 
expressed disappointment at Josefa having signed it. Solf was quite critical of 
the Ali'i Sili. 
Do you think your double game is unknown? Everyone knows 
your two faces! Speaking to me and the Malo Kaisalika, you show 
the face of the Alii Sili - appointed by H.M. the Kaiser, and loyal to 
him and his representative here, the Governor; but, looking to the 
Samoans, you show the face of the Tupu [king] faa-Samoa, 
chosen and anointed by Tumua and Pule! Try not to make 
excuses and explanations! Your secret acts lie open before me, 
and your many fold togafitis [tricks] have led you into a trap. All 
your schemes have been discovered.100 
The blame was clearly on the Ali'i Sili's shoulders, just as Tamasese and Lauaki 
had envisaged. Solf clearly pointed the finger at losefo for all the latest troubles. 
It is you who, against my order, appointed Tamasese to be 
Faamasino Sili [Chief Judge] in lieu of Suatele. It is you who 
organised the Oloa. It is you who delivered the first speech in that 
fono in which the Malo passed the outrageous resolution to break 
into the prison at Vaimea. Besides, letters written by you and 
brought to me in the cause of my careful enquiries show that you 
have no love for your own people!101 
Solf also ordered losefo to account for the money collected and how it 
was used, as he was on the verge of charging many of the Faipule with 
embezzlement. The Samoan secretary, Toleafoa Maua Afamasaga, reported 
that only $73-00 was collected, but only a little of the money was left, as most 
had been returned to the Faipule who had collected it.102 Solf then ordered all 
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the Faipule to leave Mulinu'u, dissolving the ma/a and creating a new 'native 
council' in its place. Solf ordered all mataito be present on 14 August 1905, 
when he would announce his new government.103 
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The appointed day marked the fifth anniversary of the inauguration of the 
previous 'native government' in 1900. Solf outlined the aim of his administration 
in the changes to be made. 
My speech to you today must not only be listened to during the 
time of our gathering; but it must repeat itself in your ears and 
hearts, and be heard by Samoans and white people throughout 
Samoa, for it is judgement as to the past and a law for the future. 
It is like a knife that cuts away the rotten part of the breadfruit and 
leaves only the healthy part.104 
Solfs new government consisted of twenty-seven deputies who would reside in 
their own districts, and would only meet twice a year at Mulinu'u. He also 
appointed new district administrators, plantation inspectors, and other posts 
already created. The bulk of the new officials reflected Solfs desire to select 
matai who were loyal and had not taken part in the Oloa.105 
Solfs speech went on to outline the relationship between the German 
government and the Samoans in the past. He stressed how the administration 
had tried to rule in order to promote peace and justice for the Samoans. It was 
also pointed out that Samoa's troubles had occurred because of the malevolent 
influence of Tumua and Pule, and the "double - face" attitude of its Samoan 
leaders.106 Solfthen warned the Samoans that he was aware of all their 
insidious schemes, as well as their attempt to use his name in order to promote 
the Oloa. Solf again reiterated the point he had been making since Germany 
ruled Samoa - "there is only one rule in Samoa, and that is the rule of His 
Majesty the Kaiser."107 
The most important part of Solfs speech, as far as Samoans were 
concerned, related to the punishment meted out to those who offended the 
German administration. Solf referred to Moefa'auo and Lauaki as 'ringleaders,' 
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and they were earmarked for deportation. Moefa'auo was sent to Rabaul, New 
Britain, a German colony north of New Guinea, in the ship Samoa. On the day 
of his departure, his supporters had tried to change Solfs decision, but to no 
avail. Moefa'auo left on 29 October 1905, accompanied by his wife.108 Lauaki 
was later put on probation for a year and exiled to Savai'i. According to Solf, 
Shultz and Williams had spoken very highly in favour of Lauaki during the whole 
affair. It seemed Lauaki had been right all along. He had saved his skin due to 
his positive demeanour in his earlier dealings with Shultz.109 
The Ta'imua were all dismissed except for Tamasese and 
Tuimaleali'ifano, who would live in Mulinu'u under probation for six months 
before they could fulfil their official appointments. Solf then dealt with the matai 
who were involved in the Vaimea Prison incident. They were fined 1000 marks, 
each paying an equal share of the fine. Malaeulu lost his position as village 
superior, and was reproved by Solf in the presence of his peers. Namulau'ulu, 
according to Solf was insignificant and therefore, not worthy to be deported. He 
was jailed for two months, and fined 100 marks. 110 
Solfs action was heavy-handed. There seemed to be some discrepancy 
in Solfs attitude and that of Shultz towards the whole affair. Shultz felt that he 
had already dealt with the various incidents fairly, and that Solf would only 
affirm and, if needed, would have added very little to the penalties already 
given. Shultz was just as surprised as the Samoans at the severity of Solfs 
action, but Solf was in his element. He knew the incident of the Vaimea Prison, 
the Oloa, and the insult charges, had all come together at a time when he was 
looking for an excuse to change the structure of the Samoan government, 
without Samoan approval. The Samoans could be said to have, literally, hanged 
themselves. 
Nevertheless, it presented Solfwith a great opportunity, and he used it to 
its fullest. He got rid of Tumua and Pule, and he got rid of the matai who had a 
bad influence on the other loyal matai. It also gave Solf the opportunity to 
reorganise the government into a group, which the Governor would control 
without Samoan interference. At the same time, any prestige that losefo may 
108 Report of the 'Condor Commander, 23 Oct, 1905, GP; liga Pisa, MS-Paper 4879-077, undated, GP. 
109 Reconstruction of Native Parliament,' Samoanische Zeitung, 19 Aug, 1905, GP. 
110 Minutes , Self, 30 May 1905, GSA; Memo by Taylor, 19 Jun, 1905, GSA; Reconstruction of Native 
Parliament,' SamoanischeZeitung, 19 Aug, 1905, GP. 
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have add, had been reduced after Solf had publicly humiliated him. Solf was 
given more reasons to justify eliminating the office of the Ali'i Sili in the future. 111 
The Samoans had attempted to rise above German sovereignty and fulfil 
their expectations through the Oloa. Although they failed, it created a lasting 
impression on the minds of several leaders who had not completely given up 
their struggle for self-rule. The leaders, such as losefo, Tamasese, and Lauaki, 
went their own ways and would contemplate the events that had taken place, 
and the lessons learnt from it for the future. The Samoans knew they could 
unite if they wished, but working together and trying to stay one step ahead of 
the administration was a problem. The Samoans returned to the normality of 
Germany's daily rule, and tried to work together with Solf to regain the 
confidence of the administration in its Samoan members, while searching and 
hoping for other opportunities to present themselves. losefo and Tamasese 
soon after mellowed into a peaceful state of mind. Lauaki, however, remained in 
Savai'i for an opportunity to regain his position in Solfs government, but more 
importantly, a chance to reclaim the status of Tumua and Pule as kingmakers, 
and to re-establish Tumua and Pule as the power base of Samoan authority. 
The Oloa controversy was just the beginning of Samoan dissatisfaction finding 
expression within the economical and political arena of its colonial masters. The 
Mau a Pule was the next step. 
111 Western Samoa, Historical Notes, Apr, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2/15; Report of the 'Condor' Commander, 23 Oct, 
1905, GP; Report of the 'Condor' Commander, 2 Jun, 1909, GP. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE MAU A PULE CONFLICT 
The German administration dealt with the Oloa Kamupani severely to 
discourage Samoans from such undertakings, and to reaffirm Germany's 
sovereignty in all matters in Samoa. The missions knew about the scheme but 
could only offer advice, as they cautiously remained neutral. Solf had punished 
the culprits, but he would have been mistaken if he believed the Samoans 
involved were made redundant. Solf, within three years, would witness the 
resilience of the Samoans in pursing their aspirations. Soff had dealt lightly with 
Lauaki for his part in the Oloa perhaps to entice Lauaki's loyalty, but it was a 
gesture that Lauaki failed to comprehend. Lauaki, instead, took the time to re-
examine his options in his quest to restore the status and authority of Tumua 
and Pule. 
Lauaki Namulau'ulu Mamoe was an orator of Safotulafai, Savai'i. He 
stemmed from a family, which is held in high regard among the major lineages 
of Samoa, especially among Tumua and Pule. Lauaki descended from the 
Namulau'ulu family, which has a salutation in the honorifics of Samoa - to'oto'o 
o Fuifatu (the staff of Fuifatu).1 Lauaki's father was Namulau'ulu Faleseu, who 
had adopted Christianity from the LMS at an early age. He was baptised Atamu 
(Adam), and was bestowed with the mataititle Lauaki.2 Atamu had two sons, 
namely Pulali, who took the title Namulau'ulu after his father's death, and 
Mamoe, 3 the younger brother, who took the title Lauaki. But the title Lauaki did 
not give Mamoe much influence among other prominent matai, as it was not a 
Samoan title. Mamoe, in order to gain some recognition, would use from time to 
time his family's title of Namulau'ulu to speak before his peers. 
Lauaki married Suilolo, a daughter ofTofaeono, in Vaiala, while his 
brother Pulali married Ali'itasi, a daughter of Malietoa Talavou. Tofaeono also 
' Fuifatu is an important malae (meeting place) of Pule in Safotulafai. Safolulafai belongs to the district of 
Fa'asale!eaga, and various other villages in the Faasaleleaga District, such as Salelologa and Iva have 
salutations that connect them to Fuifatu. See Augustin Kramer, The Samoa Islands, vol. 1, trans. 
Theodore Verhaaren, Auckland: Polynesian Press, 1994. 
2 According to Davidson, this title was bestowed by Taufa'ahau of Tonga in appreciation of the 
Namulau'ulu family's hospitality to himself and his people during a visit to Samoa. See J. W. Davidson. 
"Lauaki Namulau'ulu Mamoe: A Traditionalist in Samoan Porrtics: in Pacific Islands Portraits, eds, J.W. 
Davidson & D. Scarr, Canberra: Australian National University, 1970. 
3 The name Mamoe is biblical. It means sheep, but it is used as a Christian n'1me by the Samoans to 
emphasise the character of the sheep - peaceful and humble. 
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had strong family ties with the Malietoa family. These marriages connected the 
Namulau'ulu clan to most of the 'royal' families of Samoa.4 Like his father 
Atamu, Lauaki Mamoe was an adherent of the LMS, and his political ideologies 
and religious life went hand in hand with Samoan protocol. Lauaki was a 
deacon of the Safotulafai Church and was highly regarded by Newell and other 
missionaries of the LMS, as well as the Samoan pastors and the Samoan 
church as a whole. 
Lauaki had learnt very early the importance that emotion played in 
politics. He also learnt the importance of knowing the various lineage 
connections and their salutations in the Samoan honorific system. He had used 
this knowledge to effect when enticing support for Malietoa Laupepa during the 
bitter kingship conflict towards the end of the nineteenth century. 5 Solf had kept 
an eye on Lauaki's political career and his slow rise to prominence. Solf knew 
Lauaki's ambition and wrote about it. 
He [Lauaki] could not conceive that Germany for all time and 
alone - without recourse to America and England - was ruling in 
Samoa. He found Germany tedious - he wanted a change, and 
his wife wanted to see her husband again in Mulinu'u as ruler over 
politics of Samoa.6 
Lauaki, like many Samoans, did not mind being told that business 
ventures, like the Oloa, was out of his depth. He did not mind being humbled 
before the Governor and his administration, and kow-towing to their every 
ordinance. He did not mind following orders, even though at times they were 
unfair and unjust.7 But, Lauaki, like many Samoans, reacted negatively if he 
was forced to run the gauntlet each time the sovereignty of the German 
administration was threatened. Lauaki, like many Samoans, detested being 
controlled, spoon fed, and being treated like a child. But, most of all, Lauaki, 
4 See Augustin Kramer, The Samoa Islands, voL 1, trans. Theodore Verhaaren, Auckland: Polynesian 
Press, i 994. 
5 For further discussion on !his peliod, see Chapter One. 
6 Report of Dr. Solf, Western Samoa Historical Notes, 1935, Island Territories Archive, (henceforth IT) 1 Ex 
2/15. 
7 For example, see Report of Solfs Tour of Savai'i, Samoanische Zeitung, 3 Aug., 1901, PMS 479. 
unlike many Samoans, was unforgiving when foreigners tried to take away, 
replace, or change his Samoan identity.8 
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When news of German sovereignty reached Samoa, Tumua and Pule 
remained adamant in their efforts to achieve a peaceful government under the 
leadership of losefo. Of course, in such a set-up, Tumua and Pule expected to 
be at the bow, at the stern, at starboard, and, mostly, at the helm, of such a 
government. The Tumua and Pule group was strong. It was made up mainly of 
three districts, Leulumoega (A'ana), Lufilufi (Atua), and Safotulafai 
(Fa'asaleleaga).9 The Samoans understood very well the function and 
importance of Tumua and Pule in the Samoan political, religious, social, and 
economic modus operandi. But, most importantly, Samoans understood that 
without Tumua and Pule, the rest of the matai confederacy would fail to 
function. 10 
The political troubles throughout the nineteenth century in Samoa 
occurred, not because of the incompetence of Tumua and Pule to maintain a 
workable government, but because of the inability of the papalagi to understand 
the intricacy of Samoan politics. Consequently, the Samoans were cast as 
uncontrollable, uncivilised, and violent 'natives', while 'tunnelled vision' papalagi 
usurped the right to instigate a civilised and workable political scheme for the 
Samoans. Sadly for the Samoans, a workable political scheme was equated 
with a European political ideology. 
There were three problems in the equation • Britain, America, and 
Germany. While each country promoted its own political ideology, they 
remained indifferent and lacked unity over political 'correctness'. Many 
Samoans blamed the three European powers for the various conflicts during the 
second half of the nineteenth century as an outcome of papalagi 
quarrelsomeness rather than Samoan disagreements. When the 'day of 
atonement' dawned upon every little conflict that occurred, the Samoans, 
8 The Samoan identity in this case is incorporated in the concept of Fa'asamoa, which is an interaction of 
all their customs, culture, and traditions. For details see R.P. Gilson, Samoa 1830-1SJOO: The Politics of a 
Multi-cultural Community, Melbourne: Oxford University, 1970; J.W. Davidson, Samoa mo Samoa: The 
Emetgence of the Independent State ofWestem Samoa, Melbourne: Oxford University, 1967; Malama 
Meleisea. The Making of Modem Samoa, Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1987; F. J. H. Grattan. An 
Introduction to Samoan Custom, Apia: Samoa Printing, 1948; Augustin Kramer, The Samoa Islands, vol. 1, 
trans. Theodore Verhaaren. Auckland: Polynesian Press, 1994; Augustin Kramer, The Samoa Islands, vol. 
2, trans. Theodore Verhaaren, Auckland: Polynesian Press, 1994. 
•The other 5 Pule includes Saleaula, safotu, Satupa'nea, Palauli, and Vaisigano. 
10 For a discussion on traditional authortty see Gilson, 1-64; Malama Meleisea, Lagaga: A Short History of 
Western Samoa, Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1987. 24-38; see also Extract From Secret Report 
by Emasmann to His Majesty the Kaiser, 22 Mar, 1900, PMB 479. 
especially Tumua and Pule, 'filled the hoofs of Azazel,' and on his head was 
placed the blame for making fife miserable for the 'righteous' papalagi. 11 
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The Germans had formed such an opinion of Tumua and Pule, and of 
the character of Samoan protocol, early in their relationship with the Samoan 
government during the latter part of the nineteenth century, but despite their 
'infallible' wisdom, they relied more often on Tumua and Pule to enhance and 
advance German interests in Samoa. The Germans, like the British and the 
Americans, were inclined to overlook justice and Samoan welfare when 
papa/agi interests were at stake. The Germans had a knack of achieving the 
radical, and detaching themselves from the status quo, especially when the 
status quo did not equate with German interests. The Germans achieved the 
radical through the shrewd utilisation of Tumua and Pule protocol. The most 
violent and prolonged periods of agitation in the late nineteenth century involved 
Germany reacting to American and British domination. There were two clear 
examples. Firstly, the formation of the Tamasese - Brandeis government, in 
1887, to counter the official Malietoa Laupepa government, and, secondly, the 
reaction of the Germans, who had supported losefo, to the installation of 
Malietoa Tanumafili I as king of Samoa in 1899. In each case, Germany was the 
instigator of the violent encounters at a cost of many Samoan lives. At the end 
of it all, it achieved, to a certain degree, Germany's purpose - to protect its 
political and economic interests in Samoa.12 
The political mayhem also acted as a testing ground for Samoan 
traditional obligations to the various tama-a-aiga, as well as evaluating the 
strength and authority vested in Samoan traditions. For Tumua and Pule, the 
violence was unfortunate but necessary in order to filter out the weak, and help 
install and reaffirm authority upon a leader who was strong and able to rule 
Samoa. The papalagi reaction to the political conflict was to reinstate the weak 
ruler with the backing of a European community, the problem Tumua and Pule 
was trying to eradicate. Tumua and Pule remained angry and agitated, and in 
the events leading up to the official placement of Samoa under Germany, 
11 In Hebrew religious culture, Azazel was the scapegoat upon whom all the sins of the nation were 
bestowed, and who was then sent away to the wilderness to die (Leviticus 16: 6-10) 
12 Refer to Chapter One. See also Review of the Samoa Mission 1880-1890, London Missionary Society 
South Seas Archives, South Seas Reports (henceforth SSR); Newell to Thompson, Oct. 10, 1887, London 
Missionary Society South Seas Archives, South Seas Letters (henceforth SSL); H. J. Moors, Some 
Recolleclion of Early Samoa, Apia: Historical and Cultural Trust. 1986, 49; Thomas Trood, Island 
Reminiscences, Sydney: Mccarron and Stewart, 1910, 80-85; Robert Watson, Histol}'ofSamoa, 
Wellington: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1918, 69-76. 
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Tumua and Pule worked secretly to avert the situation, and perhaps reverse the 
decision in favour of Britain.13 
The German administration took over a nation with a long record of 
violent agitation against previous Samoan governments. The Germans knew 
the Samoans' expectations for their new regime. They would also entertain 
ideas as to the hopes and aspirations of the Samoan people for the future. The 
Germans would have also learnt a great deal about Samoan protocol from past 
experiences, and that Tumua and Pule were a powerful group in Samoan 
politics. The Germans knew also that Britain and America were no longer part of 
their political equation, and the Samoans had no other avenue to address their 
resentments. Thus the political arena was restricted to two players, the German 
administration and Tumua and Pule. 
Solf knew that the 'achilles' heel' of the Samoans, as far as they were 
concerned, was Tumua and Pule, and he was confident he had them under 
control. Nevertheless, Solf was cautious and took the view that Tumua and Pule 
were far too dangerous to be fully ignored. 14 Solf believed that the only solution 
for a better and peaceful Samoa was to eradicate the problem - Tumua and 
Pule. Solf began the process during the inauguration of the new government on 
14 August 1900. On that day, Solf failed to recognise Samoa's elite group, and 
the depressing task of devising a slow death for Tumua and Pule had begun. At 
the same time, however, Tumua and Pule also began the daunting task of 
personally undermining German authority.15 
In the thick of all the agitation against the German administration were 
the leading heads of the principal Samoan families, such as losefo, Tupua 
Tamasese, Tuimaleali'ifano, and Malietoa Tanumafili I. But, none of these men 
had the nimbus of lauaki. Solffeared lauaki the most because of his orator 
skills and persuasive demeanour. lauaki possessed the tenacity and strength 
of character, with an astute and brilliant manipulative mind, to use any given 
situation to advance Samoan political aspirations. lauaki was the role model for 
all Samoans who were proud of their Samoan identity. lauaki stood, voiced, 
13 Memo for H. E. by C. Taylor, 27 Nov, 1903, GSA 
14 Colonel S. S. Allen - Notes on Samoa, MS-Papers 1499 (henceforth SSA). 
15 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, Grattan Papers (henceforth GP); H. A 
Hough Report on Samoa, 1909, London Missionary Society, South Seas Odds (henceforth SSO); Memo, 
Solf, 11Aug.,1905, PMB 479; Western Samoa Historical Notes, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2115. 
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and put to action, all the wishes and aspirations of his people, which could not 
be otherwise expressed for fear of punishment.16 
The announcement of So!fs new government was a setback for Tumua 
and Pule. The abolition of the tafa'ifa, and its replacement with a foreign 
concept, Ali'i Sili, was not what Tumua and Pule had in mind. Nevertheless, the 
Samoans equated the Ali'i Sili with the holder of the tafa'ffa, and treated the Ali'i 
Sili's status, duties and tasks, as equal to that of the tafa'ifa. 17 Thus, as losefo 
was still the preferred Samoan leader, his position as Ali'i Sili had elevated him 
to a status the Samoans recognised to be equivalent with holding the tafa'ifa. 
The Tumua and Pule matai, despite their opposition and some reservations, 
also took their respective positions in the Ta'imua and Faipule ranks. They, 
however, never relinquished the thought that their old political positions, as 
'king-makers', still remained intact. In fact, Lauaki and supporters felt convinced 
that Solf had only changed the pattern, but had maintained tradition. Thus, Solf 
was still continuing the administration of Samoa by Samoans under German 
guidance. 18 
Lauaki's distrust of Solfs new government proved accurate. The three 
different incidents, which involved the distribution of losefo's fine mats, the 
implications of Solfs speech on 14 August 1900 regarding the abolition of 
Tumua and Pule and other Samoan customs, and the confirmation of German 
rule over and above Samoan authority, provided ample evidence.19 The 
changes not only served as a warning to all Samoans not to interfere with 
Germany's administration, but it also challenged Samoan traditional authority. 
Tumua and Pule, consequently, refused to accept Solfs ideology and 
intentions. While they performed their duties as German officials, their efforts 
and intentions were aimed at regaining and re-establishing Samoan traditional 
authority. For the first four years Solf continued to implement plans to develop 
his ideals and undermine Samoan aspirations, while the Samoans planned 
16 Note !he previous example (Chapter Two) when Lauaki tried to stop Samoans working on government 
road projects, as he demanded from Soff better wages and food for the workers. Stunzer to Schnee, 19 
Jun, 1902, German Aadminstration of Samoa (henceforth GAWS); Schnee, Minutes. 8 Jul, 1902, GAWS. 
17 Report of Dr Solf to the Imperial Office, Berlin - Unsent 1907, (copy in author's possession). 
18 Mata'afa to Solf, 17 Mar, 1900, GAWS; Minutes, Solf, 31 Mar, 1900, GAWS; Mala'afa to Solf, 1 May 
1900, GAWS; Mata'afa to Solf, 26 May 1900, GAWS; Solfto Mala'afa, 24 Jul, 1900, GAWS; Hackett to 
Cousins, 11 Jun, 1900, SSL; Shultze to Thompson, 6 Sept, 1900, SSL. 
19 Proclamation, Self, 31 May 1901, GAWS; Minutes, Solt, no dale, GAWS; Solf to Mala'afa, 24 Jun, 1901, 
GAWS; Minutes, Soll, 25 Jun, 1901, GAWS; Alii and Faipule of Fasito'otai and Faleseela to Solt, 3 Sept, 
1901, GAWS. 
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secretly to use their existing situation to advance their own authority. The first 
Samoan reaction took the form of an economic protest in the Olea Kamupani, 
which not only gave Lauaki and his supporters the avenue to test the strength of 
Selfs schemes, it also helped to evaluate the commitment of the Samoans to 
their own cause.20 
Self successfully manipulated the Samoans loyal to the government, and 
the missions and European community, during the Olea to halt what Self had 
deemed progress detrimental to German interests. Those who had led the 
charge included Lauaki, who had to ponder upon the shame and indignity of 
b'eing left out of Selfs calculation for new government officials. In doing so, Self 
further punished Lauaki, but he indirectly gave Lauaki a further reason to 
remain defiant and uncooperative. Shame was something that was very hard to 
swallow in the fa'asamoa and the condition usually entertained revenge as a 
form of therapy.21 
It took a further four years for Lauaki to rise again and once more present 
Samoa's case to Self for political autonomy. This time Lauaki was more 
determined to succeed and willing to sacrifice his status and authority in order 
to achieve Samoan rule; if not, then at least achieve some concessions for the 
Samoans' struggle. The Mau a Pule was, for years, like a sleeping volcano -
dormant but full of underground activity. Lauaki was the Mau a Pule personified. 
From the time he entered the political arena and sided with various Samoan 
leaders in their struggle to gain political ascendancy, Lauaki had only one aim in 
mind - to advance Samoan traditional protocol. In doing so, Lauaki knew it 
would also improve his standing, and the fortunes of Tumua and Pule. Most of 
the time, Lauaki planned and acted alone as many of his fellow matai settled 
into comfortable positions within Selfs administration. 
The little changes that Self continued to implement to erase Samoan 
customs soon added up, and created an identity crisis for the Samoans. In the 
Olea controversy, Lauaki had the support of Tumua (Leulumoega and Lufilufi) 
at the beginning, but as the controversy heated up, only some of Tumua, mainly 
Lufilufi, remained faithful. The heavy hand of Self destroyed much of the faith in 
Tumua and, to some extent, Pule. Thus, Lauaki was uncertain how much 
20 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP. 
21 Soll to Williams, 15 May, 1907, German Administration Papers (henceforth GAP); Williams to Soll, 26 
May, 1907, GAP; Taumei to Soll, 19 Jun .. 1907, GAP. 
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support Tumua would furnish and when the Mau a Pule rose to prominence, it 
was just that - the Mau a Pule - a political front supported mainly by Pule. Even 
with Pule, Lauaki had very little support, mainly restricted to villages in Savai'i 
who shared his discontent. Since the Oloa affair, Lauaki had reconciled himself 
to growing old while his hatred for the German administration remained 
unsettled. At times, he felt unable to maintain his silent seditious protest against 
the Germans, almost to the point of relinquishing his struggle and begging Solf 
for a position in his government. 
The Mau a Pule had been building up for many years and it was just a 
matter of time before it exploded. It had gathered enough momentum to 
legitimise any radical confrontation with the German administration. However, 
the Mau a Pule needed a catalyst, something to kick-start it. Lauaki fitted the 
description, but he needed something or someone to provide him with the 
passion and a sense of patriotism to do it. The opportunity presented itself in 
1908. Lauaki visited losefo in Mulinu'u and felt the urge to explode after 
listening to losefo's whispers of sadness. losefo wept and shared with Lauaki 
his bitter regret at having very little power and authority since the Oloa. losefo 
told Lauaki that lesser matai had higher honour bestowed on them, and were 
recognised and consulted by the German administration regarding matters of 
importance. losefo felt belittled at not receiving due recognition as the leading 
matai- the Ali'i Sili - of Samoa.22 
Lauaki knew losefo was right. losefo had touched upon an issue closer 
to Lauaki's own heart. The authority and recognition once accorded to Samoans 
of chiefly families were fast disappearing. Samoan traditions were turned upside 
down to maintain papalagi domination. For Lauaki, losefo's sorry state was also 
a sign that losefo's dominance was slowly depreciating. Lauaki was probably 
aware that his own days would soon be numbered if losefo lost all his prestige. 
The conversation with losefo stirred Lauaki to action. The passion and the fire 
had returned. The Germans may have given up Lauaki as a spent force, but 
Lauaki could never remain dormant, as it was not his nature. A German Naval 
officer observed this part of Lauaki's personality. He wrote, 
... a man like Lauaki who had for decades nearly unlimited 
influence upon the course of Samoan history, who installed and 
dethroned kings, whose whole life was interwoven with political 
22 A I. Braisby, "A Document Record and History of the Lauati Rebellion (0 le Mau a Lauati) in Western 
Samoa, 1932 - 1933 [copy of 1909 document], Mss. 
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and demagogic activity, could by no means satisfy himself with the 
role of the dumb onlooker for any considerable length of time.23 
Lauaki told Josefa of his intention and, after further deliberation, both men 
agreed to invite former Ta'imua and Faipule to participate. A meeting was 
planned and was well attended, and it gave Lauaki and losefo some proof that 
many Samoans were dissatisfied with the German administration, and were 
ready to support any efforts to restore Samoan protocol. But, the absence of 
Solf from Samoa and the fact that the meeting was held without the knowledge 
of the Gennan administration probably enhanced the large attendance.24 
The meeting agreed on various demands to be furnished before the 
German administration. It demanded that the status and functions of the Ali'i Sili 
be recognised and increased by allowing his signature to appear next to Solfs 
on all government documents, especially orders and ordinances. The Samoans 
also requested that the Ta'imua and Faipule, who had lost their position in the 
government, be reinstated with an increase in salaries. They also demanded 
reductions in taxation, and proposed that all Ta'imua (mainly tama-a-aiga), be 
allowed to reside pennanently at Mulinu'u, and take part in all aspects of 
Samoa's development as in the past. Furthennore, they requested that a 
successor to losefo be appointed before his death.25 In essence, the requests 
essentially demanded Solf to restore Samoan traditional protocol, which Solf 
had reverted in replacing distinguished mataiwith lesser-known matai in his 
government in 1905. 
According to the LMS missionary Newell, the proposed political agitation 
was a desperate effort to regain lost prestige and power. Newell wrote, 
... [it was a] last supreme effort on the part of our electors and law 
makers - the influential class of tulafale with whom the titles of 
Samoa ultimately rest - to regain authority and place they lost 
when Governor Solf proclaimed that the supreme titles associated 
with the prestige of all the native governing bodies were to 
cease.26 
Solf was in Germany during this time, and was expected soon to return 
to Samoa with his new wife. Lauaki felt the return of Solf was the right time to 
23 Vice-Admiral Coerper to the Emperor, 9 Apr, 1901, GP. 
24 Newell to Laurance N., 30 Jan, 1909, London Missionary Society South Seas Archives, South Seas 
Special Personals (Newell Papers), [henceforth NP]. 
25 Trood to William Lee, 5 Feb, 1909, British Consulate Samoa (henceforth BCS); Trood to Edward Grey, 
'Report re: Samoa', 6 Feb, 1909, Great Britain Foreign Office, FO 371 (henceforth GBFO). 
26 Newell to Thompson, 1909, SSL. 
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present their mau (opinion). Lauaki sought permission from Shultz to allow the 
Samoans to assemble in Mulinu'u to welcome Solf and his wife. Shultz at the 
time was unaware of Lauaki's intention to present Solf with a list of their 
grievances. Shultz granted permission on the understanding It was purely an 
act of respect towards Solf. Lauaki and the Samoans prepared with vigour, as 
they truly believed that they could achieve their aim this time round. Lauaki had 
told losefo that his status had slipped because he was weak, but he would 
defend the rights of Samoans and elevate losefo back to his former glory.27 
Lauaki was determined to show losefo that he still had the tenacity to rouse 
many of the dissatisfied matai to oppose the German administration. Lauaki 
made several mafaga around Upolu and Savai'i, explaining to people the 
intention of the German administration for Samoa's future, and called upon 
each one to join him to 'put things rig hf again. 
Lauaki received very little response. In fact, the very people he was 
counting on for support not only remained aloof from his scheme, but also 
encouraged other Samoans not to join Lauaki. The most shameful response 
was from losefo, who had been the catalyst and inspiration for Lauaki's actions. 
He abandoned Lauaki and joined Tamasese Tupua, Tuimaleali'ifano, Fa'alata 
and Tanumafili in a joint statement entitled 'Ole Talaiga i Samoa Uma', 
exhorting the Samoans to boycott Lauaki. Part of that statement read, 
... matou te matua faasilasila atu nei lo matou le aia i le anuilagi a 
lena failauga. Matou te matua faafiti atu lava .... Na ona matou 
faanoanoa lava i le ta'ufuaina o matou igoa i nei mataupu, ae 
matou te le auai. Matou te tatalo foi i le Atua ia na 
faamalamalamaina mai tagata Samoa valea na faaseseina e lenei 
failauga, i le poto o Iona laulaufaiva. 0 lenei Samoa ... ia outou alo 
ese nei lava mai lena failauga ... 28 
(Author's translation): " ... we strongly proclaim that we have 
nothing to do with the intentions of that orator. We strongly deny 
it.. .. We are sad that he has mentioned our names with regard to 
this matter, but we do not support it. We pray to God to 
enlightened the unintelligent Samoans who have been led astray 
by this orator, because of the wisdom of his tongue. 
Samoa ... remain at a distance from that orator ... " 
The support from tama-a-aiga was crucial for Lauaki, but none was 
forthcoming. losefo had not forgotten his misfortune in the Oloa controversy, 
27 Western Samoa, Historical Notes, Mar, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2125. 
28 See Ole Talaiga i Samoa Uma: Ae Maise Lava i Latou Na Ua Faaseseina e le Failauga i Safotulafai, 26 
· Mar, 1909, Maris! Archives of Samoan and Tokelau (henceforth MAST). 
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especially the humiliation he had suffered when Lauaki and Tamasese 
abandoned him to take the blame. losefo probably withdrew his support to avoid 
further shame. Furthermore, the other four tama-a-aiga were LMS deacons and 
the fact that they had withdrawn their support from Lauaki, left losefo in an 
uncomfortable position. Perhaps, the tama-a-aiga also sensed the uselessness 
of Lauaki's situation and decided to remain passive. 
Many other Samoans remained neutral because of either fear of the 
German administration or just plain loyalty to Solf and his administration. Solf 
had implemented the practice of offering inducements to entice many matai, 
such as material rewards and his personal friendship. Consequently, Lauaki's 
every word and every move was duly reported to the German administration, at 
times prompting misgivings in the German administration as to Lauaki's real 
intention.29 In the absence of Solf, Shultz dealt with Lauaki as discretely as 
possible. Shultz had followed Lauaki's every move around the country, and as 
reports piled up, Shultz took the view that Lauaki had seditious intentions. 
Lauaki, however, still managed to elicit support from members of the 
Malietoa and Tamasese families, although they were mainly from Samoans who 
had previous grievances with the German government. Shultz knew well the 
danger of allowing a group of Samoans the chance to express their anger. The 
volatile situation was not helped in any way when Lauaki and his supporters 
were under the false impression they had the backing of the LMS. Lauaki had 
good reasons to expect some support from the Samoan (LMS) Church, and this 
belief was also shared by the German administration as rumours filtered 
through from the various districts. The possibility of Lauaki being supported by 
the Samoan (LMS) Church was real enough to force Shultz to issue an order to 
confine Lauaki in Savai'i on the day of Solfs arrival.30 
The news of support for Lauaki began at Malua, and Newell was under 
pressure to refute rumours that he had told students at Malua that all matai in 
Savai'i should "hold on to their opinions and stick up to the Governor."31 These 
rumours would have reached Lauaki and further encouraged him to continue his 
political stance. There is no doubt that Newell was aware of the rumours, 
29 Shultz to Pay Office, 17 Jan, 1912, GSA; Shultz to Colonial Office, 18 Feb, 1914, GSA; Mata'ala to Soll, 
26 Feb., 1909, GSA; Mata'afa to Soll, 13 Apr, 1909, GSA. 
s:i Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP; Morley to Thompson, 21 Nov, 1908, 
SSL. 
31 Newell to Laurance N., 30 Jan, 1909, NP. 
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especially as students travelled from Savai'i back to Malua after their weekend 
leave. The fact that the LMS had little affection for the Germans, would have 
also encouraged Lauaki to believe the rumours. Newell later apologised to the 
German administration after discovering that a student from the Malua 
Seminary had spread the rumour. Aurelio was dismissed, but he was seen as a 
'sacrifice' to preserve the pride of the other Samoans in Malua who held the 
same ideology. The incident only confirmed that many Samoan church 
members supported Lauaki's political endeavours silently.32 
Self later advised Newell when he heard of Aurelio's dismissal. 
You shouldn't dismiss the fellow. If I dismiss every chief who lie 
and you turn out all who lie, I should have empty mats and you 
soon empty benches.33 
Meanwhile, Shultz continued to diffuse Lauaki's dominance by campaigning 
hard to convince the Samoans of the folly of Lauaki's actions. The Samoan 
government officials, such as Te'o Tuvale and Afamasaga Maua, revived old 
Samoan factionalism to achieve the German administration's aim. They spread 
rumours that Lauaki was preparing to depose losefo in favour of Malietoa. Self 
arrived on 19 November 1908, and once again faced a Samoan movement with 
Lauaki in the forefront. The previous time Self was away, the economic protest 
under the guise of the Olea welcomed him to Samoa. Now, it was a political 
protest that welcomed him back from his honeymoon.34 
The news that Self had arrived reached Lauaki, and he immediately left 
Savai'i with his supporters. He had already made his plans and was determined 
to carry them out. On his way to Mulinu'u, Lauaki heard rumours that Self would 
not receive him. But, as planned, he arrived at Leulumoega, a stronghold of 
Tumua, and found that A'ana would not give him the support that had been 
promised. Instead, he was given a letter from the German administration 
ordering him to return to Savai'i. To make matters painful for Lauaki, a letter 
from losefo was also furnished to support the German administration orders, 
and confirmed his stance with the other tama-a-aiga.35 Lauaki was shattered. 
The loyalty of losefo was once again tested and found wanting, as far as Lauaki 
32 The Roman Catholics in Lepa village also complaint of the affect Lauaki was having on its church 
members. See So!iola lo Moaseniolo. 28 May, 1909, MAST. 
33 Newell to Laurance N., 30 Jan. 1909, NP. 
34 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP; Newell lo Laurance N., 30 Jan, 1909, 
NP. 
35 Short Summary of Lauaki Rebellion, undated, GP; Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 
1909, GP. 
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was concerned, at a crucial political moment. Lauaki went home with his tail 
between his legs, realising just how much his countrymen had not only let him 
down, but had let Samoa down. Even before the requests were delivered at 
Mulinu'u, the movement had collapsed because of the helplessness of losefo to 
encounter Solf, and the inability of the Samoans to unite. losefo may have 
seemed weak to Lauaki but in his weakness losefo found the strength to put the 
welfare of the Samoans ahead of his personal aspirations.36 
One month after the big disappointment, Lauaki had regained his 
composure and put aside the shame of a shattered man, and called all Savai'i 
to a meeting at Safotulafai. Lauaki's heart was hardened even further against 
the German administration. He told the six districts of Pule (Safotulafai, 
Sale'aula, Safotu, Satupa'itea, Palauli, and Vaisigano) to oppose the German 
administration until they accepted their resolutions. This was the beginning of 
what came to be known officially as the Mau a Pule (the opinions or resolutions 
of Pule). For Lauaki, the political opinions of Pule represented feelings of the 
whole of Samoa, although Samoa remained aloof. Lauaki employed his closest 
friends to seek support from aiga of Samoa. l'iga Pisa was one such faithful 
friend. He was a matai from Amoa, Savai'i. He was respected among his peers 
for his wisdom and charisma, although he was only twenty-nine years of age. 
l'iga Pisa was a tower of strength for the movement. 37 
l'iga Pisa was present in Amoa when the order from the German 
administration circulated inhibiting people attending Mulinu'u to welcome Solf. 
On that occasion, l'iga Pisa was reported to have told the government 
messengers that it was "impossible, all Amoa will go to Upolu, they cannot 
stay." Furthermore, he taunted Solfs messengers and issued a challenge as to 
whether it was "true that Germany [was] really pule of Samoa?"36 In his effort to 
secure support for the Mau a Pule, l'iga Pisa sought out Tamasese at Lufilufi, 
Tuisamau in Tuamasaga, and the paramount matai of Leulumoega. l'iga Pisa 
gained for Lauaki the support of Tamasese, Fata loeta, and the matai of 
Leulumoega, who further encouraged Lauaki to be strong and press forward the 
36 Shultz had hand picked a special committee from members of the Samoan committee to welcome Soll. 
Each had to bring three taros, one big fish, and one cooked chicken. Eleven districts were selected to 
provide entertainment, while another eight districts provided ta'a/o/o (presentation of gifts). See Newell 
Papers, (Box 5, 2053), SSO. 
37 Thomas Trood, the British vice-consul, expressed his non-surprised at the outcome of Lauaki's action. 
See Thomas Trood to Solt, 6 Feb, 1909, BCS; Western Samoa Historical Notes, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2/15. 
38 Taumei to Soll, 29 Dec, 1908, GP. 
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matters concerned. l'iga Pisa tried to travel to American Samoa with a letter 
from Lauaki soliciting support In order to reach Tutuila, l'iga Pisa stowed away 
in a box of kapok on the ship, but he was discovered and deported back to 
Samoa.39 
On 29 December 1908, Solf was informed that l'iga Pisa had received a 
'strong letter of encouragement' from Tutuila. The informant, named Taumei, 
was a loyal official of the German administration. He expressed his concern that 
such a letter would lead the people astray, although Lauaki had already 
informed Taumei that the letter was a tusi fa 'aleaiga (a personal family letter). 40 
l'iga Pisa was later arrested and a letter was found on his person which 
contained speculations as to the misuse of Samoan money by the government. 
The German administration blamed 'whiskey politicians' in the white community 
who play 'pothouse' politics in encouraging the Samoans and using the 
Samoans for their self!Sh ends.41 
Solf received news that Pule was gathering in Savai'i and decided to 
undertake a personal malaga to meet the people concerned during December 
1908. But, the effort to reconcile Pule's differences with the German 
administration failed. Solffailed to dissolve the Mau a Pule movement and to 
destroy the resolutions raised therein. Lauaki got the best of Solf in a verbal 
encounter at Safotulafai, and Solf returned to Upolu a very angry man. For four 
long months afterwards, Lauaki and his supporters made life miserable for the 
German administration.42 The news of Lauaki defying the Governor spread 
throughout Samoa. 
Lauaki took advantage of the situation to order his supporters to pay all 
their taxes to the Mau a Pule and not to the German administration. Those who 
had earlier distanced themselves from Lauaki began to rise up and offer their 
support. Pule's traditional allies, such as Manono and Tuamasaga, rallied 
behind Lauaki, especially when the news broke that Solf had asked to meet 
Lauaki at Mulinu'u. Districts in Savai'i who joined Lauaki included Fa'asaleleaga, 
Lealatele, and Gaga'emauga. There was a feeling of confidence among the 
39 Kapok is a fine cotton-like material from a tropical tree used as padding. II was mainly stored in the small 
places similar to cupboards. See Taumei to Soll, 29 Dec. 1908, GP. 
40 Taumei to Solf, 29 Dec, 1908, GPL; Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP. 
41 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP. 
42 Short Summary of Lauaki Rebellion, undated, GP; Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 
1909, GP; Western Samoa, Historical Notes, Mar, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2125. 
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Samoans that the meeting at Mulinu'u would settle all their conflict, and Samoa 
would be returned to its own protocol. 
On 10 January 1909, prior to meeting Lauaki, Solf gathered many of the 
Samoans to Mulinu'u, especially Tumua and matai in Upolu, and demanded 
total loyalty to the German administration. Solf challenged Tumua (Lufilufi and 
Leulumoega) with some biting remarks. 
Poor Lufilufi! Poor Leulumoega! Where is your power and 
splendour! You are living in the shade. Tear down your huts and 
go to Safotulafai. There is power and splendour. There is the rule 
of Samoa, your glory is gone, for Lauaki is the maker of kings. He 
confers the high honours, not you. He inuncted Mata'afa. He will 
inunct himself, as tafa'ifa, he will go with his queen Sialataua to 
Mulinu'u and will be Lord over you fools.43 
Consequently, Tumua renounced Lauaki and Pule before Solt, and thus 
remained aloof from his uso tu ofe.44 A key element to Lauaki's success fell at 
the last hurdle, and weakened the efforts of the Mau a Pule to gain glory. 
Unfortunately, for Lauaki and his supporters, this 'Judas act' was not relayed to 
them. Lauaki had no idea he was lured into a political death trap with the 
helping hand of his peers. The support that Lauaki felt was forthcoming from the 
Samoan (LMS) Church was also a myth, but it was most probably withdrawn 
after the tama-a-aiga's proclamation. 
Solf met Lauaki in Mulinu'u on 16 January 1909.45 Lauaki contemplated 
using the opportunity to present the mau (grievances) of the Samoan people. 
Lauaki called at Vaiusu, Tuamasaga, with a fleet of supporters from Savai'i and 
Manono. Vaiusu became the Mau a Pule headquarter as it was across the bay 
from Mulinu'u. Even with Tumua neutralised, Solf was surprised at the strength 
of Lauaki's support. He decided not to ruffle Lauaki's feathers; especially as 
Lauaki's 'blackened faced' warriors appeared restive and edgy. In a bold move 
to diffuse a hostile situation, Solf offered Lauaki a pardon for his past misdeeds. 
He then sought dialogue with Lauaki to reach a peaceful settlement. He also 
ordered Lauaki to return immediately to Savai'i, but the meeting ended with no 
solution, as both sides refused to accept each other's proposal.46 Lauaki 
43 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP. 
44 Uso tu ofe, literally translated 'brothers who stands like bamboo plants'. It is a Samoan concept, which 
refers to brothers who have emerged from a common root. Tumua and Pule are considered 'uso tu ofe'. 
45 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP; H. A. Hough Report on Samoa, 1909, 
SSO; Western Samoa Historical Notes, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2/15. 
46 H. A. Hough Report on Samoa 1909, SSO; Short Summary of Lauaki Rebellion, undated, GP. 
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returned to Vaiusu from Mulinu'u with a sense of victory. He felt he had 
successfully argued with Solf, and had defied the German administration into 
confusion. However, Lauaki, still had to think about Solfs order for him to return 
to Savai'i. 
Solf did not ask Lauaki to go back to Savai'i, he ordered him. Lauaki 
knew Solf well, and such an order would not have been made if Solf was not 
prepared for a confrontation. Lauaki was confused as to what Solf had in mind. 
Solf had not let on to Lauaki his plan if Lauaki failed to obey German orders. 
Lauaki ignored Solfs order and he remained encamped in Vaiusu. He offered 
various excuses ranging from the weather to observing Sunday taboos in his 
efforts to defy Solfs order. Lauaki then took the initiative without waiting to see 
what Solf had up his sleeve. Lauaki felt he had the upper hand, and that Solf 
was probably bluffing. 
On 18 January 1909, at about 10 o'clock in the morning, Solf received 
two letters. One was signed by Lauaki, and the other signed by Pule and Aiga 
(Savai'i and Manono). Lauaki's letter was rebellious from the beginning. Rather 
than being addressed to the Kovana Kaisalika (Imperial Governor) it was 
addressed Kovana Siamani (German Governor). In the letter, Lauaki stated that 
he would not be deported or be sent back to Savai'i, but would remain at Vaiusu 
and enjoy watching the war between Pule and Tumua, as Solf wished. Lauaki 
then signed the letter as "Lauaki, your true friend." The second letter contained 
a number of wishes and proposals of the Mau a Pule.47 Lauaki defied Solf and 
was calling his bluff regarding Tumua remaining aloof if war broke out. While 
Solf, Shultz, Haiden, and the German administration, met to discuss the content 
of the letters, Lauaki's men paraded near Apia with blackened faces ready for 
war. 
Solf took losefo and went to Vaiusu to appease Lauaki. Solf also invited 
Newell to the meeting to influence Lauaki. When Solf met Lauaki, Lauaki 
pointed and said to Solf, "Samoa fa'a-Jeaga ina" (Samoa spoiled), to which Solf 
replied, "e Jeai, oe fa'a Jeaga ina Samoa" (No, you spoil Samoa).48 Deliberation 
then went on for hours, especially Lauaki's speech, which gathered up the past 
history of the relationship between the Samoans and the German 
47 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP. 
48 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP; see also Western Samoa, Historical 
Notes, Mar, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2/25. 
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administration. Lauaki then pointed out that losefo all along had been the 
instigator of all the troubles in Samoa. A bible was brought to Lauaki upon 
which he swore regarding the truthfulness of his speech.49 Lauaki then asked 
for peace, and pointed out his disappointment at the government using 
Togisala, a matai of Lufilufi, to stir up Leulumoega (Tumua) against Pule. 
Solf felt that Lauaki's accusation against losefo, if proven, would initiate 
charges of conspiracy against losefo, and it would certainly give Lauaki and 
Pule some foundation for their rebellious mood. Thus, for Solt to punish Lauaki 
and let losefo off unpunished would promote injustice and possibly a civil war 
among the Samoans. Newell also spoke to Lauaki and convinced Lauaki to 
accept Solfs offer. In the end, Lauaki agreed to denounce the improper letters 
and accept Solfs pardon. Solf also promised he would examine the proposals 
and demands of the Mau a Pule. Lauaki accepted Solfs address and asked 
only of Solt to declare again that he would not be punished for any of the events 
that had occurred. This request angered Solf, and he responded, 
There are two matters to be considered in this, that in themselves 
have nothing to do with each other. One of them I can see clearly, 
that is your inobedience against my representative and against 
myself, and your menacing attitude against my intention to call 
you to account. For both facts you have explanations and made 
excuses, and as regards them I have the power and feel inclined 
to let once more mercy come before justice.50 
Solf wanted Lauaki to understand that he did not deserve to be pardoned, but 
circumstances had saved him. Lauaki promised Solf again that peace would be 
kept, and he would return to Savai'i. Lauaki, had ingeniously used losefo once 
again to 'save face' before Solf and the Samoan people. 
However, Lauaki's antics had caused some jealousy among the ranks of 
Tumua, especially when the words of Solt regarding their subservient attitude to 
Pule were still ringing in their ears. Solt had sensed that the white population, 
especially the afakasi had somehow contributed to the determination of the 
A'ana, Vaimauga, and Safata, people to declare war on Lauaki, especially when 
Lauaki had opted for peace. Solf had to step in with an ordinance forbidding 
Tumua and any other group taking up arms against Lauaki and his supporters. 
Afamasaga, and other government officials, worked around the clock defusing 
the volatile situation. The order by the government had reached all people 
49 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP. 
50 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP. 
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concerned and averted an unpleasant event. Samoan pastors in various 
villages around Samoa also did their best to dissuade further Samoans joining 
Lauaki and the Mau a Pule. The conflict was an extension of Solfs comments 
earlier regarding Pule, which agitated Tumua into a frenzied mental state.51 The 
Samoan church was not keen to see Samoans fighting Samoans, as it would 
split the support of the LMS church, and in the end Tumua and Pule, as well as 
the Samoan church, would be the losers. The LMS missionaries were also keen 
to avert conflict to assure Solf of their commitment to strive for peace in 
Samoa.52 
Many supporters of Lauaki saw his pardon as a stepping stone towards 
future favourable negotiations with the government. But, the rumours that 
followed soon after that Solf was scared of Lauaki, and that Lauaki and his men 
proposed to kill every German in Samoa and Solf was powerless to prevent it, 
destroyed any chance of lasting peace.53 News of Lauaki meeting several 
villages in Savai'i to encourage and reaffirm the Mau a Pule reached Upolu. 
Lauaki further added fuel to the fire by twisting and falsely preaching the 
outcome of his meeting with Solf at Vaiusu and Mulinu'u. At Palauli, Lauaki told 
the people that Solf had agreed to the four tama-a-aiga ruling together with 
losefo at Mulinu'u, and losefo would have "a salute, uniform, sword and helmet 
- that the lafoga (poll tax) would be reduced, and Tolo and Laupu'e [Samoan 
Faipule] removed from office."54 Lauaki also spoke to the Manono people. He 
told them that the demands of the movement were accepted, and Solf declared 
to Lauaki that he "will accept all the things you declared to me just now, and will 
carry it all out in accordance with your wish."55 
In response to Lauaki's efforts, the tulafale of Palauli arose and thanked 
Lauaki for having succeeded in his endeavour, and regretted that Palauli had 
not joined Lauaki. However, the tulafale did counsel Lauaki, and Safotulafai, to 
obey the ma/o and "not get up to any more foolish things."56 Palauli, and 
51 Siuvao- Tuasivi, 0 Galuega A Ou Fai Mo Le Malo Ina Ua Tutupu Ai Ni Faalavelave, 25 Aug, 1909, NP; 
Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP. 
52 Short Summary of Lauaki Rebellion, undated, GP; A. I. Braisby, "A Document Record and History of the 
Lauati Rebellion (0 le Mau a Lauati) in Western Samoa, 1932 - 1933," [copy of 1909 document], Mss; 
HA Hough, Report on Samoa, 1909, SSO; SOC- Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 3-8 May 1909, SSL. 
53 Short Summary of Lauaki Rebellion, undated, GP. 
54 Lelei F. K. to Williams (Residence Commission), 16 Feb, 1909, GP. 
55 Lelei F. K. to Williams (Residence Commission), 16 Feb, 1909, GP. 
56 Lelei F. K. to Williams (Residence Commission), 16 Feb, 1909, GP. 
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perhaps other villages in Savai'i, welcomed the efforts of Lauaki but they 
insisted that it was better to quit while he was ahead, at least be content with 
So Ifs offer. The Samoan members of the administration also exhorted pastors 
in Savai'i to work on Lauaki to give up his mau and obey the government. The 
plea of the Samoans to the Samoan pastors, suggested that the Samoan 
church in Savai'i was supporting Lauaki, and the Samoan pastors were 
probably inactive in restraining their members from supporting Lauaki's efforts. 
The LMS would have had some idea of the support the Samoan church had for 
Lauaki, but was not concerned enough, or probably did not care, to address it.57 
Lauaki continued to raise the hopes of the Mau a Pule, in maintaining his 
own positive notion of how things stood with Solf, as he tried to entice Savai'i to 
force the hand of the German administration in his favour. Lauaki probably 
knew he was fighting a loosing battle against Solt, but he was determined to 
push Solf to the limit on an off chance that Solf would somehow change his 
mind and grant his demands in return for the termination of the Mau a Pule. But, 
rumours of Lauaki's undertaking, and the fact that he was residing in Manono 
and not Safotulafai as ordered, disturbed and angered Solf.58 
While Lauaki celebrated, Solf vibrated. Lauaki was quite content to play 
the waiting game. Time could only help with the Mau a Pule's struggle, 
especially if Solffailed to act, but Solf did act and acted quickly. In a meeting 
with the Samoan Faipule from 25 to 31 January 1909, Solf manipulated them to 
request a deportation order for Lauaki.59 This was easily obtained with only four 
voting against the move. Solf then requested the presence of several German 
warships in Samoa as soon as possible.60 Solf continued to play dirty politics by 
again hitting hard at Tumua's pride, and in doing so, he kept Tumua inactive. 
Furthermore, the news that Malietoa Tanumafili I was on the verge of 
usurping the throne dictated losefo and Tamasese's final choice to remain loyal 
57 Lelei F. K. to Williams (Residence Commission), 16 Feb, 1909, GP; Short Summary of Lauaki Rebellion, 
undated, GP; A I. Braisby, "A Document Record and History of the Lauati Rebellion (0 le Mau a Lauati) in 
Western Samoa, 1932 -1933 [copy of 1909 document], Mss; H.A. Hough Report on Samoa, 1909, SSO; 
Newell to Thompson, 1909, SSL. 
58 Siuvao - Tuasivi, 0 Galuega a cu fai mo le Malo ina ua tutupu ai ni Faalavelave, 25 Aug, 1909, NP. 
59 The Gennan government had a special fund called 'Highest Disposition Fund' to reward those loyal to 
the German Administration. See Colonial Office to Governor, 15 Apr, 1911 (reply re letter 4 Sept, 1910), 
PMB 479. 
60 Treed to William Lee, 5 Apr, 1909, BCS; Treed to Edward Grey, 6 Feb, 1909, GBFO; Imperial 
Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP. 
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to Solf.61 The LMS missionaries were unable to quell the rumours spreading 
within the Samoan (LMS) Church. It was unknown where the rumours 
emanated from, but the LMS believed they could have originated from the 
Lauaki camp to enhance support, or from the German administration to agitate 
Tumua and supporters of losefo and Tamasese. The LMS monitored Lauaki's 
efforts through the news brought back by Malua students from Savai'i. The LMS 
could no longer deny that the Samoan (LMS) Church was supporting Lauaki, 
even if it was only Savai'i.62 
Solrs plans were not revealed to Lauaki and his supporters. This made 
Lauaki even more daring and his supporters more outspoken, as they preached 
Solrs inactivity as a sign of Lauaki's strength. Many Samoans kept reminding 
themselves of the Samoan adage - sau aso (the day will come), and remained 
pacified.63 That day did come. During 18 to 26 March 1909, four German 
warships, Leizpig, Arcona, Jaguar, and the steamer Titania, arrived. On that day 
Solf made an order for the deportation of nine matai and their families, including 
Lauaki. 
In the orders, Solf stated that the matai were deported for their "violent 
acts and for [their] disobedience towards the Government's orders, even after 
[Selfs] alofa (kindness) was shown to you in Vaiusu."64 losefo also made an 
order asking Lauaki and those involved to surrender, for "it was best that a few 
should suffer for the violent acts of the past than that the whole of the country 
should suffer."65 Those involved were given seven days to surrender. Lauaki, 
Namulau'ulu, and Letasi, on 25 March 1909, informed Solf they were going into 
the bush, and refused to obey the orders given. Reports of Lauaki's supporters 
taking provisions into the bush, and traffic flowing from Tuamasaga and 
Manono to Savai'i, confirmed to Solf the intention of the Mau a Pule. Solf took 
steps to stem the flow of the supporters from Upolu by placing two warships in 
the strait between Upolu and Savai'i.66 
61 Lelei F. K. to Williams (Residence Commission), 16 Feb, 1909, GP; Imperial Government of Samoa, 
Report No. 143, May 1909, GP. 
62 Short Summary of Lauaki Rebellion, undated, GP. 
63 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP. 
64 Short Summary of Lauaki Rebellion, undated, GP; Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 
1909, GP. 
65 Short Summary of Lauaki Rebellion, undated, GP. 
66 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP. 
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On 25 March 1909, Lauaki and his supporters held a meeting at 
Safotulafai. According to Williams, there was great fear among Lauaki's 
supporters as rumour had spread that Solf had decreed that all 'rebels' would 
be hanged. The Mau a Pule declared they would rather fight and die than be 
hanged. Solf decided to act slowly and give Lauaki time. Solf issued two more 
proclamations, but with no positive response from Lauaki. Sotf, while ove~oyed 
at the arrival of the warships, did not want to use the warships early, as their 
presence could trigger an outbreak of civil war, rather than force Lauaki to 
surrender,67 and Sotf did not contemplate returning Samoa to its violent past. 
Solfs only hope to avert such violence was for Lauaki to surrender. 
The solutions available to Solf were minimal, either engage Lauaki in 
battle or grant the Samoans some of their demands. Neither fitted Solfs 
agenda, but he had to put pressure on Lauaki before he could regroup. The 
warships that had arrived had one hundred and twenty New Guineans on board 
for the purpose of pursuing and hunting down Samoans in the bush. Solf 
decided against utilising the New Guineans as it would only motivate more 
Samoans to 'go-bush' with Lauaki.68 
On 26 March 1909, Solf looked to the missions as the only avenue left to 
defuse the hostile situation.69 The mission societies in Samoa also realised the 
volatility of the situation and quickly went into action. The WMMS and LMS 
worked around the clock to convince their own adherents of the consequences 
that would engulf Samoa if they persisted in their aggression. Newell, on a 
fautasi (long boat) crewed by the Malua students, went across to Savai'i to meet 
Lauaki. He pointed out to Lauaki the futility of allowing Samoa to engage in 
another bush war. Newell told Lauaki that Tumua and Manono, as well as other 
leading allies of Pule were abstaining from any political process which would 
destroy the peace in Samoa. Newell also told Lauaki that the LMS people in 
Savai'i had withdrawn their support for any armed confrontation.70 Newell's 
statement to Lauaki proved that the Samoan (LMS) Church, in Savai'i at least, 
supported Lauaki's endeavours. Newell and the LMS knew about it but had 
"'Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP. 
68 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP; H. A. Hough Report on Samoa, 1909, 
sso. 
69 H. A. Hough Report on Samoa, 1909, SSO. 
70 H. A. Hough Report on Samoa, 1909, SSO; A. I. Braisby, "A Document Record and History of the Lauati 
Rebellion (0 le Mau a Lauati) in Western Samoa, 1932 - 1933 [copy of 1909 document], Mss. 
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remained silent in fear of the Germans. Newell's statement, however, could 
have been a clear message to Lauaki that LMS support would never eventuate. 
Newell preached in Savai'i the following weekend while allowing Lauaki and his 
supporters some time to consider Selfs proposal. 
The same message was carried to Methodist villages in Savai'i by the 
Reverend Ernest G. Neil, the chairman of the Methodist mission in Samoa. He 
persuaded Asiata Taetoloa and Asiata Meagaolo to surrender.71 Meanwhile, 
Solt delivered a message on 28 March 1909, reminding Lauaki of the 
significance of the eagle. 
The eagle [was] still willing and waiting to shelter you under his 
wings. It is for you to choose the wings or the talons and do not 
believe the foolish stories that the German pule of Samoa lasts 
but 1 O years. It will last forever, and no other nation would 
interfere with the pule of the Kaiser in Samoa.72 
Lauaki approached Newell on Monday morning, 29 March 1909, and 
advised him of his decision to surrender to the German administration. 
According to Newell, Lauaki's decision had been made "after two days of 
severe mental conflict."73 Lauaki himself probably knew what the end result 
would be, but had continued for the sake of pride. Lauaki probably knew the 
Samoan church was never in a position to support him, but had continued to 
prey on its sympathy. According to Newell, Lauaki surrendered so that steps 
could be taken to reorganise the administration of Samoa in such a way that the 
Governor's authority could be upheld in the eyes of the Samoans and the world. 
Furthermore, Solt had promised Lauaki and his supporters a light punishment, 
and permission to communicate with the missionaries if they were sent into 
exile.74 On hearing the good news Solt decided to remain in Upolu with his 
troops. He dispatched a warship to retrieve Lauaki and his supporters from 
Savai'i. On 1 April 1909, the Leizpig picked up Lauaki and five supporters from 
Safotulafai. Newell pleaded with Solt to make Lauaki's punishment as light as 
possible.75 
71 H. A. Hough Report on Samoa, 1909, SSO; Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, 
GP. 
72 Short Summary of Lauaki Rebellion, undated, GP. 
73 Newell to Soll, 29 Mar, 1909, NP; SOC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 3-8 May 1909, SSL. 
74 Newell to Soll, 29 Mar, 1929, NP. 
75 Newell to Soll, 29 Mar, 1909, NP; Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP; 
Western Samoa, Historical Notes, Mar, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2/25. 
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The day after Solf had approached the missions for assistance, Lauaki 
wrote a letter to the British Consul in Apia. Lauaki was desperate to avert, or at 
least postpone, his imminent downfall. The arrival of an American warship in 
Apia had further encouraged Lauaki to defy Solf. The warship had revived old 
recollections of the days when other powers would intervene in Samoan politics. 
Sivaotele,76 Lauaki's second wife, also encouraged her husband to pursue the 
assistance of Britain and America.77 In his letter to the British Consul, Lauaki 
argued that the agreement regarding Samoa and Germany had not invalidated 
the right of the other powers to interfere in Samoan politics, especially when 
Samoan wishes were not fulfilled. Lauaki pleaded with the British Consul to 
intervene and fulfil its obligation, which they had sworn to do on the bible. 
Lauaki wrote, "where is the word spoken by the Commissioners that Germany 
should protect Samoa; guide her, but that Samoa should be the government?"78 
The letter was a desperate plea from a man who was about to be sacrificed, as 
far as Samoans were concerned, and punished for his rebelliousness. The 
British Consul, Thomas Trood, wrote to Lauaki and reiterated what Germany 
had been ordaining in the past- only the Kaiser ruled in Samoa.79 
Lauaki surrendered after taking the missionaries and Solf to the edge, 
and exploiting every conceivable avenue to counter German authority, and 
revive Samoan hope. Lauaki's honourable character remained intact, as he 
surrendered without a hint of returning Samoa to its violent wars, and knowing 
that he had taken Samoans' complaints to the limit without bloodshed.80 Solf 
retained his supreme authority as he made an example of Lauaki in front of his 
peers. Lauaki's final demise came ominously on April Fools Day. Solf deported 
Lauaki to Saipan in the Mariana Islands. Lauaki sought out Newell, and wanted 
to know what had happened to Solfs promise of a lighter sentence, which was 
advocated by the LMS. Lauaki told Newell he was going to exile because of that 
promise, and asked Newell to intercede on his behalf to the German 
76 Lauaki had replaced his first wife, Suilolo, with Sivaotele, a daughter of Ala'iasa of Falefa. 
77 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GSA. 
78 Pule, Aiga, Tuamasaga, to Trood, 27 Mar, 1909, GBFO; see also Pule Aiga Tuamasaga to British 
Consul Kuruku, 27 Mar, 1909, British Consulate (Samoa), General Outward Correspondence, Series 2, 
vol. 26 (henceforth BCS); Short Summary of Lauaki Rebellion, undated, GP. 
79 Trood to Pule, Aiga, Tuamasaga, 28 Mar, 1909, GBFO; Trood to Secretary of Pule Aiga- Tuamasaga, 
undated, BCS; Short Summary of Lauaki Rebellion, undated, GP. 
80 H. A. Hough Report on Samoa, 1909, SSO; SOC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 3-8 May, 1909, SSL; 
Trood to Grey, 5 Apr, 1909, BCS; Trood to Grey, 9 Apr, 1909, GBFO. 
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administration.81 Lauaki had forgotten that a light sentence for Solf was exactly 
what he got. 
Lauaki was accompanied by his closest advisers and supporters, namely 
Tuilagi Letasi (Safotulafai), l'iga Pisa (Amoa), Malae'ulu Moefiu (Amoa), Asiata 
Taetoloa (Satupa'itea), Le'iataua Mana (Manono), Tevaga Matata (Lealatele), 
Namulau'ulu Pulali (Safotulafai), Asiata Meagaolo (Satupa'itea), Taupau Pauesi 
(Manono), and Tagaloa Maumausolo Va'aiga (Tufu Gautavai). They were also 
accompanied by LMS pastors, named Uria and Areta, wives and children 
numbering seventy-two.82 The rest of Lauaki's supporters, including Samoan 
officials from Fa'asaleleaga, Saleaula, and Satupa'itea, were dealt with severely 
with fines, prison terms, exile within Samoa, and loss of rights and privileges.83 
In a German report in 1909, it stated that Lauaki was a highly gifted man, but 
lacked vision and the ability to move with changes. In the report Lauaki was 
described as, 
... a truly great Samoan, the like of whom only seldom before and 
never since appeared in Samoan history, in spite of his inborn 
intelligence, in spite of his practical political schooling in praxis, 
could not acquire sufficient ability, intellectual and psychological, 
to adapt himself during 10 years of existence of German rule in 
Samoa to the essential changes of politics that took and were 
taking place ... 84 
The sun had finally set for Lauaki. The trip to Saipan would be the last 
time he would see his beloved Samoa. In 1915, on board a New Zealand 
steamer, Lauaki was filled with joy as he contemplated returning to Samoa to 
savour what he had fought for all his life - a victory over the Germans. 
Unfortunately, Lauaki died from dysentery on Tarawa Atoll, in the Kiribati group, 
enroute to Samoa.85 The celebration that was given in his district, 
81 Areta to Newell, 15 Oct, 1909, NP; Western Samoa Historical Notes, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2/15. 
82 A letter from Saipan described the conditions of the exiles in Saipan, as they established a village and 
called ii Samoafou (new Samoa). See Uria to Newell, 10 Jun, 1909, NP; Areta to Newell, 15 Jul, 1909, NP; 
Areta to Newell, 15 Oct, 1909, NP; Uria to Newell, 14 Oct, 1909, NP; Tala Sa'o i le Folauga i le Paopao a 
l'iga Pisa - Guam, Tate Papers - MS 4879-086 (henceforth TP). 
83 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP; Western Samoa, Historical Notes, Mar, 
1935, IT 1 Ex 2125. 
84 Imperial Government Report No. 143, May 1909, GP. 
85 Namulau'ulu and Asiata Toleafoa died in Guam. See Areta to Newell, 15 Oct, 1909, NP; H.A. Hough 
Report on Samoa, 1909, SSO; Cable Shultz to Colonial Office, 10 Jul, 1913, GSA; Garrett, 199. Note: The 
escapades of l'iga Pisa, which included his swim from Saipan to Guam to escape, are well documented in 
his brief biography. See l'iga Pisa, "The Mau a Pule 1909," typescript (in possession of author). 
Fa'asaleleaga, on the return of other exiled members was one of 'great 
rejoicing' but with a touch of sadness.86 
115 
Perhaps, Lauaki, and his ideas, were never meant to return to Samoa. 
Germany had lost the war, and was also deprived of returning to Samoa. 
Samoa, perhaps, needed a fresh start and needed to get rid of the old. 
Nevertheless, Lauaki's death buried with it the last hope of Tumua and Pule 
ever retaining their traditional status. It also buried with it any further notion of 
Tumua and Pule influencing Samoan politics in the foreseeable future. 
Lauaki's influence over many Samoan leaders remained. He was 
respected for his boldness in exposing the true intentions of the German 
administration regarding Samoa. He knew that to give up his identity as a 
Samoan completely as the Germans demanded was nothing short of racial 
extermination. In the end, Lauaki was the only one brave enough to assert the 
legitimate rights of the Samoan people to independence. Lauaki was willing to 
suffer for this right, and many Samoan leaders that followed later were willing to 
imitate his patriotism. 
Lauaki may have been buried. Tumua and Pule may have been 
conquered, but no one could bury an idea and conquer a spirit that was 
determined to free itself. Lauaki gave the Samoans courage and strength to 
pursue their aspirations, and free themselves of all foreign domination. Lauaki 
also imparted to his people the notion of perseverance and patience, and the 
importance of making sacrifices in order to achieve a purpose. Perhaps, Lauaki 
did win and, like Moses in the Old Testament, was not allowed to partake and 
enjoy the fruits of the promised land. Meanwhile, the Samoans, giving due 
consideration to the oppressive circumstances under Germany, perceived the 
arrival of New Zealand as a 'God-given' intervention and a benevolent act in 
advancing Samoan aspirations. 
""Lauaki's widow, Sivaotele, reached Samoa January, 1916; see Muller, Report of Faasaleleaga District, 
1916, SSR. 
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The German administration unexpectedly ended just as Samoa was 
moving into an era of passive acceptance of Germanisation. The Samoans' 
political aspirations had become mere words and wishes. Tumua and Pule were 
compelled to accept the status quo, as options to regain their mantle ceased. 
The missions were also content to carry out German policies, and Samoan 
church members slowly learned to appreciate German influence in their spiritual 
life and academic achievements. The aspiration of the Samoans to control their 
country was more of a dream rather than an achievable goal, and the Samoans 
desperately needed another avenue, politically or religiously, to regain Samoan 
protocol. World War I became the catalyst for Samoans to rekindle the spirit to 
achieve their aspirations. 
The outbreak of World War I on 5 August 1914 initiated unwanted 
changes to the German colonial regime in the Pacific. The Germans would have 
received the news soon after through their wireless communication, and 
likewise the papa/agi and missionaries who monitored radio broadcasts. The 
rest of Samoa would have heard the news soon after. When the news was 
received, there was no panic and Samoans showed little enthusiasm. The 
German residents were also unruffled and acted quite confidently that Germany 
would quickly put an end to the conflict and things would return to normal for 
Samoa. But, Britain joined the war and made things a bit more complicated for 
the Germans, although the Germans in Samoa maintained their confidence in 
success.1 
On 14 June 1914, the annual inspection tour to Germany's colonies in 
the Pacific took place, and the German fleet was expected to anchor off Apia 
harbour on 27 July 1914. However, Count Maximilian Johannes Maria Hubertus 
von Spee, the commander of Germany's Pacific Fleet, was restricted in fulfilling 
his schedule. The tension in Europe had delayed von Spee and forced him to 
'See Robert M. Watson, History of Samoa, Wellington: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1918, 138; Nelson Eustis, 
Aggie Grey of Samoa, Adelaide: Hobby Investments, 1979; Fay Alailima, Aggie Grey: A Samoan Saga, 
Honolulu: Mutual Publishing, 1988. Note: Both Watson and Grey lived through the period in question, and 
the monographs narrate their recollections of New Zealand's occupation of Samoa in 1914. 
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remain out in the open sea while awaiting news of further developments. When 
von Spee received news that war had been declared, he decided to return to 
Germany.2 He was probably thinking of utilising the large fleet under his 
command to assist Germany's effort back in Europe. But, von Spee failed to 
consider the expectations of the many German residents living in German 
colonies around the Pacific, to whom their safety had been entrusted. 
In Samoa, the German administration expected von Spee to arrive soon 
and take control of the German colony. Shultz and German residents that met 
to consider the future of Samoa had that expectation and were only considering 
how to treat other foreign residents in Samoa; such was their confidence in 
retaining Samoa.3 A day after the declaration of war, the British Secretary of 
State, Sir Lewis Harcourt, sent an urgent message to its representative in New 
Zealand, the Governor General, Earl Liverpool. Harcourt informed New Zealand 
that Britain wanted Samoa seized as it contained a wireless station capable of 
receiving and sending messages to Germany. A similar message for Australia 
to act likewise in relation to New Guinea, Yap, Marshall Islands, and Nauru was 
also delivered. New Zealand took up the challenge immediately, and eventually 
arrived in Samoa on 29 August 1914.4 
Colonel Robert Logan was the commander of the 'Advanced Force of the 
New Zealand Expeditionary Force' (NZEF). Logan's first 'Operation Order' was 
to sail to Samoa to capture Samoa and take possession of the German wireless 
station. The soldiers were issued with ammunition, and orders were given to 
destroy the wireless station first if bombardment was deemed necessary.5 The 
NZEF arrived at dawn off Matautu, with the convoy headed by the Psyche, 
followed by the Philome/, the Pyramus, and the supply ship Monowai. The New 
Zealand convoy was, at first, mistaken for von Spee's delayed German Fleet, 
' Graf von Spee had under his command a large fleet made up of two battleships, the Schamhorst and the 
Gneisnau. two cruisers, the Prinz Friedrich and the Numberg, two escort ships, the Matkomannia and the 
Titania, and one gunboat, the Cormoran. For an account on the activities of the German Pacific Fleet and 
the intention of von Spee to conduct a 'cruiser warfare' in the Pacific as tt made its way home. See Arthur 
W. Jose, The Royal Australian Navy, Sydney: Angus 7 Robertson, 1928; John A. Moses & P. M. Kennedy 
eds, Germany in the Pacific and Far East 1870- 1914, St Lucia: University of Queensland, 1977. 
3 Logan to Liverpool 8 Jun, 1916; Island Territories Archives (henceforth IT) 2/14; Shultz Diary, Minutes of 
Meeting, English translation, 5 Aug, 1914, IT 2110; Administration - Colonel Logan, IT 211; Occupation of 
Samoa, Instructions to Colonel Logan, 1914, IT 3912. 
4 For general information on the occupation of Samoa, see Samoanische Zeitung, 5-26 Sept, 1914; S. J. 
Smith, The Samoa (NZ) Expeditionary Forces, 1914-1915, Wellington: Fergusson & Osborn, 1924. 
5 Occupation of Samoa - Instruction to Colonel Logan, Operation Orders, No. 1, 26 Aug, 1915, IT 39/2. 
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but the mistake was soon realised, as the residents of Apia contemplated with 
little fuss what the ships on the horizon would do.6 
The Psyche cruised into Apia harbour, and soon despatched a message 
for the Germans to surrender unconditionally. On shore, the message bearer 
soon realised that the German administration were not present among the 
passive but inquisitive crowd that had gathered to watch. A local citizen was 
sent with a message for the German administration, which called for immediate 
surrender to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. It also called upon the German 
administration to surrender Apia Township forthwith, as well as ceasing all 
communication on the wireless station immediately. The German administration 
was given half an hour to respond or face bombardment.7 Meanwhile, the 
British and American consuls, and their respective residents, took the time to 
send a petition to Logan to consider the kindness shown by the Germans to 
Europeans and Samoans since the declaration of war. The NZEF waited for 
hours before a reply eventuated. 
The delay in a German response was not intentional. Shultz, the German 
Governor, had been meeting with the Samoan matai to discuss the best way to 
deal with the situation at hand. After weighing up all the possible solutions, 
Shultz and his administration decided to surrender. He rejected the offer from 
the Samoans to defend the colony, as it was their fight. 8 Shultz also took into 
consideration the Germans' lack of weapons and manpower. The Acting 
German Governor, S. N. Rimberg, relayed this response, which included a 
strong protest against the threat of military action, and the outcome for non-
compliance. Rimberg informed the NZEF that the German administration would 
offer no resistance, and that the wireless station had been dismantled.9 
The NZEF landed without incident. The soldiers located the wireless 
station and found it to be booby trapped with dynamite. It took sometime to 
disarm it, but eventually the station was back in operation order. The day after 
saw the Union Jack raised in place of the German flag. Shultz presented 
6 Samoanische Zeitung, 5 Sept, 1914. 
7 Samoanische Zeitung, 5 Sept, 1914; Harcourt to Liverpool, Appendix to the Journals of the House of 
Representative of New Zealand (henceforth AJHR), 1914; Western Samoa Historical Noles, 1935, IT 1 Ex 
2/15. 
8 Shultz Diary, Minutes of Meeting, English translation, 5 Aug, 1914, IT 2/10; Shultz's Diary, 9 -27 Aug, 
1914, English translation, IT 2/10. 
9 Rimberg to Paley, 30 Aug, 1914, AJHR. For further reading see M.B. Boyd, "The Military Administration 
of Western Samoa," New Zealand Journal of History, 2 no.2, 1968, 148-164. 
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himself before Logan and was informed that he and other German officials 
would be taken as prisoners to New Zealand. This was duly carried out on 1 
September 1914.10 Logan confiscated German administration records, as well 
as personal private correspondence and diaries. Logan had intended to keep 
many of the German officials in their capacity as government employees, as 
advocated under the Hague Convention, which stressed that Samoa's 
administration would continue under German law, and close as possible to the 
German pattem.11 However, contrary orders from Wellington forced Logan to 
use some of his military men, and local British residents, to staff the 
administration office. 
One of Logan's first objectives was to maintain order and discipline and 
to make sure the daily routine of the residents was maintained with very little 
interference from the military. Logan did not make many significant changes, as 
his task in Samoa was one of military occupation for an uncertain period of time. 
He maintained much of the existing policies and administrative management, 12 
and enforced much of the existing laws. Logan, however, replaced and 
repealed laws and procedures, which contravened military occupation policies. 
All in all, Logan and his appointed officials continued where the Germans left 
off, although they were far less experienced and lacked professional 
qualifications for their assigned tasks.13 For instance, Logan appointed a local 
resident as District Court Judge even though he had no legal training. 
Furthermore, Logan appointed his aide de camp as the secretary for Native 
Affairs. There was also confusion over the interpretation of various laws, as well 
as confusion over whose laws and regulations the administration upheld. The 
confusion led to mismanagement and instability. James W. Davidson, some 
years later, referred to Logan's administration as a "ramshackle 
administration."14 
10 Logan to Liverpool, 2 Sept, 1914, AJHR; Report of the Royal Commission Concerning the 
Administration of Western Samoa, 1927, AJHR; New Zealand Captured German Samoa, 3 Aug, 1914, 
Chronicle of the 2rf' Cenwiy. 
11 Administration - Colonel Logan, IT 2/1; Occupation of Samoa, instructions to Colonel Logan, 1914, IT 
3912; Report on Samoan Affairs, IT 219; Policy on Samoan Affairs, IT 2111. 
"Western Samoa Historical Notes, 1935. IT 1 Ex 2115. 
13 R. W. Tate, Native Situation, Sept, 1921, IT 88/5; RobertW. Tate Papers MS-Copy-Micro 0082-04 
(henceforth TP). 
,. J.W. Davidson, Samoa mo Samoa: The Eme1gence of the Independent State of Samoa, Melbourne: 
Oxford University, 1967, 92-93; see also Percy S. Allen, "The Pacific Islands: Fiji and Samoa," Reprint of 
Article in Sydney Morning Herald. 
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The Samoans reacted very slowly and cautiously to the presence of the 
New Zealand military. Logan's various proclamations were geared towards the 
existing military situation, and had little concern for the civil aspect and 
everyday demands of the Samoan people.15 The Samoans themselves noticed 
the low-key-lazy-approach of their new mentor, especially in making very little 
demands upon them compared to the Germans. The papalagi were just as 
surprised at the minimal attention received from the New Zealand military, and 
the ease with which everyone had picked up their lives and continued with very 
little impediment. Nevertheless, a few staunch British residents detested New 
Zealand's take-over of Samoa. This group felt the presence of a military regime 
would lead to the destruction of Samoan customs, and the disturbance of the 
peaceful lifestyle, which had been created under German rule. The concerns of 
the papalagi residents were also shared by many Samoans.16 The older 
papalagi members of the London Missionary Society (LMS), such as the 
Reverends Alexander Hough and John W. Hills expressed this attitude, 
although not all LMS missionaries shared the same view. For instance, the 
Reverend James W. Sibree praised Logan for his "wisdom and foresight in 
dealings with the Samoans."17 
The LMS mission was under the impression that the Samoan leaders 
were doing a good job keeping the church 'Samoan' under European 
missionary supervision. They were concerned that an influx of papalagi military 
men would compromise and 'water-down' LMS efforts in keeping Samoans on a 
religious path. The LMS missionaries feared a decrease in morality would stem 
from unethical and immoral characters in the NZEF. The LMS missionaries 
were very comfortable with the way things had been going under the German 
administration in relation to morality and spirituality, although relationships with 
the Germans were hardly intimate.18 
The LMS missionaries also felt they were finally in charge and were, 
since the early euphoria of mission, enjoying harmonious relations with Samoan 
15 For example, Logan's Proclamation No.1, 2 Sept, 1914, AJHR. 
16 Many Samoan matai loyal to the German regime remained confident of Germany winning the war. They 
secretly encouraged many Samoans to remain loyal and pray for Germany. See Aiona Toalepai to Saga, 
13 Aug. 1915" Grattan Papers, MS-Papers-4879-041 (henceforth GP). 
17 Sibree, 'Leulumoega Annual Report, 1915, London Missionary Society South Seas Report (henceforth 
SSR). 
18 Shultz to SDC, 2 Feb, 1914, Correspondence of LMS, Samoan District, with the German Administration, 
1905-1915, Pacific Manusclipt Bureau (henceforth PMB) 143. 
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church leaders. The arrival of the NZEF saw changes taking shape, which were 
beginning to have an impact on Samoan minds. The soft-handed approach by 
Logan had given some Samoan leaders latitude to express themselves and put 
into practice some of the customs and culture, and political ideology, which had 
been banned by the German regime.19 The LMS mission feared that the relaxed 
atmosphere would be detrimental for Samoan development, but perhaps their 
major fear was not so much the return of the Samoans to old ways, as the fact 
that a change in attitude would undermine their authority as leaders of the 
Samoan church. The LMS missionaries' concern was probably genuine 
knowing that the Samoans would not pass up an opportunity to take control of 
their affairs. 
Even under the German regime, the LMS missionaries had observed 
Samoan elders trying to take control of church matters without the missionaries' 
input. The missionaries observed a closer working relationship between the 
matai system and the Samoan church leaders to strengthen the church, to solve 
congregational problems, and to shape decisions and resolutions, something 
that had been missing earlier. The opposite was also clear, the Samoan church 
leaders were also strengthening, indirectly, the positions of many Samoan 
political leaders. 20 
While life for the papalagi and Samoans seemed normal, Logan's rule 
was, nevertheless, strict and autocratic. Logan's autocratic character was 
perhaps made less unpalatable in the eyes of the Samoans by the enormous 
prosperity Samoa was enjoying under his leadership. By the end of the war, 
total exports in copra and cocoa were valued at £264,000. However, the imports 
almost equalled exports, and Samoans blamed the greed of the traders rather 
than any lack of control by Logan's administration for the increase in imported 
goods.21 
Logan made sure everything was carried out with precision, although at 
times the standard achieved fell far below his expectation, but no one could be 
blamed for such below par performances. After a few months of watchful 
19 Proclamation, Soll, 31May,1901, German Administration of Western Samoa (henceforth GAWS), 
series 1-4; Minutes, Self, no date, GAWS; Self to Mata'afa, 24 Jun, 1901, GAWS; Minutes, Self, 25 Jun, 
1901, GAWS; Ali'i and Faipule of Fasito'otai and Faleseela to Self, 3 Sept, 1901, GAWS; Annual Report, 
Apia, Feb, 1902, SSR. 
20 Newell to Thompson, 3 Jun, 1907, SSL; see also Chapter 2 for further discussion and examples. 
21 Visit of Parliamentary Party to Pacific Islands, Report, 1920 - 1921, AJHR. 
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alertness for enemy intrusions,22 the NZEF settled into a routine that induced 
boredom and homesickness. Soon the soldiers began a newspaper with the title 
Pull-Thro, which expressed the mood of the occupied forces. The listless 
soldiers soon looked for other means of diversion to occupy their time. 
Many established relationships with Samoan women, as well as closer 
ties with many Samoan families. Many others took the time to visit more of the 
islands, especially Upolu, and familiarise themselves with some of the 
traditional sights in Samoa. The soldiers also began to engage in gambling by 
attending horse racing and introducing Totalisator (or Tote) Betting. Orders 
were issued to remind all members of the NZEF of the strict discipline required 
in all matters. Orders also reminded the soldiers that they were forbidden from 
"all gambling in Garrison, Camps, or Cantonments. This include book-making or 
acting as an agent for a book-maker."23 
The problem must have been on the increase and may have affected 
some of the Samoans especially those attached to the LMS. The Au Matutua 
wrote to Logan in protest at the introduction of 'Tote Betting,' and later furnished 
Logan with a five-page document pointing out the evil of gambling.24 It became 
a serious enough matter for the LMS and WMMS to write a combined letter to 
the administration airing their dissatisfaction regarding gambling as a whole. 
The letter, signed by the Reverends Hills, Sibree, and E. G. Neill, included the 
following: 
We view with the greatest concern the attempts being made to 
popularise its [betting] use amongst Samoans; an experience of 
many years educational and religious work for their moral and 
spiritual betterment assuring us of the evil effects which will 
certainly follow its introduction ... we consider the introduction of 
systematized gambling as a most dangerous element and strongly 
protest against it.25 
22 There were two little incidents in September1914, which helped kept the troops on their toes. The first 
was the arrival of two German warships, the Schamhorst and the Gneisenau off the coast of Samoa but 
they left just as quick, and secondly the capture of German sailors who had escaped from the ship Elsass 
in Pagopago. The sailors were captured in Samoa after they had arrived thinking Germany had retaken 
Samoa. See Jose, 49-63; Watson, 143-144. 
23 Regulation No. 459 of King's Regulations, Correspondence of LMS, Samoan District, with New Zealand 
Administration, 1915-1946, PMB 144; Richards Routine Orders No. 52, Correspondence of LMS, Samoan 
District, with New Zealand Administration, 1915-1946, PMB 144; SDC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 15-23 
May, 1918, London Missionary Society, South Seas Archives, South Seas Letters (henceforth SSL); 
Hough to Lenwood, 31 Jan, 1919, SSL. 
24 SDC to Logan, n.d., SSL; Correspondence of LMS, Samoan District, with New Zealand Administration, 
1915-1946, PMB 144; Regulation No 459 of King's Regulations, Correspondence of LMS, Samoan 
District, with New Zealand Administration, 1915-1946, PMB 144. 
25 See Hough to Lenwood, 31 Jan, 1919, SSL 
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But life was not all fun and play for the New Zealand armed forces. Many 
soldiers suffered from local ailments throughout the year, including dysentery, 
fever, and skin diseases.26 
Relief finally arrived for the lethargic group of soldiers during April 1915, 
when a smaller garrison took over the occupation of Samoa. Logan and the 
men who served as administration officers remained to continue serving in their 
existing civil capacity. Logan continued to be in command of the newly arrived 
soldiers. Logan and the new soldiers were again reminded of their task as 
military occupants as stressed by the Hague Convention. 
Logan tried hard to fulfil the convention throughout his time as 
administrator, but his administration was not free of complaints from various 
sectors of the community. Most complaints were from papalagi concerning 
economic issues. There were also complaints of inconvenience caused by the 
confiscation and liquidation of German owned businesses, the shortage of 
indentured labour and the imposition of more stringent labour laws, and the 
imposition of export duties. Many businesses became bankrupt. The economic 
difficulties that had spawned in Europe had hatched elsewhere and, 
consequently, affected the economy of the lesser countries such as Samoa. 
But, despite the economic difficulties under Logan's administration, most of the 
papa/agi and Samoan afakasi should have been overjoyed as many gained 
prominence in the Samoan community through the closure of German 
businesses. Logan wanted to encourage small planters and, unlike Solf who 
wanted to control the missions, praised the work the missions had done for the 
Samoan people. 27 
The worst disaster that occurred under the military administration of New 
Zealand took place in November 1918. The ship S. S. Tafune arrived in Apia 
harbour from New Zealand, via Fiji, with a group of passengers suffering from 
the deadly Spanish influenza. The administration's health authority in Samoa 
failed to quarantine the S. S. Talune infected with influenza and, consequently, 
a huge percentage of the population died.28 The New Zealand administration 
was also caught-out and surprised at the intensity and magnitude of the 
epidemic. The Samoans searched for answers to many questions, just as 
25 Hills to Logan, 4 Oct., 1917, PMB 144; Logan to SOC, 13 Oct, 1917, PMB 144; Hough to Logan, 3 Sept, 
1918, PMB 144; Hough to Chief of Police, 9 Sept, 1918, PMB 144; Administration - Colonel Logan, IT 211. 
27 Report on Samoan Affairs, IT 2/9; Policy on Samoan Affairs, IT 2/11. 
26 Hough to Lenwood, 17 Dec, 1918, SSL. 
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Logan and his colleagues had many unanswered questions. At the end of the 
day, the Samoans looked no further than Logan and New Zealand's 
administration as the fa'atamala (guilty or at fault) party.29 
After the epidemic, the Samoans call~d for America to take over the 
administration of Samoa, but later withdrew the petition when Logan was 
removed from Samoa, and the newly appointed acting administrator, Colonel 
Robert W. Tate, showed sympathy and sincerity towards Samoan grievances. 
Logan was not impressed at all with the Samoan petition to have New Zealand 
replaced by America. 30 He blamed some of the European residents as well as 
prominent Samoan government officials for originating it. Logan's reaction 
achieved the real aim of the petition in the first place; to upset the New Zealand 
administration and undermine Logan's authority. Logan's allegations angered 
the Samoan and European communities who bitterly rejected the charges. 
Interestingly, these were the same Samoans and Europeans who had been 
strong supporters of the New Zealand administration prior to the epidemic and 
Logan's fall-out with the Samoan people. In looking for a scapegoat, Logan 
quickly chastised his 'friends' to cover-up his own deficiency in administrative 
skills. Logan's impertinence did not help to smooth over New Zealand's 
disastrous efforts to administer Samoa and to annul Samoan aspirations to be 
under American control. 31 
The epidemic had overwhelmed the Samoans so much that they lost 
contact with the events and news of the world after World War I. Tate arrived 
soon after to take up his new post,32 while the United Nations met to decide the 
fate of German colonies and territories around the world, including Samoa. 
Many countries, including Germany, eagerly awaited a final settlement. By 
March 1919, unofficial news had reached Samoa that she would remain under 
New Zealand's administration.33 By October the same year, the New Zealand 
parliament began to debate the administration of Samoa although the mandate 
from the United Nations had not being officially announced. New Zealand's 
29 A broad account of the 1918 Influenza Epidemic and its impact on Samoa and the Samoans, and the 
controversy between Logan and the LMS, would be discussed in the next chapter (Chapter Six). 
30 Lagolago to the Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
31 R. W. Tate, Native Sttualion, Sept, 1921, IT 88/5; see also Stout to Massey, 24 Feb, 1921, IT 1 Ex 18/1; 
Lagolago lo the Commission, 1919, New Zealand Samoa Epidemic Commission (henceforth NZSEC); 
Samoa Times, 7 Jun, 1919. 
32 Samoa Times, 1 Feb, 1919. 
33 Liverpool to Governor-General, 10 Jan, 1918, IT 8817; Logan to Liverpool (Secret), 11 Jan, 1918, IT 
8817; Logan to Loverpool, (Secret), 31Jan,1918, IT 8817. 
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action only reaffirmed the rumours regarding Samoa's future. Many in Samoa 
were unhappy with the decision.34 
In New Zealand, the Reform Party, led by William Ferguson Massey, 
took the view that Samoa was an important acquisition for New Zealand. 
Massey and his fellow party members took the traditional view that taking 
possession of Samoa would not cost New Zealand a cent as Samoa was 
already self sufficient. Massey also announced that his government would back 
the importation of indentured labour to continue the economic viability of the 
existing plantations. The Refomi Party also had in mind taking over the Samoan 
civil administration and making it part of the New Zealand civil service. The New 
Zealand government took this attitude as they felt Samoans were not yet 
educated enough, or sufficiently capable to decide their own destiny.35 
However, the Reform Party did recognise that Samoa was independent 
to some degree in terms of their own customs and cultures. Somehow, the New 
Zealand government saw Samoan culture and customs as being detached from 
Samoan political ideologies. Consequently, the Refomi Party failed to realise 
that customs and culture were absorbed into the administration of Samoa. It 
was important for the New Zealand government to understand this aspect of 
Samoan politics, to realise that the governing of Samoa was not a task for non-
experienced and uneducated staff. Unfortunately, the New Zealand government 
failed to grasp this aspect of Samoan politics, as it blindly made ill-advised 
proposals for the administration of Samoa.36 
While the Liberal Party supported the Reform Party's proposal, the 
Labour Party vehemently opposed it. The Labour Party pointed out that 
Samoans were quite capable of self-government as long as it was under 
international supervision. According to the Labour Party leader, Henry E. 
Holland, and Labour Party Member of Parliament, Peter Fraser, the Refomi 
Party's proposal was nothing more than a fomi of autocracy. The Labour Party 
also rejected the Reform Party's stance on indentured labour. At the end of the 
34 The distribution of Germany's possessions was made possible with the signing of the Versailles Treaty 
in 1919. Samoans were also unhappy as New Zealand had recently been a colony itself. It only changed 
its status from colony to a Dominion on 26 Sept, 1907. See S. H. Meredith - How NZ Administers its 
Mandate From the League of Nations - 24 Feb. 1927, London Missionary Society South Seas Archives, 
South Seas Odds, Samoa Correspondence, (henceforth SSO); R. W. Tate, Native Situation, Sept, 1921, 
IT 8815; Occupation of Samoa - Cost to New Zealand, 1918 - 1921, IT 3913; Chronicle of the 2d" Century, 
Ringwood: Penguin Books, 1999. 
35 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, clxxxv, 3 Oct-5 Nov, 1919. 
36 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, clxxxv, 3 Oci-5 Nov, 1919. 
debate session, there was some scepticism among parliament members, 
including the government members, as to the ability of the New Zealand 
government to administer Samoa.37 
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The Samoans were not ignorant of New Zealand's proposed policy for 
Samoa. The epidemic debacle was still fresh in the minds of the Samoans. All 
in all, the Samoans would rather not have New Zealand guide them. The 
rejection of New Zealand was not restricted to the Samoans, but had also found 
support among the European community, especially the traders and merchants 
who rejected prohibition orders on alcohol importation into Samoa, ordained by 
the New Zealand administration.38 
The Samoans were also unhappy that in May 1920, a Samoan 
Constitutional Order was created without their prior knowledge. The Samoan 
Constitutional Order outlined the basic political structure for Samoa. It stated 
that the Administrator had executive power, and that the Administrator and a 
Legislative Counci139 held legislative power. The Legislative Council would 
consist of official members and unofficial members. The unofficial members 
were given to three Europeans. The Samoa Constitutional Order maintained the 
existence of the Fono a Faipule, although it was not legally recognised. In doing 
so, the government aimed to maintain its policy of separating legally constituted 
bodies from non-government organisations, especially Samoan movements 
related to Samoan customs and culture.40 
New Zealand government officials visited Samoa prior to enforcing the 
Samoa Constitutional Order. The Fono a Faipule and the European 'Citizen's 
Committee' met the New Zealand delegation led by Sir James Allen. The 
37 H. E. Holland, Samoa: A Story that teems with Tragedy, Wellington: Maoriland Workers Printing and 
Publishing, 1918; H. E. Holland, The Revolt of the Samoans, Wellington: Clarke Book Depot, 1928. 
38 Samoa Times, 14 Jun, 1919. Note: The issue of alcoholic prohibition was a major concern not only for 
the Samoan church but for all Protestant missions in the Pacific. The LMS missionaries opposed to church 
members partaking in alcohol, although it was difficult when many of its leading members were also matai 
prominent in the administration and were given free supplies as allowances for their services. The 
competition for church membership, especially the Roman Catholic Church's freer approach to alcohol 
consumption made ~very difficult for the LMS to discipline church members. There was, of course, the 
added problem of missionaries themselves being exceptions to the rule. See William Harbutt to Tidman, 
25 Mar, 1844, SSL; see also Charles W. Forman, The Island Churches of the South Pacific: Emergence in 
the Twentieth Century, Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1982, 114 - 116; Niel Gunson, "On the Incidence of 
Alcoholism and Intemperance in Early Pacific Missions," Journal of Pacific History 1, 1966, 43 - 62. 
39 For clarification regarding the Legislative Council as in the Samoa Constitution Order, see Samoa's 
Problem -Series of Reports by the Citizen's Commrttee, 1920, Miscellaneous, MS-Papers 4879, GP; R. 
W. Tate, Native Situation, Sept, 1921, IT 88/5. 
40 The two Samoan Advisers appointed were Malietoa Tanumafili I and Tuimaleali'ifano Si'u. See Tate to 
Allen, 20 Nov, 1921, IT 1 Ex 1/20; Visit of Parliamentary Party to Pacific Islands, Report, 1920 - 1921, 
AJHR. For a list of the NZ officials appointed under this Order see also The Western Samoa Gazette, No. 
1, 1May1920 and also The Western Samoa Gazette, No. 8, 5 Jan. 1922. 
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Samoans likewise petitioned the delegation to legally recognise the Feno a 
Faipule, and grant it legislative power to control finance in conjunction with the 
Administrator and the Fautua (Advisors). The Samoans also wanted Samoan 
representation in the New Zealand parliament, better education facilities, and 
more training for Samoan government officials.41 The European 'Citizen's 
Committee', on the other hand, wanted elective representative in the Legislative 
Council, a municipality at Apia, freedom of the press, a nullification of the ban 
on alcohol importation, and to resume importation of indentured labour. The 
demands from both sides were different in substance and it prompted the 
European community to reconsider the New Zealand government's proposal for 
the separate handling of Samoan and European affairs, but both Samoan and 
European proposals received unsatisfactory responses from the New Zealand 
government. It was a discourteous attitude on the part of the administration, 
which later provided an excuse for the Samoan and European communities to 
utilise their kinship ties for a united stand. 42 
The 'Principal Allied and Associated Powers,' under the auspices of the 
United Nations, officially allocated Samoa to New Zealand with a mandate, 
which stated: 
A mandate should be conferred on His Britannic Majesty, to be 
exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Dominion of 
New Zealand to administer German Samoa.43 
Under the mandate New Zealand agreed "to promote to the utmost the material 
and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the Territory 
[and also] ensure freedom of conscience."44 The mandate prohibited slavery, 
forced labour, arms trafficking, compulsory military training, and supplying of 
'intoxicants'. It also stressed that New Zealand and Britain did not possess 
Samoa. The United Nations could return it to Germany at any time. New 
Zealand held Samoa in trust for the nations of the world. 
The news of the mandate did not reach New Zealand until December 
1920. An official Act to govern Samoa, which incorporated much of the Samoa 
41 R. W. Tate. Native Situation, Sept, 1921, IT 8815. 
42 Visit of Parliamentary Party to Pacific Islands, Report, 1920-1921; Nelson lo Pomare, 13 Aug, 1919, IT 
1 Ex 791211; Western Samoa Historical Notes, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2115; R. W. Tate, Native Sftuation, Sept, 
1921, IT 8815. 
43 S .H. Meredith, How New Zealand Administers its Mandate From the League of Nations, 24 Feb, 1927, 
SSC. 
44 S. H. Meredith, How New Zealand Administers fts Mandate From the League of Nations, 24 Feb, 1927, 
sso. 
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Constitutional Order, was immediately rushed through parliament. It became 
known as the Samoa Act, 1921. This Act stated that Samoa would be governed 
by ordinances, and that the administrator, on advice of the Legislative Council, 
could make laws, which would come into force immediately if passed. The 
Legislative Council, appointed by the Governor-General, consisted of not less 
than four official members being officers of the Samoa Public Service, and 
unofficial members, who were not more than official members. The President of 
the Council was the Administrator. There were no provisions made for afakasi 
or Samoan representatives. The set-up of the Legislative Council was rejected 
by the Samoan and European communities. Many declined to serve on the 
Legislative Body.45 
The Samoa Act. 1921 came into effect on April Fool's Day, 1 April 1921; 
an ominous sign of things to come. The Samoa Act. 1921 would govern Samoa 
for the next forty-one years, undergoing several amendments throughout the 
ensuing years. The Samoa Act. 1921 and the official recognition of Tate as the 
newly elected administrator of Samoa, further endorsed what the Samoans had 
not wanted - New Zealand becoming Samoa's mentor. Tate was no stranger as 
administrator in Samoa. He had taken over from Logan as acting administrator, 
and had helped to appease the Samoans after his government's blunder with 
the Spanish influenza. Although only acting as Administrator at the time, the 
Samoans quickly related to his modesty and his ability to listen with 
understanding. He managed to subdue most of the Samoan criticism of New 
Zealand's administration, which contributed to the healing process between 
Samoans and New Zealand. But the Samoans had not expected New Zealand 
to remain as Samoa's mentor.45 · 
Soon after, the Samoans petitioned Britain, namely King George V, to 
grant Samoa self-government under a British Governor.47 The Samoans did not 
receive any response for their request and, consequently, remained inactive in 
this direction for years to come. The Samoans also sought concession from the 
New Zealand government in demanding reforms within the New Zealand 
45 S. H. Meredith, How New Zealand Administers its Mandate From the League of Nations, 24 Feb, 1927, 
sso. 
""Report by Colonel Tate on the Administration, Samoa, 1923, IT 1 Ex 1132; Samoa Times, 1 Feb, 1919. 
47 The Samoans not only sent Britain a petttion but to the Prince of Wales and to the League of Nations. 
See Petition to H. M. The King, 1921; IT 1 Ex 8816; Native Petition 1921, IT 1 Ex 8816; Petition Sent by the 
Samoan Chiefs to His Royal Hlgness the Prince of Wales, 1921, IT 1 Ex 8816; R. W. Tale, Native Situation, 
Sept, 1921, IT 8815; see also Percy S. Allen, 'The Pacific Islands: Fiji and Samoa," Reprint of Article in 
Sydney Morning Herald 1921," TP. 
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administration in Samoa. The Samoans also failed to impress the New Zealand 
parliament. The lack of action caused strong resentment among the Samoans, 
and encouraged further allegations that New Zealand did not possess the know-
how ln mandate administration.48 Perhaps the problem lay with Tate's own 
failure to deal with Samoan demands personally, as he was quite happy with 
the status quo. As a practice, he passed on to New Zealand Samoan proposals 
for perusal and for the final decision of the government. The Europeans were 
also not supportive after Tate's prohibition orders on the importation of liquor.49 
While Tate tried hard to bridge the gap between the two countries, he 
became more concerned with infrastructure and the development of Samoa 
than attempting to satisfy political demands of the Samoans. Furthermore, Tate 
did not have the staff and the experience needed to tackle such issues so early 
on in his administration, as the Samoans demanded.50 However, despite his 
failure to address these more important issues, Tate did take Samoa steadily 
along its economic development and, in his own modest way his healthy 
personality helped create a peaceful atmosphere for Samoans to grow socially, 
politically, economically, and religiously. According to Tate, his most notable 
achievement was terminating the Toeaina Club, an economic enterprise run by 
prominent Samoan matal, which threatened to transform into an influential 
Samoan political party.51 Tate returned to New Zealand in March 1923, having 
failed to secure total Samoan support for New Zealand's administration. The 
LMS respected him and believed that he was a "humble minded Christian" who 
would be welcomed back in the future.52 Tate himself may have achieved much 
in terms of personal relationships with the Samoans, but at the end of the day, 
"" The Minister of External Affairs. S. M. Lee did not accept there was any criticism in Samoa regarding 
New Zealand's administration. See Lee to The Prime Minister, 10 Mar. 1921, IT 1 Ex 18/1: Samoa nmes, 
14 Jun, 1919. 
"R. W. Tate, Native Situation, Sept, 1921, IT 8815; Hough to Gray, 8 Mar. 1921, IT 7914; Gray to Hough, 
29 Mar, 1921, IT 7914; Gray to Hough, 7 Oct, 1921, IT 7914. 
50 J. Allen Thomsen, Administration of Samoa, 15 Jan. 1921, IT 1 Ex 1118. 
51 Report by Colonel Tate on the Administration, Samoa, 1923, IT 1 Ex 1/32; Samoa Times, 1 Feb, 1919. 
Note: Before the New Zealand Samoa Epidemic Commission, the Samoan matai lagolago vented his 
anger regarding Logan's comments about the Toeaina Club. Logan told the commission that the Toeaina 
Club was in financial strife and was responsible for poisoning Samoan minds to seek American protection. 
See Lagolago to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. For a more broader picture of the Toeaina 
Club, see Mary Boyd, "Coping with Samoan Resistance after the 1918 Influenza Epidemic; Journal of 
Pacific History, no. 15, 1980, 155-174. 
52 The LMS missionaries probably would have thought differently if they knew Tate's attitude towards 
them. In Tate's report on Samoa, he referred to the LMS as giving the Samoans too much theory and less 
labour intensive work in the plantations, and in doing so have given the Samoans ideas detrimental to their 
welfare. See SDC -Minutes of Meeting, Papauta, 11-19 Dec, 1922, SSL; The Missions, 1921, IT 88/5; 
Speech By Toleafoa Afamasaga at the Farewell Feast... Tate, 3 Mar, 1923,IT 1 Ex 2/9; Tate to the Minister 
of External Affairs, 28 Mar. 1923, IT 1 Ex 219. 
130 
New Zealand still had a lot of work to do to convince them that they could fulfil 
the content of the mandate. 
A more dynamic leader in Brigadier-General (later Major General Sir) 
George Spafford Richardson replaced Tate.53 Richardson had arrived in New 
Zealand from Britain in 1891 on loan as a gunnery instructor. During World War 
I he received a commission in the New Zealand Forces. After the war, he 
served in the administration section of the army in Wellington. Richardson was 
ambitious and was determined to succeed. It was a test of his ability to fulfil the 
confidence and great expectations of the New Zealand government that he 
would be a more dynamic administrator than his predecessors. This fitted well 
with Richardson's arrogance, which had led him to believe that Samoans would 
simply follow his examples as the Samoans were nothing more than simple-
minded children.54 
From the onset, Richardson was, surprisingly, well received by the 
Samoan and the European communities despite having such a paternal 
attitude. Perhaps the newness of the relationship, and the high expectations of 
both communities for closer working ties with Richardson, may have produced 
such a warm reception. Furthermore, Richardson's enthusiasm had made him 
more accessible to both communities.55 The Samoans also believed he was 
more approachable than Tate, a trait the Samoans put down to Richardson's 
respect for the Samoans. Richardson was further embraced for his effort to 
understand Samoan predicaments and local situations, learning the Samoan 
language and trying to understand the Samoan culture and customs. The LMS 
mission spoke very highly of Richardson and vice versa.56 He was also praised 
for his efforts to reduce spending and minimise administrative excess, while 
promoting administrative efficiency. Most felt Richardson did more for Samoa 
than his predecessors, and more than expected by the government in 
Wellington. 57 In seemed the New Zealand government had finally found a man 
53 Western Samoa Historical Notes, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2/15; Tate to the Minister of External Affairs, 28 Mar, 
1923, IT 1 Ex 2/9; G. H. Scholefield, A Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Wellington: Internal Affairs, 
1940. 
54 Correspondence 1899 - 1934, Westbrook Papers (henceforth WP) 0061; Report of the Mandated 
Territory of Western Samoa, 1925, AJHR; Richardson to Bell, 21Aug,1924, IT 2/11; Administrator to the 
Minister of External Affairs, 9 Feb, 1928, IT 1 Ex 112318. 
55 Samoa Times, 14 Sept, 1923. 
56 Richardson to Lenwood, 2 Apr, 1925. SSL; Richardson to Barradale, 4 Aug, 1925, SSL; Richardson lo 
Liston, 17 Jan, 1926, SSL 
57 Report of the Mandated Territory of Western Samoa, Fifth Report, 1925, AJHR. 
to reverse the resentment among the Samoans, and regain for New Zealand 
the due respect it so desperately wanted. 
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Richardson's popularity with the Samoan and European community, may 
have also been prompted by a change in attitude in the New Zealand 
parliament. The New Zealand government finally decided to accept the Fono a 
Faipule and gave it legal recognition, as well as accepting elective 
representation to the Legislative Council. These changes were implemented in 
the Samoa Amendment Act. 1923, prior to Richardson's appointment to Samoa. 
The Act was implemented to address some of the Samoan contentions. It was 
also implemented to help Richardson build up New Zealand's reputation. 
Richardson's job was also made easier with the support of Sir Francis Bell, the 
Minister of External Affairs, who gave Richardson the freedom to implement and 
carry out his own policies. Richardson's philosophy was that the less 
interference by the External Affairs' Minister, the better things would be for 
Samoa.58 
Richardson accepted the New Zealand objective to promote Samoan 
welfare and develop Samoa as a nation. He pinpointed three areas of concern, 
which he termed as the principal 'native problems', and they included health, 
education, and the economy. Richardson wanted to make Samoans healthier to 
increase their numbers, more educated in order to maintain their happiness, 
and more resilient in working their land to increase productivity.59 Richardson 
also recognised European concerns and the problems they faced. He admitted 
that the prohibition on liquor importation was harsh,60 but he was powerless to 
repeal it. However, Richardson did manage to address other European issues 
to the satisfaction of its promoters. For instance, Richardson managed to gain 
permission to have old German businesses and plantations, which were 
currently under New Zealand management, leased to private interests. The 
government wanted to lease all property and business in order to remove all 
government competition with private firms. The plan was aimed at improving 
"' Bell to Richardson, 31 Mar, 1924, IT 1 Ex 1133/1; Richardson to Bell, 18 Jun, 1924, IT 1 Ex 1/3311; 
Richardson to Bell, 8 Jan, 1925, IT 1 Ex 1/33/1. 
59 Samoa Times, 28 Dec, 1928; Samoa Times, 1 Feb, 1924; Samoa Times, 8 Feb, 1924. 
60 The Administrator and Health Department worked closely to carry out the regulation. See The Western 
Samoa Gazette, No. 8, 5 Jan, 1922; The Western Samoa Gazette, "The Census Ordinance, 1925". 
132 
papalagi standing, and addressing some of their fears with regard to trade and 
commerce.61 
Such a move was not easily implemented. Richardson needed the 
support of the Samoans to privatise German businesses and plantations. In 
1923, he set-up the Fono a Faipule and through them, Richardson sought to 
gain the loyalty of the Samoans by promising to recognise their legal position 
within his administration. But, Richardson did not get things his own way. Many 
Samoans declined the offer to serve as Faipule because Richardson had failed 
to appoint the Faipule according to Samoan custom. Richardson had 
deliberately ignored this fact. Richardson, in order to arrest any conflict used the 
powers given to him under the Samoa Offenders Ordinances 1922, to force 
many of the matai to accept their nominations as Faipule. The punishment for 
failing to comply meant exile without trial or right of appeal.62 
In Richardson's first meeting with the Fono a Faipule in June 1923, he 
officially recognised that Faipule had powers within his administration, and were 
also advisers to the administrator. Richardson ordered that all district 
communications to the administrator were through the Faipule who would 
comment on it and make recommendations on behalf of the administrator. 
Richardson also used the Faipule as advisers on various matters pertaining to 
Samoans. He also gave the Faipule power to make regulations, which 
Richardson enforced by law. The effect of such delegated power was soon 
evident As Richardson envisaged, the Faipule accepted their vocation with 
pride and praised Richardson's administration. The Faipule were eager to 
support whatever reforms Richardson advocated, especially in relation to 
Samoan customs and traditional practices relating to malaga and ie toga 
distributions, which Richardson had viewed a waste of resources.63 
Richardson moved to abolish the fono a le nu'u (village council) and 
replaced it with District Councils under the presidency of the Faipule. 
Richardson also changed the boundaries of various districts in order to achieve 
twenty districts to coincide with the number of his loyal Faipule.64 The District 
61 On top of this, German and Austrian goods were not allowed to enter Samoa from Sept. 1923 until Apr. 
1924. The Western Samoa Gazette, No. 8, 5 Jan, 1922. 
62 S. H. Meredith, How New Zealand Administers its Mandate From the League of Nations, 24 Feb, 1927, 
sso. 
63 Richardson to Bell, 8 Jan, 1925, IT 1Ex1/3311; Richardson to Bell 16 Jan, 1925, IT 1Ex113311. 
64 Report of the Royal Commission Concerning the Administration of Western Samoa, 1927, AJHR. 
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Council was made up of representatives from each nu'u (village) in the district. 
They were called upon for judicial duties as well as enforcing regulations made 
by the Faipule and enacted by the administration. The District Council was 
under the department of Native Affairs, who in turn was answerable to the 
administrator. Richardson also initiated 'village committees' to make rules and 
enforce orders and regulations issued by the government and district councils. 
There were also women's committees, which functioned as assistants to the 
department of Health in enforcing regulations regarding hygiene and medical 
responsibility. In setting up such a political structure, Richardson utilised old 
Samoan customs and culture to manipulate Samoans to do his bidding.65 
Richardson's other achievements included changes to the land tenure 
system. This was a very sensitive issue under the German administration, but 
Richardson, with the help of the Faipule, managed to impose his authority upon 
the distribution and use of Samoan land. Richardson ordained the allocation of 
five-acre land blocks to every Samoan taxpayer to plant and cultivate with a 
further five-acre block on the complete planting of the first five-acre block. The 
supervision of the scheme was left to the District Council who also had the 
authority to grant holders of the five acre blocks a 'lifetime leasehold title' on 
payment of an annual lease. The land would be passed on to the next of kin 
under the direction of the District Council. The Samoans were not allowed to 
sell, lease, or buy the land in question without authority of the government. 
Richardson had managed to turn a birth right into a profitable scheme in the 
name of progress and development.66 
The Legislative Council was set up with the hope of providing more help 
and assistance to the government. It was also intended to include both 
Samoans and Europeans, but the Fono a Faipule decided, at the last minute, 
not to be involved. The Faipule probably felt they would be overwhelmed by the 
presence of the papalagi on the Legislative Council, and would lose their 
prestige and status if they joined together. 67 Richardson preferred to keep the 
Faipule under his influence to take advantage of their submissive nature. The 
Legislative Council was made up of three Europeans from the community and 
European officials from the government. It provided an atmosphere of goodwill 
65 Report of the Royal Commission Concerning the Administration of Western Samoa, 1927, AJHR. 
66 Report of the Royal Commission Concerning the Administration of Western Samoa, 1927; Samoa 
Times, 29 May, 1925. 
67 Richardson to Bell, 9 Mar, 1925, IT 1 Ex 33/1; Legislative Council Debates, 1925. 
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early on, but soon became an unsatisfactory avenue for promoting papalagi 
interests. The papa/agiwere especially unhappy as Richardson had a majority 
in the council under the Samoa Act. But Richardson was unmoved, and clarified 
that the three papalagi in the Council represented the interests of the European 
community, while the government members were there to seek not only 
papalagi interests but, primarily, to promote Samoan welfare. 68 
The Europeans soon realised that their input was minimal. They could 
only speak on behalf of the European community. This angered some of the 
papalagi members, especially those who had Samoan blood, such as Olaf F. 
Nelson. The European representatives sought to reintroduce Samoan members 
into the Legislative Council but Richardson again denied the request. 
Richardson pointed to the fact that the Fono a Faipule had not sanctioned it 
earlier. The European demands highlighted Richardson's ability to manipulate 
both communities.69 
While the Europeans sought Samoan representative, they failed to listen 
to the voices of the Samoan leaders (Faipule) who rejected any participation 
with papalagi in the Legislative Council. The Europeans had failed to realise 
that the Faipule wanted to protect their existing authority. It seemed the 
papa/agi had come to terms with the fact that they could achieve none of their 
personal and selfish goals without Samoan support. Richardson had also 
rejected such papa/agi proposals because he took the view that Samoans did 
not have the intellectual background to participate fully in the Legislative 
Council. Richardson's view was meant to down-play papalagi demands, but it, 
indirectly, insulted Samoan pride70 
Samoans have a saying, "e pa/a le ma'a, ae le pa/a le ta/a (stones rot, 
but words will never rot)." Richardson's misdirected opinion turned Samoans 
away from 'the fold'. Richardson had misjudged the reaction of the Samoans, 
including the afakasi, to his remarks. Richardson had failed to take into 
considerations the status and influence of many prominent Samoans, such as 
Tupua Tamasese Lealofi Ill, who had already visited much of Europe with his 
father and communicated well in English. There were also Faumuina Flame 
Mulinu'u I and Afamasaga Toleafoa Lagolago, who were prominent in the 
""Richardson to Bell, 9 Mar, 1925, IT 1 Ex 3311; Samoa nmes, 10 Apr, 1925. 
69 Data Compiled and Sent to NZ at the Time of the Mau Deputation to Wellington, GP; The Western 
Samoa Gazette, 'The Census Ordinance, 1925". 
70 Samoa nmes, 13 Nov, 1925. 
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German administration and had been schooled in European etiquette in their 
close social and business contact with Europeans. Lagolago, especially, owned 
several businesses and was very ambitious and influential.71 
The most influential afakasi Samoan was Olaf F. Nelson,72 a very 
wealthy businessman and influential figure in both Samoan and European 
communities. He was seen by his peers to rival the best in European culture in 
both style and character. He was an idol who many papalagi aspired to imitate. 
At the beginning Nelson and Richardson became close and relied on each other 
for advice and inspiration. They had, at first, felt comforted with the notion that 
the other embraced the agenda of the other. But, both men soon realised that 
they had differences, which would ultimately contribute to widening the gap in 
their friendship.73 Soon Nelson and Richardson worked towards undermining 
each other, while they tried to appear courteous in order to keep whatever 
means of communication open for political expediency. Both men kept their 
personal criticism of each other private in fear of inviting an adverse response, 
which was harder to do if Samoans were within earshot. 
New Zealand's administration and Richardson's heavy-handed attitude 
soon led to criticism of the administration among the Samoans and papalagi. 
The Samoans again reverted to accusing New Zealand of being inexperienced 
in administration matters. And the Samoans were right. Most officials had no 
experience to fulfil their task, including Richardson. Richardson may have been 
highly regarded in the military for his strictness and 'play it by the book' routine, 
but as far as administrater and leading a country like Samoa, he was not flexible 
in its ideology. Admittedly, at first, Richardson tried to get as close as possible 
to the Samoans through numerous visits to the various districts, and learning 
the Samoan language in order to communicate with his subjects. However, his 
efforts were destroyed by his vainglory over and above human sympathy. For 
instance, a letter to the Secretary of External Affairs revealed Richardson 
refused medical help to a pregnant mother, who was having difficulty giving 
birth, so that his malaga would not be delayed. Richardson felt the woman was 
71 Lagolago was the leader of the Toeaina Club, which functioned like a business venture. It was 
supported by many prominent matai during Logan's administration. See Lagolago to the Epidemic 
Commission, 1919, NZSEC; Boyd, 155-174. 
72 Data Compiled and Sent to NZ at the Time of the Mau Deputation to Wellington, GP; Nelson 
Correspondence, 1828-1937, PMB 712; S.S. Allen, Notes on Samoa, Colonel S.S. Allen Collection, 
MS-Papers 1499 (henceforth SSA); Westbrook Papers (henceforth WP) 0061. 
73 Richardson to Gray 29 Jul, 1926, IT 1 Ex 7912/1; Richardson to Nosworthy, 26 Jul, 1927, IT 1 Ex 1 /33/1; 
Nelson to Richardson, 21 Aug, 1924, IT 7912/1. 
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beyond his ability to help and told the family to take the woman to hospital. Both 
the mother and her baby died. Richardson's unfortunate lack of human 
kindness was magnified by the fact that a doctor and a medical officer were part 
of his malaga.74 The Samoans never forget such unsympathetic acts, which 
also served as reminders of the 1918 epidemic blunder by the same 
administration. 
It may be argued that Richardson lacked a good advisor. But, perhaps 
Richardson was never meant to have an advisor. After all, Richardson relied 
mainly on his own opinion and did not pay heed to other people's opinions. 
Thus, he fell into the trap of spending most of time talking rather than listening. 
Consequently, he could not hear the grievances of the Samoans, as well as 
papalagi complaints. But although Richardson failed in this department, his 
intention of giving the Samoans what was best for them was real. Richardson's 
intention was shown clearly in the slogan which he had conjured up - Samoa 
mo Samoa (Samoa for the Samoans),75 which meant to reflect the policies and 
objectives he had devised, adopted, and implemented for the welfare of the 
Samoans. But, sadly for Richardson, he alone determined what was best for 
Samoa. The Samoans were never really consulted on matters that affected their 
welfare. If they were consulted, it was merely to rubber stamp and approve one 
of Richardson's regulations. The policies were easily carried out with the loyalty 
of the Samoan Faipufe, whose benevolent change of status and rewards made 
it easier for Richardson to administer Samoa. On the other hand, those who 
were severed from such privileges grew more hostile, and led to a counter 
reaction among the people in nu'u and districts. Richardson reacted with 
counter measures that further undermined Samoan customs. 
The negative reaction of the Samoan matai saw many of Richardson's 
policies remain unimplemented. For instance, when Richardson tried to 
implement a new method of selecting Samoans for matai titles, the Samoans 
felt Richardson had gone too far. Even the Samoan Faipule sided with the 
indignant Samoans.76 Richardson never managed to remove the traditional way 
of selecting title-holders. The Samoans became vigilant for any such policies, 
14 Report of the Royal Commission Concerning the Administration of Western Samoa, 1927, AJHR; 
Samoa Guardian, 9 Jan, 1930. 
75 Richardson to the Minister of External Affairs, 10 May, 1923. Annual Report by the Administrator on 
Western Samoa, 1922 -1923. 
76 Samoa Times, 2J Oct, 1925. 
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which denied them their traditional rights. As Richardson attempted to carry out 
his vision of Samoa mo Samoa, the Samoans were concocting to give 
Richardson's motto a different definition. The only hope for Samoans to achieve 
their aspirations and to solve their grievances was to take full control of their 
own political destination. Richardson's policies were degrading and diminishing 
Samoan protocol further and the time had come for the Samoans to show 
they were capable of expressing their nationalistic spirit. The hatred and the 
hostility that had been bottled up since the 1918 epidemic blunder finally 
exploded, as the Samoans took their political agitation to its pinnacle in the 
aggression of the Mau movement. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
AN ADMINISTRATIVE BLUNDER 
AND THE LOGAN - MOORE CONTROVERSY 
The 1918 Spanish influenza epidemic was not only a political disaster for 
the New Zealand administration but it was also a religious tragedy for the 
Samoan (LMS) Church. The disaster itself concealed events that fuelled the 
hatred of the Samoans for the administration, especially in relation to the 
treatment of Samoan girls at the LMS Papauta School. The Logan - Moore 
controversy was more than just a personal dispute between two individuals or 
between the LMS and the New Zealand administration. It was a controversy 
that highlighted not only Logan's inadequacy but also the LMS's lack of tact and 
insight. 
New Zealand's new role as administrator of Samoa under a League of 
Nations (later United Nations) mandate, 1 was plagued with dissatisfaction from 
the beginning. The appointment of Logan, Tate, and Richardson, within a space 
of five years, was supposed to raise the image of New Zealand and confirm the 
confidence the nations of the world had for her as a worthy executive, but even 
before New Zealand had been given the mandate of Samoa officially, it was 
already dealing with a major catastrophe. A few days before the declaration of 
Armistice2 and the hand over of the mandate to New Zealand, Samoa was 
devastated with the infectious Spanish influenza. The New Zealand 
administration from that time onward had an uphill battle, not only in enforcing 
its authority and leadership upon the Samoans, but also in trying to appeal to 
Samoan sympathy and support. The 1918 influenza epidemic not only had 
political connotations, which later put pressure on the administration, but it also 
fuelled discontent within the Samoan church. The controversy between the LMS 
1 The League of Nations was inaugurated in 1920 in London with its members including Britain, France, 
Spain, Greece, Italy and Brazil. See League of Nations Launched in London, 11 Feb, 1920, Chronicle of 
the 2d" Century. 
2 Tate to Pro-Vicar, 9 May, 1919, Darnand Correspondence, Maris! Archives of Samoa and Tokelau 
(henceforth MAST); Pro-Vicar to Tate, 11 May, 1919, MAST; Victory! German Signs the Armistice, 11 Nov, 
1918, Chronicle of the 2d" Century. 
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and Logan, may not have been the "major scandal of the epidemic,"3 but it was 
a 'boil' that was never treated properly and, in the end, infected the Samoan 
(LMS) Church and Samoan politics. The 1918 influenza epidemic was an 
important event in the independent story of Samoa and the Samoan (LMS) 
Church. 
Throughout Samoan villages, there are scattered unmarked mounds, 
which stand as icons of the tragedy that completely changed the way Samoans 
perceived New Zealand rule. The 1918 influenza epidemic remains the single 
most destructive event in the history of Samoa. To this day, many Samoans 
recall the horror of the disaster. Some recollections were too clouded due to 
memory loss, while others reflected the accepted second-hand versions of other 
people's past experiences. Nevertheless, the accounts confirmed that Samoans 
suffered horrendously in the epidemic. In one account, an elderly woman from 
the Fa'asaleleaga District recalled that she was ten years old when the 
epidemic struck Savai'i. She could not recall in detail what actually happened, 
but she remembered following her father and uncle to Sapapali'i to bury the 
bodies of families and friends. She remembered some of the bodies being torn 
apart and badly decapitated by the dogs, and that image, she said, was 
ingrained in her mind for the rest of her life.4 
The influenza epidemic that struck Samoa had killed many soldiers in the 
battlefields in Europe. The deadly virus had reached Europe from America,5 but 
it was not until after the war that the real impact of the epidemic was finally 
revealed by the Spanish government, after it had devastated that nation in 
1918.6 The deadly virus reached New Zealand in September with the arrival of 
troops on board the Niagara, which was also carrying New Zealand 
Parliamentarians. The Niagara was quarantined in Suva on the advice of the 
ship's doctor, and the officers of the Niagara officially advised the New Zealand 
3 Michael Field suggested that the Papauta incident was an insignificant event compared to other issues 
that had been raised. Field failed to grasp the importance of the LMS and the Samoan (LMS) Church to 
Samoa's struggle for independence. Field seems to give the church little influence in Samoa's struggle to 
autonomy. But anything that affected the Samoan church affected the political leaders of Samoa, who 
were faithful members of the church. See Michael Field, Mau: Samoa's Struggle for Freedom, Auckland: 
Polynesian Press, 1984, 44. 
4 Vaolele Toti Laulu l'amua Tevaga (born 1908). Personal Interview, Safua, Lalomalava, September 1995; 
see also Taefu Tupou (born 1918). Personal Interview, Si'ufaga, Falelatai, October 1995; Nanai Fa'asa 
(born 1915). Personal Interview, Si'ufaga, Falelatai, October 1995. 
5 Spanish Flu Take its Toll in Britain, 30 Sept, 1918, Chronicle of the 2d" Century. 
6 For a good background of the Spanish Influenza and its beginnings, see W. I. B. Beveridge, Influenza: 
The Last Great Plague, London: Heineman, 1977; R. Collier, The Plague of the Spanish Lady, London: 
MacMillian, 1974. 
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Naval Base in Auckland to inform the Health Department that passengers from 
the Niagara were suffering from the deadly Spanish influenza. The New 
Zealand Health Minister, George Russell, in consultation with Auckland's Health 
Officer, Thomas Hughes, cleared the Niagara for berthing after Hughes had 
assured Russell it was simple influenza. A few days later, the extent of the virus 
surprised everyone, especially after people died, but was not serious enough for 
officials to act upon.7 
A week later another ship the Ta/une arrived in Auckland, and some of 
the passengers, including Robert Carter, the Samoan Labour Commissioner, 
were surprised that the Niagara was not quarantined,8 as it had on board sick 
people diagnosed with influenza. A few days later, the Ta/une sailed for its 
usual round trip to Samoa, Fiji, and Tonga, and in Suva, it allowed people to 
disembark, although the health authorities quarantined the Talune after the 
discovery of influenza on board. John Mawson, the captain of the Talune, had 
signed a declaration that as far as he knew the ship was free of any infectious 
diseases, and that allowed people off the boat. It was a disastrous decision for 
Fiji. 9 
Nevertheless, more passengers were taken on board, mainly Fijians, and 
the Ta/une sailed for Samoa. On the morning of 7 November 1918, the Ta/une 
weighed anchored at Apia harbour and on board were very sick passengers, 
including Samoans, Fijians, and papalagi, and most of the Talune's crew, 10 but 
the Samoan Health Officer, Captain Frank Atkinson, passed it off as mild 
influenza. Atkinson was not trained as a doctor and had no idea whether the 
influenza was contagious or not. Nevertheless, he was happy to clear the 
Talune on advice of the ship's captain, and the fact that the ship's log had not 
declared any cases of infectious diseases on board. Mawson also declared he 
had a clean bill of health from its last port of call, that being Suva.11 
7 Note: By December 1918, 2000 people had died in New Zealand (1000 in Auckland alone) from the 
influenza. See Influenza Brought Back From the War. 1 Dec, 1918, Chronicle of the 2d" Century; Collier. 
94. 
8 Carter to the Epidemic Commission, New Zealand Samoa Epidemic Commission Collection, 1919, MS -
2031 (henceforth NZSEC). 
9 Mawson to Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
10 Atkinson to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC; Hough to Lenwood, 2 Dec, 1918, London 
Missionary Society, South Seas Archives, South Sea Letters (henceforth SSL); SDC - Minutes of Meeting, 
Malua, 7 - 9 Jan, 1919, SSL. 
11 Atkinson to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC; Mawson to Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
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There were surprised reactions from the passengers who felt the Talune 
should have been quarantined after being quarantined in Suva. Many people 
felt the number of sick people on board should have persuaded the health 
authority to take more stringent measures than it did. The Reverend Paul Cane 
of the LMS was very surprised that he was allowed to leave the boat, as he had 
admitted to the health officers that he had influenza when he left Auckland. He 
had hoped the sea air would help clear it up but upon arrival in Apia, his 
condition worsened. He went to hospital immediately and convalesced for eight 
days before he was released, and even then he was still very weak. He felt the 
influenza that he had suffered was rather different from any he had 
experienced. 12 The Samoans, whom the authorities considered ignorant 
regarding such matters, were just as shocked that the 'yellow flag" had been 
lowered on the Talune when clearly there was something wrong. Tuatagaloa, a 
Falealili mataiwas surprised, when he went to pick up members of his family, to 
find so many people sick who appeared to be dying on board the ship. 13 It 
seemed that none of the passengers were interviewed or taken seriously by the 
health authority, and that the decision was purely made in consultation with 
Mawson, supported by Atkinson's own inadequate knowledge. 
On board the Talune, there were twelve soldiers earmarked for work in 
Samoa. On arrival at the military barracks, Major Andrew A. Richardson was 
concerned that some of the men could not stand up properly and looked very 
weak. Richardson advised General Sydney Skerman, the Public Medical Officer 
(P.M.O), of the men's condition. He tried to ascertain how quickly he could 
examine the new soldiers, as it was the policy to examine all military personnel 
who arrived in Samoa. Skerman gave the twelve men a routine medical 
examination, and found that they were all suffering from influenza. The men 
informed Skerrnan that they had been infected even before they left New 
Zealand, and revealed that the plans to send them to Samoa had been 
postponed because of their condition, but at the last minute their orders were 
changed and they left for Samoa. Skerman seemed unperturbed by the 
condition of the men as he confined them to bed and rest for a couple of days.14 
Skerman's decision was probably correct, but given the fact that Skerman had 
12 Cane to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL; SOC- Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 7 -9 Jan, 1919. 
13 Tuatagaloa to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
14 Richardson to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
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earlier left the hospital after treating Cane, and other papa/agi and Samoans 
suffering the same illness, one would expect some kind of concern or curiosity 
on Skemian's part. Perhaps, twelve men with influenza, and a hospital full of 
similar cases, was nothing out of the ordinary for Skemian. 
For the next two days, stories began to surface that the Talune had 
carried passengers infected with the deadly Spanish influenza, and that New 
Zealand had being infected with the Spanish influenza, The rumours were, in 
fact, true. New Zealand had declared the Spanish influenza an infectious 
disease, and Atkinson was later aware of this information, but was too afraid to 
speak out. The health department should have suspected the worst after two 
deaths at the hospital the day after, but the authorities remained unconvinced 
until the enormity of the situation was realised, but by then it was too late to 
properly control it.15 
The news was not just about the influenza arriving in Samoa. Stories 
also began to circulate that there had been a cover up to allow the Ta/une to 
berth in Apia and offload its passengers and cargo as it had a schedule to keep. 
Further more, it was later discovered that Arthur Davey, who was to be the next 
captain of the Ta/une, was on board and had advised Mawson to conceal the 
fact that the ship had on board sick passengers unless the authority demanded 
it. Davey was anxious to take charge of his new ship, but it would only take 
effect after it had completed its Pacific round trip. According to Mawson, Davey 
relied on the clean bill of health documentation to solve everything. 16 The 
Samoans who had travelled in the Talune spread stories that passengers were 
advised to pretend that all was well, otherwise they would not be allowed off the 
ship. Others told stories that they could not pretend as they were too sick, but 
they were allowed to go home.17 It seemed Mawson's ignorance, and Davey's 
desire to fulfil his new command, discarded their obligation to humanity. 
The New Zealand administration first realised the enormous extent of the 
epidemic three days after the Talune arrived. The news of New Zealand itself 
being infected and that the Talune had carried the disease with her to Samoa 
also began to sink in. Furthermore, the administration found that the epidemic 
had taken its toll on Samoan families in Apia. Richardson was a friend of the 
15 New Zealand Samoa Epidemic Commission Report, 1919, Appendix to the Journals of the House of 
Representative of New Zealand (AJHR); New Zealand Epidemic Commission Collection, MS-Papers 2031. 
16 Mawson to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
17 Faasiusiu to Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC; Titipa to Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
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Samoan matai Amatua, and he had summoned Richardson to visit him. When 
Richardson arrived, Amatua looked weak and admitted to him that he was 
dying. Richardson soon realised something was very wrong, especially after he 
had noticed that all the shutters of Amatua's house were drawn. Richardson 
investigated what to him was an odd situation on a hot day. Richardson's mind 
reeled as the reality of the influenza epidemic dawned on him. 
The shutters were all down, and about a dozen people 
were lying sick, with one or two children on their feet. I tore 
the shutters off, as the air was stifling. I went around the 
other tales (native house) in the village, and everywhere I 
went was the same thing - no kaikai [food], shutters were 
up, and no one able to do anything. 18 
The New Zealand Forces were immobilised and tried to do everything to 
stem the epidemic. The Market Halls in Apia was quickly converted into a make-
shift hospital and sick people were moved there for care. Many Europeans 
offered their assistance by providing transportation in getting the sick Samoans 
to the Market Halls. The news of the epidemic spreading in the surrounding 
districts only added to the confusion and total disbelief of the administration. 
The situation at Vaimoso, a village on the fringe of Apia, was so badly affected 
that a European woman personally sought out Skerman to give urgent medical 
attention to the Samoans. Skerman was overwhelmed at the hospital with the 
number of cases that had filled the hospital to capacity. Skerman, whining and 
complaining, went to Vaimoso to fulfil the demands of the wife of the Secretary 
to Native Affairs. 19 
Logan was informed of the situation but could not respond immediately 
as he was also feeling ill. Logan eventually turned up and found the situation at 
the Market Halls chaotic, although his presence made things easier as he gave 
orders to employ all administration resources available to deal with the 
epidemic. Logan called a meeting of every available papalagi, Samoans, and 
mission staffs, to put into action a more practical plan to utilise fully the available 
resources. The helpers were divided into various groups to look after the supply 
store, cook and distribute meals, collect and bury the dead, nurse and provide 
medical care, and provide transportation. They were also allocated an area or a 
district near Apia to look after. The Papauta School on the out-skirts of Apia 
18 Richardson to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
19 Cotton to Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
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under the care of Miss Elizabeth Moore and Miss Hilda Small of the LMS was 
also allocated a district to its care.20 The Lotu Pope, the WMMS and the LMS 
offered their assistance personally, and were further supported by their Samoan 
adherents and students. The Papauta School had 150 girls on campus and was 
honouring its commitment to Logan as it also took responsibilities for its many 
students affected by the epidemic. 
The distribution of food and the pick up of dead bodies was a daily 
routine. The dishonourable responsibility of digging graves and burying dead 
bodies fell on the Chinese indentured labourers. In Apia itself, two cemeteries 
were dug. The Chinese were made to dig all day in the hot conditions, and 
when they had finished, they were made to bury about 400 dead bodies in one 
grave and 150 bodies in the other.21 The administration took another gang of 
Chinese to Toamua, another village near Apia, where they dug up a lime pit 
near the pastor's house, which had been used recently to produce lime for the 
building of a new church. The turning of the lime pit into a grave was probably 
an omen for the Toamua church that there would be no brethren to fill it. At the 
beginning the missionaries offered prayers, read comforting verses from the 
bible, and gave individuals a Christian burial, but eventually, the number of 
deaths became too great so that just burying the dead was the most humane 
and Christian thing to do.22 
For three weeks, the death toll continued to increase at an alarming rate, 
and it was sapping the energy of helpers, who were pushed to their limits 
twenty-four hours a day. The situation was not helped by a reduction in the 
number of helpers through deaths and illness, and diminishing supplies. 
Consequently, many sick Samoans could no longer wait for transport to pick 
them up, or deliver food. They made their way to the Market Hall or to families 
in or near Apia where they could be near the food distribution stations.23 The 
flow into Apia was not what the administration wanted, but they were 
encouraged by the fact that the crisis in Apia itself had shown signs of 
subsiding. The arrival of additional people was probably more of a nuisance 
than an unwanted burden. Patrols were sent out to the outer districts and news 
20 Moore to A. E. Hunt, 1919, NZSEC; Logan to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
21 Hough to Lenwood, 17 Dec, 1918, SSL; Cane to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL; Richardson tolhe 
Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
22 Cane to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL 
23 Richardson to Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
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received was discouraging. The administration knew it had to provide further 
assistance to the worst infected areas, but resources and supplies were 
stretched to the limit Some relief supplies later arrived from New Zealand, but 
were not enough to solve the administration's dilemma.24 The distribution of 
food was organised from time to time by the families who could make it to the 
Market Halls. The handouts provided only very little relief, and the method of 
distribution meant the villages further out from Apia and the people who were 
too weak to travel to Apia missed out.25 
When the influenza finally abated and the surviving remnant regained 
their health and strength, the process of answering many questions relating to 
the epidemic disaster began. It was also a time for many to relive the horror of 
the epidemic itself, and to unfold the many stories of people's ordeals. There 
were stories of whole families being wiped out completely from their villages. 
The stories of missions facing empty pews and a grim future were further sad 
tales, which only exemplified the horror Of the epidemic itself. Samoans knew 
that they had just experienced an event that had touched them deeply and they 
would probably never be able to comprehend it In the end, the Samoans 
blamed the New Zealand administration for the disaster on several counts. 
Firstly, the Samoans blamed the incompetence of the administration's 
health officials for the disaster in their failure to quarantine the Talune. The 
evidence showed that the health department had done what could have been 
done given the circumstances. However, the Samoans had every reason to be 
angry. The health officials were incompetent and the administration had no 
excuse to employ people like Atkinson who had no prior training as a medical 
officer. The health department could also have done more once they suspected 
an epidemic brewing. The fact that Atkinson knew more than he had revealed 
was a violation of administration policy. If Atkinson had no idea what Samoa 
was facing with the number of sick people at his disposal, then a 'witch-doctor' 
must have trained Skerman. Skerman, of all people, should have at least been 
more conscious of the events that were unfolding, especially when deaths 
began to occur and the hospital overflowed with sick patients. Skerman's 
24 The first assistance regarding other supplies and medical help arrived from Australia four weeks after 
the incident See New Zealand Samoa Epidemic Commission Report, 1919, AJHR; New Zealand 
Epidemic Commission Collection, MS-Papers 2031; Logan lo Liverpool, 27 Dec, 1918, Island Terri1ories 
(henceforth IT) 8 Ex 8110. 
25 Moore to A E. Hunt, 191'1, NZSEC. 
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reaction questioned his professionalism and ability to be in a position of 
responsibility for the Samoans' health. Skerman, it appears, cared very little for 
the situation at hand.26 
Skerman's carelessness was clearly displayed after being informed of 
the crisis in Apia. He had left the hospital filled to capacity, and had not counted 
on finding a make-shift hospital in the middle of town. Perhaps, the enormity of 
the disaster may have dawned on him when he saw the number of people being 
cared for at the Hall. Skerman's reaction was not one of concern for human 
lives, but anger when he saw the sign 'Temporary Hospital' above the doors of 
the Market Halls. The make-shift hospital at the time was crowded with very sick 
people, but the facility helped relieve the main Hospital, which was full. 
Skerman was incensed with the idea, and immediately sought to pour abuse on 
the people responsible. Skerman then turned his attention away from the make-
shift hospital, and focussed on the lack of professionalism and qualifications of 
the volunteers who were nursing the sick. Skerman in a rage ordered everyone, 
including the sick, to vacate the hall immediately. He even assisted in 
personally kicking out a Samoan that was sick and asleep. Skerman stormed 
out of the hall and left. The sick and everyone who had been evicted returned to 
the hall. Two days later, Skerman fell ill and did not hesitate to take the next 
available ship out of Samoa for New Zealand.27 
The lazy approach by the health department towards the epidemic was 
widespread. Lieutenant Herman Wollerman criticised the Hospital's 
unprofessional attitude over the disposal of dead bodies infected with influenza. 
The doctors and health officers returned the deceased corpses to their families 
for burial. The Samoans took the bodies back to their village and, eventually, 
the villagers fell victims to the virus. Many villages near Apia had not been 
infected prior to the dead bodies of family members arriving to be buried. The 
incompetent hospital staff contributed to the rapid spread of the epidemic rather 
than taking steps to contain it.28 Skerman was denounced by the Samoans, and 
he never returned. At Savai'i, the medical officer, William James, refused to 
make house calls or visit any patients brought to his attention. The Samoans, 
and many Europeans, believed that if James had done his duty and visited the 
26 Richardson to the Epidemic Commission, 1919. NZSEC. 
27 Richardson to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC; Wo/lerman to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, 
NZSEC. 
28 Wo/lerman to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
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sick, more lives would have been saved.29 Atkinson, albeit a culprit in the eyes 
of the Samoans, redeemed himself. Richardson recalled that "no man could 
have worked harder. At all hours and at any time he was on call. His 
temperature was taken, and I believe it was a point over 100, yet he never 
relaxed in his work."30 
Secondly, the Samoans blamed Logan personally. Lagolago summed up 
the general feelings of the Samoans that Logan betrayed them in failing to 
exploit every available option to help the plight of the Samoan people. In 
Lagolago's statement to the Epidemic Commission, he mentioned that the 
American Consul, Mason Mitchell, had informed him that Logan ignored an offer 
of help from Pago Pago. Lagolago recalled his deep disappointment in hearing 
the news. 
Tears dropped from my eyes to think that this was true, for Col. 
Logan should have accepted the offer for the sake of the people. 
The doctors would have arrived in one day, and they would have 
saved some of my people, and also the people of Samoa who 
died. As far as I am concerned, everything should have been done 
by the leading people to save the people of Samoa from the 
epidemic. I must say that every necessary thing was done but 
one, and that in relation to the offer from Pago Pago.31 
In a statement to the Epidemic Commission, Logan, at first, denied 
receiving such a telegram, but after being confronted with evidence from 
members of his own staff and Mitchell, Logan finally admitted that a telegram 
was received but he had ignored its content, except for the part referring to 
Samoan ships having to undergo quarantine in American Samoa until the 
epidemic ceased. Mitchell gave further evidence to show that the content of the 
telegram confirmed an offer to help was furnished, and that the Americans were 
waiting to hear from Logan. 
In connection with Governor Payer's offer of assistance I desire to 
say on learning of the ravages of Influenza in Apia he called a 
meeting of his medical staff and nurses and stated he thought 
they should offer their services, notwithstanding the risk, and he 
felt if he could be of any service he would go himself. All the 
medical officers and nurses some 30 in all immediately offered 
their services and were prepared to go as soon as word was 
received from Colonel Logan.32 
29 New Zealand Samoa Epidemic Commission Report, 1919, AJHR; New Zealand Epidemic Commission 
Collection, MS-Papers 2031. 
30 Richardson to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
31 Lagolago to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
32 Logan to the Epidemic Comission, 1919, NZSEC. 
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Logan gave two reasons for his decision to ignore Governor J. M. 
Payer's offer. Firstly, the telegram was handed to him personally and therefore 
was not an official telegram from the American Samoan Governor, if normal 
protocol was observed in such matters. It was Logan's belief that such 
telegrams did not require any official recognition on his part. Logan also pointed 
out that the telegram had been addressed to Consul Mitchell, and he was, 
therefore, not obliged to take note of its content, except for the part Mitchell had 
pointed out to him referring to the quarantine ruling. Regarding the wording of 
Payer's offer to help, which stated "please inform me if we can be of any service 
or assistance," Logan understood the offer to have been addressed to Consul 
Mitchell's wife who was bed stricken with influenza.33 
Samoans further endorsed their belief that Logan had rejected Payer's 
action when it was revealed that Logan had made an order to sever all 
communications with Pago Pago soon after receiving the message. Logan had 
not denied that he had made an order to that effect, but he denied that it was 
related in any way to his ignoring Payer's offer. Logan maintained that the order 
regarding the disconnection of radio communication with Pago Pago was an 
administration decision to give the men who manned the radio station ample 
time to rest. Logan's reasons were later discredited by evidence from the 
soldiers manning the radio station, who rejected the idea that they did not have 
enough rest. The soldiers speculated that the closure of all communication was 
probably Logan's reaction to the restrictions the American had placed upon 
Samoan mail and ships.34 
The Samoans took Logan's evidence no other way, but that of a deceitful 
and untrustworthy person. The Epidemic Commission, on the other hand, could 
not refute nor deny Logan's reasoning for ignoring Payer's offer of assistance, 
as the telegram was ambiguous and the evidence were inconclusive to suggest 
that Logan understood the telegram as such. Nevertheless, the Samoans 
believed otherwise and would not accept that the words "please inform me if we 
can be of any service or assistance" meant something other than an offer to 
help Samoa in its crisis.35 The commission may have been reluctant to attribute 
blame to Logan for his lack of vision to utilise everything in his power to help the 
33 Logan to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
34 Richardson to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC; Davies to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, 
NZSEC; Logan to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
35 Davies to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
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Samoans, but it was a fact that Logan closed the only lifeline open to appeal for 
assistance. Logan's own staff had commented that he was not on good terms 
with the American Governor, and was not enthusiastic about anything 
American. It seemed Logan had put his personal feelings before the welfare of 
the Samoans.36 
Even if Logan was right regarding his version of the telegram and the 
Radio shut down incident, his creditability was fully expunged in the eyes of the 
Samoans after making a derogatory statement regarding the status of Samoan 
matai. Logan called some of Samoa's leading matai 'minor chiefs,"37 and the 
Samoan political leaders were irate. The Samoans were deeply wounded that 
Logan could lower the status of "Samoa's king-makers." The Samoans made it 
clear that in the old days such comments had led to death. Logan tried to patch 
things up with the Samoan community, and called a meeting at Mulinu'u to hold 
a post-mortem to discover the cause of the epidemic. The Samoans bombarded 
Logan with so many questions that he lost control and stormed out of the 
meeting in anger. The Samoans were upset with Logan's disrespectful attitude, 
especially when Logan had walked out while one of the matai was addressing 
him. The Samoans took Logan's action as a refusal to talk about the epidemic 
and, therefore, proof of his refusal to assist Samoans. Logan was probably 
angry at the continuing remarks regarding New Zealand's incompetence as a 
ruler compared to Germany and America. For the Samoans, the epidemic 
disaster and Logan's attitude was enough to convince them that New Zealand 
could not administer Samoa. The fact that American Samoa was protected from 
suffering the same fate, was ample evidence of New Zealand's 
mismanagement.38 For the Samoans, the call for American protection was not a 
hoax, but an appropriate avenue to pursue. The new group of mataiwas far 
more progressive than their deceased predecessors were. Unfortunately, for 
Logan, it was not just the Samoan matai who were disgusted with Logan's 
political performance. The Samoan (LMS) Church was also trying to understand 
the effect of the influenza epidemic, and the implication of Logan's actions in 
relation to the LMS's work in Samoa. 
36 Wollerman to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC; Richardson to the Epidemic Commision, 1919, 
NZSEC; Davies to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
37 Lagolagoto the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC; Samoa Times, 7 Jun, 1919. 
38 R. W. Tate, Native Situation, Sept, 1921, IT 88/5; see also Stout to Massey, 24 Feb, 1921, IT 1 Ex 18/1; 
Lagolago to the Commission, 1919, NZSEC; Davidson, 96. 
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The cost of the epidemic to the LMS was enormous according to letters, 
reports, and journals, submitted from the Au Fa'atonu to the Au Matutua. Hough 
wrote some four months after the epidemic, "we are just struggling through to 
the light once more. Samoa has been down into the valley of the shadow of 
death."39 He went on to describe the horror of the epidemic and the cost to the 
Samoan (LMS) Church. 
We lost more by comparison in three weeks than the British 
Empire has lost in four years of the world war. The dead lay with 
the living, until at last someone dragged himself out and dug a 
shallow grave and rolled the corpse into it.. .. The Churches have 
lost their deacons, who were also government officials. We have 
lost our pastors. Not only have we lost the old men, we have lost 
heavily amongst the younger men .... We don't know where we 
are.40 
Hough's comments highlighted just how much the Samoan (LMS) Church had 
contributed to the political and social aspects of Samoan life. The loss of its 
church members was also a blow for the administration officials. The Samoan 
(LMS) Church members dominated Samoan politics. Cane witnessed the 
devastation in Savai'i, and while it had less deaths than Upolu, the impact on 
the people and for the church was just as devastating. Cane recalled how he 
could only watch as "the poor people were stricken dumb with grief and fear, no 
cry in them no complaint, just resignation to blind fate. "41 
The epidemic, according to LMS accounts, killed between twenty and 
twenty-five percent of the Samoan population, which at the time totalled 
approximately thirty-seven thousand. In the ltu-o-tane district in Savai'i, the LMS 
mourned the deaths of all their Samoan pastors, and the ltu-o-tane's population 
of five thousands was reduced with the deaths of approximately one thousand 
people.42 The Samoan (LMS) Church was shattered. The LMS greatly mourned 
the loss of key Samoan pastors, who were earmarked to eventually takeover 
control of the church. Out of the forty members of the Au Toeaina, only twelve 
survived, while every member of the newly formed Samoa Financial Committee 
39 Hough to Lenwood, 2 Dec, 1918, SSL. 
40 Hough to Lenwood, 17 Dec, 1918, SSL. 
41 Cane to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL. 
42 According to R. W. Tate's memorandum to the Minister of External Affairs, the official death toll was 7, 
564 out of a population of 38, 302, which accounts for 19-20% of the population. Samoa's total population 
as of 1Jul,1917 was 37, 491. The number of Samoans alone was 35, 404, which means the numbers of 
Samoan deaths in the epidemic was around 22% of the population. See R. W. Tate, Native Situation, 
Sept, 1921, IT 88/5; British Military Occupation of Samoa, Census, 1 Jul, 1917, IT 1 Ex 88/7; see also Hills 
to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL; Cane to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL; Clarke to Bradford, 7 Mar, 1919, 
SSL. 
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perished. The LMS estimated that approximately one hundred Samoan pastors 
lost their lives in the epidemic. The Au Fa'atonu met at Malua in January 1919, 
and envisioned a bleak future for Samoa. 
The effect of this epidemic is not only immediately felt, but we fear 
will continue to be felt for years to come. Leulumoega will have to 
become the heads of their families and clans, and so there is, sure 
to be a dearth of candidates for the ministry .... lt is a lamentable 
fact that just at this crisis when Samoans are faced with far 
reaching political changes they have lost at one fell blow not only 
nearly all their leading pastors and teachers but the majority of the 
more experienced and sagacious chiefs.43 
The epidemic took men considered to be "pillars of the church."44 They 
included Esene, Elder and Chairman of the Au Toeaina for three years, whom 
Cane described as "a grand old man full of vigour,"45 and Kirisome, Secretary of 
the Au Toeaina, and described as "a man of great ability and geniality."46 The 
mission also lost Imo, the secretary of the Fono Tele and the Samoa Finance 
Committee, described as "a giant for work" and "one of the most valuable men 
in all Samoa.47 Petaia was also an enormous loss, being one of the original 
members of the Au Toeaina, and deemed "a useful man in Samoa, not only 
because of the dignity he lent to [the] deliberations, but also because of the 
restraining influence he exercised on the younger pastors."48 
The death of Malaefou, a tutor at Malua, was irreplaceable, and some of 
his European colleagues remembered him as "the perfect gentleman and 
kindness personified."49 Malaefou was also admired as "a man of seemingly 
wonderful vitality, good tempered, energetic and with that knack of leading men 
that only the limited number possesses. He was indeed the right hand of us 
missionaries. He will be difficult to succeed, if ever we can obtain a man 
approaching him even, in these qualities which made him so valuable to us."50 
43 SOC, Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 7-9 Jan, 1919, SSL. 
44 Cane to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL. 
45 Cane to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL. 
46 Cane to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL. 
47 Canelo Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL; Report of the Malua District, 1918, SSR. 
48 Report of the Malua District, 1918, SSR. Note: J. W. Davidson made reference to Petaia, and later 
acknowledged the great work done by Petaia's sons in the church and, especially as government officials. 
Petaia's great-grandson, Tofilau Vaaelua Eti Alesana was a Prime Minister of Samoa (died in 1999). 
Davidson's comments on Petaia and his off-springs contribution to later Samoan life was one example of 
the kind of loss Samoa sustained during the 1918 influenza epidemic. See Davidson, Samoa mo Samoa: 
The Emergence of the Independent State of Samoa, Melbourne: Oxford University, 1967. 
49 Cane to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL. 
50 74lh Annual Report of the Malua Theological Institution, 1918, SSR. 
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The list of quality pastors who perished included Viliamu, Metu, Faimalo, Uili, 
Molimauina, Liuvao, and Alefaio, who had all given so much to the church. The 
quality of leadership needed to take Samoa towards self-determination had 
been wiped out in a flash. 51 The United Nations later rated the epidemic disaster 
as "one of the most disastrous recorded anywhere in the world during the 
present century, so far as the proportion of deaths to the population is 
concerned."52 
The loss of so many members and fellow workers in the church was not 
the only issue the LMS had to deal with after the epidemic. During the crisis, 
Logan found himself at Papauta School one Sunday morning, on 24 November 
1918. In a subsequent meeting that followed with Miss Elizabeth Moore, the 
head of the school, Logan sparked off a set of circumstances that almost 
destroyed the amicable relationship between the LMS and the New Zealand 
administration. The controversy between Logan and Moore was put aside 
during the height of the epidemic, but its impact on Moore and the Papauta 
School was never forgotten. When the epidemic subsided, the Au Fa'atonu had 
many unanswered questions regarding Logan's behaviour. The Samoan 
pastors, and Samoan (LMS) Church members were also asking the same 
questions, not so much in support of the Au Fa'atonu, but for the treatment of 
the Samoan girls at Papauta School. The Logan - Moore controversy was also 
of special interest to the matai who had daughters at the school. Many 
Samoans viewed Logan's attack on Moore and the Papauta School as an 
attack on the Samoan (LMS) Church, and Samoan matai. 
The two LMS missionaries at Papauta, Moore and Small, assisted the 
efforts of the administrator to feed all the sick in Apia and its surrounding 
districts. It was a daily routine that Small and students, who were strong enough 
to do the work, had done with all sincerity and seriousness, although most of 
the time the girls at Papauta School were too ill to help themselves. When 
Logan visited Papauta on the day in question, Small and the Samoan girls had 
been unable to fulfil their obligations for several days. Small was ill and there 
were only a small number of girls well enough to look after the infirm and bury 
51 Reports of the Malua District, 1918, SSR; 741" Annual Report of the Malua Theological Institution, 1918, 
SSR; Hills to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL; Cane to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL 
52 United Nations (Department of Social Affairs), "The Population of Western Samoa," in The Reports on 
the Populations of Trust Territories, no. 1, New York: Lake Success, 1948; New Zealand Samoa Epidemic 
Commission Report, 1919, AJHR; New Zealand Epidemic Commission Collection, MS-Papers 2031. See 
also Appendix A: Memorial List: Those Who Died From the 1918 Spanish Influenza Epidemic. 
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the dead at the school. The following account of Moore's recollection of the 
events was contained in a letter to the Reverend A. E. Hunt, the secretary of the 
Congregational Union of New Zealand in Wellington. 
It was about 10 A.M. on Sunday, November 24---on the ninth day 
after the appearance of influenza in our school. About 80 girls 
were lying ill in the various dormitories, Miss Small was going 
about among them attending to their wants, while I, with two girls, 
was on the balcony preparing for burial the girl who had died the 
day before, when I was summoned below by the loud voice of the 
Administrator calling my name. Scarcely waiting for greeting, he 
began --as far as I can remember---by saying in a voice which 
became louder and more angry, 'Miss Moore, I believe you have 
sent down this morning for meat. I wish to inform you that no meat 
will be given you. I consider this the most disgraceful institution in 
Samoa, and I intend to inform your headquarter in London of the 
fact. Send them food! I would rather see them burning in Hell! 
There is a dead horse at your gate---let them eat that! Great, fat, 
lazy, loafing creatures .... Send them down to the public burial 
ground to dig graves! A disgrace to Christianity! I should send 
them all to Hell. 53 
Moore told Logan the girls were too ill to dig graves, but it only inflated 
Logan's anger. Logan told Moore "if you do not send me 25 of these girls to dig 
graves, I will come back this afternoon and burn down the school."54 Logan's 
demands were never met, because Moore had no girls well enough to be sent. 
Logan's comments soon found their way to the ears of the Samoans, and it 
further fuelled their anger against the New Zealand administrator. At the time, 
anger was all that the Samoans could express, as they were too weak, and the 
circumstances were not conducive for them to do otherwise. The news 
regarding Logan's altercation with Moore surfaced after the disaster. The 
treatment of the Papauta girls soon also emerged and the Samoans, especially 
the matai, began to realise just how much Logan's threats had attributed to the 
demise of their daughters. 
Small heard every word that Logan's anger was able to manufacture. 
Small also tried her best to comfort the many sick girls who had also heard the 
exchanges between Logan and Moore. Small and Moore were glad that the 
girls had very little command of English, and were not able to understand any of 
the coarse words Logan used. But, Logan's anger was enough to put fear in the 
hearts of the girls, and many of the girls wanted to leave Papauta immediately 
53 Moore to A. E. Hunt, 1919, NZSEC. 
54 Moore to A. E. Hunt, 1919, NZSEC. 
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and return to their families before Logan returned to carry out his threats. Small 
saw the fear in the girls and considered their request. Small then advised the 
girls once they felt strong enough "to crawl to the next village, to go away, as 
the sight of them made Col. Logan angry."55 
According to Moore, about forty girls left on Sunday afternoon "and 
started walking towards the direction of their homes, sleeping in the infected 
villages by the way."56 Many of the girls lived more than twenty kilometers (12 
miles) from Papauta School, while other girls had to find boats and fautasi (long 
boats) to transport them to Savai'i and Manono. It was a task that was 
impossible given the circumstances surrounding the epidemic. Some of the girls 
tracked across mountainous terrains in order to shorten travel time to their 
villages. Wollerman told the epidemic commission that on the afternoon in 
question, he was on his way from A'ana and Tuamasaga Districts, where he 
had been collecting dead bodies. He recalled he "passed a dozen girls walking 
in the direction of Malua, each with a little bundle of clothes and looking very 
sad. I ascertained that these were the girls from Miss Moore's school."57 
Wollerman later met the manager of Rothschild's store who commented that "it 
was a shame for the missionaries to kick those girls out at such a time." 58 
Wollerman enlightened his manager friend of the circumstances and he was 
rather stunned by what Wollerman revealed. Wollerman's final comments 
blamed Moore and Small for the girls' heart-rending circumstances. 
I thought it absolutely criminal to send those girls to their home, 
probably to die, when they were at the time in a place, which was 
practically a hospital, and the best place they could be.59 
The girls were probably heading for the Malua Seminary to find shelter 
as it would been very late when Wollerman saw them. In hearing Wollerman's 
description of the sick girls carrying their little bundles, Samoans would have 
shed tears. For the Samoans, these girls were not just any girls, but daughters 
of Samoa, who had been abandoned to survive on their own because of a 
pompous administrator, and two insensitive women missionaries. It was a 
strange decision by Small, and one that Moore also supported, as she had not 
55 Moore to A. E. Hunt, 1919, NZSEC. 
56 Moore to A. E. Hunt, 1919, NZSEC. 
57 Wollerman to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
58 Wollerman to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
59 Wollerman to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
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tried to stop the exodus later.60 It seemed the fear of Logan was the only reason 
given, and that, unfortunately, outweighed compassion and solace that should 
have been a priority. The Au Fa'atonu's own bias and looking to Logan as the 
aggressor in the controversy exonerated Moore and Small of any injustice. 
The Au Fa'atonu in its monthly meeting declared their "indignation and 
disgust at the unseemly and unprovoked attack made upon Miss Moore and the 
Papauta School by the administrator Col. Logan during the time of the recent 
epidemic."61 However, under instruction from Moore, the Au Fa'atonu took no 
official action against Logan. It was agreed that a letter to the New Zealand 
government would be sufficient to put the matter on record. The decision was 
later retracted when it was revealed that the Congregational Union of New 
Zealand had laid a formal complaint before the New Zealand government 
regarding the actions of Logan and the administration during the influenza 
epidemic.62 Sir James Allen, the Minister of External Affairs, took the allegations 
contained in the letter seriously, especially when Allen had already being 
petitioned by the Auckland Chamber of Commerce (ACC) to investigate Logan's 
administration. The President of ACC, Robert Burns, spelt out their concerns. 
The complaints were practically those of incompetence and there 
was no complaint which was of sufficient importance .. .for us to 
urge you to take any steps in this matter until the war was over. 
We would now, however, like to know if it is proposed that the 
administration should be carried on in its present form and under 
the present administrator. ... If not, we think in justice to those in 
Samoa who seem to feel very strongly that they have been 
unfairly treated, that an investigation should be made into their 
complaints.63 
The petitions led to Logan's recall to New Zealand. Allen also initiated 
the formation of a commission to look at the New Zealand administration and its 
handling of the epidemic disaster.64 Logan later wrote to Allen, to point out 
60 The LMS never addressed the reasons behind Moore and Small's decision to allow the girls to leave. 
The epidemic commission concentrated so much on the political aspects of the epidemic that had 
contributed to the deaths of Samoans, some of the little issues were overlooked. Logan and New Zealand 
became the scapegoat and ii drew attention away from Moore and Small, and the accountability of the 
LMS. Nevertheless, it was a decision that tarnished the image of the LMS in the eyes of many Samoans. 
61 The Au Fa'atonu was much more concerned with the Logan - Moore controversy, although it was aware 
of other occasions Logan had attacked the LMS. For instance, Logan condemned Harry Griffith, the LMS 
printer, for not allowing a Malua student tyring to commit suicide to drown. See SOC - Minutes of Meeting, 
Malua, 7 - 9 Jan, 1919, SSL; Griffith to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
62 Minutes of Meeting, Allen and Congregational Union, 29 Apr, 1919, IT 8 Ex 8/10. 
63 Bums to Allen, 2 Dec, 1918, IT 1 Ex 1/18. 
64 Minutes of Meeting, Allen and Congregational Union, 29 Apr, 1919, IT 8 Ex 8/1 O; Moore to Hawkins, 12 
Jul, 1919, SSL; Hough to Lenwood, 22 Jul, 1919, SSL. 
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Moore's rude conduct during the epidemic and charged her with having "no 
feelings of humanity towards a stricken people in their hour of need."65 It was a 
charge that was totally refuted by Moore and her LMS colleagues in Samoa. 
Moore only regretted that an explanation for Logan's behaviour was not 
demanded at the time. 
Logan, under oath and before the Epidemic Commission, agreed with 
Moore's version of events, but denied some of the wordings. Logan's version of 
the incident suggested that a misunderstanding over comments made by Small 
a few days before was the catalyst for his unfortunate outburst. Logan had 
asked Small for some girls to assist in feeding the sick not, as Moore had 
stated, to bury the dead. Small told Logan she could not promise anything, as 
she had to consult with Moore, and ascertain the state of school. Three days 
after, Small had not turned up with any girls due to illness, and Logan took 
exception to their absence.66 
What made me angry with them was this; they did practically 
nothing except attend to their own people right from the start, 
whilst other missions situated the same way were doing most 
excellent work. For instance, the Wesleyan Missionary and his 
wife were working all they could and said they could get on quite 
well and attend those immediately surrounding them .... they took 
the entire care of their particular district off my shoulder. 67 
Logan refused to admit that Moore, Small, and the Papauta girls had 
been faithful to their assigned tasks, even when pressed to do so by the 
overwhelming evidence presented before him. He did, however, acknowledge 
that he was misled by some of the European helpers, who had pointed out that 
the Papauta School had ignored their responsibilities and had not turned up to 
fulfil their obligations to the administration. Logan was 'passing the buck.' He 
would not admit that he had no knowledge that the LMS institution had not been 
fulfilling its task. But, despite being enlightened with the truth, Logan refused to 
admit he was mistaken, and that he did not know the circumstances of the 
Papauta School when he burst into their compound with his abusive remarks. 
Instead, he continued to ridicule the Papauta School before the Commission. 
The Wesleyan girls were doing good work and the Catholic sisters 
were doing extraordinary good work in Apia. As a matter of fact, 
65 Moore to A. E. Hunt, 1919, NZSEC. 
66 Logan to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC; Moore to A. E. Hunt, 1919, NZSEC. Note: Small in 
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67 Logan to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
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the conduct of this particular school was unchristian. It had been 
tried in the balance and had been found wanting. I think I went as 
far as to say to Miss Moore that her school was a disgrace to 
Christianity, and that she was encouraging the girls to do nothing 
when they might have been doing splendid work. I was thoroughly 
disgusted with their conduct and left them severely alone until this 
particular day. But, when I heard that not only were they doing 
nothing but were sending down for food, I was dis~usted and said 
they must either work like everyone else or starve. 8 
Logan's comments revealed the characteristics of an injured animal. Logan's 
hatred of the LMS had stemmed from the relentless battering the LMS was 
dishing out.69 Logan's reputation was not just under scrutiny in the political 
sphere, but was also under inquiry by the church. But, the comments also 
revealed a possible motive for the two women missionaries to send the students 
home. It was obvious that the girls were well looked after at Papauta, and Small 
and Moore did everything to keep the girls healthy. The vision of seeing the girls 
digging graves, and the fact that Logan had declared an embargo on food for 
the school, may have prompted the decision to get them out for their own good. 
The commission gave Logan the opportunity to examine Moore's 
evidence closely and to offer criticism. Logan refused. He was unable to 
convince the Samoans and members of the commission that he had acted 
fairly. Logan's own member of staff, Wollerman, was at the Papauta School on 
the morning in question, and he corroborated the stories given by Small and 
Moore. Logan had not told the truth and his own evidence before the Epidemic 
Commission, incriminated him. Allen and a New Zealand Parliamentary party 
visited Samoa in an effort to reassure the Samoans of New Zealand's care for 
its people. Allen also made a goodwill visit to Malua and Papauta, and later 
apologised for the treatment of the LMS missionaries by Logan. 70 
The epidemic commission was unable to find any solid motive for 
Logan's hatred for Moore, Small, and the Papauta School. The LMS was not 
aware of any conflict with the administration. Moore believed Logan was 
"distracted by his anxiety and distress at the whole situation in Samoa, at the 
time he scarcely knew what he said."71 Skerman believed Logan was suffering 
68 Logan to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
69 See Chapter 5 for examples; see also SDC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 29 Apr-8 May, 1920, SSL; 
Moore to Hunt, 1919, NZSEC. 
70 SDC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 29 Apr - 8 May, 1920, SSL; see also Logan to the Epidemic 
Comission, 1919, NZSEC; Wollerrnan to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC; Moore to Hunt, 1919, 
NZSEC,. 
71 Moore to A. E. Hunt, 1919, NZSEC. 
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from the 'tropics sickness', which affects people who reside in one place for too 
long.72 Logan's own staff also commented on his mental state at the time and 
observed that Logan was not himself. Mrs Logan also observed and 
commented that she wished her husband had stayed home because he was full 
of fever; it was no use suggesting a doctor to him, to do so was "like a red rag to 
a bull."73 Perhaps Logan's state of mind was responsible for his attack on the 
LMS institution, but it has not been able to explain the LMS's dilemma, as to 
why Logan turned his distress on Papauta. 
The Au Matutua sent the Reverend Victor A. Barradale to Samoa in 1919 
to offer assistance to the Au Fa'atonu in dealing with the trauma of the epidemic 
crisis, and to comfort the Samoan (LMS) Church. The arrival of Barradale was a 
positive move by the Au Matutua in terms of creating good relations with the 
Samoans and the Samoan (LMS) Church. The Au Fa'atonu appreciated 
Barradale's efforts in strengthening the hearts of the Samoans to overcome 
their grief and find courage to return to their normal lives.74 The Samoan church 
also showed its gratitude through Faletoese, who thanked the Au Matutua for 
thinking of Samoa in such difficult times. Some of the church districts had not 
attended Barradale's welcome, but were also comforted by Barradale's visit. To 
show their appreciation, thirty-three letters from the same number of churches 
in the Fa'asaleleaga District, and a few letters from the ltu-o-tane and Falealili 
Districts, reached Barradale to reaffirm their love for the Au Matutua. 75 
Barradale had put confidence back into the Samoan (LMS) Church and 
Samoans as a whole. Some of the deacons and lay members, especially the 
matai, found courage to review the epidemic, and to peacefully demand an 
explanation from the New Zealand administration. According to the Au 
Fa'atonu, Barradale's presence had lessened the hatred that the Samoans 
were harbouring over New Zealand's blunder.76 It was, perhaps, a misleading 
observation from a political point of view. 
The influenza epidemic affected the whole life of the Samoan (LMS) 
Church. The school rolls in all of the LMS's institutions fell dramatically. Papauta 
72 Skerman to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
73 Richardson to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
74 SOC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 7 -11 Jul, 1919, SSL; Moore to Lenwood, 12 Jul, 1919, SSL. 
75 Ole Lauga mo le Savali a Misi Peletele, Malua, 10 Jul, 1919, SSL; Tafuna'i to Barradale, 14 Jul, 1919, 
SSL; Tupe to Barradale, 16 Jul, 1919, SSL; Enosa to Barradale, 23 Jul, 1919, SSL. 
76 Hough to Hawkins, 21Mar,1919, SSL; Lagolago to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. 
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and Leulumoega school rolls, especially, were severely affected as many girls 
and boys that survived the epidemic stayed home to take care of their depleted 
families. The girls were suddenly thrust into motherhood, and performed all the 
roles of their deceased mothers. The boys were also thrust into responsible 
positions and caring for the families, as older brothers took on the 
responsibilities as matai in the decision making process.77 The administration 
found it was not easy to deal with the new generation of mataiwho had been 
chosen not for their ability but for reasons of family necessity. The epidemic 
took the lives of older matai who had counselled and guided the Samoans 
throughout the German period, and for four years under New Zealand's 
administration. The death of the older generation created a gap that, according 
to the administration, the younger generation could not fill adequately. In Tate's 
report to the Minister of External Affairs in 1921, he referred to the leadership of 
the younger matai as "the leadership of boys."76 
The Au Fa'atonu wrote to the Au Matutua that the monetary contributions 
of the Samoan (LMS) Church would be affected by the epidemic, and that they 
believed the Samoans would not get near the required target.79 The Au 
Fa'atonu miscalculated the ability of the Samoans to survive difficulties in times 
of suffering. Samoans proved the Au Fa'atonu wrong, and showed their 
versatility and support for the church by not only raising the £5000 that the Au 
Matutua had set for self-support, but also raising an extra £3000.60 The Au 
Fa'atonu appreciated the effort of the Samoan (LMS) Church in reaching the 
target, and accepted the £5000 contribution for the LMS's work in Samoa. 
Regarding the £3000, the Au Fa'atonu suggested that the £3000 be given to the 
Au Matutua for the work of the LMS. The Samoan pastors rejected the proposal 
in favour of the money being used for foreign mission. The Au Fa'atonu was 
surprised by the attitude of the Samoan pastors. Clarke attributed the Samoan 
pastors' attitude to the lack of mature leadership. He wrote to the Au Matutua 
that "the epidemic has swept away nearly all the old pastors and leaders whose 
opinions were trusted and whose decisions were final; the young men have now 
taken their places will soon be asking for detailed balance sheets to be laid 
77 Moore to Lenwood, 2 Feb, 1919, SSL. 
78 R. W. Tate, Native Situation, Sept, 1921, IT 88/5. 
79 Cane to Lenwood,? Feb, 1919, SSL. 
80 Clarke to Bradford, 7 Mar, 1919, SSL; Clarke to Bradford, 25 Mar, 1919, SSL. 
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before them."81 The Au Fa'atonu felt that the new group of younger pastors 
would be easier to control, but it was soon obvious that they would be a handful. 
From an administration point of view, the epidemic disaster taught the 
health department a lesson they would never forget. According to the Reverend 
Stanley Phillips, the administration was more professional in its approach to 
ships arriving in Samoa. Strict quarantine laws were implemented, and all other 
aspects relating to the good health of the Samoans were implemented.82 The 
1918 influenza epidemic, and Logan's irresponsible performance in dealing with 
the catastrophe, fermented to erupt into a political catastrophe within the next 
two decades. The Samoan (LMS) Church was more peaceful, and although the 
impact of the epidemic and the Logan - Moore controversy remained buried, it 
was never forgotten.83 
81 Clarke to Bradford, 7 Mar, 1919, SSL. 
82 S. G. Phillips to G. E. Phillips, 30 May, 1936, SSL; Stallan to Phillips, 30 Jul, 1935; SSL; Stallan to 
Phillips, 6 Apr 1936; SSL; Stallan to Phillips, 2 Jun, 1936, SSL; Perkins to Phillips, 22 Aug, 1936, SSL. 
83 J. W. Davidson was involved with the preparation of Samoa for independence. When he was in Samoa 
in 1947, Samoans were still talking about the epidemic and New Zealand's role in it. See J. W. Davidson, 
Samoa mo Samoa: The Emergence of the Independent State of Samoa, Melbourne: Oxford University, 
1967, 97. 
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POLITICAL INCOMPETENCE 
AND SAMOAN NATIONALISM 
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The influenza epidemic in 1918 etched gruesome snapshot images of 
death and destruction into the memory reservoir of Samoan consciousness. It 
affected every niche of Samoan existence to a point where it became the 
eleventh commandment, as the pain and rage from the event was related from 
victims to heirs. Thus, when New Zealand continued to enhance the pain 
through Richardson's insensitive policies, the Samoans reacted with passion 
and rejection. Richardson was on the verge of witnessing Samoan nationalism 
for the first time. 
The gap between Samoan aspirations and Richardson's expectations 
continued to widen during 1926. It was not that Richardson was unkind in his 
policies, but the fact that his policies were formed around the concepts and 
values of his New Zealand culture, the Samoans found oppressive. The 
Samoans tried to implement ways to counter Richardson's insensitivity, but 
failed to pierce Richardson's arrogance. The Faipule's loyalty to Richardson, 
and their duty to fulfil Samoan aspirations caused much internal conflict that 
rendered them useless. They condemned themselves to becoming fence 
sitters.1 
The matai wanted to advance their views but were powerless through the 
indecision of the Faipule. The Samoans reluctantly carried this burden as they 
also tried to side with the administrator and to satisfy their own desires. There 
seemed no stopping Richardson marching towards self-glorification and 
Samoan mortification. Richardson himself was confident that the loyalty of the 
Faipule meant loyalty of the Samoans, and failed to contemplate any adverse 
reaction from any section of the community, including the papalagi. However, it 
was precisely Richardson's over confidence in his ability to control the Samoans 
and papalagi at the extreme end of the spectrum, which blinded him to the real 
threat to his administration - the afakasi.2 
1 S. S. Allen, Notes on Samoa, S.S. Allen Collection, MS-Papers 1499 (henceforth SSA); Native 
Administrations and Local Government in Western Samoa, 21 Jul, 1947, Grattan Papers 4879 (henceforth 
GP). 
2 S. S. Allen, Notes on Samoa, SSA. 
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The year 1926 not only marked a changed of attitude towards New 
Zealand's administration, but it was also the year in which Samoans, papa/agi, 
and afakasi, began to leave their passive shells and campaign to reject 
Richardson's paternalism. Olaf Nelson's trip to New Zealand during September, 
and the meetings with some of New Zealand's leading parliamentarians, led to 
a change in attitude and vigour among the Samoans, papa/agi, and afakasi. 
Nelson had used his influence to table before the New Zealand parliament 
some of the problems faced by the Samoans and papalagi under Richardson's 
administration. Nelson's account of the Samoan political situation highlighted a 
discrepancy between the New Zealand government's policy for Samoa and 
Richardson's own personal agenda for the Samoans. 
Nelson returned with good news that the Minister of External Affairs, the 
Hon. William Nosworthy, would visit Samoa to investigate some of the 
complaints received through Nelson. Nelson quickly activated several meetings, 
which brought together Europeans and Samoans, and resulted in setting up a 
committee made up of equal number of Samoans and Europeans. The second 
meeting saw an increased number of Europeans attending but Europeans still 
greatly outnumbered by the Samoans.3 The increase in Samoan numbers 
reflected a new attitude within the Samoan community. Many Samoans were 
willing to work together with Europeans to address the problems imposed by the 
Richardson regime. It further showed that people like Nelson had made a deep 
impression on the Samoan people, especially, as an afaksi, he demanded 
respect due to his Samoan connection. Nelson was connected to the Sa Tupua 
family through his mother. He held the title Taisi and, with his immense wealth, 
he commanded respect and honour from other families.4 
Richardson disapproved of papa/agi meeting together with Samoans. 
Richardson felt the papalagi were insensitive to the problems faced by the 
administration. Richardson bluntly pointed this out to the European Citizens' 
Committee. 
You are doing a thing unheard of in the annals of colonial 
administration, and are almost certain to discredit the European 
community .... I wish all people here to clearly understand that I do 
3 Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, Appendices to the Journal of 
the House of Representatives (henceforth AJHR), 1928. 
4 Data Compiled and Sent to NZ at the time of the Mau Deputation to Wellington, GP. 
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not approve of a political meeting which mixes native politics with 
European politics.5 
Richardson saw the merging as disregarding his orders on two counts. Firstly, 
the Europeans must not meddle with Samoan affairs and, secondly, the 
Samoans must channel their complaints through the district councils and Fono 
a Faipule. Richardson saw the newly found unity in the European and Samoan 
communities as a challenge to his authority, and this prompted him to advise 
Nosworthy to postpone, or better still, cancel his visit to Samoa. 
Richardson's ego blinded him to the folly of his action. He had missed 
the opportunity to listen and address both parties at once. It was an opportunity 
to examine closely the ringleaders and those who were behind the Samoan 
hostility. Samoans and papalagi would not accept the six months delay and 
requested Nosworthy to receive a delegation in New Zealand. Richardson did 
all in his power to curb this proposal by censoring mail, impeding every effort by 
the group to raise funds. Richardson also drew up ordinances to restrict 
Samoans movements and stop Samoans living outside their own nu'u, and 
enacted regulations that made it hard for Samoans to obtain a passport.6 
Most of the administration officials felt Richardson had done well in 
putting in place such restrictions. Many felt it only turned a probable hostile 
situation into "a storm in a tea cup," while others preferred to call it "a kick by the 
half-caste at the white man."7 Richardson felt confident that Nelson had lost 
some of his influence on the Samoans, and that the joint actions of the papalagi 
and Samoans had lost its momentum. But Richardson got it all wrong. In fact, 
his restrictions turned a peaceful avenue of presenting complaints and 
grievances into a movement that later fermented into civil dissatisfaction. 
The Samoans continued with their plan to meet Nosworthy, despite 
having to wait six months or even a year. Reports were prepared, and a petition 
listing grievances was circulated to be signed by all Samoans and Europeans in 
Savai'i and Upolu. A pamphlet was published, which spelled out Samoa's 
problems and relationship with New Zealand's Samoa administration, and 
money was collected to carry out the wishes of the group. Furthermore, Nelson 
5 Royal Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, Island Territories Archives (henceforth IT) 
1 Ex1/46 (part 2). 
6 Nosworthy to Richardson, 18 Oct, 1926, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Administration to Minister, 6 Dec, 1926, IT 1 Ex 
1/23/8; Report of Visit by Nosworthy, Minister of External Affairs, 1927, AJHR; Report of the Royal 
Commission Concerning the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR. 
7 Hutchen to Gray, 17 Dec, 1926, Colonel J. W. Hutchen, Personal Correspondence, IT 1/79/76. 
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initiated a newspaper, called the Samoa Guardian in opposition to the pro-
government newspaper called the Samoa Times. 8 The Samoa Guardian aimed 
to voice in print the concerns of the Samoans and Europeans. By March 1926, 
the group had swelled into a large movement, and was given the name 'the 
Samoan League.' The movement later became well known as the Mau.9 The 
rise of the Mau prompted H. E. Holland, the Leader of the Opposition in the 
New Zealand Parliament, to comment that "New Zealand was not administering 
its Mandate over Samoa on the foundations intended by the League of 
Nations."10 
Nosworthy finally visited Samoa in June 1927. He met Richardson first 
and an outline of the Samoan situation was tabled before Nosworthy. 
Richardson was especially critical of the Samoans' continued rejection and 
neglect of government policies. Richardson pointed the finger at Nelson, and 
the European Citizens' Committee, which was now acting as the executive arm 
of the Mau, for Samoan disobedience. 11 Richardson had painted such a gloomy 
picture, Nosworthy failed to listen to the cry of the Samoans, when it was their 
turn to table their concerns. From the beginning Nosworthy condemned the 
Samoan people for the problems besieging the administration of Samoa.12 
The European Citizens' Committee also received the same 
unenthusiastic response from Nosworthy. Consequently, it dawned on the 
Samoans and Europeans that Nosworthy had no intention of even considering 
their grievances and complaints. When Nosworthy left Samoa, he promised, in 
his final address to the Mau, to pass a new law that would give Richardson the 
power to deport papalagi and afakasi that would oppose the government.13 
However, the meeting between Nosworthy and the Citizens' Committee cleared 
up a misconception on Richardson's part that the Mau was an insignificant 
8 S. S. Allen, Notes on Samoa, SSA. 
9 A detailed discussion on the Mau and its inauguration will be given in Chapter Eight. While the Mau will 
be mention throughout this chapter, it is done so in order to keep the political narrative flowing. The Mau is 
only mentioned in connection with New Zealand administration efforts. 
10 Secretary External Affairs Department to Prime Minister. 9 May 1927, IT 1 Ex 1/18. 
11 Reply to the Administrator's Official Statement by the Elected Members of the Legislative Council of 
Western Samoa, 22 Mar, 1927, IT 1Ex1/8, no.1; Richardson to Members of the Legislative Council of 
Western Samoa, 26 Mar, 1927, IT 1Ex118, no.1. 
12 Report of Visit by Nosworthy, Minister of External Affairs, 1927. AJHR; Royal Commission Report on 
Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1 Ex1146 (part2). 
"Proclamation- Nosworthy, 15 Jun, 1927, IT 1 Ex 112318; Report of Vistt by Nosworthy, Minister of 
External Affairs, 1927, AJHR; Report of the Royal Commission Concerning the Administration of Western 
Samoa, 1928, AJHR. 
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group. Although Nosworthy had left Samoa with some strong words being said 
to the Samoans and confidence in Richardson's ability to administer Samoa 
being affirmed, 14 Richardson himself was not confident and secure. The 
numbers alone in the Mau made Richardson uncomfortable. 
On 25 June 1927, Richardson issued a proclamation ordering the Mau to 
disband. He threatened to punish all Samoans and deport non-Samoans who 
continued to associate with the Mau or interfere with Samoan affairs. 
Richardson's power to deport Europeans or to deal with the Mau in such a 
manner came into effect on 4 August 1927.15 Richardson also wrote to the 
various missions to remain aloof from the Mau and to advise their members 
likewise. In a letter to Father F. Meyer, of the Catholic mission, Richardson was 
unhappy with members who "openly expressed their approval of the movement 
now disturbing the minds of the natives. "16 Meyer assured Richardson that they 
had demanded that their catechists and members remained neutral.17 
However, as Meyer assured Richardson of their mission's co-operation, 
Nelson received a letter, which suggested a very different attitude from another 
Roman Catholic leader, Father Deihl. According to the letter to the Citizens' 
Committee, Father Deihl offered to ''wait upon the Administrator"18 with other 
prominent mission leaders (LMS and WMMS) and demand some concessions 
for the Samoans. The concessions included an amnesty for all Mau members 
that had being banished or imprisoned, mataititles to be returned to their 
original title-holders, a declaration that all Faipule would retire after a three year 
term and the administrator would consult the districts for their replacements. It 
also required the administrator to meet the Mau leaders at Mulinu'u, and in the 
future the administrator to set aside a day to hear Samoan grievances.19 Nelson 
supported the idea, and Deihl and eleven other signatories wrote to Richardson 
for a meeting. Richardson replied that no meeting would take place, but asked 
14 Mau Period Papers (Miscellaneous), Circularto Faipu!e - Nosworthy, 1927, Westbrook Additional 
Papers 79-270 (henceforth WAP). 
15 Mau Period Papers (Miscellaneous), 1927, WAP; see also Report of the Commission into lhe 
Administration ofWestem Samoa, 1926, AJHR. 
16 Richardson to Father F. Meyer, 30 Aug, 1927, Damand Correspondence, MaristArchives of Samoa and 
Tokelau Islands (henceforth MAsn. 
17 Meyer to Richardson, 1Sept,1927, Damand Correspondence, MAST. 
"F. D. Baxter to 0. F. Nelson, 20 Dec, 1927, Damand Correspondence, MAST. 
19 F. D. Baxter to 0. F. Nelson, 20 Dec, 1927, Damand Correspondence, MAST. 
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Deihl and his peers to advise those in the Mau to cease their activities.20 
Richardson's arrogance and authoritarian paternalistic attitude clouded his 
judgement, and made him transcend and misuse the law to assert his power 
and authority. The Samoans prominent in the Mau, such as Faumuina Fiame 
Mulinu'u and Afamasaga Toleafoa Lagolago, were banished from their homes 
and villages, while others had their mataititles removed.21 
As Richardson tightened his grip on the Mau, the Mau became more and 
more intensified and free to operate more widely among Samoans. The 
character of the Mau also changed as many Samoans began to take over the 
Mau purely as a Samoan movement. Richardson's motto, 'Samoa mo Samoa' 
returned to haunt him as Samoans took the motto as an expression of their 
purpose - to free Samoa from New Zealand administration. 22 The Mau asked all 
Samoans and papalagito boycott, and not to co-operate with, the 
administration. This led to various village committees ceasing to operate and 
carry out their usual duties on behalf of the administration. Government 
representatives were given the cold shoulder by villages, and Samoan children 
were re-registered with mission schools, or stopped from attending government 
schools. Samoans also refrained from producing copra, as well as refusing to 
attend to their plantations. Registration of births and deaths was boycotted, 
while taxes were unpaid.23 
Nelson went to New Zealand to throw some light on a new Samoan 
petition tabled before Parliament, but Richardson intervened and requested an 
independent commission to look at the Samoan situation.24 This was accepted. 
The Samoan petition was shelved once again, and Nelson was forced to return 
to Samoa to await the arrival of the Commission of Inquiry, which included two 
judges, Sir Charles Skerrett and C. E. McCormick. The commission reportedly 
received the views of about 300 Samoans, papa/agi, afakasi, and members of 
20 Deihl to Richardson. 20 Dec, 1927, Darnand Correspondence, MAST; Richardson to Deihl, 22 Dec, 
1927, Darnand Correspondence, MAST. 
21 Report of the Royal Commission Concerning the Administration of West em Samoa, 1928, AJHR; see 
also S. G. Fetherston - Faasamoa, Robert W. Tate Papers, MS-COPY-MICRO 0082-04 (henceforth TP). 
22 Data Compiled and Sent to NZ at the time of the Mau Deputation to Wellington, GP; S. G. Phillips to G. 
E. Phillips, 15 Feb, 1933, London Missionary Society (LMS) South Seas Archives, South Seas Letters 
(henceforth SSL); S.S. Allen, Notes on Samoa, SSA. 
23 Royal Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1 Ex1/46 (part 2); Report of the Royal 
Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR; see also Confidential Report of Two 
Years in Samoa, - Bartlett, SSL. 
24 Petition Dated 1June1927 from Mr. Newton Rowe, IT 1Ex1/64; Petition From Samoans, IT 1Ex1/61; 
Petition -Anti-slavery, League of Nations, 2 Jul, 1928, IT 1 Ex 1/63. 
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the New Zealand administration in Samoa. The outcome of these interviews 
became the basis of the Commission of Inquiry's report to Parliament.25 The 
Commission of Inquiry felt that, while there was some concern over 
Richardson's Administration of Samoa, they could find nothing to substantiate 
the Samoan complaints against Richardson and his administration in Samoa.26 
The Samoans and the papalagi had feared that the limited sample of 
people interviewed would only produce a very narrow view and interpretation of 
the Samoans' grievances. The Commissioner of Inquiry's report confirmed this 
fear. While the Samoans were unhappy about the report, the commission did 
find that the introduction of taxes for the development of various needed 
services, such as educational and health services, was a burden to the 
Samoans and papalagi. The commission also felt that the continuation of the 
prohibition order was an infringement of individual freedom. The commission 
also criticised the manning of the public service with inexperienced and 
incompetent expatriates. 27 
The most pressing issue the commission had to review concerned the 
regulations the government had placed on copra, but the commission did not 
find any evidence that Richardson was restricting private business ventures in 
favour of government business enterprises, as the Samoans and papalagi had 
charged.28 The commission had been told that the government suspected 
merchants cheating the Samoans by buying copra at a low fixed price, and 
making huge profits on overseas markets. According to the report, the greed of 
the merchants had left him with no choice, but to take over the handling of 
Samoan copra products.29 Richardson proposed to do this through the New 
Zealand Reparation Estate, and pay a higher price in advance when the copra 
was received. Richardson and the commission's appraisal of the situation was 
25 Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration ofWestem Samoa, 1928, AJHR; see also Royal 
Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1 Ex1146 (part 2). 
26 Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration ofWestem Samoa, 1928, AJHR; Royal 
Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1 Ex1146 (part 2); see also Smart to Barradale, 
23 Apr, 1928, SSL. 
27 Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR; Royal 
Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1 Ex1146 (part2); see also 0. F. Nelson-
Memorandum on the Fundamental Causes of the Samoan Unrest, Jun, 1928, WAP; Davidson, 123-124. 
28 Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR; Royal 
Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1 Ex1146 (part2). 
29 Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR; Royal 
Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1 Ex1/46 (part 2). 
probably correct given the fact that some of the same merchants and traders 
had acted similarly in the past.30 
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Nevertheless, many merchants felt Richardson's action was aimed at 
destroying European merchants, especially those who irritated the 
administration.31 The merchants were probably right. The commission's findings 
were more favourable to Richardson and his administration, even though in the 
report there were no evidence to suggest that the Samoans had complained to 
the administration they had been cheated by European merchants and traders; 
it was solely a complaint from the administration. The report suggested that the 
administration only 'suspected' the merchants and traders to be cheating the 
Samoans, which suggested the administration and the commission had no 
proof of the charges within the report. In any case, Richardson had the upper 
hand. 
The commission also found no evidence that Richardson had misused 
his powers especially in relation to Samoan customs. According to the 
commission, the power to banish Samoans and strip them of their matai titles 
had been introduced in 1922 under the Samoan Offenders Ordinance prior to 
Richardson's arrival. 32 The Samoans had despised such actions under the Solf 
administration and they were not about to accept them under any other 
administration. Richardson wanted to assert his authority early, and to show the 
Samoans who really had the power to rule Samoa. Punishing those in the 
forefront of Samoan authority, and stepping on Samoan pride early, was 
Richardson's novel way of asserting that authority in the hope that it would bring 
about a peaceful subdued Samoan nation. For the Samoans, the treatment of 
their leaders, the banishment of their elders, and deprivation of their family 
matai titles, were abuses and misuses of Samoan customs. For many 
Samoans, this was part of the impetus for the Mau movement, and yet the 
commission found Richardson's actions proper.33 Richardson used the power of 
the Samoan Offenders Ordinance regularly in order to suppress Samoan 
30 See Chapter 5 for discussion and examples. 
31 Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Weslem Samoa, 1928, AJHR; Royal 
Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1, Ex1146 (part 2). 
32 Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Westem Samoa, 1928, AJHR; Royal 
Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1 Ex1146 (part 2). 
33 Royal Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1, Ex1146 (part2); Report of Visit by 
Nosworthy, Minister of External Affairs, 1927, AJHR; Petition, dated 19 May 1930, From Mr. O. F. Nelson, 
IT 1 Ex 1!58. 
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uprisings, especially as the Mau became more and more intensified. 
Richardson's insensitivity continued to fuel Samoan resentment. He became 
more and more authoritarian as he neglected the wisdom of his Fautua -
Malietoa Tanumafili I and Tuimaleali'ifano. Richardson had faith only in the 
Samoan Faipule because they were loyal and able to continually carry out his 
wishes. 
For this reason alone, the Samoans were incensed at Richardson's 
choice of the Faipule, which often by-passed important titled holders in favour of 
lesser matai, but Richardson knew the Samoans' pride and the competition in 
existence to gain higher status through recognition by those in authority. The 
Samoans became pawns, or as Samoans would like to call it - fa'atau moa, 34 
for the administrator's self-esteem on one side, and papa/agifrustration on the 
other. The Samoans were once again pitted to destroy each other while the real 
perpetrators sat and watched and hoped to pick up the pieces later. Kilifoti 
Eteuati vividly describes the tension between Mau members and those loyal to 
the New Zealand administration. 
After Palauli had insulted the ma/o, just prior to Nelson's 
departure, non-Mau Samoans from Vaimauga had gathered and 
planned to punish the Mau offenders themselves. Richardson and 
the Faipule persuaded this group not to carry out its plans. But as 
Mau activities increased around Apia, ridiculing government and 
by implication the non-Mau Samoans, many more from outer 
districts, ... joined their Vaimauga colleagues and threatened a 
confrontation. 35 
The Mau from the onset worked towards addressing the problems of the 
Samoans, afakasi, as well as those of the papalagi. The papalagi recognised 
early the importance of the Samoan Mau movement and immediately supported 
it Papalagi gave their consent for the inclusion of equal numbers of Samoans in 
the Legislative Council.36 The move countered the Faipule's power, although 
primarily, it was a way to give Samoans the opportunity to participate in the law 
making process of the administration. The Samoans, as well as papafagi, saw 
this as an opportunity to slow down the changes which Richardson had initiated, 
especially in relation to culture, Samoan political ideology, community 
34 Fa•atau moa is a Samoan phrase which describes those who do the fighting for someone else. 
"'Kilifoti Eteuati, "Evaeavaga a Samoa: Assertion of Samoan Autonomy", PhD., Australian National 
University, 1982: 164. 
36 The set-up for the Legislative Council was specified under the 'Samoa Constitution Order.' See Samoa's 
Problems - Samoa Citizens Committee, GP. 
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aspirations rather than individualism, and to re-emphasise value judgements 
affected by monetary incentives and other forms of inducements and rewards. 
The Mau wanted to return Samoa to its past when it ruled under its own 
political ideologies. They wanted to be treated as people and as equals, and not 
as subservient servants of another nation. The commission had failed to realise 
this issue because, firstly, it had taken Richardson's views more seriously and, 
secondly, as far as Samoans were concerned, it was not an independent inquiry 
because it was carried out by people biased in favour of Richardson and the 
New Zealand government. Thus, the activities of the Mau continued with 
renewed vigour and increasing support from the Samoans and the afakasi 
population .37 
Nelson became more and more in the forefront of the Mau as he 
continued to assist the Samoans in pursuing their aim, which was becoming 
clearer and clearer to every Samoan and to Richardson - self government. 311 
Richardson considered the strength of the Mau movement and the power and 
authority of Nelson and other papa/agi around him dangerous. This was clearly 
confirmed by Richardson's action in exiling Nelson, E.W. Gurr, and A.G. Smyth 
to New Zealand for five years. Richardson felt that with these three influential 
papalagi out of the equation, the Samoans would be unable to sustain their 
efforts. Furthermore, at the request of Richardson, Nelson agreed to speak to 
the Mau and ask them to disperse. But the exercise was a waste of time as the 
Mau was hard of hearing. Richardson, in deporting Nelson, gave the Samoans 
another reason to remain resilient in its efforts. Nelson left Samoa voluntarily, 
contrary to the advice of his closest friends, to avoid any violent confrontation 
and reduce the risk of injuries to the Samoan people. 39 
Richardson had under estimated the strength and the ability of the Mau 
to survive. The message to Richardson was clear, the Mau was not Nelson - the 
Mau was the Samoan people. On the day Nelson left for New Zealand, 13 
January 1928, the Mau gathered to farewell him wearing purple uniforms. It was 
a reminder to Nelson that the Samoans had united and his deportation would 
not be without meaning and significance. It was also a reminder to Richardson 
37 It even received support from American Samoa. See J. A. C. Gray, Amerika Samoa and its Naval 
Administration, Annapolis: United States Naval Institute. 1960, 209. 
38 S. S. Allen, Notes on Samoa, SSA 
39 Richardson to Nelson, 14 Dec, 1927, IT 1 EX 112318; Richardson to Nosworthy, 17 Dec, 1927, IT 1 EX 
112318; Nelson to Richardson, 17 Dec, 1927, IT 1 EX 112318. 
that the Mau was in Samoa to stay, and whether Nelson or no Nelson, the 
Samoans were in control. Richardson knew the time had come to take much 
firmer actions to break the Mau.40 
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However, instead of reacting in a more diplomatic way, Richardson 
resorted to a show of power and strength. He requested the presence of military 
hardware in Apia harbour, and the arrival of HMS Dunedin and HMS Diomede 
gave Richardson the confidence to enact against the wearing of the Mau 
uniform and the collecting of funds for the Mau. Richardson also declared 
certain areas around Samoa 'disturbed' so that the Mau could not hold 
meetings or gatherings. Richardson acted unlawfully as his ego and 
authoritarian arrogance replaced law and common sense.41 
Richardson carried out his threats by arresting and imprisoning many 
Mau adherents found in contradiction of his laws. Other members of the Mau 
made a mockery of Richardson's efforts by presenting themselves personally to 
be locked up. The prison was too small for all the Mau members, and the 
gathering of a large group considered hostile in one place was not a safe option 
for Richardson. Consequently, Richardson offered pardons to many Mau 
adherents. In the eyes of the Samoans, Richardson was weak. They saw their 
release as a victory over Richardson's oppression. Richardson then tried to 
appease the situation by playing the role of a concerned and humble diplomat. 
He asked the Mau leaders to work together with him in developing the existing 
administration. The leaders of the Mau felt Richardson's sudden change of 
attitude came too late. Tupua Tamasese Lealofi rejected the offer on behalf of 
the Mau, as he once again restated the aim of the Mau - self-government.42 
Richardson's action was that of a desperate man in need of a solution to 
a situation that was now far beyond his capabilities to handle. What was more 
remarkable was his insistence to continually punish the Samoans as a way of 
dealing with the issue at hand, especially when a sustained reverse in attitude 
would have salvaged some of the respect that the Samoans still had for the 
administration. Richardson was ill advised by his own European administration 
officials and those whom he trusted, and as a result took the wrong options and 
40 Richardson to Nosworthy, 16 Jan. 1928, IT 1 EX 112318; Richardson to Nosworthy, 10 Feb, 1928, IT 1 
Ex 112318; Liston to Barradale, 18 Feb, 1928, SSL 
" Samoa Military Police to Act as Police Force in Samoa, 16 Apr, 1928, The Western Samoa Gazette, No, 
49, 29 Mar. 1928. 
42 Administrator to the Minister of External Affairs, 28 Feb, 1928, IT 1 EX 1123/8; Samoa Guardian, 8 Mar, 
1928; Commodore to Naval Secretary, 24 Feb. 1928, IT 1 EX 112318. 
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made the wrong decisions. On 8 April 1928, Richardson left Samoa cheered 
only by hls own ego and incompetent administration. The missions attended 
Richardson's farewell. For instance, Bishop Darnand wrote Richardson a little 
farewell note: 
There is no friend ofthe Samoan people failing to recognise your 
sincere love of the natives. During the five years of your 
administration, you spared no effort to promote the well-being of 
the people and the welfare of the country.43 
The Au Fa'atonu attended despite the call from the Samoan (LMS) Church to 
boycott the event. The Samoan church leaders were not impressed with the 
LMS missionaries' support for Richardson, and took the LMS's action as a 
challenge to their authority. Colonel Stephen Shepherd Allen, another military 
man, took over from Richardson.44 
Tupua Tamasese Lealofi was seen as the new leader of the Mau with 
Nelson's departure. The Mau took the opportunity to build up its own 
administration throughout the villages before Allen, the new Administrator, had 
time to 'set up shop.' The Mau performed all the functions of a government in 
terms of enacting regulations, collecting taxes, collecting fines, and so forth. 
They also prepared a petition to the League of Nations, which was signed by 
some 8,000 out of 9,300 tax paying Samoans. Tumua and Pule threw their 
weight behind the Mau as they sought to rekindle traditionalism. This meant 
more people, especially those influenced by Mau matai, were recruited by the 
Mau. 
On the other side, Samoans who held allegiance to the government, 
mainly Faipule and their families through official capacities and other means, 
campaigned strongly among the Samoans to uphold the law. They feared that 
the Mau had grown to a level that its leaders would not be able to control, but 
even government officials could not maintain their loyalty to the New Zealand 
administration, even when Allen had officially taken over his duties in Samoa. 
For instance, Tuimaleali'ifano was dismissed as Fautua when he joined the 
Mau. Members of the Mau also changed sides, such as Afamasaga Lagolago 
and others, as they felt the Mau was losing its strength and vitality and, more 
importantly, loosing its support, soon after Allen's arrival. While the actual 
43 Darnand to Richardson. 4 Apr, 1928, Darnand Correspondence, MAST; see also Richardson to 
Darnand, 2 Apr, 1928, Damand Correspondence, MAST. 
44 Stephens. Allen to be Administrator of Samoa - Nosworthy, 14 Apr, 1928, The Western Samoa 
Gazette. No. 49, 29 Mar, 1928. 
number of supporters for each side was unavailable at the time Allen took 
control of Samoa, there was no doubt the Mau was in control.45 
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Allen felt he could contain the Mau by using the police to uphold law and 
order and by placing Mau law breakers in prison. Allen's confidence was further 
boosted after he was informed of the Permanent Mandate Commission's 
acceptance of New Zealand's version of the Samoan situation. He felt such 
news would prompt many Samoans to see the hopelessness of their rebel 
activities and discontinue anti-government efforts. The Samoans, however, 
were reluctant to give up without a struggle. Allen not only imprisoned Mau 
members, but was also vigilant in bringing to justice Mau members wanted for 
various violations of the law. The arrests, at times, led to some violent clashes 
between the Mau and the police. On one such occasion on 6 December 1928, 
Tupua Tamasese Lealofi was arrested for non-payment of taxes. He was 
charged and then sent to New Zealand to serve a six months term of 
imprisonment.46 Allen targeted the Mau leaders, but the Mau remained stubborn 
and refused to back off or reduce its hostility. The Mau continued to confront the 
government. The violence seemed to increase with each effort of the 
government to counter it, and Allen soon realised the danger of pushing the 
Mau too far too quickly. Allen backed off and allowed the situation some 
breathing space to achieve calmness while he sought solutions. 
Meanwhile, in New Zealand, Nelson started a weekly newspaper called 
the New Zealand Samoa Guardian, to promote Mau efforts and seek sympathy 
from the New Zealand Labour party, and from the New Zealand public as a 
whole. Nelson's editorial comments, together with articles published in other 
New Zealand newspapers, exposed the New Zealand public to some of the 
administrative mismanagement in Samoa. Consequently, such articles initiated 
some serious questions on many defective aspects of New Zealand's 
administration of Samoa. The New Zealand Samoan Guardian was a blessing 
for the Mau and a curse for the New Zealand government. The Mau hoped the 
widespread publicity of the Samoan situation would force the New Zealand 
government to accept its proposals and act upon it immediately.47 
"Administrator to Minister of External Affairs, 25 Mar, 1929, IT 1 Ex 112318; Samoa Times, 29 Nov, 1928; 
Samoa Times, 6 Dec, 1928; New Zealand Samoan Guardian, 6 Jun, 1929. 
46 Allen to Ward, 6 Dec, 1928, IT 88112; Allen to Ward, 10 Dec, 1928, IT 88112; Samoa Guardian, 17 Jan, 
1929; see also Feather to Barradale, 31 Dec, 1928, SSL. 
47 See for example, a list of some of the things that had dissatisfied the Samoans, in A. Eaglesham, "Bible 
and Bayonet in Western Samoa, Labour Monthly 12, 1930, 154 - 155. 
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A change of government in New Zealand resulted in some changes to 
the administration of Samoa taking effect The Fono a Faipule and the various 
district councils were dismissed, while the Legislative Council received a facelift 
with Malietoa Tanumafili and Mata'afa Salanoa being added as members. The 
Fautua post was no longer part of the administrative process. Furthermore, 
copra, taxation, and military police issues were also addressed to some degree 
of Samoan satisfaction.48 However, while these efforts by the New Zealand 
government went as far as curbing some criticism of New Zealand's 
administration, it only checked for a moment Mau defiance. 
The mood of the Mau was passive and non-violent throughout 1929, and 
Allen was misled to believe that it was slowly dismantling and disappearing. As 
Allen visited many districts throughout Samoa he misinterpreted the kindness of 
the Samoan people as total support for the New Zealand administration. The 
Samoans had respect for Allen, but were very critical of his inability to control 
the activities of the police, especially towards the Mau. The Samoans were 
worried about the police being armed and carrying guns publicly without Allen's 
official authorisation. The uncertainty of the police motives in carrying guns only 
contributed to the Mau becoming more fanatical in order to protect itself. It also 
made the Mau more aggressive, especially in marches and demonstrations, 
such as that held to welcome exiled members such as Tupua Tamasese, in 
June, and Tuimaleali'ifano and Faumuina, in November.49 
A similar march and demonstration was held to welcome other exiled 
members in December of the same year. The government warned Mau 
members wanted on various violations of the law not to march. But the Mau 
members ignored the warning and as a result a violent confrontation took place, 
and within minutes gunshots filled the air as police and Mau members became 
engulfed in a frenzy that took many lives. A European policeman was killed, and 
many Samoans were seriously injured including Tuimaleali'ifano, Faumuina, 
and Tamasese. Tupua Tamasese and ten other Samoans later died from 
gunshot injuries.50 The day of 28 December 1929 became 'Black Saturday' for 
the Mau movement and for the Samoan people. The Samoans blamed the New 
48Eaglesham, 154 - 155. 
;•Allen to Ward, 1 Jun, 1929, IT 1 Ex 112318; Allen to Ward, 19 Nov, 1929, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Allen to Ward, 
20 Dec, 1929, IT 1Ex1123/8; see also Petition from O.F. Nelson, 3 July, 1930, IT 1Ex1/58. 
50 Coroners Inquiry into the Shooting, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1/23/11; Westbrook to Nelson, 9 Jan, 1930, 
Westbrook Papers MS-Papers 0061 (henceforth WP); see also Bartlett to Chirgwin, 29 Nov, 1931, SSL. 
Zealand authorities, while the New Zealanders blamed the Samoan Mau 
leaders, but the incident marked the point of no return for both sides in their 
efforts for reconciliation. Samoans had no other point of direction but self-
government New Zealand had no other choice but to find a way out with 
dignity. 
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New Zealand declared the Mau a seditious organisation. Under the 
Samoa Seditious Organisation Regulations. 1930, Colonel Stephen S. Allen 
declared the Mau a seditious organisation.51 The Regulation defined clearly the 
difference between an organisation per se and a 'seditious' organisation. 
According to the regulation an organisation meant: 
Any society or body, any two or more persons associated for any 
purpose who act or intend to act in conjunction with each other or 
who associate together with the object of considering or carrying 
out purposes as an organisation whether such purposes are to be 
carried out by any number of such persons or any other person or 
persons acting on their behalf.52 
The Regulation went on to define a 'seditious organisation' as «an organisation 
declared to be seditious by the Administration of Western Samoa."53 The 
regulation made sure the Mau or any other organisation hostile to New Zealand 
rule was quickly eliminated. The Administration also made sure that districts 
and individuals were kept checked through a series of regulations and orders.54 
Consequently, the presence of the military and the outlawing of the Mau 
forced Mau members to find refuge in the bush. Allen used Tiger Moth planes to 
drop leaflets over Samoan villages. In the leaflets, the message was clear, as 
Allen tried to entice Mau members to surrender.55 
1. During last week, 100 of the Mau were arrested. They were 
all very pleased at being able in this way to come out of the 
bush and be finished with the Mau. 
51 Proclamation: The Samoa Seditious Organisation Regulation, 1930, 13 Jan, 1930. The Westem Samoa 
Gazette, No. 61, 13 Jan, 1930; Mau declared a Seditious Organisation," Samoa Guardian, 10 Jan, 1930. 
52 Charles Fergusson Governor General: The Samoa Seditious Organisation Regulations, 1930. 11 Jan, 
1930, The Western Samoa Gazette, No. 60, 11Jan,1930; la Samoa Uma, Ordinance on Mau, Feb, 1930, 
MAST. 
53 Charles Fergusson - Governor General: The Samoa Seditious Organisation Regulations, 1930, 11 Jan, 
1930, The Western Samoa Gazette, No. 60, 11Jan,1930. 
54 Disturbed Areas Declared, 10 Jan, 1930, The Western Samoa Gazette, No.60, 11Jan,1930; The 
Samoa administration Additional Powers Order, 1930, The Western Samoa Gazette, No. 62, 7 Feb, 1930; 
Revoked Proclamation and Replace, 13 Mar, 1930, The Western Samoa Gazette, No. 64, 15 Mar, 1930. 
55 Moth Planes Drop Leaflets Over Villages, Samoa Guardian, Feb, 1930: la Samoa Uma, Samoa 
Guardian. 31Jan,1930. 
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2. The men of several villages have returned to their homes. 
As they have done with the Mau and are paying taxes, 
these villages are now being left in peace. 
3. Other villages will be left in peace when their men, too, 
renounce the Mau and return to their home and pay their 
taxes. They must give their names to the Pulenuu, who will 
sent notice at once to the Native Office, otherwise they may 
still be arrested. 
Despite the content of the leaflets indicating a decline in Mau activity, it was not 
forceful enough to have an affect on the rebellious activities of the Mau. 
The police engaged in search and arrest operations found it very difficult 
to locate members of the Mau, because Samoans continued to assist their 
escape. The government issued regulations forbidding Samoans travelling in 
order to stop further assistance to the Mau.56 The families of Mau members 
were searched and had their properties ransacked by government officials 
during unannounced raids at night time. The police were heartless and 
unsympathetic as they entered Tamasese's house as the family mourned his 
death. The Police arrested Tamasese's relatives, including Faumuina, and 
nineteen others, for various offences ranging from threatening to kill, assault, 
abusive language, intimidation, and escaping custody.57 The New Zealand 
government had no sense of shame. Allen's insistence on putting things back 
on track and restoring administration pride clouded his moral judgement to allow 
the Samoans peace in their time of grief.58 
New Zealand government Minister, the Hon. John G. Cobbe, visited 
Samoa and praised New Zealand's policy on Samoa, although he had some 
concern about Allen's attitude towards destroying the Mau.59 Cobbe offered the 
Mau an amnesty in order to initiate dialogue with its leaders. In a meeting that 
followed, Cobbe told the Mau to dissolve immediately, and Mau members 
wanted by the police to surrender peacefully, and for all Samoans to respect the 
Administrator and adhere to his rule. Faumuina, who acted on behalf of the 
56 Charles Fergusson - Governor General: The Samoa Seditious Organisation Regulations, 1930, 11 Jan, 
1930, The Western Samoa Gazette, No. 60, 11Jan,1930. 
57 Mau Members Arrested, Samoa Guardian, 11Jan,1930. 
58 Allen to Ward, 3 Jan, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1123/8; Allen to Ward, 15 Jan, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Police v Slipper, 
26 Feb, 1930, IT 69/56/5; see also Petition from O.F. Nelson, 3 July, 1930, IT 1Ex1/58. 
59 Report on Visit to Samoa, Memo for Cabinet, 20 Mar, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Allen to Ward. 15 Jan, 1930, 
IT 1Ex1/23/8; Allen to Ward, 10 Mar, 1930, IT 1Ex1123/8; Allen to Ward, 28 Jan, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; 
Samoa Guardian 3 Jul, 1930; Auckland Star, 18 Feb, 1930. 
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Mau, agreed only to surrender Mau members wanted by the police.60 On the 
other requests by Cobbe, Faumuina rejected the plea for the Mau to be 
subjected to the Administrator's will. The Mau would not submit to the 
Administrator, as it would mean submitting to the will of the Samoans loyal to 
the administration. According to Faumuina, Samoa was the Mau, those not in 
the Mau were not Samoans.61 
However, the Mau members did disperse to their villages, and Allen 
acknowledged the part played by the missions in a letter of gratitude for their 
support. The New Zealand Prime Minister, the Hon. Joseph Ward, also wrote to 
thank the missions. In a letter to the Catholic Bishop, Joseph Darnand, he 
thanked him for service rendered "in inducing the leaders of the Mau movement 
to come out of their concealment in the bush and meet the Administrator and 
the Minister in conference. "°2 The meeting that the two parties had agreed to 
before Cobbe eventually took place, but only a third of the Samoan matai 
supported it. The small numbers would either indicate the continuous defying 
attitude of the Samoans to the administration, or the matai who attended were 
none other than the loyal supporters of the administration. Nevertheless, Allen 
used the opportunity to restore the Feno a Faipule with the clause that 
members would be nominated by matai of each constituency. Afterwards, Allen 
felt content that finally the Mau era had being broken, while the Samoans saw 
the situation as a recovery period, or as in the Samoan adage - moe le toa (let 
the cock sleep). 
The Mau may have dispersed but the ideology of self-government had 
remained etched in the Samoan mentality. The Mau leaders who returned to 
their villages continued to strengthen the support for the Mau. The Mau leaders 
continued to meet regularly at Vaimoso. The Mau remained active and 
continued to function with taxes collected from members, as well as voluntary 
donations and contributions from supporters. Keesing correctly pointed out that 
Allen had misread the dispersion of the Mau as a sign of defeat, but Allen 
60 Report on Visit to Samoa, Memo for Cabinet, 20 Mar, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Notices, Samoa Guardian, 
26 Feb, 1930; Notice by Allen and Cobbe, 1 Mar, 1930; Administration and Mau: Meeting at Vaimoso, 
Samoa Herald, 7 Mar, 1930. 
61 Report on Visit to Samoa by J. G. Cobbe, Memo for Cabinet, 20 Mar, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1123/8; Bartlett, 
Confidential Report of Two Years in Samoa, 28 Nov, 1931, SSL. 
62 J. Ward (N.Z. PM) to Darnand, 1 Apr, 1930, Darnand Correspondence, MAST; see also Darnand to 
Ward, 28 May, 1930, Darnand Correspondence, MAST; S.S. Allen to Darnand, 18 Mar, 1930, Darnand 
Correspondence, MAST. 
should have known better that dispersion for the Samoans usually meant re-
strengthening of the movement.63 
178 
The Mau members who had boycotted the meeting that reinstated the 
Fono a Faipule, further refused to participate in the election of new members for 
the Fono a Faipule as Allen had planned.64 The re-strengthening period was 
over, and once again, the Mau re-emerged stronger and more determined to 
take control of Samoa. The Mau that Allen thought was 'broken' was still intact 
to strike at the heart of the New Zealand administration in its own time. Allen left 
Samoa in April 1931, with the belief that the Mau could have been pacified if it 
was not for the influence of the afakasi. Allen felt that a civil ruler, and not a 
military man, would better administer Samoa.65 
Allen's failure in administrater Samoa deprived him of his credibility as 
the New Zealand government shoved aside his recommendations. New 
Zealand opted for another military leader to turn New Zealand's fortunes 
around. He was Brigadier-General Herbert Ernest Hart, a solicitor and a 
soldier.66 Hart had the required qualities to succeed if given the opportunity and 
if Wellington refrained from dictating how Samoa should be administered. When 
Hart arrived, the Mau was practically running Samoa economically and 
politically. A women's Mau also indicated that support for the Mau still 
remained. Hart, on the other hand, was comforted by the thought that the 
administration still had the support of the missions, especially the Lotu Pope. 67 
While Hart tried to find a quick solution for a peaceful reconciliation, the 
Samoans were hard at work gaining support for self-government. The Samoans 
again presented their case before New Zealand's parliament, and before the 
League of Nations. A petition was also sent to Britain, United States, and 
63 Felix M. Keesing, Modem Samoa: Its Government and Changing Ufe, London: Allen and Unwin, 1934, 
187-190. Note: Keesing was present in Samoa in 1947 as part of the United Nations visitation team 
investigating the possibility of Samoa becoming selfiJovernment. Keesing had kept a close eye on the 
Samoan political scene before that and his book is a result of research and visits to Samoa at the 
aftermath of the Mau shooting in 1929. 
64 Report on Visit to Samoa by J. G. Cobbe, Memo for Cabinet, 20 Mar, 1930, IT 1Ex1/23/8. 
65 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, cccxxvi, 19 Sept - 25 Oct, 1930; Women's Mau to Allen 
(Farewell), 3 Apr, 1931, IT 1Ex1/23/8; S.S. Allen, Notes on Samoa, SSA. 
66 Herbert Hart Papers, Correspondence, 1932 - 1951; Herbert Hart Papers, Scrapbook, Oct, 1882 - Mar, 
1968. 
67 S. S. Allen, Notes on Samoa, SSA; Bartlett to Chirgwin, 28 Mar, 1930, SSL; Bartlett to Chirgwin, 24 Apr, 
1920, SSL; Western Samoa and Samoan Women, WP; Some of the Grievances of the Samoan Women, 
Starting From 28 December 1929, IT 1 Ex 1/52; Damand to Hart, 22 Dec, 1934, Darnand 
Correspondence, MAST. 
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Germany.68 The Samoans hoped that their problems would be acknowledged 
and be dealt with promptly by any of the recipients. Hart's problems were further 
intensified with the return of Nelson to Samoa in 1933. Hart felt Nelson would 
take the Mau to new heights, and saw him as a very dangerous adversary. He 
tried desperately to have Nelson detained in New Zealand for a further period, 
but Nelson prevailed and returned promptly to Samoa.69 The Mau immediately 
chose Nelson as its mouthpiece and demanded a meeting with Hart to settle 
their differences. Nelson processed knowledge and had dealings with the New 
Zealand government. The Mau felt that Nelson was the best person to promote 
its aim for self-government. Furthermore, the Mau also acknowledged Nelson 
as one of them as he held the mataititle Taisi.70 
Hart found it very hard to establish dialogue with the Mau leaders as they 
often refused to meet. By August 1933, the Mau had made a decision not to 
have any contact with Hart and his administration. They felt Hart no longer had 
the power to prevent and disrupt Mau activities. Under Tupua Tamasese 
Meaole, a son in law of Nelson, the Mau turned inward to strengthen its own 
administrative structure and to consolidate its aim of self-government. But within 
this structure, individual Mau leaders were well aware of their own motivations 
and personal aspirations. For instance, Tupua Tamasese Meaole saw the 
movement as a way to fulfil his ambition to be the leader of the Samoan people, 
while others, such as Autagavaia Siaupiu from Savai'i, saw the success of the 
Mau as an opportunity to revive Tumua and Pule authority.71 
The Mau drafted a constitution under the guidance of Nelson. The 
constitution was taken around Samoa and its content explained to the people. 
The aim of the Mau was clearly presented to the people. Nelson wrote, "New 
Zealand will wake up one day to find that by [the] peaceful penetration of the 
Mau ... the Samoans will have wrestled the last vestige of control. .. from the 
Mandatory Government."72 The Mau published newspapers and pamphlets to 
inform its members. This led to a regulation, the Samoa Publication Order 1933, 
68 Petition From Samoans, IT 1Ex1/61; Herbert Hart Papers, Correspondence, 1932-1951; Herbert Hart 
Papers, Scrapbook, Oct, 1882 - Mar, 1968. 
69 Herbert Hart Papers, Correspondence, 1932 - 1951; Herbert Hart Papers, Scrapbook, Oct, 1882 - Mar, 
1968; Hart to Forbes, 26 Jul, 1932, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Forbes to Hart, 24 Aug, 1932, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Nelson 
Return to Samoa, Samoa Herald, 19 May, 1933. 
70 Data Compiled and Sent to NZ at the time of the Mau Deputation to Wellington, GP. 
71 Memorandum, Secretary Native Affairs, 10 Dec, 1937, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Turnbull to Minister of External 
Affairs, 1 Jun, 1938, IT 1 Ex 1123/8. 
72 Samoa Herald, 22 Dec, 1933. 
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which banned any newspaper the administration felt was seditious. A seditious 
newspaper, according to the regulations was ... 
. .. any newspaper which invites, encourages, advises, or 
advocates violence, lawlessness and disorder, or express any 
seditious intention, or misrepresents or tends to bring into hatred 
or contempt the Parliament or Executive Government of New 
Zealand of the Administration or Public Service of the territory by 
intemperate language, malicious or reckless criticisms or 
otherwise tends to interfere with the peace, order or good 
government of the territory ... 73 
The regulation took away the Samoans' right to express themselves, and it also 
gave Hart the power to declare Nelson's New Zealand Samoan Guardian, the 
Mau vehicle for its propaganda, a seditious newspaper.74 
Many Samoans informed on the Mau and its activities. Consequently, the 
administration intercepted copies of the constitution circulating around Samoa. 
The administration also searched Nelson's house and seized documents, which 
implicated his involvement with Mau and his part in the plot to overthrow the 
administration. As a result many Mau members were imprisoned while Nelson 
was not only sentenced to prison for eight months, but to exile for ten years. 75 
However, the Mau spirit remained strong as they rallied to support each other, 
and continued to frustrate Hart's efforts for a peaceful solution. The Mau spirit 
found form in other bizarre groups being formed, such as the Samoa Nazi, in 
1934. The group, started by Alfred Mathes, was following the rise of Hitler in 
Germany and the Nazi Party. It was made up mainly of German blood 
descendants. Mathes and his followers began to spread rumours that Germany 
was on the verge of inflicting punishment on Samoa and New Guinea.76 
In 1935 the Labour Party was elected to government in New Zealand. 
The Prime Minister, Michael Joseph Savage, terminated Nelson's exile and 
73 Samoa Publication Order, 1933, 15 Dec, 1933, The Western Samoa Gazette, No. 81, 9 Jan, 1934. 
74 Samoa Publication Order, 1933, 4 Jan, 1934, The Western Samoa Gazette, No. 81, 9 Jan, 1934. 
75 Hart to Forbes, 18 Oct, 1933, IT 1Ex1/23/8; Police v Nelson, 3 Jan, 1934, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Nelson to 
Forbes, 1Aug,1934, IT 1Ex1/23/8; Nelson to Forbes, 27 Sept, 1935, IT 1Ex1/23/8; Perkins to Chirgwin, 
8 Mar, 1934, SSL. 
76 The Samoa Nazi party contemplated Germany attacking the Pacific, and was determined to take over 
many Samoans institutions once news of war from Germany was received. But, in 1939 affer Germany 
had declared war, the Samoa Nazi party received a letter from Germany informing them that their 
application for membership in the Nazi Party had been turned down. Mathes and many of his supporters 
were sent to New Zealand when war started. See Department of External Affairs to Island Territories, 29 
Jul, 1946, IT 79/131; Braisby to Turnbull, 2 Dec, 1934, IT 79/131; Department of External Affairs to 
Turnbull, 18 Jul, 1936, IT 79/131; Braisby to Turnbull, 18 Jul, 1938, IT 79/131. 
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promised the Samoans a better working relationship.77 In 1936, several 
government ministers visited Samoa and were greeted with great pomp. They 
repealed the ordinance, which had declared the Mau a seditious organisation. 
They were an immediate success with the Mau and Samoans generally.78 The 
visitors also influenced the Samoans to such a degree the Samoans set up their 
own Labour Party under the auspices of Amanda Stowers.79 The Samoan 
Offenders Ordinance was repealed, and taxes which had been unpaid, were 
written off. The visitation team also promised to consider other Samoan 
proposals in the future.80 
New Zealand's willingness to work closely with the Samoans, took a step 
forward when Savage made good his promise to replace Hart. In 1935, Alfred 
Clarke Turnbull was appointed Acting Administrator in Hart's place, a post he 
held until 1945 when he was promoted to Administrator. 81 The New Zealand 
government further cemented good relationships with the Samoans by revoking 
the Samoa Seditious Organisation Regulation 1930. On 24June 1936, Turnbull 
declared the Mau a non-seditious organisation.82 Furthermore, several Samoan 
districts that were declared 'disturbed areas' under the Maintenance of Authority 
in Native Affairs (no. 2) Ordinance 1928, because of their support for the Mau, 
also had their label revoked. The districts included Anoama'a, Vaimauga, 
Faleata, Sagaga, Laeauva'a, and A'ana (Lefaga and Falelatai). The Mau, for 
the first time, felt they were finally given the opportunity to be heard, and despite 
not having all of their demands and proposals granted immediately, they were 
happy at the outcome of the visit by members of the New Zealand 
government.83 
77 H. E. Holland, Revolt of Samoa, FERG 6289; H. E. Holland Papers: Pamphlets and Letters, MS-MICRO 
831-02; Perkins to Phillips, 22 Aug., 1936, SSL. 
76 Meeting at Vaimoso Between the Ministerial Delegation, the Mau, Faipule and Mr. Nelson, July 23, 
1936, IT 1Ex1/65; Meeting Between the Mau and Ministerial Party at Central office on 26 June, 1936, IT 
1 Ex 1/65. 
79 Western Samoa Mail, 17Jul,1936; see also Samoa Guardian, 9 Jun, 1927. 1927. 
60 Meeting at Vaimoso Between the Ministerial Delegation, the Mau, Faipule and Mr. Nelson, July 23, 
1936, IT 1 EX 1/65; Meeting Between the Mau and Ministerial Party at Central office on 26 June, 1936, IT 
1 Ex 1/65; Notes on Educational Matters, Western Samoa, IT 1 Ex 1/65. 
61 Turnbull to Savage, 3 May, 1936, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Turnbull to Savage, 30 Jul, 1936, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; 
Bartlett to Barradale, 14 Jul, 1939, SSL. 
62 Proclamation- The Samoa Seditious Organisation, 1930, The Western Samoa Gazette, No. 95, 29 Jun, 
1936. 
83 Proclamation - The Maintenance of Authority in Native Affairs (No. 2) Ordinance, 1928, The Western 
Samoa Gazette, No. 95, 29 Jun, 1936; Disturbed Areas Declared, 10 Jan, 1930, The Western Samoa 
Gazette, No.60, 11 Jan, 1930; Future Development of Native Administration and Local Government in 
Western Samoa, IT 25/1/38; Native Administration and Local Government in Western Samoa, 21 Jul, 
1947, GP. 
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Nevertheless, it was not all plain sailing for Turnbull. The following years 
saw the missions maintaining their support for the administration,84 but some 
Samoan animosity began to surface again over the lack of action taken by the 
New Zealand government to address further some of the problems the Mau had 
tabled in 1936. The Mau had called for the removal of several staff members in 
the New Zealand administration who were still active in 1945. For instance, the 
Mau demanded the removal of the Inspector of Police, Inspector Braisby, as he 
was a constant reminder to the Samoans of the oppressive and savage nature 
of their colonial masters. The horror of 'Black Saturday' was imbedded and 
remained fresh in the minds of the Samoans. Inspector Braisby was an 
unwanted reminder of that 'bloody' day. Furthermore, the Samoans were also 
not impressed with Braisby's lack of respect for the Mau.85 
Chinese indentured labour was hotly debated in Turnbull's 
administration, the Samoans, planters and papalagi, and the church.86 The 
European planters were especially incensed with administration policies that 
undermined their livelihood in preference to protecting the welfare of the 
Samoans. The indentured labour issue led to deterioration in relations between 
the administration and the people it relied upon most for support - the planters 
and papalagi,87 but the humble and steady charisma of Turnbull helped the 
administration to function despite the difficulties over the labour issue. The Mau 
was relentless in its efforts to dominate Samoan politics. They sent a delegation 
to Lauli'i and Malie villages to persuade the matai to join the Mau. 88 The Faipule 
fono also began to reflect not only the strength of the Mau regarding 
membership, but its policies also reflected Mau aspirations. The Faipule fono 
had carried out the wishes of the administration without question. The new fono, 
with Mau influence, began to question the validity and the intention of New 
Zealand's policies for Samoa. 
The Faipule demanded many changes, which reflected Mau aspirations. 
These included changes to the Legislative Council membership, changes to 
84 For example, see Turnbull to Darnand, 21 Dec, 1935, Damand Correspondence, MAST; Darnand to 
Turnbull, 24 Dec, 1935, Damand Correspondence, MAST. 
85 Dora Phillips to Friends, 28 Jul, 1937, SSL; Stallan to Chirgwin, 27 Aug; 1937, SSL 
66 NZMC Minutes, 1921, SSL; Mawson to Darvill, 29 Aug, 1927, SSL; Darvill to Barradale, 9 Nov, 1927, 
SSL 
"A. Stowers to the Acting Administrator, 27 Apr, 1942, MAST; S.S. Allen, Notes on Samoa, SSA; 
Meeting Asau, 21 - 24 Nov, 1939, Minutes 1938 - 1960, Methodist Archives, Apia; H. E. Moston, Visit to 
Western Samoa, 22 Jun, 1945, GP. 
88 Alipia, Samoa mo Samoa, Leulumoega, 9 Oct, 1937, IT 88/13. 
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judges of the High Court, changes to the salaries of Samoan officials, and 
changes to the number of Samoan officials appointed to various districts. 
Turnbull realised that the respect, which was once shown by the Faipule, had 
turned to arrogance, and the administration was forced to slowly give way to 
some of the Mau demands. 89 
In 1938 further demands from Samoans for self-government were tabled 
before New Zealand's parliament. These were also rejected, and the Mau 
blamed Turnbull and his administration. As a result, the Mau sent its own 
delegation, Tamasese Meaole and Nelson, to present Samoa's case personally. 
The government assured the delegation that they were doing all it could. It also 
assured the delegation that policies would be in line with Samoan aspirations. 
The government called for a report on the best way to develop Samoa in the 
future and to guide the New Zealand government in its future policies.90 The 
friendly reception prompted the delegation to abandon and withdraw many of 
their other demands, including the proposal to appoint Nelson as the Fa'atonu 
(adviser or supervisor) for the proposed Samoan Mau govemment.91 
Nelson arrived in Samoa with the intention of accepting the New Zealand 
government proposal, and joined the Legislative Council as a European 
member. The Samoans on the other hand saw Nelson's case as a blessing in 
disguise. The Mau could put another of its Samoan members in the Legislative 
Council while treating Nelson as one of them. In the first session of the 
Legislative Council, one of the Samoan members remarked, 
Although the Honourable Taisi [Nelson] stands on the European 
side, yet we still look to him to help us representatives of the 
Samoans in all matters to advance the welfare of the whole 
community.92 
Between 1938 and 1945, several important changes began to emerge. 
Firstly, there was a break down in village and district relationship with the main 
administration in Apia. Districts took matters into their own hands and set up 
their own government, police and judicial system. Villages relied on matai to 
maintain law and order, and to elect Faipule when necessary. Secondly, the 
89 Grattan to Monaghan, 12 Aug, 1944, GP; Grattan to Monaghan, 20 Aug, 1944, GP; Memo: Mau 
Activities, 3 Sept, 1937, IT 88/13. 
90 Future Development of Native Administration and Local Government in Western Samoa, 25 Jan, 1938, 
IT 25/1/38. 
91 Western Samoa Mail, 5 Feb, 1938; Western Samoa Mail, 11Feb,1938. 
92 Western Samoa Mail, 5 Feb, 1938. 
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Mau lost three leaders in Tuimaleali'ifano, who died in 1937, Malietoa 
Tanumafili I, who died in 1939, and Nelson, who died in 1944. Malietoa 
Tanumafili II, Tupua Tamasese Mea'ole and Mata'afa Fiame replaced the late 
Samoan leaders in the Legislative Council as joint Fautua to the government. 93 
All three were respected by the Samoans as tama-a-aiga. The change in 
leadership should have been an incentive for the administration to assume and 
continue dialogue. Instead the administration continued with its old ways and 
the opportunity for a peaceful solution went begging, and consequently, the 
administration watched as the new Samoan leaders resumed with vigour the 
struggle for self-government. 94 The advent of World War II, exposed Samoa to 
many changes that had a lasting impact on its leaders and people. 
World War II took away the opportunities that Turnbull was building on to 
restore good relations with Samoa. World War II left New Zealand marking time, 
while the Samoans continued to pressure the administration to resolve their 
grievances. New Zealand was involved with the war in Europe, and it had no 
time to deal with Samoan problems. The Fono a Faipule tried to usurp the 
authority of the fono to remove New Zealand officials from various 
administration positions. The Faipule wanted Samoans to fill the positions. 
There were also demands for more Samoans to be trained to replace 
expatriates in government positions. Samoan grievances were often placed 
before the administrator, but Turnbull was powerless to address it fairly. 95 
Turnbull did its best to pacify the situation through the war period. But, the 
arrival of the Maligi (American Marines) in Samoa further complicated matters 
for the administration, as Samoans warmed themselves to American wealth and 
lifestyle. The inclusion of Afro-Americans in the American contingents as 
equals, and not servants or slaves, of the white Americans impressed many 
Samoans. The wealth flaunted by Afro-Americans was even more impressive. 
Within a few years, the Maligi in Samoa would not only change the way 
Samoans perceived the world, but it would change the way Samoans behaved 
and envisaged their future.96 
93 Bartlett to Barradale. 14 Jul, 1939, SSL; Bartlett to Goddall, 14 Jun, 1940, SSL. 
94 Bartlett to Chirgwin, 27 Aug, 1939, SSL; Bartlett to Barradale, 30 Sept, 1939, SSL. 
95 The Samoans took the opportunity in 1944 and 1945 to present the same to Peter Fraser, the New 
Zealand Prime Minister, when he vistted Samoa at the end of 1944. See Representations Made on the 
Prime Minister's Visit to Samoa and Cook Islands, Dec, 1944-Jan, 1945, IT 1Ex1/6711; Visit to Samoa 
and Cook Islands by the Prime Minister, Dec 1944 -Jan, 1945, IT 1 Ex 1/67. 
96 The impact of the American occupation of Samoa will be discussed later in Chapter Eleven. 
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The climax in political agitation reached its height during Richardson's 
term as administrator. The Mau not only touched the political disposition of the 
Samoan people, but also its religious vein. Samoan nationalism reached a point 
of no return and led New Zealand, the missions, papafagi, and the country 
towards the path of independence. The support of the Samoan (LMS) Church 
was crucial and the Mau received it, as they bonded to demonstrate to 
Richardson the extremity of Samoan patriotism. 
The emergence of an independent Mau Church was not an accident. The 
writing was already on the wall for sometime, even before the formation of the 
Mau movement The establishment of the Fono Tele (General Assembly) in 
1875, gave the Samoan pastors a chance to attend and observe the fono of the 
Au Fa'atonu, made up entirely of LMS missionaries. The inauguration of the 
National Reference Council (later to become known as the Au T oeaina 
[National Advisory Council [NAC]) in1907,1 also gave the Samoan pastors the 
chance to participate in the decision making process of the Samoan church. 
Part of the mission strategy of the LMS mission was to give the Samoan church 
autonomy, and the formation of the Fono Tele and the Au Toeaina were a step 
in that direction. The dwindling finances of the LMS was also a factor in the Au 
Matutua's decision to prepare the Samoan (LMS) Church for independence.2 
The LMS missionaries in Samoa were not enthusiastic about the Au 
Matutua's proposal, especially when turning over authority to the Samoans 
1 This council, although officially known as the National Reference Council (NRC), was in later years called 
the National Advisory Council (NAC), which later became the Council of Elders or Au Toeaina. The Council 
originally included the missionaries in charge of districts, but later became a Samoan pastors only council. 
The council of elders was made up of elder pastors and deacons from lluotane (6), Faasaleleaga (8), 
A'ana (4), Malua (3), Apia (8), Falealili (8), and Tutuila and Manu'a (8). The council was responsible for 
matters relating to government and church, district matters, matters relating lo public worship, appointment 
Of Samoan ministers, and ordination. 10% of the annual collection was given to the council to carry out 
their work. See The Church in the Mission Field and Its Workers, South Seas Special Personal, Newell 
Papers (henceforth NP): Newell to Thompson, 12 Mar, 1909, London Missionary Society South Seas 
Archives, South Seas Letters (henceforth SSL); Newell to Thompson, 3 Jun, 1907, SSL; see also SDC -
Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 25-30 May 1908, SSL; Newell to Thompson, 12 Mar. 1909, SSL. 
2 Thompson to Hills, 17 Jun, 1905, SSL; Thompson to Hills, 30 Sept, 1905, SSL; Kinnersley to Bradford, 
11 Jan, 1916, SSL. 
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meant turning over control of funds and educational work. 3 However, the Au 
Matutua's proposal took a step further towards its fulfilment with the LMS's 
failure to maintain its missionary quota in Samoa. The shortage of staff 
transferred some of the responsibilities to the Samoan pastors, which presented 
them with a chance to work without supervision.4 In 1914, the Au Matutua sent 
a deputation to investigate the possibility of transferring control to the Samoans. 
The Deputation made up of the Reverends Frank Lenwood, A. J. Viner, and G. 
J. Williams, arrived in Samoa in October 1915. They expressed the opinion that 
Samoan pastors were not ready to administer the Samoan (LMS) Church. The 
Deputation believed that the Samoan pastors were intellectually backward and 
morally weak. Lenwood wrote: 
The impression I have gathered is that this is impossible, if they 
were left [alone] they would rapidly degenerate unless others took 
up the work that we abandon. 
Instead, the Deputation advised the Samoan church leaders to prove 
they could financially support the Samoan (LMS) Church by raising five 
thousand pounds a year for five years without assistance from the Au Matutua.6 
According to Lenwood, the whole idea of self-support made the Samoan church 
leaders nervous of their future, and he felt that "the native wasn't fit for this 
[autonomy] and wouldn't be for years ... Samoans were childlike and incapable."7 
The Samoan church leaders felt that 1930, the centenary year of the LMS 
mission in Samoa, would be a much better time to reconsider such a proposal. 
However, Lenwood was wrong about the attitude of the Samoans; they took on 
the challenge enthusiastically.8 
The influenza epidemic in 1918 was a significant turning point in the 
independence debate.9 The younger Samoan pastors took over leadership 
responsibility at a time of great Samoan detestation for the New Zealand 
3 SOC, Minutes of Meeting, May 1905, SSL; Newell to Thompson, 12 Feb, 1909, SSL; Thompson to Hills, 
4 Mar, 1909, SSL. 
4 Hawker to Thompson, 4 Jan, 1912, SSL; Hills to Thompson, 8 Mar, 1912, SSL; Hills to Thompson, 23 
Jul, & 27 Aug, 1912, SSL; Hawker to Thompson, 20 Jan, 1906, SSL; SOC, Minutes of Meetings, 
Leulumoega, 10-15 Dec, 1906, SSL; SOC, Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 5-9 May 1914, SSL. 
5 Notes on the Visitation by Frank Lenwood, Aug, 1914, SSL. 
6 SOC, Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 2-11 May 1917, SSL. 
7 Lenwood to Hawkins, 24 & 27 Oct, 1915, SSL; see also Feno Tele to Directors of LMS, 4 Jun, 1916, 
SSL. 
8 Feno Tele to Directors of LMS, 4 Jun, 1916, SSL; see also SOC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 3-13 May 
1922, SSL; Kirisome, Sosene, Imo, Samoa's Response to the Holy Deputation: Let the Comtrol Remain, 
Chronicle of the LMS, Jan, 1917. 
9 See Chapter Six for details regarding the 1918 Influenza Epidemic. 
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administration, and for which, there was a strong call for New Zealand's 
departure from Samoa. How much this may have affected the Samoan pastors' 
mentality, can only be speculated, but the call for an independent Samoan 
(LMS) Church was voiced, as the relationship between the Samoan church 
leaders and the Au Fa'atonu began to deteriorate. Eventually, both sides settled 
down to work together, although it only took a minor disagreement or some 
negative criticism to trigger Samoan opinions against the Au Fa'atonu. The LMS 
missionaries were wary of the unpredictable nature of the Samoan pastors, but 
remained confident that as long as the Samoan political circumstances 
remained stable and peaceful they could control the Samoan (LMS) Church. 
The arrival of George Richardson in 1923, saw the creation of 
unnecessary new laws, especially in relation to the fa'asamoa. The most radical 
of his ordinances gave Richardson the right to remove matai titles from their 
bearers. In a letter to a member of the New Zealand Parliament in 1924, he 
highlighted his position when he wrote: "If I find any of the natives intriguing 
against the Government, I shall remove their titles, which I have discovered, is 
the greatest punishment one can give."10 Richardson ventured into territories 
that had caused much agitation during the German administration and raised 
much condemnation for his predecessor Tate. It was precisely the kind of policy 
that triggered anti-government sentiments and provoked Samoan hostility. 
The next significant incident was the conflict over the involvement of the 
government in fixing the controlling price of copra in 1926, which led to the 
disintegration in relationship between Richardson and the traders.11 The stand 
off between the administration and the traders soon found a supporting ear 
among the Samoans, especially those who had unpleasant dealings with the 
administration. The Samoan pastors could also feel the winds of change and 
tried to understand their own independent aspirations within the new political 
atmosphere. The Au Fa'atonu, however, was not able to comprehend the 
changing political environment and failed to observe the rise in Samoan 
patriotism. In fact, in 1926, the LMS missionaries painted a rosy picture of 
Samoan conditions and contemplated no problems or any interference with the 
work of the LMS in Samoa in the near future. Despite the shortage of 
missionaries in Upolu, Darvill wrote ... 
10 Richardson to Gray, 18 Jan, 1924, Island Territories Archives (henceforth IT), Series 79f78. 
11 Royal Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1 Ex 1146 (part 2). 
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... the Christian witness has been maintained and signs are 
evident that the churches centre is fixed in spiritual realities. Great 
advances have been made under the progressive policy of the 
administration and the church is alive to the necessity of using her 
power to moral and spiritual ends. I am glad to report that in every 
branch of work harmonious relationships between the 
missionaries and natives have been reflected, and if such is 
preserved, the temptation that follow material prosperity will be 
mitigated. 12 
Darvill also wrote enthusiastically about the progress of Savai'i. 
The spirit of suspicion which lurked in the hearts of the people two 
years ago has given place to keener and sensible interests in our 
endeavour to help them, and also, they are beginning to feel their 
own responsibility in all matters undertaken for the common 
good.13 
Darvill's appraisal of the church and conditions in Samoa was personal. Darvill 
was aware of the Au Matutua's plans to hand over authority to the Samoans 
because of their financial and resource problems, and the rosy picture was an 
effort to delay such action. The real situation in Samoa was soon revealed, as 
their benevolent vision of the future was shattered with the emergence of the 
Mau movement. Political instability, the very thing the LMS missionaries feared 
would destroy their work, threatened to engulf the mission without their 
knowledge. 
The Mau embodied Samoan patriotism. There was no other event or 
organisation in the history of Samoa that had a greater impact on the magnitude 
and direction of Samoan nationalism than the Mau. While the previous chapter 
highlighted the attitude of the Mau towards the New Zealand administration, the 
interconnection between the Mau and the missions, especially with the LMS, 
was an issue that had a huge impact on Samoan aspirations for independence 
and, therefore, needs to be discussed more fully. 
According to the administrator, Brigadier-General Richardson, the 
Samoan uprising began in 1926 with Olaf Nelson, a trader and merchant, 
inciting the Samoans "in order to increase his power and influence particularly in 
native matters, and so materially enhance his commercial interests."14 
Richardson charged that Nelson enticed a matai and trader named Lagolago, 
12 Darvill, Report for 1925, Apia District, 2 Mar, 1926, London Missionary Society South Seas Archives, 
South Seas Reports (henceforth SSR); see also SOC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 20-30 May 1925, SSL. 
13 Darvill, Report for 1925, Apia District, 2 Mar, 1926, SSR; see also SOC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 20-
30 May 1925, SSL; Smart to Barradale, 4 Jun, 1928, SSL. 
14 G. Richardson: Political Situation in Samoa, 25 Jul, 1927, London Missionary Society, South Seas 
Archives, South Seas Odds (henceforth SSO). 
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whom Richardson describes as "a trader in Apia with a notorious bad record,"15 
to promote discontent among other matai and induce them to believe 
government policies were wrong for Samoa. Lagolago also promoted Nelson as 
the only person who could return the matai to their political status and authority. 
Many of Lagolago's supporters were either dismissed government officials, or 
Samoans who had been constant law-breakers and enemies of the 
administration.16 
The Samoan League, or more popularly known as the Mau, formally took 
shape on 19 March 1927. Dominated by Samoans and supported by a few 
afakasi and papalagi, it declared its objective to be: 
The advancement of Samoa, and to present to the Administration 
and the Government of New Zealand from time to time subjects 
concerning the Government of Western Samoa which may be 
considered by the members of the League essential for the 
promotion of the peace, order, good government, and the general 
welfare of the territory. 17 
This declaration of purpose was accompanied by a solemn declaration from its 
members in four parts, which stated: 18 
1. We declare and believe that man's heritage from God is to 
help each other irrespective of station, race, colour, and creed 
and that all men are equal in the sight of God. 
2. We declare and believe that it is the inherited privilege of a 
person living under the British flag, and especially the duty of 
the British subject, to assist the members of a subject race in 
advancement towards civilisation. Good morals, and a 
government of the people in accordance with the will of the 
people. 
3. We declare and believe that all constitutional authority shall be 
maintained, and respect must be shown to all persons placed in 
authority, from the Administrator to the village policeman. 
4. That, whilst maintaining authority and showing respect, we 
declare and believe that it is a privilege, and a duty to society 
and Government, of every person to endeavour to procure by 
lawful means the alteration of any matter affecting the laws, 
government, or constitution of the territory which may be 
15 G. Richardson: Political Situation in Samoa, 25 Jul, 1927, SSO; see also Western Samoa, Historical 
Notes, IT 1 Ex 2115. 
16 G. Richardson: Political Situation in Samoa, 25 Jul, 1927, SSO; Richardson to Gray, 22 Oct, 1926, IT 
79178; Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, Appendices to 
the Journal of the House of Representatives (henceforth AJHR). 
17 Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR. 
18 Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR. 
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considered prejudicial to the welfare and the best interests of 
the people. 
Various definitions have been attached to the word Mau and its usage by 
the Samoan movement, 19 but perhaps the best definition comes from the 
initiators of the movement itself. In 1927, the official report of a visit to Samoa 
by the New Zealand Minister, the Hon. William Nosworthy, quoted Nelson's 
definition of the word Mau as ... 
... an opinion, and also represents anything that is firm or solid. In 
this case the Mau represents that very large majority of the people 
of these Islands (Samoa] who are of the firm opinion that drastic 
changes are necessary in the Administration and in the method of 
government in Samoa.2° 
When the Mau officially began, many Europeans, including missionaries, 
constantly questioned the motives behind the Mau's inauguration. Some 
papalagi felt Samoans blindly joined the movement but had no knowledge of 
what the Mau represented.21 Richardson also commented on the absurdity of 
the Samoans supporting something they did not understand. 
The majority of them [Samoans] did not even know the objects of 
the so called 'Mau' movement were, but they heard Mr Nelson 
speak or they saw a big demonstration in his favour and as the 
government did not prohibit the demonstration they naturally 
interpreted it as a victory for the Mau.22 
For Samoans, many saw the Mau purely as a Samoan struggle for 
independence and nothing else, while others believed the Mau was a European 
political protest, and those involved had used the Samoans and the Mau for 
their own benefit Some Samoans felt the Mau was just a vehicle to promote 
European economic prowess, especially Nelson's economic gains, but had 
turned into a personal political conflict between Nelson and the New Zealand 
administration with the Samoans caught in the middle.23 Richardson also 
believed that the European community had used the Samoans and later the 
Mau to promote their own self interest. Richardson, however, wrote that the 
19 Several meanings could be rendered to the word Mau have been put furth by Samoans interviewed by 
author in 1995. They include 'opposition,' 'objections,' 'lists of resolutions,' 'a Samoan polttical party,' and 
'an economic complainf. (Interviews conducted during Field Work in Samoa August 1995 - December 
1995. All tapes and list of interviewees with author). For other rendering of the word Mau see also Field, 
85. 
20 Royal Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1 Ex 1/46 (part 2); see also Davidson, 
119. 
21 Hoad to Barradale, 12 Mar, 1928, SSL; Perkins to Chirgwin, Report 1929, 31 Dec, 1929, SSR. 
22 G. Richardson: Political Situation in Samoa, 25 Jul, 1927, SSO. 
23 Royal Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1 Ex 1/46 (part 2); see also Report of 
the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR. 
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combined Samoan and European committee (which later became the Mau) was 
initially set up to address Samoan interests. But, it became nothing more than a 
pretext to promote European influence and increase their political and 
commercial interests.24 
The Mau had a huge impact on the European community as it divided 
many papa/agi into Mau and government supporters. When Richardson sent a 
letter to the Europeans' Citizen's Committee calling for restraint in European 
activities and support for Samoan opinions, many of Neslon's European 
committee members resigned and sided with the government,25 but it did not 
have the effect Richardson intended. Instead, the Samoans regarded the 
papalagi, as well as Samoans loyal to the government, as anti-Mau. Vaimoso 
continued to function as a political cocoon for Mau supporters from other 
villages.26 When Richardson toured the islands of Upolu and Savai'i he found 
many of the villages had been influenced by the Mau to the extent that they 
passively resisted village authorities and disobeyed government orders.27 In 
Tutuila, the American administration also felt the extent of the political unrest in 
Samoa as people refused to pay taxes, and there were several meetings being 
called to hear people's grievances. According to the Reverend Harold Perkins, 
LMS members were the main advocates.28 
Richardson felt he could have done a lot more to quash the influence of 
the Mau, but he was powerless to do anything more than to warn papalagi 
affiliating with and inciting Samoan rebellion, as he had no power to punish 
papalagi for such affiliations. As for the Samoans he had only limited power to 
punish them for petty offences for only a short period of time. Richardson was 
further restricted when the Mau hired a lawyer to help keep Richardson 'honest 
and above-board' in his treatment of the Mau.29 
24 G. Richardson: Political Situation in Samoa, 25 Jul, 1927, SSO. 
25 G. Richardson: Political Situation in Samoa, 25 Jul, 1927, SSO; see also Report of the Royal 
Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR. 
26 See discussion in Chapter Seven regarding Richardson's reaction to the Samoans resistance. See also 
G. Richardson: Political Situation in Samoa. 25 Jul, 1927, SSO; Report of the Royal Commission into the 
Administration ofWestem Samoa, 1928, AJHR. 
27 In fact, a Commission of Inquiry looking at ways to improve the administration of Samoa in 1928 found 
the Richardson's administration to be inefficient, extravagant, and did not know how to govern. The V. P. 
B. Report in 1928 confirmed that the Samoans complaints had some grounds to it. See Grossmann to E. 
A. Ransom, 7 Sept, 1930, IT 1123116, see also G. Richardson: Political Situation in Samoa, 25 Jul, 1927, 
sso. 
28 Perkins (Tutuila) to Barradale, 31 Dec, 1927, SSR. 
29 G. Richardson: Political Situation in Samoa, 25 Jul, 1927, SSO. 
The Mau also influenced the missions although each mission's 
involvement was different in magnitude. The biggest and most influential 
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players were the Catholics and the LMS.30 The involvement of the Catholics and 
the LMS was not coincidental. They had been key players in the competition for 
church members since 1845. This competitive spirit not only infected the 
Samoans within the religious sphere of the mission, but it also infected their 
social and political environment.31 The placing of the missions under the 
umbrellas of colonial administrators, such as Germany and New Zealand in 
later years resulted in a more stable relationship as each mission concentrated 
in trying to fulfil the policies of the administration. 
Germany and New Zealand tried hard to provide Samoa with a stable 
government, albeit unacceptable to the Samoans. Maintaining such a stable 
government was important as it released some of the tension that plagued 
Protestants and the Catholics mission under previous administrations and 
governments. There were a few times when the old wounds of the nineteenth 
century reopened to haunt both missions,32 especially when the loyalty of the 
missions and their adherents was divided between the ruling administration and 
the Mau. The Samoan (LMS) Church members (in this case Samoan pastors, 
deacons, and Samoan church members of the LMS mission), took a very 
different view of the political atmosphere compared with its mentors, the LMS 
missionaries, and such differences in opinions and allegiance eventually led to 
bitter disagreements.33 
The LMS missionaries tried to maintain their 'no politics' principle, 34 but 
at times were found wanting as they acquiesced in and promoted much of New 
30 Many examples can found In the archives of the respective missions. See London Missionary Society 
South Seas Archive, National Library of Australia, Canberra and the Marist Archives of Samoa and 
Tokelau Islands, Apia. See also Mormon Church peliodicals such as the Deserel News in the London 
Missionary Society South Seas Archives. 
31 Slatyer to Tidman and Freeman, May 28, 1845, SSL; Drummond to Freeman and Tidman, Sept, 19, 
1845, SSL; see also R. P. Gilson, Samoa 1830-1900: Politics of a Multi-Culture/ Society, Melbourne: 
Oxford University, 1970, 82-83. 
32 Stair, Minutes of the Meeting held at Apia, Feb, 3, 1841, SSL; Hunt to Thompson, Feb, 2, 1894, SSL. 
33 Perkins to Barradale, 31 Dec, 1927, London Missionary Society South Seas Archives, South Seas 
Reports (henceforth SSRJ; Perkins to Chirgwin, Report 1929, 31 Dec, 1929, SSR. 
34 The 'Fundamental Principles' of the LMS forbade LMS missionaries being involved in politics. See 
Norman Goodall, The Fundamental Principles of the London Missionary Society, London: Livingstone, 
1945; see also Richard Lovett, The History of the London Missionary Society, 1795- 1895, vol. 1, London: 
Frowde, 1899; Minutes of Meeting held at Malua 8 - 10 Jun, 1839, SSL; Bartlett to Mau Council, 29 Nov, 
1929, SSO; Hoad to Chirgwin, 18 Dec, 1932, SSL. For a position on the WMMS, see David Thompson, 
Nonconformity in the Nineteenth Century, London: Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1972, 99; Anthony 
Armstrong, The Church of England, the Methodists and Society, 1700- 1850, London: University of 
London, 1973, 192. 
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Zealand's administration policies. Although the LMS, as well as Catholics and 
WMMS, missionaries were guilty of this many times, their intentions were, in 
many cases, for the good of the Samoans and their country. Perkins not only 
commented on the LMS missionaries' dilemma over the issue of political 
participation in Samoan affairs, but also found Samoan exploits in the conflict 
amusing. 
Though believing strongly that the missionary should not be mixed 
up in Native politics, yet in times of stress the Samoans perhaps 
not unnaturally, thinks he [they] should come over solidly to the 
side which the majority of Samoans may happen to be. There is a 
humorous side to things, for whilst in mass, refusing to recognise 
the administration, yet individually they come and ask me to try 
and obtain some favour or concession for them. 35 
At the height of Mau activities, the missions, especially the LMS, tried to 
help the Mau overcome administration violence, by assisting in the call for Mau 
members to surrender to New Zealand authorities. Many Mau members, 
including Samoan church leaders, saw the LMS's actions as siding with the 
enemy.36 Understandably, the dilemma for the LMS was not so much over their 
participation in Samoan politics, but the knowledge that the greatest supporter 
of Samoan patriotism was none other than the Samoan (LMS) Church -
pastors, deacons, and church members. 
The LMS, compared with other missions in Samoa, had a huge 
indigenous ordained ministry, working as pastors in villages. It was also a 
priceless resource base for the various LMS mission enterprises throughout the 
Pacific. 37 It also became the power base for Samoan patriotism, as the LMS 
indigenous ministry became the backbone and vehicle for Mau agitation. The 
LMS Samoan pastors, teachers, deacons, and church members, were the 
dominant manipulating force in coordinating and procuring political support for 
the Mau. While other missions lost many adherents to the cause of the Mau, it 
was the Samoan (LMS) Church that contributed the biggest support 
numerically.38 The LMS missionaries condemned the menacing influence the 
Mau had on the church, and lamented the negative effect Samoan patriotism 
35 Perkins to Chirgwin, Report 1929, 31 Dec, 1929, SSR. 
36 Bartlett to Mau Council, 29 Nov, 1929, SSO; Bartlett to Bitton, 18 Dec, 1929, SSO; Bartlett to Bitton, 29 
Nov, 1929, SSO; G. Richardson: Political Situation in Samoa, 25 Jul, 1927, SSO. 
37 Fono AJJ Toeaina lo Au Matutua (LMS), 19 Dec, 1921, SSL 
" Perkins, Statistical Report, 28 Feb, 1938, SSL. 
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had on the work of the mission.39 For the whole of 1927 the Mau movement 
overwhelmed almost every village in Samoa. At the beginning of 1928, the 
political situation in Samoa reached new heights, as efforts to bring together the 
administration and the Mau for dialogue failed. The enormity of the conflict saw 
Samoa being dubbed with such expressions as the 'Isles of Unrest' and 
'Tragedy lsland.'40 
The LMS missionaries continued to be concerned with the impact the 
movement was having on the mission and Samoa as a whole. According to the 
Reverend Frank S. Hoad, the Mau called itself "the people of Samoa,"41 to 
highlight its dominance over Samoa and the Samoans. Hoad confirmed the 
control the Mau had by estimating that 95% of the population sided with the 
Mau. The other 5%, according to Hoad, were either employees of the 
administration, people who were waiting to see which side won, or people who 
were "careful at how they walk. "42 The Mau even controlled Apia, as they freely 
walked around with knives and guns, and threatened the peaceful atmosphere 
of the European community. It was within this arrogant environment, the Mau 
issued three demands. (1). Withdrawal of all government native Faipule, (2) 
Richardson to leave Samoa, and (3) New Zealand's administration of Samoa to 
cease.43 For the Samoans, Richardson's Samoa mo Samoa ideology was given 
a new dimension, and a solution to its fulfilment - Samoa without New Zealand. 
The LMS missionaries could only pray for its members, as the Mau 
intensified its activities. They could not deny that many of the leaders of the 
Mau were deacons and church members of the Samoan (LMS) Church. The 
LMS missionaries could not comprehend the actions of Samoans who held 
church offices, and positions of leadership in the church, being in the forefront 
of Mau activities. Prominent leaders such as Tupua Tamasese Lealofi I, from 
Vaimoso, Faumuina Fiame of Lepea, who later became Mata'afa, Afamasaga 
Lagolago of Fasito'otai, Tofaeono of Siumu, Toelupe of Malie, Umaga Pau, 
39 Darvill to Barradale, 25 May, 1927, SSO. 
40 Perkins to Chirgwin, Report 1929, 31Dec,1929, SSR. 
41 Head to Barradale, 19 Feb, 1928, SSL; Hoad to Barradale, 12 Mar, 1928, SSL; see also Translation of 
Some Representation of 'New Mau' Delivered at the Acting Administrator's Office, 19 Apr, 1938, IT 88/13. 
42 Hoad to Barradale, 12 Mar, 1928, SSL. 
43 Hoad to Barradale, 19 Feb, 1928, SSL. 
Tagaloa, Alipia Siaosi, Moananu Fa'afo'i of Mulifanua, Molio'o Saoletai, Sa'u 
from Apotima, and many others.44 
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The volatile situation raised fears among the European community, and 
the arrival of two New Zealand warships in Apia harbour probably allayed some 
of the fears.45 But, many papalagi saw the presence of the warships as 
provocation and "part of a big stick policy."46 The LMS missionaries shared the 
same opinion, and according to Hoad, "it certainly did seem from an outsiders 
point of view that the present government has done many things the wisdom of 
which is exceedingly doubtful.""7 
For the most part, Europeans, and some LMS missionaries, felt the 
administration was uncertain and indecisive at what to do with the Mau, and this 
only gave the Mau strength and determination. They criticised the administrator 
for being too aggressive at one time and then lenient the next. For instance the 
police arrested 400 Mau supporters including the Mau committee, but the next 
minute they were all released. Then the administration tried to arrest a Mau 
leader and the Samoans surrounded him and told the police that they could 
arrest him only if there was bloodshed. According to Hoad, "the Samoans were 
wonderfully tactful and so arrange their forces that any attempt at violence 
would have had to be made by the government forces.''48 The Mau leader was 
not arrested, and the administration police walked away with more pie on their 
face. 
Some LMS missionaries blamed Richardson personally for the popularity 
of the Mau. According to Smart, Richardson was slow to recognise Samoan 
grievances, and his reforms had been implemented too quickly. On Richardson 
himself, Smart claimed his "over zealousness has been perhaps his worst fault, 
coupled with a certain personal vanity and a somewhat autocratic military 
method of doing things."49 Smart also blamed the New Zealand government. 
New Zealand's failure to carry out its threats with warships, and its restraining 
policy on Richardson in taking stronger actions against the Mau, had given the 
44 G. Richardson: Political Situation in Samoa, 25 Jul, 1927. SSO; see also Report of the Royal 
Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR. 
45 Hoad to Barradale, 12 Mar, 1928, SSL; Meeting of SDC and Deputation, Apia, 29 Sept-1Oct,1928, 
SSL 
46 Hoad to Barradale, 12 Mar, 1928, SSL 
'
7 Hoad to Barradale, 12 Mar, 1928, SSL 
48 Hoad to Barradale, 12 Mar, 1928, SSL. 
49 Smart to Barradale, 23 Apr, 1928, SSL 
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Mau a sense of superiority. Smart stated that Richardson's administration had 
not only become "a comical farce" but had been ridiculed by the Samoans. 
Samoans believed New Zealanders were all talk but no action. 50 
The deacons and Samoan members of the Samoan (LMS) Church were 
not the only people causing concern for the LMS missionaries. The pastors, 
whom the missionaries had relied upon to dissuade people from the Mau, were 
the very people promoting and instigating many of the Mau activities. The 
missionaries called especially upon the Au Toeaina, the authority and power 
behind Samoan pastors, to try and influence Mau members to cease all 
agitation and to accept the decision of the administration. But the influence of 
the missionaries on the Au Toeaina was also waning, and with the cultural and 
traditional interaction between the Mau and the Samoan (LMS) Church being 
very close, it was not easy for the Au T oeaina to take such action. The Au 
T oeaina found it hard to advise the pastors and Samoan members of the 
church, let alone to persuade the whole Mau movement to give up their 
struggle. Samoan politics and Samoan Christianity per se, had reached the 
crossroads in their struggle for traditional protocol and the pursuit of autonomy. 
When the 1928 report of a New Zealand Commission was released, 51 the 
Samoans refused to accept it. Richardson appealed to Smart for assistance. 
I do not ask for the Native Pastor to participate in political 
controversies, to express opinions as to the right and wrong of any 
of the government's actions, but merely request and hope that 
they use their influence with their people to obey the law and 
respect the government and constituted authority; and so help me 
bring about that peace and harmony which formerly prevailed and 
without which all our efforts on behalf of the natives will be of little 
avail.52 
Smart approached the Au T oeaina to assist in getting the Mau to accept the 
Commissioner's report and to influence them to return to their villages. The Au 
T oeaina bluntly told Smart it was not a wise move. 53 Smart approached the 
other missions for a combined effort in getting the Mau to abide by the 
Commission's decision, but without success. The refusal stemmed from the fact 
that the LMS and the administration initiated the idea without consulting the 
50 Smart to Barradale, 23 Apr, 1928, SSL. 
51 Royal Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1 Ex 1/46 (part 2); Western Samoa, 
Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2115. 
52 Richardson to Smart, 26 Aug, 1927, Pacific Manuscript Bureau (henceforth PMB) 144. 
53 Smart to Barradale, 23Apr, 1928, SSL 
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other missions. It may also have been the result of the threats to those who 
supported the administration, but many may have refused to be involved as the 
situation at hand pointed to a future under Mau. The LMS's authority in the 
Samoan (LMS) Church was challenged and their efforts to sever the close ties 
between the Samoan church leaders and the Mau were foiled.54 
The bond between the Mau and the Samoan (LMS) Church grew 
stronger as the call for independence and self government struck a chord in the 
Au Toeaina and the pastors of the church. The Mau had more respect for the 
Samoan church leaders to conduct and direct church activities than for 
European missionaries. In an incident involving the Reverend Harold Darvill's 
comments about the Mau in New Zealand newspapers, the Mau promised to 
support the Samoan church leaders to boycott his return to Samoa. When the 
Samoan pastor Sa'aga left for New Zealand at that time, the Mau instructed 
Sa'aga to tell Darvill not to return to Samoa.55 For the LMS missionaries, it was 
a blatant attempt by the Mau to infiltrate and control the Samoan church leaders 
and the Samoan (LMS) Church. But, as far as the Mau was concerned, it was in 
control. 
In 1928, as the Samoan (LMS) Church prepared for its annual Feno 
Tele, the Mau ordered pastors in the Malua district to dispense from holding 
prayer meetings every Thursday morning. The Mau suggested that it restricted 
its prayer activities to once a month, and confined the prayers to two central 
themes, which were "thanking God that the Mau has been kept safe when 
soldiers and warships arrive", and to ask for "God's blessings on the Mau."56 
The Mau further informed the parishes in Malua, Leulumoega and Apia not to 
pay taxes, and to abstain from sending any boats to farewell Richardson, who 
had recently been recalled and was due to leave Samoa.57 The Mau warned 
that if any of its orders were disobeyed, the perpetrators would be exiled. 
Furthermore, pastors who refused to vacate their villages when requested 
54 Smart to Barradale, 23 Apr, 1928, SSL. 
55 A discussion regarding Darvill's actions and conflict with the Mau and the Samoan (LMS) Church will 
found in Chapter Ten of this study. See also Smart to Barradale, 23 Apr, 1928, SSL 
58 Smart to Barradale, 23 Apr, 1928, SSL. 
57 The Samoan church leaders did not farewell Richardson. Instead, they placed a short farewell note in 
the Samoa Guardian. See Church Address to Sir George Richardson, Samoa Guardian, 21 Apr, 1928; see 
also Smart to Barradale, 23 Apr, 1928, SSL; Meeting of the SDC and Deputation, Apia, 29 Sept-1 Oct, 
1928, SSL; Report of the Royal Commission inlo the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR. 
198 
would earn that village a fine of £40, and if government villages worshiped with 
a prohibited pastor, they would also be fined £40.58 
The European missionaries were enraged with the Mau's heavy-
handedness, and having the nerve to order pastors and church members under 
their authority and supervision. The influence of the Mau movement on the 
Samoan (LMS) Church became more concrete when the Au Fa'atonu clashed 
with the Au Toeaina over what to include in the agenda for the Fono Tele. The 
Au Fa'atonu felt the Au Toeaina was trying to undermine the whole purpose of 
the Fono Tele in insisting on discussing matters outside the sphere of the 
church. In a letter to the Au Matutua, Mr E. H. Feather suggested that the Au 
Toeaina "desire absolute control of the church," because the aims of the Mau 
"ran along parallel lines, for the aim of the latter was to gain full control of the 
state."59 
Feather commented further on the similarity of the visions of the Mau and 
the Au Toeaina and its effect on the Samoan (LMS) Church. 
The similarity of their [Mau] aims and those of the ... NAC, together 
with the fact that a large proportion of the controlling Committee of 
the anti-government party were members and deacons of our own 
churches, enable them seriously to interfere in the affairs of the 
church .... Pastors refusing to comply with these orders were 
threatened with dismissal: attempts were made to dictate as to 
what should be done in the institutions, and definite instructions 
were issued with regard to certain services and their conduct. The 
people were also ordered not to pay contributions to the church.60 
The LMS missionaries blamed the Au Matutua for having given the Au Toeaina 
the chance to shoulder some of the financial burden of the mission. In doing so, 
the Samoan church leaders interpreted 'financial control' to mean 'absolute 
control' of the affairs of the Samoan (LMS) Church.61 
The impact of the Mau eventually created disunity within the Samoan 
(LMS) Church. Some weeks before the Fono Tele, the Mau disrupted Sunday 
worship, as their supporters refused to worship with supporters of the 
administration, and those who remained aloof from the Mau. The Mau wanted 
to conduct their own church services, and to have their own pastors. The Mau 
wanted to identify with a church that was not symbolic of the Au Fa'atonu, and 
58 Smart to Barradale, 23 Apr, 1928, SSL. 
59 Feather to Barradale, 28 May, 1928, SSL. 
6
° Feather to Barradale, 28 May, 1928, SSL. 
61 Feather to Barradale, 28 May, 1928, SSL. 
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wished to separate Mau supporters from those loyal to the administration. The 
Au Fa'atonu refused,62 and as a result, the Mau took control of all the parishes 
in the villages under Mau control. The pastors who supported the Mau were 
quite happy to conduct church services in those villages. The people in Mau 
dominated villages loyal to the government were forced to find other places to 
worship. In Mau villages that had no pastors, the Mau would send a pastor from 
another district to perform church services. In villages that were dominated by 
government supporters, the Mau established its own church and nominated a 
pastor loyal to the Mau from a government village to conduct the service.63 
The Mau Church became dominant, as the Samoan (LMS) Church took 
on the character of a remnant church. The movement away from the Samoan 
(LMS) Church was a declaration of a new independent church - the Mau 
Church - and despite the different controlling authority and differences in 
motives and emphasis, the Mau Church still considered itself part and parcel of 
the LMS. The Mau Church, as far as the Mau was concerned, was an LMS 
church and looked forward to attending the Feno Tele. The Mau church 
probably took the view that with its dominance the Au Fa'atonu would 
reconsider the agenda for the Feno Tele, but the Au Fa'atonu reacted severely 
and postponed the Feno Tele; a decision that did little to pacify and initiate 
reconciliation regarding the conflict at hand.64 
The Au Fa'atonu, after consultation with a few Samoan pastors that 
remained loyal to the Samoan (LMS) Church, reversed its earlier decision in 
favour of having the Feno Tele. There was a great possibility that the Mau 
church would create its own independent body and become a separate identity 
without the LMS. For the Au Fa'atonu, the best solution was to have the Feno 
Tele and continue dialogue and reconciliation efforts within the LMS circle. In 
response to the positive news about the Feno Tele, the Mau church reaffirmed 
its participation. It also sent a copy of the issues it wanted to include in the 
agenda. The Mau demanded the dismissal of Darvill, and the removal of the 
designation 'toeaina' from a certain unnamed Samoan elder. The Au Fa'atonu 
bluntly told the Mau "hands off the church."65 
62 Feather to Barradale, 28 May, 1928, SSL. 
53 Feather to Barradale, 28 May, 1928, SSL. 
64 Feather to Barradale, 28 May, 1928, SSL. 
65 Feather to Barradale, 28 May 1928, SSL; Tamasese to Deputation, 26 Sept, 1929, SSO. 
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The Mau pastors and church members attended the Fono Tele despite 
the LMS missionaries' refusal to accept their proposals. An agenda for the 
following day was discussed and the LMS missionaries ensured that nothing on 
the agenda related to the existing political problem. On the day of the fono, the 
Au Toeaina requested a postponement to the afternoon, which was granted. 
The Au Toeaina then sent a further message stating that they were not 
attending unless the Au Fa'atonu accepted their resolutions; this time for the 
dismissal of Darvill, and Faletoese, a toeaina, from their positions. The Au 
Fa'atonu responded with a clear message forthe Au Toeaina as to who was in 
control. 
The Au Fa'atonu wish to inform the Au Toeaina that their hearts 
are heavy because of the resolutions showing their will that 
Faletoese should retire from the office of toeaina, also they wish 
that the fono should discuss the address of Mr Darvill in NZ. It is 
obvious to us that these subjects have come from the committee 
of the malcontents of Samoa [Mau], and have not come through 
the proper channels, the recognised tofiga of the districts. The Au 
Fa'atonu has already informed the Au Toeaina of their wish in this 
matter namely, no interference from outside bodies can possibly 
be accepted in church matters. Therefore, we express again with 
sorrow our feeling with regard to these resolutions. If the Au 
Toeaina is not willing to eliminate entirely these two subjects, no 
gathering of the fono can take place; it will end from this very hour 
and the fono should disperse at once.66 
The Au Toeaina rejected the Au Fa'atonu's position, and requested once 
again that their resolutions be accepted. The Au Fa'atonu remained firm in its 
position and made the decision to call off the Fono Tele. The Au Toeaina 
realised the absurdity of the situation and retracted its resolutions. They also 
apologised to the Au Fa'atonu and requested that it reconsider its decision and 
allow the Fono Tele to take place. However, the Au Fa'atonu stood by its 
decision, and informed the Au Toeaina that their "apology lacked sincerity and 
the full backing of the NAC, and was prompted more by a realisation of the 
shame that would be theirs if the fono was thus summarily terminated."67 The 
Au Fa'atonu then threatened to report the Au Toeaina to the Au Matutua, and 
reminded the Samoan leaders that ''we know we are doing God's will in this 
matter."68 The Au Fa'atonu's forceful approach produced the result they wanted, 
66 Feather to Barradale, 28 May 1928, SSL. 
67 Feather to Barradale, 28 May 1928, SSL. 
68 Feather to Barradale, 28 May 1928, SSL. 
but their lack of diplomacy and not knowing when to show sympathy was its 
downfall. 
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Consequently, the Au Toeaina ordered Samoan church members to 
remain at Malua and conduct the Fono Tele themselves. The Au Fa'atonu lost 
more authority and respect as the Au Toeaina took another step towards 
'absolute control' of the church; something the Au Fa'atonu dreaded.69 In the 
end the Fono Tele discussed the upcoming centenary celebration, and agreed 
to advise the Au Matutua of the Au Fa'atonu's behaviour.70 The Au Toeaina and 
the Au Fa'atonu went their separate ways, and as far as the Mau church was 
concerned, the Au Fa'atonu and the Samoan (LMS) Church were anti-Mau. The 
church services on Sundays continued to be divided into the Mau Church and 
Samoan (LMS) Church. The Au Toeaina had control of the Mau church with the 
knowledge that total control was still with the Au Fa'atonu as long as they 
remained in Samoa under the LMS. For the Au Toeaina, the hope for 
reconciliation, or better still independence, rested with the Au Matutua, whom 
they had written to for a solution. 71 
The Au Matutua responded to the request of the Samoan church leaders, 
by sending a Deputation, made up of the Reverends Alexander Hough and G. 
Parker, which arrived in October 1928.72 Some of the LMS missionaries were 
unhappy with the Deputation taking place, as they felt it was nothing short of an 
inspection tour and missionary assessment,73 but others like Miss E. A. Downs 
supported the idea and felt a Deputation would help the Samoan crisis.74 Some 
of the LMS missionaries' fears were soon realised as the Deputation found the 
Au Fa'atonu to be at fault in all matters that had led to the split between the Mau 
church and the Samoan (LMS) Church. The Deputation also blamed the Au 
Fa'atonu for spreading false stories regarding the Samoan church wanting to 
set up a "Free Church". The Deputation felt this had encouraged many 
Samoans to abandon the Samoan (LMS) Church for the Mau church; thinking 
69 Feather to Barradale, 28 May, 1928, SSL. 
70 The centenary celebration started at Savai'i on the 21 August and ended at Malua on the 1 September 
1930. Mission Council, Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 5 May 1930, SSL; see also Feather to Barradale, 28 
May 1928, SSL; LMS Centenary: Great Rejoicing, Samoa Herald, 9 Sept, 1930. 
71 Board of LMS to Hough, 23 Jan, 1928, SSO; Barradale to Toma and Mali, 15 Aug, 1928, SSO; Bartlett 
to Mau Council, 29 Nov, 1929, SSO. 
72 Hough and Parker to Barradale, 20 Sept, 1928, SSL. 
73 Smart to Barradale, 6 Aug, 1928, SSL. 
74 Feather to Barradale, 6 Aug, 1928, SSL; Feather to Barradale, 27 Aug, 1928, SSL; Downs to Barradale, 
4 Aug, 1928, SSL; Liston to Barradale, 17 Sept, 1928, SSL. 
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that the Au Fa'atonu was about to abandon the Samoa mission. It was 
established that the idea of a 'Free Church' came from the imagination of the 
Reverend Arthur R. Smart.75 
Some of the LMS missionaries were disappointed with the Deputation 
findings, and for not considering their side of the story regarding their 
relationship with the Au Toeaina. One of the LMS missionaries expressed his 
disappointment in a letter to the Au Matutua "we are sick to death of the Au 
Toeaina."76 But, in the end, the Au Fa'atonu apologised to the Au Toeaina. The 
Deputation promised to look at some of the grievances and needs of the 
church, and the possibility of an early transfer in the administration of the church 
to Samoan hands. This was later carried out when the Deputation made the 
Fono Tele the supreme head and final authority of the Samoan (LMS) Church. 
The Samoans received the right to dominate and make decisions for the 
church. 77 The deputation also drafted a new constitution for the Samoan (LMS) 
Church, which not only legitimated the Fono Tele, but also initiated three 
committees, which gave many Samoan pastors the chance to participate in 
decision making.78 
The Deputation relieved some of the tension in the Samoan (LMS) 
Church, but the Mau remained dominant, even over the Samoan (LMS) Church, 
throughout 1929. However, the church was less bitter in its division in worship 
life as a few villages took the opportune peace to again worship together, albeit 
in a superficial manner. The Au Fa'atonu was still unsure whether the services 
on Sundays were under the LMS banner or the Mau emblem, although the Au 
Fa'atonu rightly conceded that the churches in Mau dominated areas were still 
under the influence of the Mau. The churches under administration dominated 
villages, such as Lauli'i, Letogo, Moata'a, Vaiala, and Magiagi were, at least, 
under the influence of the Samoan (LMS) Church. Nevertheless, the rift 
75 Joint Meeting of the SOC and Deputation, Apia, 29 Sept, -1Oct,1928,SSL; Parker and Hough to 
Barradale, 7 Oct, 1928, SSL; Hough and Parker to Barradale, 27 Oct, 1928, SSL; Hough to G. E. Phillips, 
26 Aug, 1930, SSL 
715 Head to Barradale, 14 Sept, 1929, SSL 
77 Joint Meeting of the SOC and Deputation, Apia, 29 Sep1, -1Oct,1928, SSL; see also Mission Council, 
1928-1929, SSL; The Executive Council, 1928-1929, SSL; The Ministerial Committee, 1928-1929, SSL; 
General Assembly of Samoa Church, Malua, 14-27 May 1929, SSL. 
18 The three committees included the Komtti Au Toeaina (Elders Committee), Komitt Tupe (Finance 
Committee), and the Au Taitai Tausi le Ekalesia (literally, the Leaders who looks after the Church or the 
General Committee). See Faletoese, 63. 
between the Mau church leaders and the Mau, and the LMS missionaries 
remained unresolved. 
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The Reverend Reginald Bartlett, an ex Papuan Missionary,79 was given 
the task to put the Samoan (LMS) Church back in order. While Bartlett's mission 
was to reconcile the Mau church and the Samoan (LMS) Church, Bartlett also 
wanted to re-establish the good relations and peaceful coexistence between the 
LMS mission and the Mau itself. Bartlett wrote to the Mau council to assure 
them that the LMS took no side in their political conflict with New Zealand. 
Bartlett exhorted the Mau to seek peace and to "think about Jesus Christ who 
has brought Samoa out of darkness ... such [violent) actions by the Mau hinders 
the coming of the Kingdom of God."80 
Bartlett requested a meeting and the Mau Council granted it, and the two 
parties met on 21 December 1929 at Vaimoso. Tamasese acted as secretary 
for the meeting as Bartlett, Smart and Darvill listened as Mau leaders took turns 
to outline their grievances, especially in regard to the payment of government 
taxes, and the Samoans' ban on copra production. Bartlett told the Mau, that his 
main concern was the effect the ban on copra was having on the LMS 
financially, but the Mau reminded the LMS missionaries that by asking the Mau 
to remove the ban on copra was the same as siding with the administrator and 
those who spoke against the Mau.81 Bartlett had made contact even though he 
found it hard to convince the Mau to abide by the government's orders. For 
Bartlett it was a positive start to re-establishing good relations, but his 
arrogance blinded him to the fact that Samoans were no longer ignorant 
'natives.' What Bartlett wanted was not going to be bargained for easily, 
especially because his comments on the 'copra ban' reflected his bias and 
concern only for the welfare of the LMS. 
A week later, the bloody events of Black Saturday, 28 December 1929,82 
brought confusion to the Samoan people, and destroyed any hope Bartlett may 
have had for reconciliation. A Mau procession through Apia to welcome back 
79 For a background on Bartlett see T. W. Reid ed, A Man Like Bati: Reginald BarfJett, O.BE : The Story 
of His Missionary Work in Papua and Samoa as Told in His Letters Home, London: Independent Press, 
1960. 
80 Bartlett to Mau Council, 29 Nov, 1929, SSO. 
81 Bartlett to Bitton, 28 Dec, 1929, SSO; Bartlett, Confidential Report of Two Years in Samoa, 28 Nov, 
1931, SSL. 
82 Coroners Inquiry into lhe Shooting, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1/23/11; Westbrook to Nelson, 9 Jan, 1930, WP; see 
also Bartlett to Chirgwin, 29 Nov, 1931, SSL; see also Crossmann to Ransom, 7 Sept, 1930, IT 1/23/16. 
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European supporters of the Mau, namely Alfred Smythe and Hall Skelton,83 
ended in a violent confrontation with New Zealand police. According to Perkins, 
the noise made by the Mau's marching sounded like 'fireworks' due to their 
numbers, which he estimated at 2000.84 The police moved to arrest a Samoan 
wanted for criminal offences but lost control of the situation. As a result, a young 
policeman was 'clubbed' to death, and thirteen Samoans lost their lives in the 
worst affray between the Mau and the New Zealand administration.85 
The administration reacted by landing further armed police from New 
Zealand as Mau members absconded to the bush to avoid captivity.86 Among 
the fugitives were prominent members of the Samoan (LMS) Church. This 
prompted the Au Fa'atonu, especially Bartlett, to find a solution, not only to save 
Samoa politically, but to save the Samoan (LMS) Church, from extinction as 
Samoans reaffirmed their commitment to the Mau and to the Mau church. 
Bartlett approached Tuimaleali'ifano and exhorted him to strive for peace and 
deliver Samoa from any further suffering. Tuimaleali'ifano agreed 
wholeheartedly with Bartlett, and challenged Bartlett that all "must pray to God 
to help us to finish this up quickly and to let Samoa to have [sic] another 
country."87 The Mau was willing to find peace, but without New Zealand being 
part of the equation. The Mau told Bartlett they could not give him an answer 
but would be happy to talk further. Bartlett showed his disappointment by later 
writing; "was there ever a nation in all the world that talked as these Samoans 
talk."88 Bartlett's attitude was far from being objective and this was probably due 
to his lack of background in Samoan etiquette. 
Nevertheless, it was the efforts of all the missions, prominent papa/agi 
and Samoans,89 and the arrival in Samoa of the Hon. John G. Cobbe,90 New 
63 Coroners Inquiry into the Shooting. 1930, IT 1 Ex 112.3/11. 
"'Perkins to Chirgwin, Report 1929, 31 Dec, 1929, SSR. 
85 The outcome of these events has already being discussed in Chapter Seven. See also Bartlett to Bitton, 
1 Jan, 1930, SSO; Perkins to Chirgwin, Report 1929, 31 Dec, 1929, SSR; Western Samoa, Historical 
Notes, IT 1 Ex 2115. 
86 Bartlett to Bitton, 1Jan,1930, SSO; Perkins to Chirgwin, 1 Jan-13 Mar, 1930, SSR; Bartlett, 
Confidential Report of Two Years in Samoa, 28 Nov, 1931, SSL; Grossmann to Ransom, 7 Sept, 1930, IT 
112.3116; Some of the Grievances of the Samoan Women, 28 Dec, 1929, IT 1 Ex 1/52. 
"'Tuimaleali'ifano to Bali, 10 Jan, 1930, SSO. 
88 Bafi to Bitton, 28 Mar, 1930, SSL 
89 J. Ward (NZ PM) to Oamand, 1Apr,1930, Oarnand Correspondence, MAST; S. S. Allen to Damand, 
18 Mar, 1930, Darnand Correspondence, MAST; Bartlett to Barradale, 14 Jul, 1939, SSL. 
90 Samoa Guardian, 6 Aug, 1932; Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 211 S; Grossmann to Ransom, 
7 Sept, 1930, IT 1123/16. 
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Zealand's Defence Minister that persuaded the Mau to leave the comfort of the 
bush and participate in meaningful dialogue. The New Zealand administration 
met the Mau on 28 February 1930 and offered the Mau three conditions for 
peace; a renouncement of the Mau, that all Mau prisoners would be released, 
and that the government would be available for any discussions. The Mau 
reversed the order of the terms and wanted to talk first, release all prisoners, 
and then the Mau would consider dispersing.91 A further meeting two days later 
failed to find a solution; but this time it was the Mau dividing over the terms for 
peace. Eventually, the Mau agreed to disperse and for everyone to return to 
their villages. 92 The Mau had finally cracked and all because it had given up the 
only thing that had given it strength and authority to stay on top - solidarity. The 
Mau weakened as they failed to agree on the order of priority for the terms 
offered. The Mau dispersed prematurely because of their differences of opinion, 
rather than an acceptance of New Zealand's terms for peace. 
Bartlett, still insensitive to the Samoan psyche made LMS Mau members 
swear on the Bible not to return to the movement, and to obey all administration 
orders. Bartlett wanted to be certain that the LMS's work in Samoa would not be 
disrupted again. Thus, when orders were received banning the wearing of the 
Mau lava/ava (cloth), Bartlett exhorted the Mau to obey the order, as they had 
already sworn on the Bible. The Samoans were irate as they had only sworn to 
obey the administration's order to disperse and return to their villages. The Mau 
cried out, "Misi faalata le Mau (Missionary (Bartlett] betray the Mau).93 Many 
l\llau members were fined and imprisoned for disobeying the order as the 
administration reasserted its authority. The ill-treatment of the Mau members 
only led to the formation of the women's Mau led by Nelson's wife and his 
sister. But, it was a short-lived affair as the administration dispersed the women 
back to their villages, and fined the sisters five pounds each. 94 Bartlett deceived 
the Samoans, and such deception remained ingrained in the minds of the 
Samoans for a long time. 
91 Notice by Allen and Cobbe, 1 Mar, 1930, Report on Visit to Samoa, Memo for Cabinet, 20 Mar, 1930, IT 
1 Ex 112318; Damand Correspondence, MAST; Bali to Bitton, 28 Feb, 1930, SSO; Administration and Mau: 
Meeting at Vaimoso, Samoa Herald, 7 Mar, 1930; Bartlett, Confidential Report of Two Years in Samoa, 28 
Nov, 1931, SSL. 
92 Report on Visit to Samoa, Memo for Cabinet, 20 Mar, 1930, IT 1 Ex 112318; Bartlett to Toeaina (LMS 
Directors), 15 Mar, 1930, SSO; Bartlett, Confidential Report o!Two Years in Samoa, 28 Nov, 1931, SSL. 
93 Bali to Bitton, 4 Apr, 1930, SSO; see also Bartlett to Chirgwin, 28 Mar, 1930, SSL. 
94 Memo -Women's International League For Peace and Freedom, 23 Oct, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1152; Bali to 
Bitton, 4 Apr, 1930, SSO; Bartlett to Chirgwin, 28 Mar, 1930, SSL; Bartlett to Chirgwin, 24 Apr, 1930, SSL. 
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Peace was finally achieved, but it never undermined nor swept away the 
wish of the Mau for political independence. The Samoan (LMS) Church 
celebrated the chance for peace, as it returned to its calling as a church. Many 
Mau church members also returned to the fold, as the Au Fa'atonu and the Au 
Toeaina began dialogue, albeit on the surface, to revitalise the Samoan (LMS) 
Church, but disunity remained within the Samoan (LMS) Church itself as small 
number of villages continued to worship separately, as Samoan pastors 
continued to encourage the existence of the Mau Church.95 It was not until the 
end of 1930, that the Mau church lost momentum and was no longer a distinct 
entity as it submerged itself back within the Samoan (LMS) Church, but it was 
not a sign that the Samoan (LMS) Church was free from Mau influence.96 
The 1930 Fono Tele saw many Mau members wanted on warrant by the 
administration attend, although they had been warned not to do so. The 
Samoan church leaders requested Bartlett to speak to the administrator not to 
arrest them. He agreed and the Mau members were allowed to attend the Fono 
Tele without any interference from the administration. Bartlett could still not 
believe that the Samoans wanted for criminal offences were active members of 
the Samoan (LMS) Church and, most of all, confessors of Christianity. 
These people [Mau] know their bible almost by heart. Yet so 
many, even of the pastors, are ruled by Nelson & Co., rather than 
by the bible. If only we could get our LMS pastors to do the right 
thing I believe we could break the Mau forever. So long as there is 
a Mau, Samoa is doomed to trouble. Nelson is clever, and he has 
around him men of brains, brains but no conscience. And what 
can Samoa do against such forces?97 
Bartlett was right as far as Nelson's influence was concerned, even from New 
Zealand. 
Leading up to the anniversary of Black Saturday, the Mau, with the help 
of four Samoan pastors, tried to organise a procession to commemorate the 
event. According to Bartlett, Nelson initiated the idea from New Zealand. The 
administration quickly stepped in and banned it. Instead, a commemorative 
service was allowed and it took place without any reference to the bitterness 
and anger that had encompassed Samoa. Samoans, papalagi, and even the 
95 Bartlett to Chirgwin, 24 Mar, 1930, SSL: Bartlett to G. E. Phillips, 9 Dec, 1930, SSL. 
96 Downs to Chirgwin, 10 May 1931, SSL; see also Downs to Chirgwin, 25 Jun, 1932, SSL; Hoad to 
Chirgwin, 5 Aug, 1932, SSL; Bradford to G. E. Phillips, 30May1933, SSL; Bradford to Chirgwin, 18 Dec, 
1933, SSL. 
97 Bartlett to G. E. Phillips, 9 Dec, 1930, SSL: see also Bartlett to G. E. Phillips, 27 May, 1931, SSL. 
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administrator attended the packed church service. Even though no bitter words 
had been spoken, the presence of many Samoan church and Mau leaders only 
confirmed to the New Zealand administration that the Mau still existed.98 
Perhaps, Bartlett finally understood the intricacy of the Mau and its relationship 
to the Samoan (LMS) Church. Perhaps, also, he understood what peace meant 
in Samoa after the Mau had dispersed. Perhaps, he was no longer ignorant of 
the Samoan psyche when he wrote to the Au Matutua, "Samoa is wearing no 
wrinkles, and there are no lines of pain on her features. That does not mean 
there is no trace of stiff joints and rheumatism."99 
The Mau's influence remained strong in the Samoan (LMS) Church for 
many years after. It prompted some of the LMS missionaries to complain 
continuously of its detrimental effect on the Samoan (LMS) Church.100 The 
Samoan church leaders were just as assertive as their political counterparts in 
their efforts to be independent. They were still searching to discredit many LMS 
missionaries to achieve their vision, as Downs noticed that "the most difficult 
thing to bear is their [Samoans] attitude of suspicion with which they regard our 
[LMS] efforts, and the skills at spoiling something by wicked gossip."101 But, 
although Downs believed the Samoans still needed good strong leadership, she 
was intelligent enough to realise that the Samoan church leaders would never 
accept such leadership again because they had been conditioned and 
strengthened by the past events to believe they were the final authority in all 
church matters. In the end, other LMS missionaries shared the same sentiment 
and put it down to "the price of independence."102 
The Au Matutua did not view missionary leadership as the solution for 
Samoa's future. In 1931, the Au Matutua broadened the Samoan church 
leaders' horizon by granting a request from the Au Toeaina to give all Samoan 
delegates to the Fono Tele the right "to speak and vote."103 It was further 
evidence that the Au Matutua wanted to move the process of church 
independence forward as planned. The last time the question of independence 
98 Bartlett to G. E. Phillips, 30 Dec, 1930, SSL. 
99 Bartlett to Chirgwin, 15 Jun, 1930, SSL. 
100 S. G. Phillips to G. E. Phillips, 15 Feb, 1933, SSL; Stallan to Chirgwin, 27 Aug, 1937, SSL; Bartlett to 
Barradale, 14 Jul, 1939, SSL. 
101 Downs to Chirgwin, 15 Sept, 1932, SSL. 
102 Bradford to G. E. Phillips, 30 May 1930, SSL; see also Downs to Chirgwin, 15 Sept, 1932, SSL; Bartlett 
to G. E. Phillips, 9 Dec, 1930, SSL. 
103 Bartlett to Chirgwin, 29 Nov, 1931, SSL. 
was raised, the Samoan church leaders postponed it to 1930; its centenary 
year. The Au Matutua was just taking that request a step further, although it 
raised very little enthusiasm and support among the LMS missionaries in 
Samoa. 
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The Mau had come in from the bush, and Nelson was again exiled to 
New Zealand, but it contlnued to remain influential throughout many Samoan 
villages under the guidance of Samoan leaders, who had gained experience as 
the conflict broadened.104 In its own passive ways, the Mau continued to push 
for independence through petitions and submissions to the New Zealand 
government, League of Nations, and other countries, 105 The Samoan (LMS) 
Church remained silent as many of its church members took the lead on behalf 
of the Mau, For the Au Toeaina and the Samoan (LMS) Church members, the 
Mau was just an instrument to achieve absolute control of the Samoan (LMS) 
Church. World War II momentarily delayed the quest for independence. 
104 Memo - Mau Activities, 7 Nov, 1936, IT 1123/16; Meeting at Vaimoso Between the Ministerial 
Delegation and the Mau, 23 Jul, 1936, IT 1 Ex 1165; Mau Activities, 2 Sept, 1937, IT 88/13. 
105 The Samoans sent petitions to England, Wales, New Zealand, America, and 1he League of Nation, 
See, for example, Bartlett to Chirgwin, 28 Mar, 1930, SSL; see also Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 2 
Ex 2/15. 
CHAPTER NINE 
CHINESE IN PARADISE AND 
INDENTURED LABOUR PROBLEMS1 
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The treatment of the Chinese indentured labourers was another issue 
that alienated the Samoans from the New Zealand administration and the 
missions, especially the LMS. The injustice and bad management of the 
Chinese labourers further pressed the Samoans to demand independence. The 
Samoans were a proud people, and before it had become a colony in 1900, 
they were conscious of keeping Samoa free from being toto /ua (mix blood). 
They took steps to arrest the problem of mixed relationships with other ethnic 
groups, especially with the Chinese. Germany, and later, New Zealand, not only 
took over the administration of Samoa, but failed to take into consideration the 
feelings of the Samoan people regarding the introduction of Chinese into 
Samoa, and within three years Samoa was inundated with Chinese from all 
walks of life. Germany and New Zealand, in the end, failed to control the 
Chinese and, consequently, anger the Samoans in more ways than one. 
The arrival of Chinese, and later Melanesians, as indentured labourers 
was a constant issue for discussion as to its merit. The missions, the traders 
and merchants, the administrators, and even the Samoans expressed varied 
opinions regarding the importation of indentured labourers. In the end, the 
Samoans had no real say in the matter, the missions sat on the fence mostly, 
and now and then would side with the administration, while the administration 
tended to reject the importation of foreign labour but usually changed its mind 
under pressure from plantation owners and traders. The plantation owners, on 
the other hand, were not always in agreement, especially on the ethnicity of the 
labourers to be imported. Nevertheless, by the time Germany had taken over 
the administration of Samoa, their large-scaled plantation operations saw 
boatloads of Chinese being introduced into Samoa. Later, under New Zealand's 
administration, Melanesian labourers were indentured but not at the same scale 
as the Chinese had been indentured. 
1 A brief version was published under the title "Dragons in Little Paradise," Journal of Pacific History 32: 1 
(1997). 
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In Samoa today, there are many graves of Chinese indentured labourers 
dotting Samoan soil, perhaps the only remaining meaningful icons of the 
Chinese contribution to the development of Samoa during the first half of last 
century. Many of the graves are unmarked and the identity of many cannot be 
established. Some graves have tombstones with their names inscribed on 
them. On one particular tombstone, the identity of the Chinese labourer could 
not be established for his name was not etched into the brittle slab. Yet, in the 
small area provided for an inscription, four Chinese characters appeared 
distinctively, which literally translates 'dragon, came, thousand, miles'. Nancy 
Torn, an educationalist and writer, simply puts it; "the dragon came from afar."2 
The tombstone epitaph is a strong historical reminder of the diasporic spirit of 
the Chinese, which found enthusiastic hosts among Chinese eager to escape 
population pressure, war and hostility, unemployment, famine, and other 
catastrophes. 3 
Samoa's chance to experience first hand the 'dragons from afar' began 
prior to the introduction of indentured labour in 1903. A handful had already 
made Samoa their home. Three had arrived prior to Malietoa Laupepa's 1880 
law, which forbade Chinese entering Samoa. They had married into well-known 
Samoan families, pursued very lucrative businesses, and enjoyed European 
status.4 Other Chinese settlers found their way to Samoa as servants of 
government officials. When Germany took over the administration of Samoa in 
1900, they became free to pursue their own business activities. In 1904, they 
successfully applied to Governor Solf for 'free settler' status, thus maintaining 
their business pursuits and strengthening ties with their Samoan farnilies. 5 
These Chinese were a marked contrast to the Chinese who arrived under the 
indentured labour scheme, in terms of wealth and freedom. They kept very 
2 Nancy, Y. W. Tom had used this interpretation as the subtitle of her book The Chinese in Samoa, 1875-
1985: The Dragon came From Afar, Apia: Western Samoa Historical and Cuttural Trust 1986. 
3 For a brief history on the Chinese labourers' accolades in other places, see Featuna'i 8. Liuaana, 
"Dragons in Paradise: Chinese (Mis-) Fortunes in Samoa, 1900 - 1950," Journal of Pacific History 32: 1 
(1997), 29-48. 
4 One such early Chinese settler, Ah Mu, married into the Malietoa family. See Notes on Samoa, 1928-
1931, S.S. Allen Collection (henceforth SSA); Westbrook to Samoa Guardian, n.d., Westbrook Additional 
Papers, 79-270 (henceforth WAP); see also Tom, 38-43; H.J. Moors, Some Recollections of Early Samoa, 
Apia: Western Samoa Histori<:al and Cultural Trust, 1986, 41. 
5 One Chinese businessman, a box maker, complaint to So!fregarding concessions granted to the London 
Missionary Society (henceforth LMS) school at Leulumoega to make boxes without a license. The Chinese 
man feared that such special favours to the LMS school threatened his business. See Leulumoega School 
Report, 1901, LMS South Seas Archives, South Seas Reports (henceforth SSR); Hills lo Thompson, 7 
Sep!, 1901, LMS South Seas Archives, South Seas Letters (henceforth SSL); see also D. R. Haynes, 
"Chinese Indentured Labour in Samoa, 1900-1950," M.A. Thesis, Otago University, 1965. 
much to themselves as an elite group of Chinese. They eventually employed 
Chinese indentured labourers in their businesses as time went by. 
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The Germans administered Samoa, according to Solf, "merely to guard it 
as what it is - a little paradise - and to do my best to keep the passing serpent 
out of our garden of Eden,"6 but at the same time developing Samoa for 
economic gain. Samoans, first and foremost, pledged their loyalty and total 
commitment to their matai, aiga, and nu'u. This diminished any chance of 
securing a permanent and consistent labour supply. The DH&PG, backed by 
the German government, had a monopoly on tama uli (black) labour from the 
Bismark Archipelago and Solomon lslands,7 and labour shortage was never an 
issue. However, the newly arrived individual investors and small businesses, 
which poured unlimited wealth into plantation developments, soon faced a huge 
labour shortage. Some observers have assumed, incorrectly, that it was "the 
disinclination of the Samoan to sell himself into wage slavery"8 which created a 
vacuum in the labour pool. Clearly, it was the idea of 'wage deficiency' rather 
than 'wage slavery', and a disinterested capitalist attitude, which kept Samoans 
distant from plantations. Nevertheless, the labour shortage provoked an outcry 
for government assistance.9 
In 1903, Solf, with approval of the Samoan fono ofTa'imua and Faipule, 
issued an Ordinance which superseded the old Malietoa Laupepa immigration 
law, opening the way for the planters to recruit Chinese labour.10 The traders, 
such as H. J. Moors and R. H. Curruthers, argued strongly against 
implementing the planters' aspirations, fearing an increase in Chinese business 
interests. However, the planters, such as Charles Roberts, and Francis 
Harman, tried to alleviate anti-Chinese feelings by pointing out that Samoa 
would not have the same problems with Chinese as did Hawaii and Tahiti, an 
opinion based mainly on speculations that the government would exercise tight 
control. 
6 Tate to External affairs, 22 Oct, 1921, Island Territories Archives (henceforth IT) 1 Ex 1120. 
7 For a good study on tama uli ( Melanesian) labourers, see Malama Meleisea, "The last Days of the 
Melanesian labour Trade in Western Samoa," Journal of Pacific History 11, 1976; Malama Meleisea, 0 
Tama Uli: Melanesians in Samoa, Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1980; Cyclopaedia of Samoa, 
Sydney: Mccarron, Stewart & Co., 1907, 79-94. 
8 A Eaglesham, "Bible and Bayonet in Western Samoa", The Labour Monthly 12, 1930: 152. 
9 Diary, 26 Feb, 1919, R.W. Tate Papers (Diaries), MS-COPY-MICRO 0082-07 (henceforth TP). 
10 Soll: Programme for Fono, 30 Jan, 1903, German Samoa Administration Papers, (1900-1914) Vol. 3, 
(henceforth GSA). 
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The planters, initially, failed to secure expired Chinese contract workers 
from Hawaii. It then took several more months, and shrewd negotiations with 
Chinese officials, before the first lot of Chinese arrived in Samoa in 1903, in the 
Decima. There were mixed reactions to the 289 Chinese from Swatow. While 
many planters praised the enthusiasm of the new arrivals, others belittled the 
early euphoria. According to Harman, some of the Chinese recruited were 
"practically useless,"11 but Harman represented a dissatisfied minority. 
In 1904, the German Administration agreed to oversee the recruitment of 
future Chinese labour. The fierce competition for Chinese labour meant 
recruiting agents had to be more inventive and more resourceful, improvising 
and offering attractive employment packages, to woo candidates to sign labour 
contracts. 12 The German government's Chinese Commissioner was A. R. Fries, 
and his recruiting methods were no different from those previously used by 
British, Americans, and Chinese agents. Fries displayed posters of a Samoan 
drawing a rickshaw, on which sat a Chinese coolie fanned by Samoan women. 
On other posters, Fries depicted scenes of happy receptions of Chinese upon 
landing in Samoa by beautiful women.13 
In June 1905, a further 528 Chinese left Swatow for Samoa, and this was 
followed by five more shipments before the outbreak of war in 1914. In total 
some 3,868 Chinese arrived in Samoa between 1903 and 1913 under the 
German administration. The biggest single shipment totalled 1,039 Chinese in 
1913. The recruitment of Chinese did not resume until 1920, and for fourteen 
years, New Zealand arranged eight shipments, totalling 3, 116 Chinese.14 
Interestingly, the last shipment, in July, 1934, included Chinese from Toisan 
District who had been lured into signing contracts by agents who once again 
"wove an appealing tale of happy and well-fed Chinese in the islands 
accompanied by pretty brown-skinned belles clutching almond-eyed babies in 
their arms relaxing under the swaying fronds of stately coconut palms."15 The 
11 Harman to Imperial Government... 4 Jul. 1904, German Colonial Administration (henceforth GCA), 
Micro-R 5768; Western Samoa Historical Notes, 1935, IT 1, Ex 2/15. 
12 Soll to Trood, 3 Dec, 1904, British Consulate (Samoa) Archive (General Outward Correspondence), 
series 2, Vol. 25 (henceforth BCS); A. Radford to Chief of Police, 7 August, 1903, GSA, Roll 8, Micro-
R,5768; Kulis, Samoanische Zeitung, 8 Oct, 1904, GSA, Micro-R 5768; Bowden Brothers & Co. to Solf, 10 
Oct, 1904, GSA, Micro-R 5768. 
13 Pros and Cons Regarding the Chinese Labour Question in Samoa, n.d., WAP (Samoa & NZ 
Administration), 79-270. 
14 Tom, 36. 
15 Tom, 12. 
Chinese in Samoa were recruited mainly from Fukien and Kwangtung 
Provinces, with their port of loading and departure centred on Swatow and 
Hong Kong. 
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The voyages to Samoa took on average three weeks, with no other ports 
of call prior to Samoa. Given the appalling conditions of some of the ships, the 
Chinese showed aptness to survive extreme conditions. A Chinese labourer 
recollected the boredom, the discomfort, and the feeling of emptiness, during 
the voyage. 
Life on board ship was monotonous. Long hours were spent 
simply day-dreaming. No typhoons buffetted the ship. No sighting 
of playful dolphins nor whales, mammoth denizens of the deep. 
Not even that of a passing freighter. Crowded conditions 
prevailed. The men slept on double and triple-decker bunk beds in 
the hot and stuffy hold of the ship. Ventilation was poor, lighting 
dim, comforts minimal and sometimes the stench overpowering 
from the vomit of the seasick.16 
The paradisal images of the posters quickly vanished as the harsh 
realities of Samoan plantation conditions emerged. The Chinese soon 
discovered that their employers did not strictly adhere to the terms of contract 
agreed upon in China. And to make matters worse, the German government 
sanctioned flogging for the minutest misconduct, at twenty lashes each, once a 
week, before a government official, as if his presence made it less barbaric. 17 
Towards the end of 1905, Chinese began to write home detailed 
descriptions of their ordeals in Samoa. The German government, and 
employers of Chinese labour, were unaware of the mounting literature 
circulating in Hong Kong, and areas of South China, regarding the treatment of 
Chinese. The literature took the form of large posters displayed in well-
patronised areas. One of the many posters printed was a letter from a very 
distressed Chinese, named Cheng Wing, to his uncles. Part of the letter 
included the following: 
I am undergoing unbearable hardship, but repentance is too late. 
The monthly rate are [sic] only 10 marks equal to $2.50. I do not 
mind receiving this low wage but the tortures are hard to suffer. In 
16 Not all 6,984 who left China reached Samoa. Some Chinese died during the voyages, while others 
never landed but returned after failing medical checks. See Tom, 21-37. 
17 The contracts for the Chinese to Samoa varied little with each shipment. The basic contract was over 
three years indentured. Passage and repatriation paid by employer. One month's wages paid in advance 
and repaid once employed in Samoa. Each Chinese was entitled to free housing, food, some clothing, 
and medical care. During New Zealand Administration, re-indenturing was introduced, which varied from 
time to time, and contract to contract. The flogging of Chinese resulted from laziness, running away, 
disobedience, insulting behaviour, and not bowing low to masters. See Tom, 4-5. 
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case of sickness, one mark per day will be taken away from the 
wages and you will not be allowed to return to the house for rest 
but will be driven out of it and required to cut and carry grass, no 
medicine being given to you - If you do not recover in a few days 
you will be hit and kicked and if you are still not recovered in a 
week or ten days you will be carried out in the street and receive 
strokes with a cane. I cannot describe the bitterness of the sighs 
of the sick. Besides the food is [too] hard to be eaten; four men 
seat at a table with a bowl of salmon each day; at breakfast only 
one biscuit and a half are given to each man, at luncheon 
bananas and taro are eaten and supper consists of boiled rice and 
beans. Those who take this food have weakness in legs and 
swelled stomachs. I do not think I can live for three years more. 
[The Masters are wicked], over ten men have been beaten to 
death and the number of deaths cannot be counted. Even Cha Wa 
[a close friend] he has been bribed by the foreigners and forgets 
that I am his countryman, regarding me as an insect and inflicts 
heavier punishment on me .... We are living in Shan Pui and can be 
compared with the fish caught by the net, the meat on the 
chopping block, the bird confined in a cage, or the ox under the 
yoke .... What I hope is that the spirits of my ancestors will secretly 
help me that I may leave through these three years.16 
The posters created a political stir in China and Hong Kong, resulting in 
the Colonial Secretary for Britain, in Hong Kong, demanding a report from 
Thomas Trood, the British acting Consul in Samoa, to confirm or deny the 
allegations. The Colonial Secretary highlighted in several memos the main core 
of Chinese complaints. These included; the terms of contract being changed; 
Chinese treated as chu chai (slaves); Chinese battered by overseers and when 
they complained, their masters beating them again; Chinese confined to gaol for 
minor matters; Chinese being killed as a result of brutality by masters and 
overseers, and then buried uncoffined; and Chinese appeals to German courts 
resulting in more beating of the complainants.19 
One of the letters, signed by 1,300 Chinese, mentioned a labourer 
named Wong being beaten to death for eating while working. In another letter, it 
is stated that the overseer "has done five men to death" and his "extortion [$3 a 
month] is unbearable."20 As a result, the Chinese labourers killed the Chinese 
overseer involved. This was followed soon after by an uprising, which resulted 
in several Chinese been shot; fortunately, there were no deaths. According to 
16 Translation - Placard in Streets of Hong Kong, BCS. 
19 See Precis 1-7, BCS. 
'° Precis 6: Plaint of 190 odd Chinese, BCS. 
the British Colonial Secretary, over 1, 700 Chinese had signed the various 
complaints received. 
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The mounting accusations and pressure from other Consuls in Samoa,21 
together with the disturbing news of the ill-treatment of Chinese circulating in 
China and Hong Kong, forced Self to initiate an investigation. The investigation 
proved the allegations beyond doubt. The larger German firms, such as Safata 
Samoa Gessellschaft (SSG), the Samoa Kautschuk Compagnie (SKC), and the 
Deutsche Samoa Gesellschaft (DSG), caused the Chinese much misfortune 
and suffering. In particular, Richard Deeken, of the DSG, was singled out. He 
personified the most heartless element of labour treatment and plantation 
management, although he was not unique. Deeken alone was charged and 
sentenced to prison for ill-treatment of Chinese, and causing the death of 
Chinese under his care. Deeken became the scapegoat in a face saving 
exercise for the German Administration.22 
In 1908, the Chinese government sent two of its own officials to ascertain 
independently the plight of the Chinese in Samoa. The consequent reports to 
China were very incriminating, which further distanced any hope of re-
establishing any kind of relationship. The Self Administration was forced to 
revise its labour policy by modifying and improving various facets of the labour 
contract, including the eradication of corporal punishment. The establishment of 
a Chinese Consulate office in Samoa also created a favourable impression 
among Chinese officials.23 The concessions agreed upon by the German 
government under great pressure from the Chinese authorities, only served to 
strengthen Chinese bargaining powers. By 1913, the planters and the German 
administration contemplated replacing Chinese labour.24 Such sudden contrary 
attitudes reflected the uneasiness felt by the employers and the government 
over increasing wage demands and, especially, intensifying Chinese strikes, 
revolts, violence, and criminal activities. 
21 Treed to Soll, 19 Jan, 1907, BCS; Trood to Soll, 4 Aug, 1909, BCS. 
22 Tom, 5. 
23 Wendt & Co., to Colonial Secretary (Hong Kong), 4 Feb, 1908, BCS; Treed to Colonial Secretary (Hong 
Kong), 2 Sept, 1909, BCS; Treed lo Soll, 26 Mar, 1910,_BCS; see also, Chinese Contract Ordinance, R.W. 
Tate Paper§, MS-COPY-MICRO 0082-05 (henceforth TP); Chinese Contract Ordinance -Amendments -
Proclamation 17, Samoa Times, 15 May, 1915; Seventh Transport Contract, 1913, TP. 
24 The German government had made arrangement for Javanese labour just prior to the outbreak of World 
War I. See Reply to the Administrator's Article in the Samoa Times, 3 Sept, 1926, Westbrook Papers, 
0061-010 (henceforth WP). 
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A New Zealand Expeditionary Force occupied Samoa with the advent of 
war in 1914.25 At that time, there were over 2000 Chinese employed on 
plantations. Many took advantage of the changing political situation to rebel 
against their employers. A New Zealand soldier wrote home "it was something 
worth seeing. It resembled some of the scenes during the strike in Wellington 
last year, and I guess there were some sore Chinese heads about after that."26 
Soon after, New Zealand forces suppressed a riot by 120 Chinese at Tapatapao 
plantation, objecting to an order for ration reduction.27 Colonel Logan, in charge 
of the New Zealand forces, gave no indication that he wanted to terminate the 
supply of labour from China, although he did intend to fulfil German plans to 
repatriate all Chinese whose contracts had expired or were due to expire in 
1915. 
It was at this time, according to administration records, that Mata'afa 
losefo visited and drew Logan's attention to the "intermixture of Samoa & 
Chinese blood."28 losefo's visit to Logan coincided with Chinese efforts to 
secure 'free settler' status. It seemed to be an unexpected act on losefo's part, 
and one most likely to have been spurred into action under duress from anti-
Chinese Europeans. Logan immediately took steps to repatriate the Chinese 
labourers without replacements. Logan dismissed the notion of acquiring more 
Chinese labour, as he truly felt the Samoans had the potential to do the work 
themselves. Between 1914 and 1920, over one thousand and two hundred 
Chinese returned home.29 
The resulting critical shortage of Chinese labour led to a petition from the 
Samoa Planters Association, suggesting that New Zealand look for alternative 
labour,30 or permit the re-indenturing of expired Chinese labourers. The 
25 For details of New Zealand Forces preparations and landing in Samoa, see S. J. Smith, The Samoa 
(NZ) Expeditionary Force, 1914-1915, Wellington: Fergusson & Osborn, 1924. 
26 Evening Post, 7 Sept, 1914, Wellington. 
27 Chinese Labour- Samoa, TP; see also Samoa: The Labour Problem, n.d. WAP; Field 13-15. 
26 Chinese Labour - Samoa, TP. 
29 Samoa Problems, 26 Jan, 1920, Grattan Papers - Miscellaneous, 4879-123 {henceforth GP);~: In 
1916, Australia offered New Zealand, and later Samoa, 214 Maltese labourers whom the Australian 
government had refused entry into Australia. A response from the New Zealand Administration in Samoa 
said there was enough labour for Samoa planters and there was no need for Maltese labour. A statement 
Logan made knowing it was 1alse. See Administrator to Governor {NZ), 5 Dec, 1916, IT 1 Ex 17/5. 
30 Some of the planters approached the Colonial Office to resume negotiations for Javanese labour. But 
the Netherlands government refused the request, and the New Zealand government never pursued the 
matter again. See External Affairs to J. Allen, 10 Mar, 1920, IT 1 Ex 1712; Governor-General to Secretary 
forthe Colonies, 1Apr,1920, IT 1Ex17/2; A. M. Snouck Hurgronja to Foreign Affairs, 2 Jun, 1920, IT 1 
Ex 1712; Massey to Governor-General Netherlands East Indies, 23 Jan, 1923, IT 1 Ex 1712; see also 
Samoa's Problems: Report by Citizens' Committee ... to Sir James Allen .. ., 26 Jan, 1920, GP. 
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government felt comfortable with the latter suggestion, although it was 
apprehensive at the planters' capacity to exercise strict control, in order to 
"prevent contamination of the Samoans."31 Some planters suggested Indian 
labour as an alternative, although they all agreed, there was "no room for an 
alien coloured population in Samoa."32 The Samoa administration sought the 
opinions of the various missions. The Au Fa'atonu wanted nothing to do with 
Indians in Samoa, as it was its duty "to safeguard our Samoans as far as 
possible, physically and morally."33 The Au Fa'atonu, however, supported more 
Chinese labour in order for Samoa to continue developing despite its earlier 
fears of Chinese defiling the purity of the Samoan race.34 
The Au Fa'atonu believed Chinese were no longer a physical and moral 
hindrance to the Samoans because they were on strict contract. The Au 
Fa'atonu went on to say that it believed people in New Zealand and Britain were 
misinformed, and wrongly condemning the Chinese.35 In a way, it was a 
compromise to show support for the administration over the issue, and a way to 
reject Indians entering Samoa. The missions positive attitude prompted Logan 
to negotiate the recruitment of 600 Chinese, but Logan received a prompt reply 
from the Chinese Consul, in Apia, stating that "the exportation of coolies from 
China has been prohibited during the war."36 This view was not only reiterated 
by the Chinese government, but also added; "it is against the fixed policy of the 
Imperial government to allow the indenture of Chinese coolies. •37 It implied that 
any further Chinese emigration to Samoa would be under a 'free' labour system. 
Logan reacted strongly: 
If Chinese cannot be imported under indentured [labour] they 
should not be imported at all, the importation of free labour would 
probably lead to a rising of Samoan$. The result of importing 
further Chinese labour would be utter ruin of the Samoan race. At 
present there is considerable admixture of races, and it appears 
that complete destruction of the Samoan race would be the 
lamentable result of British occupation.38 
31 Administration of Samoa: Report by Col. Logan, 8 Jul, 1919, IT 1 Ex 1/10. 
32 Petition from Residence, 18 Dec, 1915, IT 1 Ex 1116. 
33 SOC to Lenwood, 20 Jun, 1916, SSL 
34 SOC, Minutes of Meeting, Papauta, 20-23 Dec, 1909/1910, SSL; SOC, Minutes of Meeting, Ma!ua, 3-8 
May, 1909, SSL 
35 SOC to Lenwood, 20 Jun, 1916, SSL; Sibree to Lenwood, 28 Jan, 1916, SSL 
36 Chinese Labour - Samoa, TP. 
37 Chinese Labour- Samoa, TP. 
38 Chinese Labour- Samoa, TP. 
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In 1918, New Zealand policy regarding Chinese took on a mood of 
condemnation. But, the influenza epidemic killed thirty-one Chinese,39 and as 
the epidemic intensified, planters feared that plantations in Samoa were on the 
brink of total devastation. In 1919,. According to Colonel Robert Tate, who 
replaced Logan as Administrator in 1919, Logan had been in Samoa too long, 
and his strained relations with the Chinese showed he did not have a full grasp 
of all his faculties.40 With Tate, New Zealand's attitude towards Chinese labour 
took on a new direction, and many planters felt optimistic about their future.41 
Tate had no objection to Chinese labour as long as the labourers were 
repatriated at the end of their contracts. According to Tate, compared with 
Indians, the Chinese were the better of the two 'evils' available. The LMS 
continued to support the recruitment of Chinese labour, and further affirmed that 
Chinese do not "constitute any serious moral danger to the Samoan people."42 
Despite such positive statements, there was growing opposition to 
Chinese labour, not only from the European community but also from Samoans. 
Tate later admitted that some Chinese were "worthless" and "troublesome," but 
they were dealt with severely. Tate also planned to send back Chinese who 
were incompetent.43 At the same time, he was well aware of the resentment in 
New Zealand, and elsewhere, over the ill-treatment of Chinese. Furthermore, 
Tate was equally wary and cautious of the Chinese Consul; whom he felt was 
too well educated to be ignorant of any unfair treatment of Chinese. Tate wrote 
to his wife, "I do not suppose that we shall be able to sustain imprisonment for a 
punishment for disobedience, especially as the new Chinese Consul is an MA. 
of Cambridge. "44 Tate decided to exploit the Samoa Immigration Act, 1920 in 
dealing with disobedience and ill-disciplined Chinese. In 1921, Tate deported 
twenty-seven Chinese under the Act because they were "a source of danger to 
peace, order and good government of Samoa and that they are aliens not born 
in Samoa."45 
"' See previous chapter (Chapter Six) fur evidence of Chinese helping both the church and the New 
Zealand administration dig graves and buiy the dead. 
40 Samoa Problems, 26 Jan, 1920, GP; Hough to Lenwood, 12 Dec, 1918, SSL 
41 See Alan Cobcroft, A Plea for Indentured Labour, Samoa Times, Sept, 1919. 
42 SOC to J. D. Gray, 24 May, 1920, Correspondence of LMS, Samoa District. with the NZ Administration, 
1915-1946, PMB 144; Tate to Robin, 11Aug,1919, TP; Tate to Gray, 7 Nov, 1920, TP. 
43 Tate - Confidential Report, 1 Jan, 1922-31 Mar, 1922, IT 1 Ex 2111. 
44 Tate to Maud, 25 Jul, 1920, TP; Tate to Gray, 7 Nov, 1920, TP. 
45 Order of Deportation, 1921, IT 1 IT 69156; see also: Tate to Gray, 6 Dec, 1920, TP. 
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However, in 1922, Chinese persistence, and Chinese Consular pressure, 
paved the way for positive negotiations over conditions and wages. Changes to 
contract conditions included the eradication of all forms of corporal punishment, 
and a 'no work no pay' system, which offered higher wages, and better living 
conditions, but made the Chinese responsible for their own upkeep. However, 
there was still no concession on the question of a 'free' labour system.46 
Captain Carter, the Chinese Commissioner, noticed that the Chinese had 
become much harder to handle, and gave his reasons for their change in mood. 
With the advent of the Chinese Republic brought about by the 
Revolution of 1911, the thinking power of the Chinese, which 
include the coolie class, has been awakened and has undergone 
an entire change, and having taken his cue from our own labour 
organisation, is proving himself an exceedingly difficult proposition 
to handle .... Coolies as well as other classes of Chinese workers 
have their own guilds or unions as we have, with educated 
Chinese at the head .... The indentured system of labour is 
repugnant to all enlightened Chinese and also to the coolie after 
he has tried it.47 
However, Carter felt this was no excuse for the ill-treatment of Chinese. 
Carter encouraged employers to be more humane in order to succeed with 
Chinese labour. 
Coolies though they are, they are human beings, and are entitled 
to be treated as such. The days have long since gone by when 
they were looked upon as beasts of burden, and any one who 
entertains any such ideas is far behind the times. In order to get 
the best out of the coolie, you must understand him and his 
customs, and unless you are capable of looking at things from the 
Chinese point of view as well as your own, you are at a dead end 
and can never expect to succeed with Chinese labour ... 48 
After Richardson replaced Tate as administrator of Samoa, despite the 
efforts to implement improvements, the harsh treatment, forced deportation, and 
a persisting unsympathetic spirit, continued to be the New Zealand 
administration's policy. Richardson, like his predecessor, also relied on 
46 New Zealand had to be very careful with the issue of 'free settler' as they got into all kinds of difficulty 
with the case of a Chinese woman, Mrs Ah Lam, whose husband had died in China but returned to Samoa 
and bought land and ran a business. See A. McCarthy: Memo re: Mrs Ah Lam, 29 Jun, 1929, IT 1 Ex 
17/12; Secretary of Administration Samoa to Department External affairs, 4 Jul, 1929, IT 1Ex17/12; Tate 
to Minister of External Affairs, 24 Aug, 1921, IT 1 Ex 17 /12; J.D. Gray to Tate, 28 Sept, 1921, IT1 Ex 
17/12; Extract from a Memorandum by Col. Hutchen, n.d., IT 1Ex17/12; see also: Terms of Labour 
Contract For Chinese Labour in Western Samoa, Appendices to the Journal of the House of 
Representatives (henceforth AJHR) 1922 - Appendix (A-4a); Extract From Report of Receiver D.H.&P.G. 
to Minister, 1919, TP. 
47 Carter's Speech on a Luncheon Farewell to Tate, 1922, TP; see also, Report of the Secretary for 
Chinese Affairs for the Year 1922, IT 1 Ex 20/1/1. 
48 Carter's Speech on a Luncheon Farewell to Tate, 1922, TP; Gray to Tate, 2 Aug, 1923, TP. 
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enactments, such as the Samoa Immigration Consolidation Order. 1924, to deal 
with undisciplined Chinese. Richardson's abusive use of the Samoa 
Immigration Consolidation Order, resulted in the deportation of twenty-one 
Chinese for medical reasons, and nine for being undesirables. Chinese who 
escaped while in Police custody were also deported. Deportees awaiting 
transportation were imprisoned for the amount of time it took to secure such 
transport. The Chinese Consul intervened and appealed to the High Court, 
questioning the legality of Richardson's actions. The High Court ruled that under 
the Samoa Immigration Consolidation Order, which Richardson himself had 
been exploiting, deportees could not be imprisoned. Richardson was furious, 
and consequently, when the time came for the deportees to depart, many failed 
to show up. Richardson angrily blamed and condemned the decision of the 
High Court.49 On Richardson's return to New Zealand he commented, 
If some steps were not taken very quickly the destiny of Australia 
and New Zealand and of the rest of the Pacific would be very 
different from what we wished it to be ... a barrier [must] be set up 
to prevent the yellow taint which was coming down through the 
Pacific and gradually polluting the British and other races. 50 
The deportation of Chinese continued under Richardson's successor, 
Colonel Stephen Allen. It satisfied anti-Chinese factions, and served the 
purpose of reducing the spread of the 'yellow taint'. While imprisonment and 
deportation were preferred form of punishments, the hanging of Chinese did 
continue to occur while other incidents involving the Chinese rioting and 
attacking employers decreased,51 but much more common occurrences were 
individual and gang related incidents, which not only invited the attention of the 
Administrator, but caused fear among Samoans, and instilled terror among 
other Chinese. 
According to G. E. L. Westbrook, a resident of Samoa and an LMS 
adherent, one of the unfortunate legacies introduced with the very first 
indentured Chinese was the inclusion amongst the recruits of "gangsters, 
gamblers and other bad eggs."52 The German administration continuously dealt 
with Chinese criminal activities, which increased with the arrival of more 
49 Secretary External Affairs, 25 Oct, 1922, IT 1 Ex 69/56; Order of Deportation, 1921, IT 1 Ex 69156; 
Secretary External Affairs, Memo. 15 Aug, 1923, IT 1Ex69156; Richardson to Minister External Affairs, 
Memo, 11 Jan, 1928, IT 1 Ex 69/56; Memo to Secretary External Affairs, 11 Jan, 1928, IT 1 Ex 69/56. 
•
0 That Yellow Taint, New Zealand Times, 28 Feb, 1923. 
51 R. A. North, Coolie Deserters, 7 Jul, 1922, IT 1 Ex 69156. 
52 Pros and Cons Regarding lhe Chinese Labour Question in Samoa, n.d., WAP. 
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Chinese. These criminal activities ranged from minor assaults and theft to gang 
conflicts and murder. For instance, in 1913, German authorities hanged four 
Chinese at Vaimea gaol for the murder of a storekeeper. In a separate murder 
case, two Chinese were, fortunately, sentenced only to life imprisonment. But, 
both men escaped, resulting in the shooting of one of the Chinese by Police. 53 
Westbrook also recalled an incident involving a plantation owner, where a 
Chinese labourer "broke into her [plantation owners] sleeping quarters at night, 
and tried to ravish her. In the struggle the lady received seventeen cuts and 
bruises."54 When Logan first arrived in Samoa, he was astonished by the 
number of Chinese in gaol for serious violent offences.55 
In 1921, charges were laid against two Chinese for the attempted murder 
of Wong Suikan, while charges of conspiracy and inciting to murder were laid 
against twelve other Chinese, and the Chinese Consul. Suikan, the government 
Chinese interpreter, had his eyes poked with sharp needles. The culprits 
admitted it was their intention to kill Suikan slowly by chopping him from the 
ankles upward.56 In July 1931, a disturbance in Apia town among Chinese 
resulted in the stabbing of Chan Chong. Chiu Sung was charged and convicted 
of murder,57 but perhaps, the most heartless incident involving Chinese 
occurred on 15 October 1927, with the brutal murder of two young girls. 
Westbrook graphically detailed the discovery of the young girls by two 
Europeans. 
They discovered first the Samoan girl on the verandah, with her 
head chopped off and just hanging by the muscles of the neck. 
[The other girl was found inside] ... she was all slashed to pieces 
one side of the face was gone, and there were 21 cuts from a very 
sharp knife, in some instances the flesh was cut away from the 
limbs exposing the bones, she also had a nasty cut in the stomach 
and part of her intestine was exposed.58 
53 Ten Yeara After Berlin Treaty, WAP; Diary of Government (Samoa), 193-1914, GP. 
54 Pros and Cons Regarding the Chinese Labour Question in Samoa, n.d., WAP. 
55 In fact, by 1931, Chinese rank second behind the Samoans in numbers gaoled. See Police and Prison: 
Quarterly Report, 31 Dec, 1931, IT 1 Ex 111719; see also Pros and Cons Regarding the Chinese Labour 
Question in Samoa, n.d., WAP. 
56 The attempted murder charges were laid against Wong Ung (No. 4287) and Ho Ip (No. 4233). The 
Chinese Consul charged was Dr. leefong Ahlo. The other Chinese included Chu Chi (No.4329), Ah Sam 
(3722), Wong Mow (No. 1641 ), Wong Chee (No. 2244), Ip At (No. 1873), and Chee Him (No. 1873). See 
Report of Proceedings of the High Court of Western Samoa. 14 Jul, 1921, IT 1 Ex 20/2; Tate to 
Wohlmann, 16 Jul, 1930, TP. 
57 Police and Prison: Quarterly Report, 30 Sept, 1931, IT 1Ex111719. 
58 Westbrook to Rowe, 17 Ocl, 1927, WP. 
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The search for the culprits involved the police, Europeans, and many 
Samoans, who were shocked and horrified at the extent of the crime. The 
search lasted all Saturday night and well into Sunday, but failed to uncover any 
clues as to the identity of the offenders. In December 1928, Westbrook 
commented that "it was now 15 months ago since the two young girls of 14 
were done to death, yet the police have failed in every way to find the murderer 
or murderers."59 It was not until the beginning of 1929, that the police arrested 
and charged five Chinese with the murders of the girls. Chu Fook, one of the 
offenders, was forced to give evidence that they had planned only to rob the 
house, belonging to Charlie Mugele, but things went terribly wrong when the 
young girls disturbed them. Chu Fook gave evidence that they washed their 
blood stained clothes at the river nearby afterwards. 6°The case became a head 
hunting, face saving fiasco, for the police and anti-Chinese factions. 
Nevertheless, these examples highlight the extent of unlawful activities of 
the Chinese and the ferocity of the murders in which some of the Chinese 
became involved. While a few of the Chinese involved in such violent crimes 
were eventually hanged, most were deported after serving a few years in 
prison. On the other hand, the treatment of the Chinese by the justice systems 
of both Germany and New Zealand administration can only be described as 
heartless and oppressive. Both legal systems seemed to regard Chinese 
complaints, and complainants, as affronts to the administration, and to their 
Chinese employers. Under German administration, all Chinese cases were 
dealt with by the Chief of Police, who "decides au cases in which they [the 
Chinese] were involved, and who often sent them to be punished by whipping, 
which was regarded as the best way of dealing with some of these people .... no 
appeaL"61 
The eradication of corporal punishment and the promotion of the better 
treatment of Chinese labour, failed to curb the influx of Chinese into prison. For 
those who were unfortunate enough to receive long term imprisonment, 
especially for violent crimes such as murder, serving out their prison sentences 
was pure hell. For many Chinese, the death penalty would have been a far 
more humane and a less painful ordeal than prison. The New Zealand 
59 Westbrook to Holland, 8 Dec, 1928, WP. 
60 Those involved included Chu Fook (No. 5475), Ah Mau, Chang Sang, Ah Sui, and Ah Fung. See 
Chinese Prisoners ... Convlcted of Murder, 1928/1929, IT 1Ex711/4. 
61 H.J. Moors, Notes on Police Affairs, 1875-1914, GP. 
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administration police and prison wardens were especially cruel to Chinese 
inmates. The reports of the ill-treatment of Chinese while in police custody or in 
prison found its way into the New Zealand Parliament debates. Holland, the 
leader of the Labour Party, was especially hostile in condemning the Samoa 
administration's efforts to repress the reports.62 
Holland tabled before Parliament reports of police kicking, punching, 
starving, and denying injured Chinese medical treatment. One report mentioned 
the case of an innocent Chinese whom the police arrested, in 1931, for murder, 
but later found no evidence to proceed with the case. He was starved and 
"hammered in his cell by fists of his assailants and was also lashed with a whip 
and eventually he confessed to a crime for which he was not guilty."63 
But, perhaps, the worst case of Chinese abuse in custody, involved the 
offenders (Chu Fook, Chang Sang, Lei Mau, and Wong See) in the Mugele 
girls' killing. Chu Fook and Chang Sang protested against the inhuman 
treatment that they had received from the police while in custody. They alleged 
that European policemen had starved them prior to making their confessions. 
An inquiry was opened, reluctantly, and quickly concluded that the allegations 
were false.64 Lei Mau and Wong See were found guilty and received death 
sentences. While awaiting their fate in prison, they were forced to give evidence 
against Chu Fook and Chang Sang. 
The New Zealand Parliament was informed of the savageness with 
which the police treated Lei Mau and Wong See. The report graphically 
described how one of the Chinese men, due to be executed the next day, was 
transported to Court, cross examined for some six hours, and then returned 
back to Vaimea prison at night without a meal, and was then executed early the 
next morning. The second Chinese man was also subjected to the same 
degrading treatment. He was carted off to court the day before his execution 
and returned to his cell late in the evening. The next morning he was found 
dead in his cell; strangled with strips tom from a blanket. He was still hand-
cuffed, had his legs in irons, and chained to the floor. The police report stated 
that the victim had committed suicide by strangling himself. The police also 
admitted that they knew the victim was sick, but the prison authorities did not 
52 Holland Speech to NZ House of Representative, 1933, WP. 
63 Holland Speech to NZ House of Representative, 1933, WP; see also Westbrook to Holland, 8 Dec, 
1928, WP. 
64 Baxter to Administrator of Samoa, 3 Apr, 1929, IT 1 Ex 7/1/4. 
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believe his condition was serious enough, otherwise, "they would have carried 
out the execution sooner."65 As for Chu Fook and Chang Sang, the fabricated 
evidence provided by the police failed to secure a conviction. 
Many Chinese, struggling to survive plantation conditions, and physical 
and mental misfortunes, found very little practical assistance from the Chinese 
Consulate, not so much because the Chinese Consuls failed to assist the 
Chinese in their predicaments, but because they themselves received very little 
respect and co-operation from the New Zealand administration. When the first 
Chinese Consul, Lin Jun Chao, took up office in 1909, he promptly took up 
Chinese complaints with the German administration. Chao's determination and 
successful dealing with the German administration gave the Chinese a much 
needed avenue for fairness. The relationship between the German 
administration and the Chinese Consulate was difficult, but co-operative. 
Dr Leefong Ahlo arrived in June, 1920, as the Chinese Consul in Samoa. 
He was accompanied by his wife and daughter, and the Chinese vice-Consul, 
Pan Chengfu, a secretary, Tang Changpin, and two maids, Mrs Li and Mrs Lo.66 
A year after taking up his post, Ahlo found himself in Tate's list of enemies. 
Tate demanded Ahlo's removal from Samoa for "he has interfered with the 
administration of justice, has interfered with the political situation with the 
natives, and has improperly influenced Chinese labour...s7 Tate accused Ahlo of 
influencing witnesses in an opium criminal case, influencing Chinese not to take 
up the option of re-indenturing, and trying to influence Samoan matai to help 
Ghinese with Samoan families stay as free settlers.68 
The conflict between Ahlo and the Administration reached an 
irreconcilable position, in June, 1921, when the police arrested and charged 
Ahlo with inciting Chinese labourers to murder the government Chinese 
interpreter.69 Ahlo's arrest was bitterly condemned and harshly criticised by the 
U.S. vice-consul, Q. F. Roberts, and the French consular agent, G. H. 
MacKenzie. Roberts accused Tate of a "serious breach of privilege and 
courtesy usually extended to Consuls of friendly nations."70 The High Court 
65 Holland Speech to NZ House of Representative, 1933, WP. 
66 The Samoa Times, 24 Jul, 1920, TP. 
67 Tate to Minister of External Affairs, 11 May, 1921, IT 1 Ex69/56; Tate to Wohlmann, 16 Jul, 1930, TP. 
68 TatetoMinisterofExtemalAffairs, 11May,1921, IT1 Ex 69156. 
69 Tate to Wohlmann, 16 Jul, 1930, TP. 
70 Q. F. Roberts,. .. to Administrator of Samoa, 18 Jul, 1921, IT 1 Ex 2012. 
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upheld Ahlo's good character and acquitted him of all charges. Ahlo left Samoa 
in July 1921.71 
Chao-Song Lee arrived in July, 1922, commended by the New Zealand 
government as a "modern Chinese, a radical but hardly a firebrand. He is very 
popular with local Chinese ... quiet and friendly in manner."72 Lee found himself 
flooded with complaints from Chinese,73 and pressure from employers and the 
administration which continued to arrest and charge Chinese labourers with 
petty vagrancy offences, and disobedience; further creating tensions. 74 The 
Chinese Consulate continued to operate in Samoa with no real influence, until 
the administration finally choked the life out of it. The Consulate closed in 
1947.75 
Accusations of tong (secret society) links did not help the reputation of 
the Chinese Consuls. According to Tate, the tongs had a lot to do with the 
violent criminal activities involving Chinese. Tate's accusations first surfaced in 
1921 when he accused Ahlo of using secret societies to incite Chin~se not to 
re-indenture, but to coerce the administration to grant 'free settler' status. Tate 
also believed secret societies extorted money from Chinese, threatening injuries 
if such money was not paid. According to Tate, Ahlo belonged to the Wai -Chao 
Pu society, which controlled various unlawful operations at different plantations. 
Tate called for stringent selection guidelines and an assurance from the 
Chinese government, that future Consuls would not have secret society 
connections. 76 
Many Chinese had serious opium addictions. Secret societies were 
accused of smuggling and distributing the drug. During the German 
Administration, importation of opium into Samoa was strictly controlled.77 With 
the advent of war in 1914, the question of opium usage and opium importation 
gained little attention. It was not until 1920 that a huge opium addiction problem 
71 Reports of Proceedings of the High Court of Western Samoa, 14 Jul, 1921, IT 1 Ex 20/2; Q. F. 
Roberts .. .to the Administrator of Samoa, 18 July, IT 1 Ex 2012. 
72 Thomas Harrington to Marquess Curson of Kedleyton, 2 Dec, 1921, IT 1 Ex 2012/3. 
73 Mandated Territory of Western Samoa, First Report, 1May,1921-31Mar,1922, AJHR 1922 (A4}. 
74 Quarterly Report Chinese Commissioners Department, 30 Sept, 1922, IT 1Ex1/1712. 
75 Confidential Report (December) No. 16, 1947, Confidential Papers from Col. F. W. Voelecker (High 
Commission), 1947-1949, IT 1Ex1136/4. 
76 Mandated Territory of Western Samoa - Report, 1921, WP; Tate to Minister of External Affairs, 11 May, 
1921, IT 1 Ex 2012; Tate to Gray, 4 Sept, 1921, TP; Minister of External Affairs - Memo, 10 Aug, 1921, IT 1 
Ex 20/211. 
77 Harman to Imperial Government, 4 Jul, 1904, GCA, Micro-R 5768. 
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surfaced among Chinese. The Chinese Commissioner and several employers 
noted that many Chinese worked just to maintain their addiction.78 Tate took 
steps to prohibit the importation of opium, but only succeeded in creating an 
opium black market 
Several papa/agi and Chinese merchants financed opium shipment into 
Samoa. Ships carried large quantities of opium from China and Hawaii for 
distribution. The island steamers trading between islands, which were exempted 
from custom clearances, also carried opium supplies for distributors.79 New 
Zealand business-men travelling to China and other parts of Asia also returned 
via Samoa with quantities of opium for distribution. Rewards were offered for 
information leading to the seizure of opium, and the arrests of opium offenders. 
80 When opium supplies dried up, the Chinese turned to the manufacturing of 
drugs, and the distilling, of proof spirits, from cocoa juice. They made more 
money selling drugs and proof spirits in one night than working on a plantation 
for a month. According to the police, the increase in such activities stemmed 
from a High Court decision, which ruled that the manufacturing of drugs, and 
distilling proof spirits, from cocoa juice, did not constitute an offence.81 The 
number of addicts increased with an increase in drug supplies. 
The Chinese gambling houses were the nerve centres for much of the 
Chinese misfortunes. The Chinese spent their Sundays, Chinese holidays,82 
and public holidays, gambling or learning to gamble within such premises. The 
gambling dens trapped many Chinese into debt, some picked up criminal 
habits, while others became drug addicts.83 The Chinese government became 
78 Report by the Government of NZ ... Traffic in Opium and Dangerous Drugs, 1925, IT 1 Ex 5112/2. 
79 Importing opium and other drugs into Samoa were made easy by the non-existence of a wharf. Ships 
anchored out at sea and small trading vessels load and unload cargoes at will. Customs found it very hard 
to control movements of ships in Samoan waters. See Tate to Minister of External Affairs, 24 Aug, 1921, IT 
1 Ex 17112; Tate to Collector of Customs, 8 Feb, 1921, IT 1 Ex 5112; Braisby to Commissioner of Police, 
16 Feb, 1921. IT 1 Ex 5112; Governor of Fiji to Governor-General of NZ, 13 May, 1921, IT 1 Ex 5112; 
Commissioner of Police Report, 31 Dec, 1922, IT 1 Ex 1/1719; Forty-Two Years in Samoa," WP. 
"" The case of Alexander (Max) Sutherland who worked for Burns Philp, is an example. See J. D. Gray to 
Robert Bums, 7 Oct, 1922, IT 1 Ex 511211; Administration to External Affairs [Telegram), 16 Oct. 1922, IT 1 
Ex 5112/1; R. Burns to Gray, 27 Oct, 1922, IT 1 Ex 5112/1; see also, Gray to Inspector of Prison, 27 Aug, 
1920, IT 1 Ex 5112; Rewards for Opium Seizures, 26 Jun, 1920, IT 1 Ex 5112; S.G. Trail to Acting 
Secretary, 17 May, 1921, IT 1 Ex5/12. 
"Police and Prison: Quarterly report, 30 Sept, 1922, IT 1Ex1/17/9; Tate to Secretary External Affairs, 30 
Sept, 1922, IT 1 Ex 69156; The Story of the Snake, n.d.," WP. 
82 The Chinese celebrated most of the Chinese holidays, including the Chinese New Year, Revolution Day, 
and so forth. See Tom, 56-60. On the effect on Samoans of the gambling houses see Western Samoa 
Historical Notes, 1935, IT1 Ex 2115. 
83 II seems Chinese labourers complaints may have been true. Samoan policemen carried out a raid of 
their own and took money from a gambling school in 1914. See Ten Years After Berlin Treaty, WAP. 
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aware of the Chinese addiction problems and tried to address them with the 
help of the Anti-Opium Society. The Chinese government was advised that, in 
order to succeed in "eradicating the said evil from these [Chinese] unhappy 
people,"84 New Zealand needed to implement the recommendations of the Anti-
Opium Society. There is no evidence to show that the New Zealand 
administration in Samoa was aware of such recommendations. But, even if it 
did, the administration would have ignored it, as Tate's policy focused more on 
the elimination and deportation of Chinese addicts, rather than curing them.85 
Melanesian labourers created far less problems compared to the 
Chinese. One reason for this was the great interest shown by the missions, 
especially the LMS, towards Melanesian labourers. While the LMS failed to fully 
implement any kind of evangelisation work among the Chinese, it ensured that 
Melanesian workers received a pastor, and full usage of LMS resources.86 The 
Lotu Pope and the WMMS also had little to do with Chinese, although, by the 
late 1950's, a few Chinese had adhered to the Lotu Pope.87 Other missions, 
such as the Mamona, also distanced themselves from the Chinese at the 
beginning. In a letter to the President of the Mamona church, a goodwill mission 
to Samoa wrote, "we do not like cheap labour. We hate it as we hate the devil, 
and it is no good talking to us about Chinese."88 
LMS interest in the Chinese began in 1911, when Chinese relations with 
Samoan women increased, and Chinese gambling activities increasingly 
fascinated Samoans. The Au Fa'atonu searched for a Chinese pastor to work 
among the Chinese, but would not commit to it any LMS support.89 In 1913, the 
German administration approved Li-Shiu Kwai as the Chinese pastor. Kwai, 
84 Chinese Foreign Office (Peking - T. F. Hwang} to Directors of Anti-Opium Society (Peking}, 2 Mar, 1921, 
IT 1 Ex 5/12. 
""Anti-Opium Society (A, Sowerby) to T. F. Hwang, 9 Mar, 1921, IT 1 Ex 5/12. 
86 D.R. Eden to W. H. Whyte, 26 Nov, 1945, IT 1 Ex 6916311; W. H. Whyte to Eden, 14 Dec, 1945, IT 1 
Ex69/63/1; W. H. Whyte to Administrator, 5 Jun, 1946, IT 1 Ex69/63/1; Administrator to W. H. Whyte, 4 
Jun, 1946, IT 1 Ex 69163/1; Eden to Administrator, 12 Jun. 1946, IT 1 Ex 6916311; Copp's Answers to 
Capell, 1945, GP; Women's Work in Mafua, 1918, LMS Papers, 1918-1919, GP. 
87 Tom, 100. 
68 Goodwill mission to President of LDS, 16 Jul, 1936, IT 1 Ex 1165. 
89 Instead, the SOC called upon the students at Mafua Theological College to contribute towards any 
financial obligations. See Hills to Shultz, 19 Jun, 1913, Correspondence of LMS ... with the German 
Administration, 1905-1915, PMS 143; Newell to Rev. Harwood, 25 Jun, 1910, LMS South Seas Archives, 
South Seas Special Personal (Newell Papers 1899-1910) [henceforth NP]. 
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who spoke very little English, commenced work in Samoa in May 1914.90 In 
1916, fifteen Chinese offered themselves for baptism during the Samoan 
Church General Assembly, with a further seventeen Chinese baptised in 1917. 
Unfortunately, the Au Fa'atonu commended Kwai for missionary work in China, 
leaving the work among the Samoan Chinese in obscurity. 91 
It seems the Au Fa'atonu was under the impression that Kwai was no 
longer needed. The repatriation policy of the Samoan administration after the 
war may have influenced the Au Fa'atonu in its decision. Nevertheless, it was a 
decision that haunted the Au Fa'atonu for a long time. By 1919, unchristian 
Chinese activities impelled the Au Fa'atonu to call for a re-commencement of 
Chinese evangelisation in Samoa. The Au Fa'atonu wrote, "the place [Apia] is 
rotten with Chinese gambling dens."92 The Au Fa'atonu tried to deal with the 
problem by appointing one of the Chinese converts as a caretaker pastor, but 
his forced repatriation created a further dilemma for the Au Fa'atonu.93 Tate 
also initiated enquires to obtain a Chinese missionary from Hawaii, but with no 
success. The Au Fa'atonu finally turned to New Zealand churches in a 
desperate effort to recruit a Chinese pastor, but to no avail. The problem, 
according to the Au Fa'atonu, was finding the right person who could 
understand the different dialects of the Chinese.94 
In 1927, the Reverend W. Mawson of the New Zealand Methodist 
Conference, visited Samoa in a bid to find a solution to the problem of 
appointing a Chinese pastor to Samoa. Mawson's visit highlighted the idleness 
of the Au Fa'atonu in finding a solution to the problem. Mawson surveyed the 
various plantations and found that the majority of Chinese were Cantonese from 
the districts of Sze Yap, Heungshan, Yan Ping, and P'oon Yue. There were also 
some twenty Foochow men and a number of Hakkas. Mawson recommended a 
Cantonese pastor familiar with various other dialects. Mawson also 
recommended that the LMS should initiate the evangelisation of the many half 
90 SDC -Minutes of Meeting, Papauta, 12-17 Dec, 1911, SSL; SDC- Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 26 Apr-
4 May, 1912, SSL; SDC - Minute of Meeting, Malua, 2-10 May, 1913, SSL: Hills to Thompson, 11, 14 May 
& 9 Jun, 1914, SSL; SDC - Minutes of Meeting, Apia, 15 Dec, 1914, SSL: SDC - Minutes of Meeting, 
May, 1915, SSL. 
91 Kwai prayed and preached in Chinese during the service in 1917. See SDC - Minutes of Meeting, 
Malua, 3-12 May, 1916, SSL; SDC- Minute of Meeting, Malua, 2-11 May, 1917, SSL. 
92 SDC - Minutes of Meeting, Papauta, 6-15 Dec, 1919, SSL; SDC - Minute of Meeting, Papauta, 10-18 
Dec, 1917, SSL. 
93 SDC - Minute of Meeting, Papauta, 12-17 Dec, 1921, SSL. 
94 TatetoGray,31Jan,1921, TP. 
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Chinese children, whom Mawson believed were "susceptible to good [Christian] 
influence. "95 
The Au Fa'atonu rejected Mawson's recommendations. The Reverend H. 
Darvill favoured a non-Chinese pastor who can speak Cantonese. Darvill 
pointed out that: 
The limited scope of the Chinese mission field will hardly justify 
the appointment of a Chinese pastor. Moreover, the 
Administration would not be greatly interested in supporting any 
scheme of religious instruction to Chinese in Samoa, which 
included in its objects the introduction of a pure-blooded Chinese 
pastor. Being obsessed with the Samoan [sic]problem, the 
Administration would be apprehensive lest in the pursuance of his 
work the Chinese pastor should take up certain social problems, 
the essence of which may not be for the good of the territory. 96 
This was a blatant excuse for the Au Fa'atonu non-commitment in finding 
a solution to the problem. Instead, the Au Fa'atonu laid the blame squarely on 
the New Zealand administration. Another Au Fa'atonu member, the Reverend 
E. H. Feather, pointed to the cost involved, and the administration's own policy, 
which "discountenanced anything likely to interfere with the progress of the 
Samoans as a race and such a step [appointment of a Chinese missionary] 
might be regarded as one that would be a danger to the welfare of such a small 
nation."97 The Au Fa'atonu's position created a negative impression of the 
Chinese among members of the Samoa (LMS) Church. Pastors and village 
congregations man-handled, and ejected Chinese from villages, as they 
attempted to conduct trade on Sundays.98 The notion of securing a Chinese 
pastor for Samoa was never again considered. 
It was within such a depressed unreasonable religious atmosphere, that 
a New Zealand government goodwill mission visited Samoa in 1927. They 
heard numerous complaints from planters regarding unfair Chinese demands 
and the labour shortage, which had forced the closure of several large 
plantations. Traders and merchants also complained of Chinese expropriating 
95 Mawson to Darvill, 29 Aug, 1927, SSL. 
96 Darvill to Barradale, 9 Nov, 1927, SSL 
97 Feather to Barradale, 2 Apr, 1928, SSL; see also Feather to Barradale, 25 Jun, 1928, SSL 
98 Interview with many elderly Samoans recalled many such incidents occurring. Many of those interviewed 
recalled taking part in such actions as young boys. (Interviews conducted between 1992 and 1995. Audio 
tapes and transcript in author's possession). 
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jobs, which rightly belonged to them.99 There is no doubt that the shortage of 
labour gave the Chinese leverage to negotiate for high wages, and to move 
from one employer to another, at will. Such freedom to act at will created friction 
between labourers and employers, and between employers competing for the 
same labourer. It installed little sympathy for the Chinese among employers. In 
1928, a frustrated manager of the Vailele plantation named Heycock, badly beat 
up one of his Chinese workers over what he considered unfair demands, and 
his unwillingness to work. The matter was reported to the police by the Chinese 
Acting-Consul, but the court case cleared Heycock of any misdeed.100 
During this time, the Mau activities gained momentum and attracted large 
followings among Samoans. In 1929, Mau aggression towards the 
administration amplified, and not surprisingly, the Chinese used such political 
instability to continue hostility against employers. 101 In August 1929, some 300 
Chinese employed by the government owned New Zealand Reparation Estate 
(NZRE), 102 went on strike over the failure of the Chinese Department to resolve 
a dispute over the question of foreman. The two rival tongs of Taumoon and 
Haiyan origins fought over the post, with a Haiyan candidate winning. The 
police arrested a small group whom they considered to be the ring-leaders. The 
arrests did not deter the Chinese from marching again in numbers to the 
Chinese Department two days later. The confrontation with government officials 
turned violent and the police unrestrainedly used batons and firearms to diffuse 
the situation. Five Chinese received gunshot wounds with nine others being 
treated for baton injuries. Of those arrested, fourteen were convicted, with four 
receiving deportation orders.103 A few months after the NZRE Chinese riots, 
New Zealand police used the same batons and firearms to pacify the Mau 
procession in Apia.104 
"'European Planters' Report, ca. 1927, IT 1 Ex 1123/9; Notes of Deputation From European 
Planters ... Upon the Hon. W. Nosworthy, 19 Jun, 1927, IT 1Ex112319; Petition by Traders, n.d., WP; Pros 
and Cons Regarding the Chinese Labour Question in Samoa, n.d. WAP; Haynes. 25. 
100 Westbrook to Holland, 8 Dec, 1928, WP. 
101 It was also a time of heightened political conditions in China - with the Chinese revolution in full swing, 
there is no doubt Chinese everywhere, including Samoa, would have been heartened by such uprising in 
their struggle against oppression. See S. Lautenschieger, Present Conditions in China, 23 Mar, 1927, IT 1 
Ex 111712. 
102 NZRE was the largest employer of Chinese labourers in Samoa. See Memorandum, J. D. Gray, 27 
Sept, 1921, IT 1 Ex 1/1712. 
103 Police and Prison: Quarterly Report, 30 Sept, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1/1719; Field, 143. 
104 Perkins to Chirgwin, Report 1929, 31, Dec, 1929, SSR; see also Chaj>lers Seven and Eight. 
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The unstable political conditions also encouraged many Chinese to seek 
permanent and free settler status. The 'no Chinese in Samoa' stance taken by 
the administration, and the unwillingness of many Chinese to leave Samoa, was 
motivation enough to rebel against the administration. The Chinese 
confrontation with administration officials in 1929 may not have been connected 
with the Mau confrontation a few months later, but its impact on the minds of 
Samoans embracing the Mau cause, meant nothing other than support for the 
Mau. While there is no written evidence to suggest this connection between the 
Mau and the Chinese in Samoan politics, there is oral evidence, and land and 
chiefly title evidence, which suggest otherwise.105 Many Chinese, traders, 
merchants, and even labourers, passively and actively, assisted and supported 
the activities of the Mau through provisions, logistics, and monetary assistance. 
Those who served the Mau faithfully were generously rewarded fa'asamoa. 106 
It is true that one of the grievances the Mau wanted addressed was the 
question of Chinese repatriation, but evidence suggests that 'pure' Samoans 
were very much in favour of Chinese, especially those who had established 
themselves with Samoan connections.107 It seems the Mau had used the 
'mongrelisation of the Samoan race' issue only as ammunition against the New 
Zealand administration, while all along Mau leaders had no intention of seeking 
a satisfactory outcome. It certainly gave New Zealand a bad name, and 
highlighted Mau contention that New Zealand was unfit to administer Samoa. 
The Mau found ample support for its contentions in the Labour Party and the 
New Zealand press.108 
The idea of mixed relations between the Chinese and Samoan women 
was an issue that did concern a cross section of the Samoan community. The 
German administration had no law against such relationships, although labour 
contracts prohibited Chinese entering into relationships with Samoan women. 
105 The transferring of matai names to non Samoans occurred regularly, especially when the Samoans 
concerned have much to gain from the exercise. In the middle of a power struggle between chiefs of 
Vaimoso village in 1909, Tamasese illegally gave away Vaimoso titles to Melanesian labourers. See 
Memo by T olo, 6 Feb, 1909, German Administration Papers : Samoan Affairs XVII 84 (henceforth GAP); 
Shultz to Sotf, 12 Dec, 1908, GAP. 
106 The contentions I made are based on personal interviews with descendants of Chinese traders, 
merchants, and labourers in Samoa, and Samoans themselves. (Interviews conducted between 1992 and 
1995. Audio and transcripts in author's possession). 
107 Tate commented on the close relationship between Chinese and Samoans during his term as 
Administrator, something that many Europeans and outsiders had faHed to observe. See Tate to Liverpool, 
21 August, 1919, BCS; see also Field, 216-217. 
108 Samoa and Chinese, The Star, 22 Nov, 1935, WP (Newspaper Cuttings). 
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Self dealt with several violent disputes arising from such mixed relationships, 
such as complaints concerning Chinese sleeping with Samoan women within 
village boundaries, and disputes concerning Samoans prohibiting Chinese from 
cohabiting with their de facto wives. The LMS provided Self with practical 
solutions to the problems, while the planters' selfish resolution called upon Self 
to sanction Samoan women to work in the plantations; thus helping to keep the 
Chinese within the boundaries of the plantations.109 Self finally issued an order 
forbidding Chinese entering Samoan houses.110 However, the order failed to 
restrict the movement of Samoan women into Chinese dwellings. 
The problem escalated, and continued unmonitored between 1914 and 
1918. After the war, an enormous increase in the number of illegitimate half-
Chinese children,111 forced the administration to consider forced repatriation in 
order to arrest the problem. The administration also called for future Chinese 
labourers to be accompanied by their Chinese wives, an idea also favoured by 
the missions, but it never eventuated. Single Chinese continued to be recruited 
to cut costs, and for those who were married, low wages meant they could not 
afford passage for their wives.112 
According to Tate, mixed relationships was not a Chinese problem, but a 
Samoan one, because "the Samoan women recognise them [Chinese] as better 
husbands than Samoan men"113 and "they are prostitute at heart both men and 
women; the whole thing for the gain of the Samoan family."114 But, several 
European residents reminded Tate that the Chinese were not the only ones 
defiling Samoan women. Westbrook wrote: 
Why are the blackboys, an inferior race, time expired labour, 
allowed to remain in Samoa, and live fa'a-Samoa with Samoan 
women, and would it not be better if they were returned to their 
homes, and some arrangement made to get others to take their 
place accompanied by their wives? Is it good for the Samoans that 
their blood should be mix [sic] with that of a race (Melanesian) that 
is inferior? 115 
'""Notes of Deputation From European Planters ... Upon the Hon. W. Nosworthy, 19 Jun, 1927, IT 1 Ex 
1123/9. 
110 Memo by Tolo, 3 Sept, 1910, GAP; Stockicht to Shultz, 10 Sept, 1910, GAP; Stockichl to Shultz, 11 
Oct, 1910, GAP, 84; Newell lo Solt, 28 May, 1909, NP. 
111 Imhoff to Shultz, 21 Oct, n.d. GAP; Tale lo Robin, 11Aug,1919, TP. 
112 Liversedge to SOC, 26 Jun, 1922, SSL; Lin Shih-Yuan to Prime Minister (NZ), 12 Aug, 1920, IT 1 Ex 
7217; Tale lo Maudie, 1Jan,1921, TP. 
113 Talelo Robin, 11Aug,1919. TP. 
114 Memorandum, J. D. Gray, 27 Sept, 1921, IT 1 Ex 1/17/2. 
115 Westbrook to Holland, 23 Apr, 1927, WP. 
Westbrook also noted that a number of white New Zealand policemen would 
also leave behind "a number of bastards."116 
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Several proclamations were enacted but failed to alleviate the growing 
and deep relationships fathomed by the Chinese and their Samoan families. In 
1931, the administration issued a further proclamation, forbidding Chinese 
entering Samoan houses, and Samoan women entering labourers' homes. The 
administration also rejected Chinese applications for 'free settler' status, for 
those who arrived in Samoa after 1900, to further discourage mixed 
relationships. 117 The administration also made laws to stop Samoans marrying 
Chinese, but the missions were at odds as to how they should tackle the 
problem regarding church memberships for Samoans involved in such de facto 
relationships. The Methodist Synod in 1939 spelled out its position in relation to 
Samoans living with Chinese for its pastors. 
Where Samoan women are living faithfully as the wives of 
Chinese ... the fact that the government does not permit these to 
marry shall be no bar to full church memberships if the catechist 
vouches for their good character.118 
The stories of the Chinese "bastarding of Tahiti", Hawaii, and other 
places in the Pacific, circulated widely in New Zealand.119 Eventually, the New 
Zealand government bowed to public pressure, and proceeded to implement 
plans to repatriate the remaining Chinese in Samoa; a move which further 
infuriated the planters. 120 But the advent of the World War II put a stop to the 
repatriation plans as transport became limited, and the fact that China was at 
the mercy of the Japanese army.121 After the war, there were about 285 
Chinese in Samoa. Of these, eighty-seven were elderly, and only a hundred 
116 Westbrook to Logan, 1 Dec, 1930, WP. 
117 In 1921, the New Zealand Administration had issued a Proclamation prohibiting marriages between 
Chinese and Samoans. Unfortunately, it did not stop mixed relationships. In 1936, there were 898 Chinese 
in Samoa, of which 778 were a mixture of Samoan and Chinese blood. See Chinese Labourers and 
Samoan Women Proclamation, 26 Oct, 1931, IT 1 Ex 37/11; Mandated Territory of Western Samoa, 1938, 
GP. 
118 Minutes of the Annual District Synod of the Samoan District, Asau, 21 - 24 Nov, 1939, Archives of the 
Samoan Methodist Church, Apia. 
119 Samoa and Chinese, The Star, 22 Nov, 1935, WP (Newspaper Cuttings). 
120 It had been an official Labour Party policy to reduce Chinese in Samoa from 1935. See Report to the 
Trusteeship Council by the United Nations Mission to Western Samoa: Annexes to the Report, 24 Sept, 
1947, GP; see also Percy S. Allen, The Pacific Islands: Fiji and Samoa, Sydney: James J. Lee, 1921, 15-
16; Samoa: The Labour Problem, n.d., WAP; Malama Meleisea, The Making of Modem Samoa, Suva: 
University of the South Pacific, 1987, 173; J.W. Davidson, Samoa mo Samoa: The Emergence of the 
Independent State ofWestem Samoa, Melbourne: Oxford University, 1967, 151. 
121 Mandated Territory of Western Samoa, 31 Mar, 1937, GP; Confidential Political Report - German 
Samoa, 30 May, 1937, GP; Mandated Territory of Western Samoa, 20~ Report, 1940, AJHR, 1940, vol. 1. 
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and twenty six persons wanted to return to China. But the cost of repatriating 
was in the vicinity of £17,000; a sum the Chinese Repatriation Funds, and the 
New Zealand administration, could not accommodate.122 
By 1948, the government, grossly embarrassed, had still not managed to 
arrange a ship for the repatriated Chinese.123 The delay increased the 
possibility of all Chinese remaining permanently in Samoa. The League of 
Nations (later United Nations) reiterated that if the Chinese remained in Samoa, 
they were entitled to privileges as any other immigrants. Under the League of 
Nations Charter, there was no discrimination, and no restrictions on 
employment and way of living which were not imposed on other nationalities.124 
Furthermore, there was strong support from the Samoans for Chinese with 
Samoan families to remain in Samoa.125 However, in September 1948, the last 
Chinese repatriates were dragged onto small boats, despite the emotional and 
physical protests of Samoan families and friends, and were ferried to the 
S.S. Yunnan which took them away from Apia. Out of the one hundred and 
twenty-six Chinese who had indicated their willingness to return home, only one 
hundred and four persons embarked for China; twenty-two found something 
more precious in Samoa than a free trip home.126 
The Chinese made enormous sacrifices in pursuit of material fortunes 
and, at the same time, contributed to the development of Samoa. However, it 
seems the misfortunes outweighed the fortunes; and the sacrifices were not 
worth the pilgrimage to Samoa. Just how precise this appraisal may be, I cannot 
say with any amount of certainty, but perhaps, the epitaph on a Chinese 
labourer's tombstone at Talimatau cemetery provides a better insight as to the 
'tainted dragon's' fortune in paradise. The identity of the Chinese labourer is 
also unknown, but the unusual inscription on his tombstone explains why. It 
reads: 'Who knows why unlucky be I to die in a foreign country?"127 
122 Mandated Territory of Western Samoa, 23'' Report, 3 Mar, 1946, AJHR, 1946, vol. 1(A4); Confidential 
Report (March), no. 2, 1947, Confidential Papers From Col. F. W. Voelcker, 1947-1949, IT 1 Ex 1/36/4. 
123 Confidential Report (December), No. 16, 1947, Confidential Papers From Col. F. W. Voelecker (High 
Commission), 1947-1949, IT 1Ex1/36/4; Western Samoa, 27th Report, 1950, AJHR 1950, vol. 1 (A4). 
124 Western Samoa - NZ Government, Policy, 1 O May, 1948, IT 1 Ex 1/36/1. 
125 Confidential Report (June) No. 6, 1947, Confidential Papers From Col. F. W. Voelecker (High 
Commission), 1947-1949, IT 1Ex1/36/4. 
126 Tom, 66. 
127 Tom, 104. 
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The treatment of the Chinese and other indentured labourers found a soft 
spot in the Samoans, especially with those who had built up connections with 
Samoan families. While missions and many Europeans detested Samoan 
mixed marriages with Chinese and Melanesians, the Samoans sympathised 
with the indentured labourers because of the harsh treatment at the hands of 
the authorities. The Chinese, especially, had found favour with many Samoans 
during the Mau troubles and their support had not been forgotten by the 
Samoans. The indentured labourers' predicaments found a compassionate ear 
during Samoan's struggle for self-determination. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
A QUESTION OF AUTHORITY: 
SAMOAN (LMS) CHURCH LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES 
The New Zealand administration took over Germany's labour problems 
and tried to deal with them according to suggestions and advice from the 
various plantation owners, papalagi and the missions. The last time Samoans 
had the right to control immigrants, such as Chinese, entering Samoa was in 
1880,1 and the last time they spoke up regarding Chinese 'tainting' Samoan 
blood was in 1915.2 But overall, papalagi, including missionaries, maintained 
the view that Samoans were ignorant and incapable of making decisions 
beneficial to their welfare, and in doing so, failed to canvas Samoan opinions on 
matters important to the Samoans. The Chinese indentured labour problems 
highlighted this superiority mentality among the papalagi and the missions. For 
instance, the LMS missionaries were aware of the problems of having Chinese 
labourers in Samoa, but in consultation with the New Zealand administration, 
they relinquished their moral obligation to the Samoans and supported the 
importation of Chinese labourers.3 Samoans and Samoan church leaders were 
not even invited to submit their views. 
The Samoans had always done things the soalaupule way.4 When the 
opinions of influential and important members of the Samoan community were 
overlooked, their pride was usually injured. Such offences usually resulted in 
warfare and revenge in order to redeem one's pride and family honour. It was, 
therefore, unacceptable to make final decisions on any matters on which the 
Samoans themselves had not been given the opportunity to offer an opinion. 
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Samoans found it hard to 
express their opinions on matters important to their welfare, because of the 
interference of other nations, Europeans and missions. Consequently, they kept 
1 Notes on Samoa, 1928-1931, S.S. Allen Collection (henceforth SSA); Westbrook to Samoa Guardian, 
n.d., Westbrook Additional Papers, 79-270 (henceforth WAP). 
2 Mata'afa losefo approached the New Zealand administration to express his concern at an increase in mix 
blood Samoans. See Chinese Labour - Samoa, R.W. Tate Papers (Diaries) [henceforth TP]. 
3 SOC to Lenwood, 20 Jun, 1916, SSL; SOC, Minutes of Meeting, Papauta, 20-23 Dec, 1909/1910, SSL; 
SOC, Minutes of Meeting, Mafua, 3-8 May, 1909, SSL 
4 This is a word that describes the mentality of the Samoans towards making a final decision on any 
important matter. Soa/aupule means to talk about something openly and everyone expresses an opinion 
before a consensus is reached regarding a final solution. 
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their grievances to themselves, while exploring ways to recover their right to 
free expression. At times, various avenues for expression presented 
themselves, but they only led to punishment and, consequently, the Samoans 
relapsed back into their shells. 5 
The political conflicts that followed were just further avenues towards free 
expression, and the consequent petitions for independence, but the motivation 
for control was not restricted to the political arena. The Samoan pastors, on 
many occasions, also challenged the LMS's leadership on matters they felt 
warranted their opinion. At times, out of frustration for lack of being consulted, 
the Samoan church leaders took an aggressive stance to the point of meddling 
in church matters without the consent of the Au Fa'atonu. 
The leadership dispute between the Au Fa'atonu and the Samoan church 
leaders was never an issue in the nineteenth century.6 There were times the 
Samoan pastors tried to influence the decisions of the Au Fa'atonu, but the 
Samoans were generally of the idea that the Au Fa'atonu was in charge. At the 
height of the political stand-off between America, Britain and Germany over the 
kingship issue in 1889, and later in 1899, the Au Fa'atonu voiced its support for 
the LMS candidate the Samoans' supported.7 The establishment of the Fono 
Tele gave the Samoan church leaders the chance to observe the running of the 
Samoan (LMS) Church, but the leadership of the church remained firmly in the 
hands of the Au Fa'atonu.8 
The events that took place early in the twentieth century triggered 
opinions on church autonomy, and the first signs of a challenge to the Au 
Fa'atonu's authority occurred in 1902. The Samoan pastors took the initiative 
and invited the Au Fa'atonu to a meeting to discuss the issue regarding the 
Reverend William E. Goward and the dismissal of four Samoan pastors from 
their post in Beru, in the North West Outstations (NWO); comprising the Gilbert 
[Kiribati] and Ellice (Tuvalu) Islands. The LMS missionaries were not prepared 
for what was about to take place, and later revealed it was one of the most 
5 For instance, the Oloa Kamupani and the Mau-a-Pule. See Chapters Three and Four. 
6 Note: Although relations between the Samoan pastors and LMS missionaries remained cordial, there 
was within the ranks of the LMS Samoan District Committee [Au Fa'atonu] a dispute over leadership in 
1871. See Pratt to Mullens, 11 May 1871, SSL; Whitmee to Mullens, 11 May 1871, SSL. 
7 For examples, see previous Chapter One - Introduction: Echoes From the Past. 
8 Newell to Thompson, 8 Oct, 1888, SSL; Claxton to Thompson, 25 Feb, 1889, SSL; Newell to Thomson, 
Oct, 31, 1898, SSL; S. A. Beveridge to Thompson, Feb, 3, 1899, SSL. 
sorrowful and bitter meetings they had ever encountered with the Samoan 
pastors.9 
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The Samoan pastors, Apelu, luta, lsaia, and Luka, claimed the 
controversy began over Goward's comments that "Samoan teachers were of no 
use; they were foolish and that the work here [in the Gilberts] was badly 
begun."10 The Samoans demanded that Goward withdraw his statement 
regarding Samoan pastors, and threatened to return to Samoa if Goward failed 
to apologise.11 Goward refuted the Samoans' claim, and Goward threatened to 
send the Samoans home if they refused to withdraw their abusive remarks. 
Goward's ego was too inflated for such a proposal, and the Samoan pastors 
returned to Samoa where they took up their grievances with the Samoan senior 
pastors. 12 Goward later charged that the Samoans had left on their own accord 
after having insulted him. 
At the meeting between the Samoan pastors and the Au Fa'atonu, the 
Samoans spoke strongly against Goward's action. The speeches outlined some 
of Goward's misconduct when he was in charge of Falealili. According to the 
Samoan pastors, Goward's cruelty to the Samoan pastors in Beru, was a 
repetition of the same treatment that was handed out to the Samoan pastors in 
Falealili. 13 The Samoan pastors believed Goward was at fault, but the Au 
Fa'atonu remained impartial as it struggled to comprehend the truth. 
The Au Fa'atonu refrained from casting blame, but admitted that the 
Goward affair was a crisis for the LMS mission. According to the Reverend John 
W. Hills, the issue at hand would decide the future and the fate of the Samoan 
church, and the LMS's work in Samoa and the NWO. Hills believed the 
Samoans exploited the Goward affair to advance their efforts to control the 
affairs of the church. Hills called upon his colleagues to support Goward. He 
warned that the Samoan pastors were determined to "hinder Mr Goward's 
work ... [and] something Mr Goward has said has been twisted so as to wound 
9 SDC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 20 Sept, 1902, SSL. 
10 SDC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 20 Sept, 1902, SSL. 
11 Goward to Thompson, 1 Nov, 1902, SSL. 
12 SDC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 20 Sept, 1902, SSL. 
13 SDC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 20 Sept, 1902, SSL; Hills to Thompson, 24 Jan, 1903, SSL. 
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the Samoan pride (their greatest asset), yet they have taken extreme measures 
to show their resentment."14 
The Reverend John Marriott felt Goward was telling the truth, and that 
the Samoan pastors should apologise to Goward. Marriott believe Goward 
should not apologise to the Samoans, as it would be acknowledging that he was 
wrong. Marriott proposed dismissing the four Samoan pastors involved, 
although he felt one should "never put pastors out of work unless Samoan 
pastors are not with us, and we could see from the language of their leading 
Samoan pastors we were uniting with that; if we took such a step, it would lead 
to our humiliation."15 Marriott's narrow vision seemed to expect Samoan pastors 
to be like puppets on strings, and kowtow to their every command. 
But, there were LMS missionaries who felt the issue was not about truth, 
but attitude. The Reverend James E. Newell criticised Goward for his remarks 
regarding the worth of the Samoan pastors. Newell pointed out that many 
people outside the LMS respected and admired the work done by the Samoan 
pastors throughout the Pacific. Newell quoted a letter from the Reverend 
William G. Lawes in which he stated that "I have known South Sea Island 
Teachers for forty years and there are none trustworthy and capable of such 
splendid work as Samoans."16 Newell reminded his colleagues of the enormous 
contribution the Samoans were making to the work of the LMS. Newell believed 
Goward started his work in Tuvalu and the Gilbert Islands with prejudice against 
the Samoans. It only distorted his judgement and prevented the Samoan 
pastors from enjoying a more intimate relationship with him. Newell, however, 
was not enthusiastic about his colleagues' suggestions to transfer the LMS 
mission to a German society.17 
The suggestion of a German society as an alternative to a Samoan 
independent church was raised by the Reverend Walter Huckett to counter, 
what he believed, was a growing passion for independence among the Samoan 
pastors. Huckett wrote with passion to the Au Matutua. 
14 Hills lo Thompson, 7 Oct, 1902, SSL; see also SOC-Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 20 Sept, 1902. SSL; 
Marriott to Thompson, 11 Oct, 1902, SSL. 
15 Marriott to Thompson, 11 Oct, 1902, SSL 
16 Newell to Thompson, 21 June, 1903, SSL. 
17 Newell to Thompson, 12 Sept, 1903, SSL; Newell to Thompson, 21 Jun, 1903, SSL; see also E. Hawker 
to Thompson, 31 Jul, 1903, SSL; Huckett to Thompson, 2 -10 Jul, 1903, SSL. Note: When the LMS were 
in dire straits with Self over fulfilling German policies, the idea of being transferred to a German mission 
society was raised by Reverend E. F. W. Heider. See Heider to Thompson, 28 Jul, 1913, SSL. 
240 
You will be sorry to see how the Samoan pastors are playing into 
the hands of the Directors who want us to withdraw. Unluckily their 
thick headedness shows their incompetence to govern 
themselves, and worst still there is no recognised authority when 
matters of the present nature are brought up. Apparently the 
wisest course for the good of the Samoans would be to hand them 
over to some German evangelical society. They would then come 
under German discipline. This lax system of church government 
crumbles to pieces at once in the force of idiotic obstinacy. 18 
A joint letter by the Au Fa'atonu reaffirmed its anger. 
We take a serious the view of the attitude of Samoan pastors in 
this matter. We feel that the one incident is sufficient answer to 
those who are advocating the withdrawal of men from Samoa 
while Samoans are proving themselves so utterly incapable of 
taking an enlightened view of a difficult situation. 19 
In the end, the Au Fa'atonu concluded that the Goward affair was just a 
personal quarrel between Goward and the Samoan pastors under his 
supervision.20 Goward took exception to the assertion and reacted that "it was 
just as correct to say that a man attacked by four foot-pads, and was entirely at 
their mercy, had a personal quarrel with them."21 Goward protested to the LMS 
missionaries regarding their lack of support, as he further attacked the Samoan 
pastors credibility in the mission field. 
The present generation of Samoan pastors are not what they 
ought to be, and they are not doing their work as it should be 
done, many of them; and the fact they consider that they owe their 
first allegiance to the Samoan pastors, and not to the English 
missionaries, settles the question for me, Let them go back to 
Samoa, all of them, and give me colleagues as soon as 
possible.22 
In taking this view, Goward blamed the fa'asamoa for the Samoan pastors' 
downfall,23 a view shared by several members of the LMS, including the 
Reverends Victor A. Barradale and Frank Lenwood.24 
The Samoan pastors remained firm in their decision to withdraw all 
Samoan pastors from the NW0.25 The Au Fa'atonu suggested that a letter be 
18 Huckettto C. Cousins, 20 Sept, 1902, SSL. 
19 SOC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 20 Sept, 1902, SSL. 
20 Newell to Thompson, 3 Jun, 1908, SSL. 
21 Goward to Thompson, 1 Nov, 1902, SSL. 
22 Goward to Thompson, 1 Nov, 1902, SSL. 
23 Goward to Thompson, 25 Nov, 1902. 
24 Barradale to Thompson, 9 Jan, 1902, SSL; Lenwood to Hawkins, 24 & 27 Oct, 1915, SSL. 
25 Marriott to Thompson, 11 Oct, 1902, SSL. 
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sent to the Au Matutua and allow them to suggest a solution, but the Samoan 
pastors refused and suggested that such action would only damage Goward in 
the eyes of the Au Matutua. If the Samoans were returned home, then by 
"withdrawing the men who are present there [Kiribati and Tuvalu], they would 
simply relieve Mr Goward of these men who are no good."26 Furthermore, the 
Samoans had not forgotten Goward's harshness towards Samoan pastors, and 
the fact "that he cared little for their reputation. Good men who go to him, many 
of them returned with damaged reputation. "27 The Au Fa'atonu even appealed 
to the wrath of God to frighten the Samoans. Goward added to the threat by 
pointing out that it was God's "guidance" to get rid of all the faithless. The Au 
Fa'atonu also invited the Samoan pastors to think of the 10,000 people without 
guidance, without Scripture leaders, and the thought of returning back to 
'heathenism' after recently emerging from it. The emotional psychology and 
wrath of God approach failed to impress the Samoans. The Samoans were no 
longer ignorant.28 
Despite the failed dialogue, and the insistence of the Samoan pastors to 
carry out its decision, the Au Fa'atonu continued to gamble that the Samoan 
pastors would withdraw their statement and admit that it was all a bluff. But a 
few days later at a function held at Papauta School, the Samoan pastors 
interrupted the proceedings, and demanded a time frame for carrying out their 
decision. There were blushing faces everywhere as the LMS missionaries tried 
to contain their humiliation in the presence of their guests. The Au Fa'atonu 
finally got the message as it silently condemned the efforts of the Samoan 
pastors to control the church.29 It was another reminder to the Au Fa'atonu of 
the power in the hands of the Samoan pastors. 
A renewed effort and a more humble approach by the Au Fa'atonu 
resulted in a settlement conducive to all parties concerned. The Samoans 
agreed to withdraw their demand for total withdrawal of the Samoan pastors 
from the NWO, ifthe Au Fa'atonu agreed to refrain from putting pressure on the 
four Samoan pastors involved in the conflict. The Samoans also agreed that the 
26 SDC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 20 Sept, 1902, SSL. 
27 SDC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 20 Sept, 1902, SSL; see also Goward to Thompson, 25 Nov, 1902. 
28 SDC - Minutes of Meeting, Apia, 13-18 Dec, 1920, SSL; Marriott to Thompson, 11 Oct, 1902, SSL; 
Goward to Thompson, 25 Nov, 1902, SSL. 
29 Marriott to Thompson, 11 Oct, 1902, SSL. 
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four pastors involved would never return to the NW0.30 The Samoans, however, 
demanded that the Au Fa'atonu take further action regarding Goward. The Au 
Fa'atonu agreed to review the matter but, eventually, Goward only received a 
slap on the hand and returned to the NW0.31 The Au Fa'atonu's lack of 
diplomacy, and its continuing assertion of superiority in dealing with Samoan 
pastors, failed to encourage any lasting relationships. The Au Fa'atonu 
remained blind to the issues overwhelming the mission and failed to 
comprehend the implications of continuing to show superiority and disrespect 
towards Samoan pastors. 
For Goward, his attitude towards Samoan pastors remained inflexible 
over the ensuing years. He initiated a call for ni-Kiribati and Tuvaluan pastors to 
replace Samoan pastors in the NW0.32 In the years that followed, Goward 
continued his character assassination of Samoan pastors, as well as sending 
Samoan pastors home charged with disgracing the LMS mission.33 Goward 
even furnished the Au Fa'atonu with a proposal to "draw up regulations which 
shall make Samoa pastors quite clear as to what is expected of them."34 
Goward wanted to put the Samoan pastors in their place as servants of the 
white missionary rather than as equal partners in the mission field. The Au 
Fa'atonu discussed the proposal privately (without any knowledge of the 
Samoan pastors) and, in sheer stupidity, upheld the proposal.35 A letter was 
drafted and sent to all Samoan pastors in the mission field pointing out the 
nature of their relationship to the white missionaries, and "correcting certain 
misconceptions as to their position in relation to the committees and Fono 
Tele."36 The Au Fa'atonu, sadly, was again travelling along the same stretch of 
road that had almost destroyed previous LMS relations with the Samoan 
pastors. 
'
0 The Samoan pastors never kept their promise and finally had their own way. To the disgust of Goward 
and the Au Fa'atonu, the four pastors concerned returned to Beru in 1908. See Goward to Thompson, 3 
Mar, 1908, SSL; see also SDC -Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 12 -18 May 1903, SSL; Hills to Thompson, 
24 Jan, 1903, SSL 
31 Hills to Thompson, 24 Jan, 1902, SSL 
32 Goward to Thompson, 20 Dec, 1902, SSL; Campbell to SDC, 28 Jun, 1903, SSL; Goward to Hills, 16 
Nov, 1903, SSL. 
33 Report of Visitation lo the Tokelau and Ellice Islands, Jul, 1905, SSL; Goward to Thompson, 1 Aug, 
1905, SSL; Goward lo Thompson, 24 Nov, 1905, SSL 
34 Newell to Thompson, 19 May, 1904, SSL. 
35 Newell to Thompson, 19 May, 1904, SSL 
36 SDC- Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 9-14 May 1904, SSL. 
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The Samoan pastors in the NWO were furious over the fetter and 
likewise the Samoan pastors in Samoa, as news of its existence and content 
filtered back to Samoa. The Samoan pastors in NWO distanced themselves 
from Goward and, consequently, ignored his presence. In Samoa, the same 
attitude towards Goward existed. For instance, on a trip to Samoa in 1904, the 
Samoan pastors boycotted Goward. 
No welcome of any kind was accorded me, no united services 
arranged, and no chance given for meeting with my old native 
pastors; it was a strange return to Samoa for a missionary who 
had done ten years good work there [Samoa]."37 
But, some of Goward's colleagues were just as stubborn in their attack on the 
Samoan pastors. Huckett, who was incensed with the attitude of the Samoan 
pastors, had insisted all along that the blame rested entirely with the younger 
Samoan pastors. 
Samoans are such an utterly lawless lot and absolutely 
unreasonable when their backs are up .... The younger men 
unluckily are more hairbrained and less manageable than their 
elders and would not hesitate I think to take responsibility of an 
independent Samoan Church. 38 
The relationship between Goward and the Samoan pastors in the NWO 
remained unstable for several more years. The Resident Commissioner in 
Tuvalu and Kiribati had sensed the deterioration in relationships and wrote to 
the LMS missionaries, and advised them on how best to conduct their work in 
NW0.39 Newell, feeling incensed at being told to sort out LMS problems in 
NWO, sent a Deputation to pacify the situation and generate reconciliation. The 
selection of two senior and respected Samoan pastors, Malaefou and Alama 
(there was no LMS missionary in the Deputation), not only highlighted a 
shortage of LMS missionaries, but indicated the displeasure the Samoans in the 
NWO felt for LMS missionaries. Goward was ecstatic with the Deputation and 
felt confident that Alama and Malaefou would influence the Samoan pastors in 
the NWO, and also solve the problem at hand.40 The Samoan adage emu loa 
37 Goward to Thompson, 30 Aug, 1905. SSL 
30 Huckett to Thompson, 11 Dec, 1902, SSL 
"Resident Commission to LMS missionaries in Samoa, 1906, SSL 
'
0 Goward to Thompson, 6 Aug, 1906, SSL; Newell to Thompson, 5 Jun, 1906, SSL 
le lima tapa i le iofi (when the hand burns reach for the fire tongs)41 best 
describes Goward's thoughtless attitude. 
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The conflict between Goward and the Samoan pastors affected other 
areas of the mission, including its educational institutions. In August 1904, the 
Leulumoega High School erupted into rebellion while the Reverend John W. 
Hills, the missionary in charge, was visiting the Falealili District. The Samoan 
teacher, Mose, disciplined the students over comments made about other 
students in the school. The students became hostile and decided to abscond 
from school. Hills refused to accept back any of the students involved, as he 
wanted to make an example so that a similar situation would never happen 
again. In the end, the students concerned had to prove their worth to the LMS 
missionaries in their district in order to re-enter the school.42 
The Goward incident left a lasting impression on the minds of the 
Samoan pastors, especially on those who felt justice had not been truly 
dispensed. For the next fifteen years, the working relationship between the Au 
Fa'atonu and the Samoan pastors slowly improved.43 The introduction of a 
separate women's meeting during the Fono Tele in 1906, and the formation of 
the Au Toeaina in 1907, were fruits of the benevolent relations enjoyed by the 
Au Fa'atonu and the Samoan pastors,44 but while the Samoan pastors saw it as 
a recognition of their status in the Samoan church by the Au Fa'atonu, Newell 
believed the decision was also one of timely necessity. 
Newell had observed and was concerned that "the chiefs have come to 
usurp the true functions of the church meeting in such matters as the calling of 
a pastor, and other things."45 According to Newell the only solution was to 
establish an Advisory Council or Presbyter with limited powers, to deal with 
such matters within the Samoan (LMS) Church itself. Furthermore, the Au 
Fa'atonu could not fully supervise the many parishes within their districts. 
Consequently, the Au Fa'atonu divided the congregations within the large 
41 The implication is that, a person who rashly ventures upon an undertaking and having come to grief, 
asks for help. 
42 Newell to Thompson, 23 Sept, 1904, SSL; Hills to Thompson, 4 Oct, 1904, SSL. 
43 SDC - Minutes of Meeting, Mafua, 9 -14 May 1904, SSL; SDC - Minutes of Meeting. Malua, 8 - 13 May 
1905, SSL; Newell to Thompson, 28 Oct, 1905, SSL; SOC -Minutes of Meeting, Mafua, 15-19 May, 
1906, SSL. 
44 SOC - Minutes of Meetings, Malua, 15 - 19 May, 1906, SSL; SOC - Minutes of Meetings, Malva, 20 -
26 May, 1907, SSL; Newell to Thompson, 3 Jun, 1907, SSL; SDC- Minutes of Meeting, Papauta, 2· 4-
0ec, 1907, SSL. 
45 Newell to Thompson, 3 Jun, 1907, SSL. 
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districts into sub-districts, and Samoan pastors were selected as Toeaina to 
supervise the newly established sub-districts. The creation of the Au Toeaina 
followed immediately. 
The Au Toeaina considered and advised on all church matters before 
they were presented to the Fono Tele. The Au Toeaina supervised Samoan 
pastors in their sub-districts as well as having the power to make appointments 
and dismissed pastors. The formation of the Au Toeaina also gave the Samoan 
pastors and deacons the opportunity to chair the Fono Tele with a member of 
the Au Fa'atonu, as well as fulfilling the role of General Secretary. For the Au 
Fa'atonu, it was a step in the right direction in filtering out Samoan culture and 
cementing good relationships with the Samoan pastors. The Samoan pastors' 
sense of loyalty to the Au Fa'atonu and recognition of its authority in final 
decision making was, for the moment, unquestionable.46 
The LMS missionaries revelled in the latest harmonious environment as 
they wrote praisingly of their work. The gloating reports probably prompted the 
Au Matutua to renew its efforts to transfer control of the Samoan (LMS) Church 
to the Samoans. A Deputation was sent not to ascertain whether Samoa could 
become independent, but to assess ways that would best initiate full control of 
the Samoan (LMS) Church. Despite the praises, the Deputation, to the relief of 
the Au Fa'atonu, found Samoa incapable of taking control of the Samoan (LMS) 
Church.47 
In fact, the Au Toeaina rejected the idea and refused to give it any 
consideration. The secretary of the Fono Tele, Imo, the secretary of Au 
Toeaina, Kirisome, and Sosene, a representative of the Samoan pastors, 
conveyed their decision and their intention to the Au Matutua. 
Ua le loto lenei Fono Tele Aoao i Samoa ina ia tu'uina mai le pule 
ia Samoa e tausia le galuega i lenei atunuu ... seia oo le 
senetenari o le galuega i Samoa o tausaga ia e 14 o loo lumanai 
ai ona atoa lea o le 100 tausaga. Afai ua aulia na ona aso ona toe 
iloilo lea ma suesue lenei mataupu, po ua tatau ona faia e pei o le 
finagalo o le Savali na outou auina mai.48 
(Author's literal translation): This General Assembly of Samoa 
does not accept the proposal to give Samoans the authority to 
look after the work in this country ... until the centenary of the work 
46 Newell to Thompson, 12 Mar, 1909, SSL; see also Kenape Faletoese, Ole Tata Fa'aso/opito o le 
Ekalesia Samoa (LMS), Apia: Malua Press. 1958, 81. 
47 Notes on the Visitation by Frank Lenwood, Aug, 1914, SSL. 
48 Feno Tele to Directors of the LMS, 4 Jun, 1916, SSL; see also Lenwood to Hawkins, 24 & 27 Oct. 1915, 
SSL. 
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in Samoa, 14 years in the future, then 100 years would be 
achieved. When we reach those days then we shall reconsider 
this subject, whether it would be carried out as the deputation has 
brought. 
The Au Toeaina went on to explain the reasons for its stance. 
Ua matua matou taofi e lei oo i ona po ua tatau ai ona tu toatasi le 
Ekalesia i Samoa; aua e lei masani ma le faatatauina tonu o itu 
eseese e pei ona faatonuina ai e Ali! o le Au Faatonu, a seia 
a'oa'oina atilti ia malamalama lelei le uiga moni o ala eseese; i le 
ua le lava foi le malosi o le Ekalesia i Samoa e mafai ai lea feau i 
nei ona; aua ua le matua mavae atu nei tu ma masani faaleatunuu 
nei, e fai ma mea e faigata ai ona tuuina atu le filifiliga i se toaitiiti 
e pei ona masani ai outou, e lei matua mafai foi ona autasi gofie 
tagata Samoa i nisi o i latou, vagana se faatonuga mai Alii o le Au 
Faatonu, ona ta!ia vave lea ma le le masalosalo .... E le'i matua 
lava se poto i Faifeau Samoa e mafai ai ona faatasi ma le Au 
Faatonu i ona po nei.49 
(Author's literal translation): We truly know that the time is not 
at hand for the Church in Samoa to be independent; because it 
has not fulfilled all the tasks commanded by the Directors, and to 
understand all the different ways; and also the Church in Samoa 
does not have the strength to do the work at this time; because it 
has only just recently put aside customs and traditions, which 
makes it hard to give to a few people the power of decision 
making as you are accustomed to; and some of the Samoa people 
are not obedient, unless ordered by the directors, then they will 
accept it without suspicion .... The Samoan pastors have not been 
educated enough to be on par with the Samoa District Committee 
[LMS missionaries] at this time. 
The Au Toeaina was content with the way the Au Matutua was guiding the 
Samoan (LMS) Church. They never entertained the idea of an independent 
Samoan (LMS) Church without the Au Matutua. In all their earlier efforts to take 
control of the church, it was only to take away some of the authority from the Au 
Fa'atonu. The Au Toeaina wanted to remain under the umbrella of the Au 
Matutua, and also made it clear that they would rather seek self-support than 
independence. 50 
Infrequent misunderstanding and conflict of opinions persisted from time 
to time to put the Au Fa'atonu on guard. For instance, the Reverend Peter 
Cane, while stationed at Matautu, Savai'i in 1914, visited Falealupo sub-district 
to avert trouble brewing between four LMS villages. Cane found that one of the 
LMS deacons, a matai, in the Tufutafoe parish was running the church because 
"Fono Tele to Directors of LMS, 4 Jun, 1916, SSL 
50 Kinnersley to W. F. Bradford, 11 Jan, 1916, SSL; Fono Tele to Directors of LMS, 4 Jun, 1916, SSL. 
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it was without a pastor. Cane gave the matai advice in order to maintain peace 
with the other LMS villages, but Cane was frankly told, "if you don't like our way 
then we will all change our religion."51 For two years, Cane tried to reconcile the 
LMS villages who had become split over church contributions. The placement of 
a pastor at Tufutafoe changed the attitude of the matai concerned, and 
encouraged him to work positively. 52 
A similar conflict between deacons in the Matautu church, at Falelatai, in 
the A'ana district in 1915, also highlighted the growing passion for absolute 
authority. The Tuimaleali'ifano family was divided over several matters 
pertaining to the family itself.53 When Tuimaleali'ifano was absent from Matautu, 
one of the family matai sacked the LMS Samoan pastor Setope. 
Tuimaleali'ifano returned to Matautu and closed the doors of the church, and 
then laid a complaint against the matai involved before the administration. The 
parties were later reconciled and Setope was returned to his post.54 But, the 
incident highlighted the power of the matai to meddle in the affairs of the 
church. Newell had envisioned the problem with matai interfering with church 
matters, but the LMS was not fully prepared to deal with it due to staff shortage. 
Consequently, many Samoan parishes were left to the supervision of the 
Samoan pastors, but at the mercy of the matai. 
A few years after the 1918 influenza epidemic, the Au Toeaina again 
challenged the authority of the Au Fa'atonu. The transition of power from the 
older and more experienced Samoan pastors to younger pastors caused a 
serious communication breakdown and misunderstanding. The Au Fa'atonu 
blamed the younger pastors' materialistic inclinations for the problem. 
The young men now in charge, in the majority of cases, are the 
poorest of Samoan pastors. We are deeply distressed to see the 
growing tendency towards material things. Wealth is pouring in on 
51 Cane, Matautu Report, 1917, London Missionary Society, South Sea Reports (henceforth SSR). 
52 Cane, Matautu Report, 1917, SSR. 
52 This family conflict maybe linked to the differences between Catholics and LMS adherents in the family. 
This had caused much trouble after 1901. Leading up to this incident, the Roman Catholic had applied to 
Solt for permission to establish a Roman Catholic church in Falelatai. The Catholic - LMS conflict will 
surface again after the Mau in 1937. See A'ana District Annual Report, 31 Dec, 1901, SSR; Brayer to 
Shultz, 14 Feb, 1912, Maris! Archives of Samoa and Tokelau Islands (henceforth MAST), Apia; Shultz to 
Brayer, 12 Mar, 1912, MAST, Apia; Deihl to Turnbull, 21Oct,1937, MAST; Treatment of Catholic 
Samoans in Falelatai, 27 Oct, 1937, MAST; McKay to Deihl, 4 Jun, 1937, MAST. 
54 Sibree, Leulumoega: Annual Report for 1915, SSR; see also Appendix 1- Tala Fa'alelotu, EFKS, 
Matautu, Falelatai, in "Aganu'u ma Agaifanua Fa'a Samoa. Custom and Usage in Samoa: A History and 
Process of a Tama'aiga Tit!e Dispute in Falelatai," Ph.D. Thesis, University of the South Pacific, 1997. 
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these people. They are exceedingly rich ... it is all having an effect 
on the life of the church.55 
The charge of materialism was probably unfair as the LMS had given the 
parishes the responsibility to look after their own pastors compared to a set 
salary that had existed previously. The Au Fa'atonu pointed the finger at the 
fa'asamoa and the spirit of competition between villages and district, for the 
exceptional high standard of living the Samoan pastors were enjoying.56 The 
Samoan pastors must have puzzled over the Au Fa'atonu's attitude regarding 
the fa'asamoa. It was, after all, the same fa'asamoa that was keeping the LMS 
afloat and making the work of the LMS missionaries and Samoan pastors more 
accessible. The Au Fa'atonu had never complained about that. 
The materialism debate aside, the Samoan church was reeling from the 
incompetence of the New Zealand administration. The political fall-out between 
New Zealand and the Samoans over the influenza epidemic started a chain 
reaction that shot Samoa into a political frenzy less than a decade later.57 The 
emergence of the younger pastors and their call for independence coincided 
with the Samoans' challenge to the political leadership of New Zealand. The two 
groups would pursue their dreams independently but eventually sought the 
same goal as their determination for autonomy intensified. The Samoans finally 
realised they could not isolate the Samoan church from Samoan politics. 
For the Samoan church things started to move with the Reverend James 
W. Sibree's comments in an American newspaper in 1919. It was the beginning 
of a renewed leadership challenge that would push the Au Fa'atonu to the brink 
of its endurance. Sibree and his wife, Gertrude, arrived in Samoa in 1898 and 
worked at Tuasivi in the Fa'asaleleaga District, Savai'i. They were very well 
liked and contributed to the development of Christianity in the district,58 but 
tragedy struck the Sibree household when Gertrude died in 1900. After a short 
furlough he was transferred to Apia when staff shortage hit the LMS mission in 
1905, although he was still in sole charge of Savai'i. The Savai'i pastors vetoed 
55 SDC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 29 Apr, - 8 May 1920, SSL. 
56 Cane to Hawkins, 22 Jul, 1915, SSL: Clarke to Bradford, 12 Jul, 1918, SSL; W. E. Clarke to Lenwood, 
28 Aug, 1917, SSL: SDC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 29 Apr, - 8 May 1920, SSL; Report Districts of 
Falealili and ltuotane, 1921, SSR. 
57 See earlier discussion in Chapter Six. 
58 For instance, Mrs Sibree, with very little resources and assistance, managed to teach and maintain a 
small class of Samoan girls. See Mrs Sibree to R. W. Thompson, 19 Feb, 1900, SSL: see also Sibree to 
Thompson, 5, 15, 19, Oct, 1912. 
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the idea, and threatened to boycott the Fono Tele if Sibree transferred.59 
Eventually, the Savai'i pastors recanted their threat and obeyed the will of the 
Au Fa'atonu. 
Sibree remarried in 1905 to Lucy Johnson at the Apia Protestant Church. 
After another furlough to England, Sibree and his wife returned to Samoa and 
were again posted to Tuasivi in 1910. For four years, Sibree fulfilled his ministry 
earning great respect, while also doubling as a medical officer,60 but staff 
shortage remained the stumbling block for the LMS and Sibree was transferred 
to the High School at Leulumoega in 1914, with the added responsibility of 
looking after A'ana District. Sibree was also involved in the visitations to the 
NWO, and was an activist in improving the welfare and working conditions of 
the Samoan pastors.61 
After the World War I, Sibree went on furlough and visited friends and 
colleagues in Australia and England before returning via America. The success 
of the LMS in its worldwide mission, and global interest in the Samoan political 
scene, made Sibree a target for journalists and other interested church groups. 
In an interview with the Sunday Origonian in Portland, on 15 August 1919,62 
Sibree was reported to have commented that the "natives of Samoa were fools; 
the missionaries could get them to do anything they liked; they could get all the 
money they [LMS] wanted from them."63 According to J. Gillespie, the District 
Commissioner in Tutuila, Sibree was the victim of a long-standing feud between 
the LMS missionaries and Mrs Field, a step-daughter of Robert Louis 
Stevenson living in America. It started with comments made by the Reverend 
William E. Clarke in his American Lectures earlier in the year, which according 
to Field, discredited the character of her late father Stevenson. According to 
Gillespie, Field was responsible for the alleged comments attributed to Sibree, 
and for the report that circulated in Tutuila, which implicated Sibree for making 
improper remarks about the Samoan chief Mauga. Sibree returned to Samoa 
via Tutuila and tried to clear up the misunderstanding. Sibree had with him a 
59 Sibree to Thompson, 15 May, 1904, SSL. 
60 London Missionary Society Register, 4'" ed., 1796 - 1923, London : London Missionary Society, 1923. 
61 SOC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 13 - 18 May, 1901, SSL: see also London Missionary Society 
Register. 
62 J. Gillespie to the Secretary of Native Affairs, 6 Nov, 1920, SSL; R. W. Tate, Native Situation, Sept, 
1921, IT 88/5; London Missionary Society Register. 
63 J.M. Gillespie to the Secretary of Native Affairs, 6 Dec, 1920, SSL; see also Hough to Lenwood, 20 Apr, 
1921, SSL; Samoan Elders to LMS Directors, 18 May 1921, SSL; Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 11-20 May 
1921, SSL. 
copy of the article in question, but the new evidence had no effect on the 
attitude of the Samoans in Tutuila.64 
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When the stories reached Samoa, the Au Toeaina called for Sibree's 
removal. The Au Fa'atonu tried to reason with the Au Toeaina, pointing out that 
it was a Mormon65 in America who had misreported Sibree's comments in order 
to discredit the LMS. The Au Toeaina argued that the Mormons would never 
have been misled if Sibree had not misled the Mormons in the first place by 
giving the interview. The Au Toeaina argued that Sibree should have taken into 
consideration Samoan customs and cultural etiquette. The Au Toeaina agreed 
that newspapers take information, and expand and add to it, but Sibree knew 
about it, and whether he said only a little, it was enough to "spark a big fire."66 
The more the Au Fa'atonu pressed for Sibree to be exonerated, the more the 
Au Toeaina remained defiant in their stance. 
The Au Toeaina, the Samoan pastors and members of the Samoan 
(LMS) Church, felt Sibree had brought disrespect upon the Samoan (LMS) 
Church. They felt that the stories referring to Samoans being 'fools' may not 
have been printed but the story had circulated widely and it insulted the 
Samoans. For the Au Toeaina, the comment was not just an attack on any 
Samoan, but a direct attack on the Samoan (LMS) Church. The comments 
made the Samoan pastors the laughing stock among other rival missions. 
Sibree had brought disgrace on the Samoan (LMS) Church, and had hurt the 
pride of every Samoan pastor. The Au Toeaina believed Sibree could have 
used a bit more diplomacy.67 
The Au Fa'atonu was exasperated with the Au Toeaina's anger against 
Sibree. Sibree had worked hard and long in developing the spiritual life of the 
Samoan church. He was well liked and respected, and a friend to the Samoans 
during the years that he was in Samoa,68 but it all counted for nothing after the 
pride of the Au Toeaina was tarnished. The Au Fa'atonu, especially the 
Reverend Alexander Hough, felt Sibree was a victim of Falealili matai and 
64 J. Gillespie to the Secretary of Native Affairs, 6 Nov, 1920," SSL. 
65 The Sibree incident occurred at a time when Mormon - LMS competition for members in Tutuila 
continued to reach explosive heights. See Hawker to Thompson, 16 Mar, 1902, SSL; Hawker to 
Thompson, 5 Feb, 1904, SSL; Hawker to Thompson, 15 Dec, 1904, SSL. 
66 Samoan Elders to LMS Directors, 1 B May, 1921, SSL; see also SOC - Minutes of Meeting, Apia, 13 -
1 a Dec, 1920, SSL. 
67 Samoan Elders to LMS Directors, 1 B May, 1921, SSL. 
68 SOC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 13 -18 May, 1901, SSL; Sibree to Thompson, 24 Aug, 1911, SSL. 
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pastors pressuring the Au Toeaina at the initiation of Malietoa Tanumafili.69 
Hough's statement provided no proof of Malietoa's involvement, but it revealed 
there was a problem in relations between the LMS and its greatest Samoan 
supporter and protector, Tanumafili, but even though there was no evidence of 
Tanumafili's involvement, Hough may not have been wrong in pointing the 
finger at Falealili pastors and matai. 
Clarke had earlier been concerned at the lack of an LMS missionary at 
Falealili district where "young pastors [were] shouldering responsibility with 
enthusiasm."7° Falealili was a rich district but the influence of the younger 
Samoan pastors on the people was limited.71 Sibree was temporary assigned, 
in addition to his other duties, until the appointment of a permanent missionary. 
In 1920, the Falealili district began to show signs of taking control of their own 
affairs. The Samoan pastors constantly encouraged members to maintain a 
high level of annual contribution to the church, as they aimed to be financially 
self-supporting. 72 
The Au Toeaina had put forth charges that Sibree often quarrelled with 
the Falealili pastors, although these differences were never brought to the 
notice of the Au Fa'atonu out of respect. The Falealili pastors were also 
dissatisfied with Sibree's failure to fulfil his commitment to the district. The 
charges were not by any means unreasonable, but the Au Toeaina had failed to 
take into consideration that Sibree's first responsibility was to the High School at 
Leulumoega and he was only obliged to make the occasional visitation to 
Falealili. In relation to the charge of quarrelling, the Falealili pastors may have 
been recalling past relationships with Goward.73 
Sibree could also have been a victim of the LMS's unsympathetic 
treatment of its German missionaries after the First World War. The German 
missionaries, Shultze, Heider, and Carl A. A. Muller were loved and respected 
by the Samoans for their total commitment to the Samoan church.74 After 
Germany lost the war, the Samoans detested the attitude of the Au Fa'atonu, 
69 Hough to Lenwood, 20 Apr, 1921,SSL. 
70 Clarke to Lenwood, 6 Dec, 1919, SSL. 
71 Clarke to Lenwood, 6 Dec, 1919, SSL; see also Report of the Falealili District for the Year 1906, SSR. 
72 SOC - Minutes of Meeting, Apia, 13 -18 Dec, 1920, SSL; Muller to Lenwood, 25 Jan, 1919, SSL; 
Clarke to Lenwood, 6 Dec, 1919, SSL. 
73 Samoa Elders to the LMS Directors, 18 May, 1921, SSL. 
74 SOC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 26 Apr-4 May 1912, SSL; Muller to Lenwood, 5 Apr, 1916, SSL; 
Letter From Faasaleleaga District, 8 Jun, 1920, SSL. 
and in general the LMS mission, towards its German colleagues. For the 
Samoan pastors, the LMS had forgotten all the good work the German 
missionaries had done for Samoa and the LMS, just because they were 
Germans. The prejudice of the Au Fa'atonu was exposed, and Sibree, 
especially, was singled out as the most outspoken of the Au Fa'atonu.75 
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The Au Toeaina probably knew that most of the charges against Sibree 
were fabricated, but that was no longer the issue at hand. They comforted the 
Au Fa'atonu regrading its decision; pointing out that they had not taken the 
Sibree affair lightly but justice had to be done. The Au Toeaina believed their 
decision was not for revenge but for the good of the church. In a letter written in 
Samoan, the Au Toeaina poured out their inner most feelings in relation to their 
decision. 
Ua matou le faia lenei mea ia Misi Saipele ise agavale poo se 
tuuaiina fua, ae le o lagona ai i o matou Joto fuatia ifo e lelei; po ua 
matou faia ise fia taui ma sui ise itu faa-le-tino, ae na o le alofa 
moni lava i le galuega a lesu ma Jana Ekalesia ... matou te tautino 
atu ai, matou te lei faia ma se manatu o se mea faafaigofie, pe 
pipisi atu e pei o se faamai. E leai lava. 76 
(Author's literal translation): We have not done this thing to 
Sibree out of spite or malice, and knowing in our heart it is not a 
good thing, or had we done it for personal revenge, but only for 
true love for Jesus and his church ... we truly declare, that we had 
not done this thinking it was easy, or it would become a sickness 
with us. No it's not. 
The younger pastors were determined to show the Au Fa'atonu that they had 
the intelligence to make decisions for the Samoan church. Unfortunately, Sibree 
found himself in the centre of a power struggle between the Au Toeaina and the 
Au Fa'atonu. Sibree, on his own accord, resigned and left Samoa in 1920.77 
Sibree wrote to Lenwood afterwards and stated that he was dazed and 
crushed by the events that had taken place.78 Lenwood agreed that Sibree's 
demise and rejection, and the humiliation of the LMS mission, was due to a 
younger and inexperienced ministry, but Lenwood believed the Au Fa'atonu had 
contributed immensely to their own misery by "holding on to power a day too 
75 SOC - Minutes of Meeting, 29 Apr-8 May, 1920, SSL; SOC-Minutes of Meeting, Apia, 13-18 Dec, 
1920, SSL; Sibree to Lenwood, 28 Jan, 1916, SSL; Sibree to Hawkins/Lenwood, 17 Jun, 1916, SSL; 
Sibree to Lenwood, 4 Apr, 1917, SSL; Sibree to Lenwood, 31 Aug, 1917, SSL; Shultze to Lenwood, 26 
Dec, 1917, SSL; Sibreeto Lenwood, 21Feb,1918, SSL 
76 Samoa Elders to the LMS Directors, 18 May, 1921, SSL 
77 Samoa Elders to the LMS Directors, 18 May, 1921, SSL; SOC - Minutes of Meeting, Apia, 13 -18 Dec, 
1920, SSL; London Missionary Society Register. 
78 Sibree to Lenwood, 22 Dec, 1920, SSL. 
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long."79 Hills disagreed with Lenwood and pointed the finger at the Au Matutua 
for planting the idea of independence in the Samoans' minds, which had 
eventually led to the seed of discontent being sown between the Au Fa'atonu 
and the Au Matutua. Hills was merely pointing out the strength and vitality of the 
Samoans in pursuing independence, and their ability to create friction between 
the Au Fa'atonu and the Au Matutua. 
The Sibree affair was a big blow to the LMS mission, especially when it 
was faced with missionary shortage. The Au Toeaina and the Samoan pastors 
had called the shots and it was a reminder to the Au Fa'atonu that the Au 
Toeaina would go to any lengths to reinforce their authority. Tate, the New 
Zealand administrator at the time, felt the Samoan pastors had been given too 
much power and control for which "they are not yet fit to possess."80 Time again 
healed discontent and, eventually, the LMS missionaries managed to overcome 
the humiliation of the Sibree affair. The vision for independence had been sown, 
and it would take only a minor disagreement or a negative criticism to again 
trigger independence sentiments. 
For instance, between 1927 and 1928, the Reverends Harold Darvill and 
Arthur R. Smart upset the Au Toeaina. Darvill's sin, like Sibree's earlier, was 
offering comments to newspaper journalists; this time over Samoans' role in the 
Mau, and New Zealand's administration of Samoa in the Samoa Guardian. 
Darvill was portrayed as a "political agent of the government" as he exonerated 
George Richardson, the administrator, of any blame for the crisis besieging 
Samoa.81 Darvill then went too far and passed judgement on the Mau. 
The natives followed a movement, the significance of which they 
could not understand. Suspicion was enthroned and grievances 
became easy to manufacture when natives were uninformed, as 
they had to be, that their grievances were without foundations, 
suspicions passed into hatred.82 
The New Zealand Herald, The Auckland Star and The Sun newspapers all 
quoted Darvill praising the New Zealand administration's efforts, and blaming 
79 Lenwood to Hills, 7 Feb, 1921, SSL. 
80 R. W. Tate, Native Situation, Sept, 1921, IT 88/5. 
81 Smart to Barradale, 23Apr, 1928, SSL; see also Bartlett to Barradale, 19 Feb, 1928, SSL; Mali and losia 
to Barradale, 29 May, 1928, SSL; Political Parsons in Samoa, Samoa Guardian, 12 May, 1932. 
82 Newspaper Article on Darvill's Visit to New Zealand, n.d., SSO. 
Samoans and European merchants for the troubles in Samoa.83 In the New 
Zealand Herald Darvill praised Richardson. 
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He has given himself wholeheartedly to the welfare of the people 
and New Zealand has every reason to feel proud of his work. The 
administration of the territory deserves credit all over the world.B4 
Perhaps it was not surprising that Darvill had openly expressed his 
resentment of the Mau. A few years earlier, he wrote to the Au Matutua about 
the Mau and the Samoan (LMS) Church. He wrote: 
The influence of this movement [Mau] is becoming a menace to 
the church. The Samoan committee is composed of prominent 
leaders in the church, and absorbed in political excitement they 
are losing sight of their spiritual obligations.B5 
Darvill's behaviour in New Zealand not only captured the attention of the 
Samoan church, but also the interest of the Mau leaders. 
The Au Matutua's Deputation in October 1928, led by the Reverends G. 
Parker and Alexander Hough, met the deacons of the LMS church at Faleata 
District. Tamasese Lealofi I, a deacon of the LMS church at Vaimoso (the home 
of the Mau), requested the Deputation on behalf of the Mau to remove Darvill 
from Samoa, as he was "no use to the work of God in Samoa," and would only 
"harm the work of God in Samoa. •BS The Samoan church leaders condemned 
Darvill's actions, but their anger was more controlled than it had been over the 
Sibree affair, and as a result, Darvill was spared the humiliation Sibree 
suffered.B7 The Mau was seeking a repetition of Sibree's fate. 
Smart, on the other hand, faced the wrath of the Samoan pastors over 
finance mismanagement allegations.BB Smart went on furlough before the Feno 
Tele of 1927, when the Samoans were expecting him to furnish a financial 
statement outlining the cost of the rebuilding of Malua and Leulumoega schools. 
The F alealili District had petitioned Smart to postpone his furlough until after the 
Feno Tele, but Smart went ahead with his plans. In the Feno Tele, Smart's 
" Newspaper Article on Darvill's Visit to New Zealand, n.d., SSO; Feather to Barradale, 28 May, 1928, 
SSL. 
64 Newspaper Article on Darvill's Visit to New Zealand, n.d., SSO. 
65 H. Darvill to Barradale, 25 May, 1927, SSO. 
86 Tamasese to Deputation, 26 Sept, 1929, SSO; Hough and Parker to Barradale, 8 Oct, 1928, SSL; 
Perkins to Chirgwin, Report 1929, 31Dec,1929, SSR. 
87 Newspaper Article on Darvill's Visit to New Zealand, n.d., SSO; Hoad to Barradale, 19 Feb, 1928, SSL; 
see also Downs to Bartlett, 1 Dec, 1930, SSL; Liston to Bartlett, 7 Dec, 1930, SSL; Bartlett to G. E. 
Phillips, 9 Dec, 1930, SSL; Smart to Barradale, 23 Apr, 1928, SSL; Liston to Bartlett, 7 Dec, 1930, SSL; 
Bartlett to G. E. Phillips, 9 Del, 1930, SSL. 
68 Baker to Smart, 21May1927, SSL; Smart to Barradale, 27 Jun, 1927, SSL. 
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financial statement was rejected, and a revised statement by the Au Fa'atonu 
was shunned. The Fono Tele demanded to see every receipt before they would 
approve any statements.89 
The districts of Apia, Falealili, and Fa'asaleleaga called for the removal of 
Smart. The Falealili pastors were unhappy with Smart's lack of commitment to 
the Samoan church and labelled him "ua matua le faamaoni [completely 
untrustworthy]."90 The Au Toeaina called Smart a "taulealea osovale [an 
uncontrollable untitled man]" who should not be "taalo i le tupe a le Ekalesia .... 
matou te le fia faasatauroina o ia, matou te le fia faatautauina o ia [playing with 
the church's money ... we do not want to crucify him, we do not want to hang 
him]."91 But, although the Au Toeaina was infuriated with Smart, they found it 
prudent to forgive him. 
Smart was despondent that the Samoan church had made him a 
scapegoat for the excessive spending on the Malua and Leulumoega projects. 
Smart believed he was not criticised for any misappropriation of money, but that 
the Samoan church had over spent their budget. According to Smart the 
Samoan pastors had approved the use of reserve funds for the projects.92 The 
LMS missionaries continued to be astonished at the unpredictable nature of the 
Samoan church leaders, but still remained confident that as long as the political 
circumstances remained stable and peaceful they would always control the 
Samoan (LMS) Church. 
Prior to the Smart and Darvill incidents the Mau leaders had detached 
their political aspirations from the Samoan church, but soon after, especially 
after Darvill's comments, the Mau was presented with an opportunity to meddle 
in the affairs of the Samoan (LMS) Church. The Mau's immediate response was 
to shut down Samoan (LMS) Church programs and replace them with their own 
agenda.93 The events between 1928 and 1930 were the most challenging for 
the Samoan church and for the political aspirations of the Samoan people. In a 
period of three years the authority of the administrator was challenged time and 
time again through passive resistance, and disobeying administration orders 
89 Barker to Smart, 21 May, 1927, SSL. 
90 Barker to Smart, 21 May, 1927, SSL. 
91 Barker to Smart, 21 May, 1927, SSL. 
92 Smart to Barradale, 14 Sept, 1927, SSL. 
93 Smart to Barradale, 23 Apr, 1928, SSL; Smart to Barradale, 23 Apr, 1928, SSL; Meeting of the SOC and 
Deputation, Apia, 29 Sept - 1 Oct, 1928, SSL. 
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and regulations. In the Samoan (LMS) Church, the leadership challenge 
culminated in the emergence of the Mau church.94 When the dust settled, the 
crusade towards political independence was unrelenting, while the momentum 
for an independent Samoan (LMS) Church was revitalised. In 1931, the LMS 
missionaries revealed that their authority was no longer effective, as Samoan 
pastors took over the running of the church. The Au Fa'atonu became 
disheartened with the state of the church. The Reverend Frank S. Hoad was 
especially concerned with the minimal effect the church was having on the 
young people. 
The modern young youth is a wild rough thing, becoming more 
like the natives of South Africa, crimes which were hitherto 
unthought of are no lon~er so, but a degeneracy seems to have 
come over the people.9 
Hoad was also concerned with the Samoan pastors' enthusiasm in using 
their positions in the church to advance their own wellbeing and family interests. 
The Samoan pastors were also using their position to push unworthy students 
into the Malua Seminary. For the Samoans, the pastoral ministry was the 
ultimate lifestyle; as Bartlett pointed out a few years later, for a Samoan "to be a 
theological student is to have eternal life."96 In one of the districts, a Samoan 
pastor called himself "Misi Toeaina" to highlight his standing in his district. Hoad 
believed the lack of European supervision was one of the main causes for this 
laxity.97 
At Fa'asaleleaga, two of the elders, Tafuna'i and Amosa, staged a coup 
to eliminate Hoad and Kirisome's authority in the Fa'asaleleaga, but after a 
bitter struggle Tafuna'i and Amosa were dismissed.98 The District of ltu-o-tane 
was also overwhelmed by conflict between pastors and deacons arguing over 
financial contributions, which eventually led to a boycott of the annual church 
Me (May) contributions. The differences between the twelve villages within the 
district were finally healed, but it had affected the church as a whole. The 
94 See Chapter Eight for a discussion of this period, 1928 - 1931. 
95 Hoad, Report of the District Missionary, Savai'i, 1931, SSR. 
96 LMS Annual Report, Malua College, 1934, SSR; see also Bartlett to Barradale, 13 Dec, 1939, SSL. 
97 Hoad, Report of the District Missionary, Savai'i, 1931, SSR. 
98 Report of the District Missionary, ltuotane, Faasaleleaga, Aana, Falealili, 1932, SSR. 
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boycott was a protest to the Samoan (LMS) Church over the treatment of the 
Mau church by the Au Fa'atonu.99 
In the Falealili District, the Samoan pastors refused to recognise the 
leadership of the Elder pastor Enosa, who had called himself "Missionary 
Elder''100 to enhance his authority. He tried to dismiss the Samoan pastors 
Sione and Esera from their parishes as a show of power. Consequently, the 
Falealili pastors plotted Enosa's downfall and, according to Hoad, "tongues 
have wagged until Samoa is full of tales of Enosa and the wife of Esera."101 The 
tales were believed and Enosa and Esera were dismissed, and the pastors 
responsible for the rumours were also dismissed for misbehaviour. According to 
Hoad, the only Samoan pastor left to take responsibility for the Falealili District 
was "temporarily insane."102 Falealili District was left to the supervision of 
incompetent young pastors. Nevertheless, the Falealili district had established 
itself as the leading threat to LMS missionary authority. 103 
The hostility towards the Au Fa'atonu plagued the Fono Tele in 1932. 
The Samoan pastors and the LMS missionaries were drawn into a heated 
debate over the authority and leadership of the Leulumoega Fou High School. 
The Sibree and Darvill affairs were still fresh in the minds of the church, and the 
Samoan church leaders made sure the Au Fa'atonu had not forgotten it during 
the heated debates.104 The crisis began with the appointment of Ariu to the High 
School as Samoan Master, and the Reverend Stanley G. Phillips as Principal. 
From the beginning, both men tried to assert their authority over the 
school but this only led to disruption and chaos. Ariu refused to obey Phillips, 
and chose to do things his own way. 105 Phillips could not maintain discipline as 
many students obeyed Ariu. Phillips eventually condemned Ariu and called for 
his dismissal. The LMS missionaries and Samoan pastors in the newly formed 
99 Report of the District Missionary, ltuotane, Faasaleleaga, Aana, Falealili, 1932, SSR; see also SDC-
Minutes of Meeting, 10 -15 Dec, 1923, SSL; Hough 1o Lenwood, 9 May, 1924, SSL. 
100 Report of the District Missionary, ltuotane, Faasaleleaga, Aana, Falealili, 1932, SSR. 
101 Report of the District Missionary, ltuotane, Faasaleleaga, Aana, Falealili, 1932, SSR. 
102 Report of the District Missionary, ltuotane, Faasaleleaga, Aana, Falealili, 1932, SSR. 
103 In the Malua District a similar report criticised the pastors trying to take over the leadership but they 
lacked spirituality, and were irresponsible. See A Brief Report in the Work in the Malua District, 1932 - 33, 
SSR. 
104 Liston to Chirgwin, 6 Jul, 1932, SSL; Liston to Chirgwin, 4 Aug, 1932, SSL. 
105 Tuatagaloa to Directors in Britain, 22 Jun, 1932, SL, NLA; Vaega to Chirgwin, 30 May, 1932, SSL. 
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Mission Council (combined LMS missionary and Samoan pastors committee) 
found in favour of Phillips and recommended the dismissal of Ariu. 106 
During the Fono Tele in 1932, the matter regarding Ariu was raised, and 
soon after escalated into a heated debate. The LMS missionaries, with support 
from a few Samoan pastors, maintained their view regarding Ariu. The Fono 
Tele, however, insisted that both men be retained, but pursued an effective 
reconciliation whereby Ariu and Phillips settled their differences through "mutual 
forgiveness."107 Phillips refused to accept the resolution and threatened to 
resign if Ariu was retained. Phillips told his colleagues that "the way for most 
peace in the church is for me to tell the Directors that I have done my best for 
Samoa, and that my sphere of usefulness may lie in another way in another 
land."108 The Au Fa'atonu was sympathetic to Phillips, but they were powerless 
as the Fono Tele and the Au Toeaina contained powerful family connections of 
Ariu.109 The Au Fa'atonu had not forgotten Sibree, and losing another 
missionary was not an option. Nevertheless, the Au Fa'atonu wanted to solve 
the matter quickly, and it looked to Phillips for understanding. Hoad wrote that 
the LMS missionaries "met, wept with, prayed over, and advised Phillips to 
relent, all did this, in the hope that he would alter his position," but Phillips 
"turned a deaf ear."110 According to Stallan, Phillips maintained his stance and 
"failed to understand the difficulty of the situation" for his other colleagues. 111 
The Samoan pastors on the Mission Council, such as Sa'aga, Alesana 
and Vaega, pressed Ariu to accept the decision of the Mission Council and not 
to have the matter dragged on any longer, but their efforts were also in vain as 
Ariu refused to resign, although he was willing to abide by the decision of the 
Fono Tele and settle matters through reconciliation. Sa'aga was disappointed 
106 Head to Chirgwin, 30 May, 1932, SSL. Note: The formation of the Mission Council replaced the 
Samoan District Committee (SOC) which was made up entirely of LMS missionaries. The Mission Council 
was a combine committee of Samoan pastors and LMS missionaries set up to deal with various issues 
within the church. It gave the Samoan pastors the same rights as the LMS missionaries in dealing with 
issues involving Samoan pastors and LMS missionaries. Samoans became dominant within the Mission 
Council as the years went by. The Mission Council controlled all church matters, including the work of the 
missionaries, and school institutions. Under this council, a Samoa pastor was appointed Treasurer for the 
first time. Thus, the Mission Council increased the power and authority of the Samoan pastors within the 
LMS Samoan church. See SOC to Barradale, 28 May 1928; Constituuon of the Samoan Church, Apia: 
Malua Press, 1928. 
107 Head to Chirgwin, 30 May, 1932, SSL. 
1°' Head to Chirgwin, 3o May, 1932, SSL. 
109 Vaega to Chirgwin, 30 May, 1932, SSL; Downs to Chirgwin, 25 Jun, 1932, SSL.. 
110 Head to Chirgwin, 30 May, 1932, SSL. 
111 Stallan to Chirgwin, 6 Jun, 1932, SSL. 
259 
with Ariu's attitude and suggested that Ariu had been brought up, in the old 
ways, like his father Sio before him, at Leulumoega High School. Sa'aga also 
suggested that Ariu was "only a boy [who] wants to take full charge of the 
school himself."112 
In the end the Mission Council and the Fono Tele's resolutions were 
carried out. A reconciliation service was to take place and Ariu was to remain at 
the High School pending a decision from the Au Matutua. Ariu was also 
informed that he faced dismissal if his conduct deteriorated. The decision was 
accepted by the Samoans and it eliminated any possibility of the Fono Tele 
being disrupted. Phillips and Ariu attended the reconciliation service, but Phillips 
had no idea what was happening, as he did not understand Samoan and no 
one had bothered to inform him. When Phillips found out later, he was furious 
and rejected reconciliation, although he could not change Ariu being retained at 
the High School. 113 
Samoan pastors and the LMS missionaries afterwards criticised Phillips 
for lack of sympathy towards Ariu and the situation that had arisen, which led to 
the controversy. Hoad felt Phillips had "over exerted his authority,''114 while 
Stallan believed his ego had been his undoing as "he had concluded that he 
was doing the will of God."115 From a Samoan point of view, Sa'aga felt Phillips 
was too strict and "strikes too soon;"116 a weakness that Alesana also 
confirmed. 
He deals in haste, remembering he is the Headmaster and does 
as he pleases instead of consulting or respecting those who are 
under his supervision; this fault will only despise his good zeal. 
This same fault of his is formed inside the school and it has also 
reached the matters concerning the whole church.117 
The fate of Ariu was decided towards the end of 1932. The Au Matutua 
ordered that Ariu be dismissed from the High School. 118 The decision probably 
satisfied Phillips and the Au Fa'atonu, but it caused some resentment among 
the Samoan members of the Mission Council, as well as the Au Toeaina and 
112 Saaga to Chirgwin, 9 Jun, 1932, SSL. 
113 Hoad to Chirgwin, 30 May, 1932, SSL. 
114 Hoad to Chirgwin, 30 May, 1932, SSL. 
115 Stallan to Chirgwin, 6 Jun, 1932, SSL. 
116 Saaga to Chirgwin, 9 Jun, 1932, SSL. 
117 Alesana to Chirgwin, 10 Jun, 1932, SSL. 
118 Mission Council, Minutes of Meetings, 6 Jan, 1933, SSL; Mission Council, Minutes of Meetings, 10 -11 
Jan, 1934, SSL. 
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Samoan pastors. The Samoans wanted to reopen discussions immediately but 
the Au Fa'atonu refused. It was clear that the Samoans were not taking the 
decision lightly. 
The decision regarding Ariu reached Elder pastor Sio, Ariu's father. Sio 
immediately called upon the pastors and members of the Fa'asaleleaga district 
to boycott the up-coming Fono Tele until the Au Fa'atonu agreed to discuss his 
son's case. Sio was angry that the decision had been made public without the 
sanction of the Fono Tele. Sio believed the Fono Tele was the supreme 
authority of the Samoan church. The Au Fa'atonu rejected Sio's request, and in 
retaliation Sio removed his son from Malua and placed him as a teacher at the 
government school at Malifa. Ariu took on another government post at Avele 
School.119 
Sio had very powerful family connections within the church, and was also 
related to the Tamasese family, and as the Fono Tele loomed near, the Au 
Fa'atonu feared Fa'asaleleaga's absence would cause dissension in the 
church, 120 but the Au Fa'atonu was expecting the imminent arrival, just before 
the Fono Tele, of an LMS Deputation, and was counting on its presence to 
solve the tension. The Deputation, led by the Reverends J. A. Kaye and Nelson 
Bitton wrote to the Fa'asaleleaga District to attend the Fono Tele.121 For the Au 
Fa'atonu the letter from the representatives of the Au Matutua was enough to 
put the Samoan pastors in their place. 
Sio carried out his threat, and showed his influence on the Fa'asaleleaga 
District by boycotting the Fono Tele. The Au Fa'atonu's pride as well as that of 
the Deputation was dented. The Samoan pastors from the Fa'asaleleaga district 
had enhanced their bargaining power by defying the LMS. The challenge to the 
Au Fa'atonu's leadership was real and it was no longer confined to Falealili. 
After the Fono Tele, the Deputation agreed to meet with the Fa'asaleleaga 
District Sio's accusations and Fa'asaleleaga's grievances were tabled and the 
Deputation promised that their grievances would be addressed in the next Fono 
Tele. 122 The success of the Fa'asaleleaga District in defying not just the Au 
Fa'atonu but representatives of the Au Matutua, was disheartening news for the 
119 S. G. Phillips to G. E. Phillips, 15 Feb, 1933, SSL. 
120 Hoad to Chirgwin, 14 Feb, 1933,SSL. 
121 Hoad to Chirgwin, 14 May, 1933, SSL; Tala i le Fono a le Savali Mai le Au Matutua ma le Matagaluega 
a Faasaleleaga, Sapapali'i, 31 May-1Jun,1933, SSL. 
122 Statement Handed to J. A. Kaye by Sio, Faasaleleaga District, 30 May, 1933, SSO. 
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Au Fa'atonu. It would only encourage other districts and Samoan pastors to 
take matters into their own hands, but the Au Fa'atonu's had a far bigger 
dilemma in trying to explain to the Samoan districts and pastors loyal to the Au 
Fa'atonu and the Fono Tele, the Deputations' handling of the Fa'asaleleaga 
situation.123 
In the 1934 Fono Tele, the Fa'asaleleaga District attended en mass. 
Hoad suggested to his colleagues "have a cigar and if it comes to a showdown 
we must all stand together. "124 The comment was meant to reassure the Au 
Fa'atonu of its own leadership and superiority, but it also highlighted the 
strength of the Samoan church leaders in their challenge for that leadership. 
Hoad's comment was an expression of fear and an acknowledgment of the 
strength and vitality, and determination of the Samoans to assert their authority 
in the church. However, the excitement fizzled out into nothing as both sides 
settled their differences and proceeded to work together for the rest of the Fono 
Tele. For some of the LMS missionaries, the events that had taken place were a 
powerful display by "the pastors and even the deacons to have their own 
way."12s 
The influence and attitude of Hoad on Samoan church matters, and his 
lack of respect for Samoan pastors finally caught up with him in 1935. During 
the Fono Tele, the Au Toeaina resolved that Hoad, who was on furlough in 
England, be relieved of his position in Samoa "because his conduct is not in 
keeping with one who leads the work of the Samoan church."126 Hoad was 
unpopular in the 1934 Fono Tele because of his cigar remark and insensitive 
attitude towards Sio and other Samoan elders. According to Downs, Hoad had 
upset some of the Au Toeaina. 
When their [Au Toeaina] objections are personal it will be next to 
impossible to get them to face it out with the person involved; their 
habit of insincere courtesy is too deeply ingrained; they will either 
wait until you are away, as in the case of Mr Hoad, or they will wait 
and catch you out on some mistake or failure which all human 
beings, including missionaries, are liable to make.127 
123 Head to Chirgwin, 23 Sept, 1933, SSL. 
124 Head to Phillips, 7 Nov, 1934, SSL. 
125 H. S. Balsford to Phillips, 11Feb,1935, SSL; see also Head to Phillips, 7 Nov, 1934, SSL; 
126 Feno Tele, Malua, 30 May-1Jun,1935, SSL. 
127 Downs to Phillips, 15 Nov, 1935, SSL. 
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The Au Toeaina's decision to terminate Head's services was further 
evidence of the Samoans unrelenting pursuit of authority and church autonomy. 
For the LMS mission, Head's demise led to a deterioration of their work and an 
increased sense of failure, which led some LMS missionaries to keep company 
with 'the bottle'. Phillips was a victim, and on his own free-will left Samoa at the 
beginning of 1936. Phillips later blamed the Samoan church leaders for trying to 
"legislate work" at the High School, which kept him from exercising his 
authority. 128 For the Samoan pastors, especially Sio, Ariu, and the 
Fa'asaleleaga, justice had finally been served. 
The LMS missionaries also gave the Samoan pastors motivation for 
independence when they disagreed over important issues. For instance, the 
question of ordination, especially in relation to Miss Evelyn A. Downs and the 
Samoan pastors, divided the Au Fa'atonu in 1937. Stallan wanted Samoan 
pastors to concentrate more on the lay-ministry. He pointed out that "ordination 
for Samoans in the LMS church is so cheap that there is a good reason for 
every case of non-ordination."129 Stallan believed the ordination of Samoan 
pastors had got out of hand compared to the WMMS and the Catholic mission. 
He called upon the LMS not to fall for the Samoan pastors' point of view that 
people do not respect non-ordained pastors. Stallan also criticised Downs' role 
in examining Samoan pastors for ordination. He felt as Downs was not ordained 
she was, therefore, "neither expected nor allowed to inquire into any of the 
aspects of the lives and work of the ordained native ministry."130 
Bartlett also criticised Downs' attitude regarding Holy Communion but not 
because she was not ordained. Bartlett felt it did not set a good example for the 
Samoan pastors who were not ordained when Downs conducted Holy 
Communion. However, he believed Downs has every right to do it, because "to 
say she must not we simply say Miss Downs is a missionary of a lower grade, 
only a missionary in part."131 Bartlett also agreed with Downs' view that the 
custom of women not conducting Holy Communion applied only to Samoan 
women "for the church is very young ... the time has not yet arrived when 
128 S. G. Phillips to G. E. Phillips, 17 Apr, 1936, SSL; see also S. G. Phillips to G. E. Phillips, 10 Feb, 1936, 
SSL; Stallan to Phillips, 2 Jun, 1936, SSL; S. G. Phillips to G. E. Phillips, 2 Nov, 1936, SSL 
129 Stallan to Goodall, 9 Mar, 1937, SSL 
130 Stallan to Goodall, 9 Mar, 1937, SSL 
131 Bartlett to Barradale, 9 Jan, 1940, SSL. 
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Samoan women can be allowed to conduct this service."132 Bartlett felt the 
Samoan pastors understood the situation regarding Downs and had accepted it. 
Bartlett may have been right on the surface, but he had no idea of the real 
feelings of the Samoan church leaders. A woman, and not a Samoan pastor, 
conducting Holy Communion was a sin as far as Samoan pastors were 
concerned. For Bartlett to say the Samoan pastors understood and accepted 
what was clearly their hypocrisy only revealed the ignorance and inconsistency 
of the missionaries in treating the Samoan pastors as equals. 
The ordination issue was just a storm in a teacup, but it indicated the 
'mean spirit' that was slowly eating into the LMS missionaries' relationships. 133 
When the Reverend Norman Goodall visited the Samoan mission in 1939, he 
found the relationship between the LMS missionaries unpleasant. He felt the 
problem with the Samoan mission "is the failure in the fellowship on the part of 
the missionaries ... the amount of evidence for it is appalling. I doubt if there is 
any more confidence and love between the missionaries as a whole than there 
is in beach society at its worst...mistrust, slander, and malicious gossip have 
been made."134 Goodall felt none of the Au Fa'atonu was worthy to keep its 
place in Samoa. The Samoans' challenge for leadership and independence 
thrived upon such inadequacy and failures. 
The Au Fa'atonu agreed with Goodall and believed the Samoan (LMS) 
Church itself was in good shape, except for the European missionaries' disunity, 
which had kept the Samoan pastors at a distance, but they all failed to see the 
splinter in their colleagues' eye through the log in their own eye. 135 The conflict 
between the Au Fa'atonu finally found its way into the 1940 Fono Tele, and the 
failure of the LMS missionaries to solve their differences, put a strain on 
Samoan church leaders' loyalty. The Au Fa'atonu noticed the negative reactions 
of the Samoan pastors, but it was powerless to put an end to their hostility. 136 
The Samoans took the Au Fa'atonu's disunity as frail leadership, and it only 
strengthened the Samoan pastors' pursuit for control of the Samoan (LMS) 
Church. 
132 Bartlett to Barradale, 9 Jan. 1940, SSL. 
133 Downs to Barradale, 10 Dec, 1937, SSL. 
134 Goodall to Barradale, 22 Apr, 1939, SSL. 
135 For examples, see Bartlett to Barradle, 9 Jan, 1940, SSL; Statement by Miss Downs to Accusations 
Made by Some of Her Colleagues, undated, SSL; Bartlett to Barradale, undated, SSL; Downs to Goodall, 
27 Mar, 1940, SSL. 
136 Downs to Goodall, 30 May, 1940, SSL; Bartlett to Chirgwin, 25 Jun, 1940, SSL. 
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The resurgence of old Samoan superstitions within the Samoan (LMS) 
Church was also a challenge to the leadership of the church. Although very 
rarely practiced in the open, the Au Fa'atonu was aware of their existence within 
the Samoan church. Much of the superstition involved aitu (spirits) possession, 
and the usage of traditional medicine to rid oneself of such aitu.137 Many 
Samoan church members believed in aitu, but were careful to conceal it from 
European missionaries. When such cases captured the attention of the Au 
Fa'atonu, the Samoans took avid interest in its outcome, especially if the 
missionary's medicine failed to treat such illness. 138 In such cases, the 
Samoans' attributed the deaths to aitu power. The German administration was 
also aware of such practices and issued an order prohibiting superstitious 
practices in the treatment of illnesses. The order was prompted by the 
behaviour ofVasati, the wife of a Methodist pastor named Mose, who ordered 
people to cut down breadfruit and coconut trees when family members died of 
suspected aitu sickness. 139 The German administration order, however, had no 
affect on Tutuila where superstition also affected the work of the church. 
The Reverend John G. Hawker reported Samoans in a Tutuila church 
believed their pastor and his wife had power over evil spirits and could cast out 
demons. They were summoned before the administrator but were later 
dismissed with a warning. Two days later, two people died and aitu possession 
was blamed for their death. Hawker realised Samoans truly believed in aitu and 
the occurring deaths only reaffirmed in the Samoan minds the power of the aitu. 
Hawker was not far from the truth when he wrote that "medicine and charms are 
indissolubly connected with one another in the mind of the average Samoan, 
who believes that most of his ailments are work of evil spirits. I am afraid that 
even the medicines we ourselves dispense are frequently expected to act 
magically."140 
137 For background reading on the phenomenon of aitu, see Horst Cain, Aitu,Weisbaden: n.p., 1979; 
Richard Goodman, "Some Aitu Beliefs of Modern Samoa," Journal of the Polynesian Society BO no. 4, 
1971; E. S. Graighill Handy, Polynesian Religion, Bernice P. Bishop Museum Bulletin 34, New York: Kraus 
Reprint, 1971; Featuna'i B. Liua'ana, "Resurrecting Aitu as a Contemporary Theological Concept," B.D. 
Thesis, Pacific Theological College, 1991. 
130 For example, in 1905 Miss Elizabeth Moore gave medicine to an ex-student, Saiperia, for an illness. 
The Samoans believed she was possessed by the spirit of her husband's ex-wife. Within two days 
Saiperia died and the Samoans believed it was an aitu that had killed her. The aitu was stronger than the 
medicine of the missionary. See Fifth Annual Report of Atauloma Girls school, 1905, SSR. 
139 Shultz to Vasati (Sataoa), 4 Dec, 1911, German Administration Papers (henceforth GAP), vol. 1; Sava/i, 
May 1912, GAP. 
"
0 Hawker, Report of Work in Tutuila and Manu'a, 1907, SSR. 
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The greatest challenge to the Samoan (LMS) Church took place in the 
A'ana District regarding "witchcraft."141 According to Hoad, it was the biggest 
threat since the introduction of Christianity into Samoa; the ''whole of 
Christendom in Samoa was jeopardised."142 The practice of "witchcraft" 
surfaced in 1931 but evidence showed that it had been infecting the church for 
many years. Mr John W. Liston, in charged of the Printing Press, claimed the 
practice had started within the Falealili District and its popularity was 
unquestionable as "a narrow track across the mountain is now wide enough to 
drive a car across."143 The practice, also called by Hoad as "consulting the 
oracle," soon spread to the nearby district of A'ana, especially in the parishes in 
the sub-district of Lefaga, Alofi, Lotofaga, Falelatai and Manono. It practically 
turned Samoan pastors into "quack doctors and fortune-tellers."144 
Hoad immediately set up plans to curb the practice, which had spread 
like fire and enticed many Samoan church members under its power. Samoan 
pastors, Alesana and Sa'aga visited the perpetrators, and tried to stop all 
"witchcraft" activities, but were unsuccessful.145 A Deputation was then formed, 
made up of Hoad, and Samoan Elders Samuelu and Filimoni, Samoan pastors 
Epelu, Tamate, Perelini, Laiva, Pilitati, and Samoan deacons Fata, Va'afusuaga 
and Nanai. The Deputation visited all the pastors and parishes involved in the 
"witchcraft" phenomenon, which included Amosa (Safa'atoa, Lefaga), Apela 
(Savaia, Lefaga), luvale (Si'ufaga, Falelatai), and Aseta (Salua, Manono). Two 
other Samoans pastors also involved, Elder Enosa (Falealili) and Solomona 
(Lotofaga), appeared before the Deputation under summons. 146 
The Deputation were soon informed of the details of the so-called 
'consulting the oracle.' 
A bible has a key partially inserted about the middle with the loop 
of the key protruding, and it is then bound tightly on both sides of 
the key so that the bible may be suspended by means of the key. 
141 There is no Samoan term to describe what happened at Lefaga. The event described does not 
constitute 'witchcraft' as far as Europeans understood the concept. The pastors performed the functions of 
a Samoan tau/asea (one who treats sickness with aitu medicine) and also of a taulaitu (one who exorcised 
spirits and communicates with the spirit wortd). I do not believe the Samoa pastors saw themselves as 
performers of witchcraft. See also Aitu Stories, Samoa Herald, 18 Aug, 1933. 
142 Head to Chirgwin, 18 Mar, 1932, SSL. 
143 Liston to Chirgwin, 24 Nov, 1931, SSL. 
144 Phillips to Chirgwin, 15 Dec, 1931, SSL; see also Liston to Chirgwin, 24 Nov, 1931, SSL. 
145 Head, Report on Recent Witchcraft Practice in Aana, 3 May, 1932, SSL. 
146 Liston to Chirgwin, 24 Nov, 1931, SSL; Head, Report on Recent Witchcraft Practice in Aana, 3 May, 
1932, SSL. 
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Two ways are then open, (1), for two people each using their 
index fingers beneath the loop of the key or, (2). For the pastor to 
use the index finger of both hands, Prayer is then offered on the 
following lines 'O God Almighty, thou knowest all things, and thou 
dost reveal thy will unto thy people through thy Holy Word, tell us 
therefore we beseech thee. (Then follows the question). If the 
answer is 'Yes' turn the bible we are thy children. Amen.147 
If the key turned, the answer was 'Yes', if not, the answer was 'No'. The 
simplicity of the method, and the fact that it actually entertained and fulfilled the 
longings and aspirations of many Samoans, made 'consulting the oracle' a very 
biblical and Christian thing. The fact that Samoan pastors promoted and took 
part in the matter gave it authenticity. It was another vehicle for young pastors 
to express their free will and take control of their own spiritual welfare. 
In the end, the Deputation managed to convince the Samoan pastors 
involved to renounce their activities, especially when the police became 
involved after the death of four people. The deaths included a baby who was 
overdosed with ten calomel tablets, a Samoan who was ordered to drink an 
excessive amount of neat Lysol, a woman starved to death, and a man 
poisoned by Samoan medicine.148 When l'uvale was asked as to why he had 
given a baby 10 calomel tablets, he replied "I am clean in the sight of God, only 
such things as His Holy Word tells me I do."149 Apela also proved difficult as he 
referred to the so-called 'consulting the oracle' as the new way for God to reveal 
his will. This was a common mentality among the Samoan pastors involved. 150 
The Samoan pastors involved and their parishioners, at first, stood their 
ground and defied the authority of the LMS deputation. According to Hoad, their 
task was not just to extinguish "witchcraft," but to secure the future of the 
Samoan (LMS) Church from the clutches of fanatical authoritarian Samoan 
pastors. In the end, the parishes concerned surrendered and agreed to part with 
their pastors. In all, eight pastors were imprisoned for manslaughter and 
witchcraft. The Samoan (LMS) Church itself dismissed all the pastors that had 
participated in any way with the phenomenon.151 
147 Hoad, Report on Recent Witchcraft Practice in Aana, 3 May, 1932, SSL. 
148 Hoad, Report on Recent Witchcraft Practice in Aana, 3 May, 1932, SSL. 
149 Hoad, Report on Recent Wttchcraft Practice in Aana, 3 May, 1932, SSL. 
150 Hoad, Report on RecentWttchcraft Practice in Aana, 3 May, 1932, SSL. 
151 Hoad, Report on Recent Wttchcraft Practice in Aana, 3 May, 1932, SSL. For a fuller picture of the 
incident, see Appendix B: Report on Recent Witchcraft Practice in Aana. 
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The challenges to the leadership of the Samoan (LMS) Church continued 
to perturb the Au Fa'atonu up to World War II. The impact of World War II on 
the lives of the Samoans took the Samoans' independent visions to new 
heights, and provided new challenges. Many of the challenges were subtle, but 
occasionally, a major issue gripped the attention of the Samoan church leaders, 
and threatened to seize control of the Samoan (LMS) Church. The ongoing 
petitions for independence, during and after World War II not only stirred up 
political emotions, but also gave the Samoan church leaders further incentive to 
achieve their aims. The Samoan political vehicle also advanced to achieve its 
goal-independence. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
THE IMPACT OF WORLD WAR II 
AND A MANDATE FOR INDEPENDENCE 
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The beginning of World War II was the final catalyst that set off a chain of 
events, which eventually took Samoa towards independence. World War II 
provided an opportunity to expose the Samoans to the technology and wealth of 
America, and an opportunity for the Samoans to re-evaluate their future 
together with New Zealand. Furthermore, World War II provided the allied 
nations of the world with an opportunity to consider the destiny of the axis 
powers' colonies and to seek political and religious avenues to halt further 
incalculable destruction of world peace. 
The scale and impact of World War II for Samoa was far greater than 
World War I, and unlike World War I, it overflowed the boundaries of Europe.1 
When war began in 1939, Turnbull put Samoa on military alert and was forced 
to place German citizens under house arrest, who were later interned in New 
Zealand.2 Two German priests were among the internees and Darnand wrote 
to Archbishop O'Shea of the Catholic Church in New Zealand pointing out, "it is 
our earnest desire that they be not kept in any concentration camp."3 
On 7 December 1941, Japan bombed Pearl Harbour in Hawaii, but only 
succeeded in forcing America to join the war.4 America supported the allied 
nations against Germany and Italy in Europe, while in the Pacific it committed 
all its resources to protect mainland America and its Territories, including 
American Samoa; a key strategic location for the American Navy. New Zealand 
1 The axis powers included Germany, Italy and Russia, and Japan. Russia, however became an ally 
against Germany after Germany attacked Russia in 1941. The allied nations included America, Britain and 
France. Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939 after Germany had invaded 
Poland. See "World War II," in Encyclopedia of the id" Century, ed. John Drexel, Oxford: Facts on File, 
1991; Chronicle of the 2d" Century, Ringwood: Penguin Books, 1999. 
2 The application for the Germans' release came from certain sectors of the community. The 'Alien 
Emergency regulations, 1940' was later implemented to restrict the movements of Germans in Samoa. 
See Unknown to Acting Administrator, 13 Oct, 1939, Darnand Correspondence, Maris! Archives of Samoa 
and Tokelau (henceforth MAST); Turnbull to Darnand, 21 May, Darnand Correspondence, 1940, MAST; 
Alien Emergency Regulations, 1940, Darnand Correspondence, MAST. 
3 Darnand to Archbishop O'Shea (NZ), 29 Apr, 1942, Darnand Correspondence, MAST; Turnbull to 
Darnand, 28 Apr. 1942, Darnand Correspondence, MAST; Darnand to Turnbull, 11 May, 1943, Darnand 
Correspondence, MAST. 
4 Pearl H,;:-rbour Bombed: US is at War. 7 Dec, 1941, Chronicle of the 2d' Century. 
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and Australia were also put on alert as they had interests in Samoa and Papua 
New Guinea respectively. 5 
New Zealand and Australia were committed to Britain's war effort in 
Europe and North Africa, although Australia was heavily committed to the 
defence of its own territory, and that left America dominant in the Pacific. A 
Japanese submarine shelled Pago Pago harbour in 1942, and prompted 
America to set up a permanent base in Samoa.6 Magia in Upolu was chosen for 
the campsite while at Faleolo, an airfield was constructed. A cross-island road 
linking Leulumoega in the west and Aleipata in the east was also constructed 
for easier troop and machinery movement, and to monitor the enemy presence. 
Many underground bunkers were built for the storage of ammunition and other 
combat increments. Apia harbour was also a very busy point of entry for 
American supplies and personnel. 
Magia was the main American camp. It was fenced and well guarded, 
and very large to the extent that the Samoans referred to it as the 'Taulaga 
Meleke'.7 The camp maintained a number of personnel to monitor and check 
supplies, and to guard the airfield. Many Samoans sought and received 
employment at Magia,8 and there was a continuous flow of Samoans to and 
from the Taulaga Meleke daily. 
The contact between Maligi (American Marines or soldiers) and 
Samoans was not restricted to the camp at Magia and to the town of Apia. The 
5 For the involvement of Island nations in the war, see Geoffrey M. White and Lamont Lindstrom, eds., The 
Pacific Theatre: Island Representations of World War II, Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1990; 'World War 
II," in Encyclopedia of the 2d" Century, ed. John Drexel, Oxford: Facts on File, 1991; Chronicle of the 2d' 
Century, Ringwood: Penguin Books, 1999. 
6 Japan had been expelled from the League of Nations in 1933 for starting the war with China. After 
bombing Pearl Harbour, the Japanese advanced quickly through Asia, taking the American base and 
territories in the Philippines, Wake Island, and Guam. The Japanese took the British base in Hong Kong, 
and then captured 70,000 British troops as it routed Singapore. From Singapore, the Japanese planned to 
take Papua New Guinea and use it as base to attack Australia and New Zealand. The Americans 
recovered from the shock Japanese attacks and decisively won the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle 
of Midway, followed by their victory in Guadalcanal. Solomon, Kiribati, and Guam were all recaptured, and 
from then on the Japanese started to lose ground. See 'World War II," in Encyclopedia of the 2d' Century, 
ed. John Drexel, Oxford: Facts on File, 1991; Chronicle of the 2d' Century, Ringwood: Penguin Books, 
1999. 
7 Literally translated "American town." Kake Aiona was 15 years old when the American occupation took 
place. She lived at Nofoali'i, a village sttuated a few miles from the American base at Magia. Kake Aiona 
(68 years). Personal Interview, National University of Samoa, Apia, October 1995; also Toala Malaki (78 
years). Personal Interview, Faga, Savai'i, September, 1995; Fa'i Maui'u (71 years). Personal Interview, 
Saleaula, Savai'i, September, 1995. 
8 Su' a lsaia (83 years). Personal Interview, Saipipi, Savai'i, September 1995; Tupa'i Posese (70 years). 
Personal Interview, Safua, Savai'i, September 1995; Va'afusuaga To'oto'o II (75 years). Personal 
Interview, Sa'asa'ai, Savai'i, September, 1992; Su'a Toala Sarni (78 years). Personal Interview, 
Salelavalu, Savai'i, September 1995; Soana'i Oeti (60 years). Personal Interview, Safua, Savai'i, 
November, December 1992. 
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Maligi maintained small bases throughout Upolu, Savai'i, Manono and Apolima, 
and from these bases they patrolled nearby villages. The Maligi became friendly 
with many Samoan families and as time passed, Samoan families adopted 
them.9 The Samoans washed the Maligis' clothes and provided Samoan goods 
on request. The Maligi gave the Samoans money, pocket-knives, screwdrivers 
and hammers, torches, hurricane lamps, canned food, mitiafu me/eke 
(American singlets), cigarettes, alcohol, and other items the Maligi took for 
granted but the Samoans regarded as luxury items.10 In Apia, American wealth 
led to the establishment of new restaurants, stores, laundry outlets, dance halls, 
movie houses, and motels.11 It was the beginning of an association between 
two different cultures and diverse customs that would leave a lasting impression 
on the Samoans.12 
The presence of America in Samoa was positive for the Samoans. 
Samoans felt America cared more for them than New Zealand, especially when 
New Zealand had opted to defend Britain instead of Samoa. The Samoans 
showed their support and appreciation in obeying all orders and curfews without 
criticism, even when the Maligi acted violently towards Samoans who 
disobeyed.13 The Samoans took such violent outbursts as the result of ill-
discipline on their part, and a true indication of the Maligi's willingness to 
safeguard Samoans from the Japanese. America was seen as the providers of 
goods, employment, and wealth. The sight of fighter planes, trucks, jeeps, and 
other mechanical wizardry impressed the Samoans immensely. The equal 
coexistence of Afro-American and white American soldiers impressed the 
9 Kake Aiona (66 years). Personal Interview, National University of Samoa, Apia, October 1995; Vaolele 
Laulu Tevaga (66 years). Personal Interview, Safua, Savai'i, September, 1995; Ta'aseu Kuini (63 years). 
Personal Interview, Sa'asa'ai, Savai'i, September 1995; Utumata Tonu (61 years). Personal Interview, 
Saipipi, Savai'i, September 1995. 
10 The impact of the American occupation in Samoa was very similar to that in Tonga. See Elizabeth 
Wood-Ellem, "Behind the Battle lines: Tonga in World War II," in Echoes of Pacific War, eds. D. Scarr, N. 
Gunson, J. Tyrrell, Canberra: Target Oceania, 1998. 
11 A good account of the life in Apia during the war is given in the biography of Aggie Grey, a prominent 
hotelier in Samoa at the time. See Nelson Eustis, Aggie Grey of Samoa, Adelaide: Hobby Investments, 
1979; Fay Alailima, Aggie Grey: A Samoan Saga, Honolulu: Mutual Publishing, 1988. 
12 For an appraisal of the impact of American occupation on other islands of the Pacific, and in the 
churches of those islands, see Charles Forman, The Island Churches of the South Pacific: Emergence in 
the Twentieth Century, Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1962, 139 -144. 
13 The curfew imposed from the 1 October 1942, was mainly between 9pm and 6 am the next morning, 
and it restricted movement and absenteeism from residence. Samoans that I interviewed revealed stories 
of Maligi brutality for Samoans lighting a match for a cigarette, lighting lamp for emergencies or a sick 
person. Babies were born in the dark. The curfews and orders relating to such curfews were revoked 
towards the end of 1944. See Curfew Orders, Western Samoa Gazette, no.130, 1Oct,1942; Samoa 
Emergency Regulations, 1942, Western Samoa Gazette, no. 131, 24 Mar, 1943; Samoa Energy Order No. 
7, Western Samoa Gazette, no. 131 & 132, 21Jul,1943 & 15 Mar, 1944; Curfew Revoked by Samoa 
Emergency Order No. 10, Western Samoa Gazette, no. 136, 1Dec,1944. 
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Samoans, and left them bitter towards their oppressive mentors. The Samoans 
envied American materialism and freedom, and sought to possess it, either 
under American rule or as an independent nation.14 
The presence of the Maligi led to a decline in morality and church 
attendance. Apia town attracted many Samoans, especially young men and 
women seeking opportunities to make money through work, gambling, and 
companionship. Some thirty-six kilometres from Apia, the Taulaga Meleke was 
not only a buzzing location daily but once a week a dance was held on Saturday 
night. The dances were restricted to Maligi and Samoan women who needed no 
invitation to attend. The dances not only attracted women from nearby villages 
but from other districts and Apia. The women learnt of the dance some days 
before and would travel and stay with families at villages near Magia. The 
dances provided Samoan women with an opportunity to smoke cigarettes and 
drink alcohol, a lifestyle that many Samoans were learning to imitate.15 
The dances fostered relationships between Maligi and Samoan women. 
The matai and pastors in many villages found it difficult to combat the problem 
of de facto relationships, especially when the sa [prohibition under village rules 
and regulations} and tapu of the nu'u, and Christian regulations were 
transgressed. At times, the task was much harder when those in leadership of 
the nu'u promoted and encouraged such relationships for wealth.16 Samoan 
women became pregnant and by the end of the war, there were numerous 
'blond hair blue eyes mafigi se' in Samoa.17 A Samoan, who had lived through 
the American occupation of Samoa, wrote a song soon after the war regarding 
relationships between the Maligi and Samoan women. 
1. Outou teine o le atunu'u 
Na ou fa'apea e le valea lou ulu 
Tama mai Meleke ua taunu'u 
Ae vali ai fua lava ou laugutu 
1 . You girls of the country [Samoa] 
I thought you were not foolish 
The boys from America arrive 
And you begin to paint your lips 
14 Nanai Fa'asa (75 years). Personal Interview, Falelatai, Upolu, October 1995; Va'afusuaga To'oto'o 11 (75 
years). Personal Interview. Sa'asa'ai, Savai'i, September 1995; Su'a Toala Sarni (78 years). Personal 
Interview, Salelavalu, Savai'i, September 1995; Tutuaitu Ualesi (66 years). Personal Interview, Saipipi, 
Savai'i, September 1995. 
15 Koke Aiono (68 years). Personal Interview, National University of Samoa, Apia, October 1995; Reverend 
lupe!i lupeli (82 years). Personal Interview, Alafua, Apia, October 1995. 
16 Nanai Fa'asa (75years). Person Interview, Falelatai, Upolu, October 1995; Taefu Tupou (77 years). 
Personal Interview, Falelatai, Upolu, October 1995; Taefu Mata'! (69 years). Personal Interview, Falelatai, 
Upolu, October 1995. 
17 The term maligi se Oost marine or accidental marine) was used as a derogatory term for the illegrtimate 
children of the Maligi. The term maligi itself was later used for identity as the derogatory term maligi se 
disappeared. See Kake Aiono (66 years). Personal Interview, National University of Samoa, Apia, October 
1995 
Su'e mai se'evae ma fa'amaulu 
Ae le masani talu o na e tupu 
E te usu lava i le togaulu 
E toli mai ni ulu e fai se umu 
2. Sosola uma o seila i Meleke 
Tia'i oe i le alatele 
Nofonofo solo i le aualatele 
Ma si ou foga ua tau malepe 
Ua uma fo'i aso o le fa'apepe 
I talane o le tama mai Meleke 
Ua uma na ou faiatu 
Aua e te mateletele 
E te i'u lava i le tu sameme 
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You find the shoes and put it on 
But you never use to do it since birth 
You go early to the breadfruit trees 
To get breadfruit for an umu18 
Sailors have all run away to America 
Abandoning you on the road 
You sit by the roadside 
With your face falling apart (crying) 
Over were the days of romancing 
Next to the boy from America 
I have already told you 
Don't be arrogant 
You will end up with nothing 
The lyrics of the song 19 suggested that Samoan men detested the relationships 
between Samoan women and the Maligi. The animosity was probably prompted 
by the jealousy of young men over a shortage of women due to the Maligi's 
presence. The song also suggested that women neglected their responsibilities 
to their families, as they preferred to patronise Apia in the company of the 
Maligi,20 and ultimately described the women's disappointment when the Maligi 
left Samoa. 
The song also highlighted a negative aspect of the American occupation 
of Samoa - prostitution. The wealth of the Maligi drove families to set up small 
brothels within their own homes. Samoan families would invite Maligi to their 
homes for fellowship and, eventually, recreation and pleasure. Many families 
had special curtains drawn for the benefit of the Maligi and a female member of 
the family. At times the financial gain was so overwhelming a Samoan would 
offer his wife for sexual favours. The church leaders from the various missions 
were not immune from temptation. At the Methodist Synod in 1946, a teacher 
was expelled from the church "for having allowed his house and daughter to be 
used for infamous purposes [prostitution]."21 Wealth tempted and encouraged 
many Samoans to sacrifice their daughters and family members. Samoans 
18 An umu is a Samoan way of cooking food with hot stones covered by banana and breadfruit leaves. 
19 The song, entitled 'Oe Teine o le Atunuu." was composed by Siaki Lapana of Palolo Deep, Matautu-tai, 
Upolu. The English translation is only a literal translation provided by the author. I cannot date this song, 
although when I grew up as a child in Samoa in the 1960s it was already a very popular song. 
20 But, the Samoan women were not the only ones neglecting their duties. The young Samoan men 
preferred to play ma/igi all day rather than tending the family plantations. Consequently, many plantations 
laid waste. Reverend lupeli lupeli (82 years). Personal Interview, Alafua, Apia, October 1995. 
21 The incident occurred in 1945 before the Maligi had left Samoa and was only dealt with in the 1946 
Synod. See Minutes of the Annual District Synod of the Samoan District, Saleaula, No. 26 - 29, 1946, 
Samoa Methodist Church Archives. 
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blamed the Maligi for demanding sexual relationships with Samoan women, and 
for offering large sums of money that were too tempting to resist.22 In the end, it 
was the greediness of the Samoans' themselves that contributed to a decline in 
morality. The Samoan leaders wanted to take control of their country to counter 
the 'evil' influences affecting their society. 
The missions were also concerned about the lack of morality displayed 
by their members. The Samoans mimicked Maligi lifestyles to the point of 
spending Sundays with the Maligi. Furthermore, the matai and church members 
that the missions relied on for maintaining church discipline promoted 
immorality. The Samoan pastors lacked the authority to discipline young people 
of the churches, because the matai they relied upon for carrying out the 
discipline in the villages were ill-disciplined themselves, and lacked moral 
standards. It was not easy for the Samoans to maintain a strict spiritual life in 
competition with wealth. The increased wealth being contributed to the church 
would have also compromised the moral positions of the matai as well as the 
pastors. 
American troops entered Japan in April 1945. At the same time, the allied 
nations inaugurated the United Nations on 25 April 1945.23 On 7 May 1945, 
Germany surrendered unconditionally, while America gave Japan an ultimatum 
to surrender. Japan remained defiant, and on 6 and 9 August 1945, America 
dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Ngasaki respectively. Japan 
surrendered five days later, and America emerged as a superpower. By the end 
of the war, over 55 million people, including Pacific Islanders, had sacrificed 
their lives for world peace.24 
The Maligi left Samoa at the end of 1945. They were forced to leave 
behind 'sweethearts' and many maligi se as a legacy of their occupation. It was 
not easy for Samoans as well, especially women who had developed intimate 
relationships with the Maligi, to disguise the pain as close ties were severed 
unexpectedly. Many Samoan families lost not just relationships, but also a 
regular income. The Maligi probably felt the same pain, but they were comforted 
22 A similar problem was also prevalent in Tonga during the American occupation of that island. See 
Siosua F. Pouvalu Lafitani, "New Behaviours and Migration Since World War II," in Echoes of Pacific War, 
eds. D. Scarr, N. Gunson, J. Tyrrell, Canberra: Target Oceania, 1998. 
23 This replaces the old League of Nations. It had forty-six participating members. See UN is Born in San 
Francisco, 25 Apr, 1945, Chronicle of the 2d' Century. 
24 
"World War II," in Encyclopedia of the 2d' Century, ed. John Drexel, Oxford: Facts on File, 1991; A-
Bomb Vaporises Japan Cities, 9 Aug, 1N5, Chronicle of the 2d' Century; Hirohito: We Surrender, 15 Aug, 
1945, Chronicle of the 2d' Century. 
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by the idea of returning home as heroes for their country; an honour the Maligi 
felt was far more important. Many Samoans were happy with the departure of 
the Maligi, as they contemplated the immense impact the Maligi had on the 
Samoans. The wealth and technology, and a different lifestyle created a craving 
among the Samoans for material goods and independence. For the Samoan 
leaders, they were again given the chance to preserve the purity of the Samoan 
race and the normality of Samoan life.25 
The missions were also happy in more ways then one. On one hand, the 
departure of the Maligi was an incentive for young Samoans to return to church. 
Most importantly, it was a chance to halt immoral practices, such as prostitution 
and to return Samoan families to the practice of Christian principles. 26 
Lieutenant-Colonel Francis William Voelcker, the new administrator of Samoa in 
1946, wrote to the various missions regarding Samoan morals as the basis to 
unity. He wanted to see "every Samoan catechist and pastor an active force, 
seven days a week, for Christian morals and clean Christian government."27 
Voelcker further reminded the missions, 
To my mind it is not enough to talk of love and inveigh against sin 
from the pulpit on Sundays. These Samoan clergies must know 
who are the thieves, adulterers, trouble makers, produce cheats 
and all who offend against the laws of God and man. Even those 
who do not send their children to school, are cruel, or lean lazily 
on their aiga and do not do their share in the community life.28 
Voelcker's comments highlighted the problems with children and young people 
failing to attend school, and not attending their family plantations; a problem that 
started with too much attachment to the Maligi. Voelcker shared the missions' 
vision to influence the Samoans to regain their sense of industriousness. 
The missions were concerned with the number of maligi se left behind to 
be cared for by Samoans, without any assistance from America. The rise in 
crime was also a concern as the taste for luxury goods, and the ready 
availability of alcohol, tempted the Samoans. The missions called for an 
establishment of a Board to distribute and monitor the availability of alcohol. 
"Reverend lupeli lupeli (82 years). Personal Interview, Alafua, Apia, October 1995. 
'"There are no indications of sexually transmitted diseases having spread among the Samoans due to 
contact with the Maligi, but it was possible that such diseases were prevalent. For a comparison see 
example from Tonga in Siosua F. Pouvalu Lafitani, "New Behaviours and Migration Since World War II," in 
Echoes of Pacific War, eds. 0. Scarr, N. Gunson, J. Tyrrell, Canberra: Target Oceania, 1998. 
27 Voelckerto Darnand, 25 Oct, 1946, Darnand Correspondence, MAST. 
28 Voelcker to Damand, 25 Oct, 1946, Darnand Correspondence, MAST. 
The Catholic leaders advised Turnbull, "there should always be some very 
definite control of distribution in view of our native population and of the 
overwhelming evils and abuses that would overtake our young people were 
they permitted easy access to strong drink."29 
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The end of the war saw changes in the Samoans' attitude towards the 
New Zealand administration. The Fono a Faipule began to dominate and 
influence political decisions, as it restricted the role of the administrator into 
taking malaga and distributing gifts. The new attitude rendered the administrator 
almost useless as he tried to maintain his integrity and the precedence of his 
position under the circumstances. On the other side of the world, the United 
Nations decided the fate of Germany's colonies. Samoa was put under a United 
Nations Trusteeship with trusteeship entrusted to New Zealand. Under the 
terms of the Trusteeship, New Zealand was ordained to carry out four basic 
duties.30 
1. To promote progressive development towards self-government 
or independence as may be appropriate to the particular 
circumstances of each Territory and its peoples and the freely 
expressed wishes of the people concerned. 
2. To foster the development of free political institutions suited to 
Western Samoa. 
3. To assure to the inhabitants of Western Samoa a progressively 
increasing share in the administrative and other services of the 
Territory. 
4. To develop the participation of the inhabitants of Western 
Samoa in advisory and legislative bodies and in government of 
the Territory. 
The Samoans first realised their fate when Turnbull presented to the Fono a 
Faipule a Trusteeship Agreement for Samoa on 28 October 1946. The 
Samoans unequivocally rejected the proposal, citing that they were not 
consulted on the matter, and wrote to the United Nations objecting to the 
trusteeship proposal. 
We .... submit to the present session of the United Nations' 
Organisation ... the freely expressed wishes of the Samoan people 
as declared at the Fono held at Mulinuu ... based on our firm belief 
in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, which have been 
29 Darnand to Turnbull, 17 Feb, 1946, Darnand Correspondence, MAST. 
30 Report to the Trusteeship Council by the United Nations Mission to Western Samoa, 4 Jul - 28 Aug, 
1947, Grattan Papers, MS-Paper 4879 (henceforth GP). 
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proclaimed throughout the world and confirmed by the House of 
Parliament in New Zealand and for which millions of lives have 
been sacrificed. The proposed draft Agreement of the Trusteeship 
concerning which you sought our views was discussed at length at 
the said Fono and, while we recognise that this represents an 
advance upon the Mandate, we feel that an acceptance of it would 
bring us no nearer [to] our ultimate aim of self-government for 
which we have earnestly and consistently striven under the 
Mandate.31 
The Samoans set out before the United Nations three issues they 
believed should be considered. 32 
1. We humbly beseech that Samoa be granted self-government. 
2. We earnestly pray that New Zealand will see fit to act as 
Protector and Advisor to Samoa in the same capacity as 
England is to Tonga. 
3. We sincerely pray that the unnatural division of the islands of 
Samoa Groups enforced by the Three Powers in the past 
without the consent of the Samoans be left in abeyance until a 
meeting can be arranged between Eastern and Western 
Samoa. 
The petition was a protest over the United Nations' failure to canvass Samoan 
opinions, and a 'shot in the eye' for New Zealand's deceitful treatment of the 
Samoans. The Samoans were irate with New Zealand tabling the agreement 
before the United Nations, while discussion was taking place in Samoa.33 
The petition presented several demands. The Samoans, while 
appreciating the efforts of the United Nations, rejected the idea of Trusteeship in 
favour of immediate self-government instead of full independence. It also 
requested New Zealand to act as protector and adviser, although it was not a 
sign that New Zealand had been forgiven, but only a goodwill gesture to the 
United Nations. The petition was also a message to the United Nations that 
Samoans had had enough foreign rule, and that the idea of a trusteeship was 
31 Fautua, Members of the legislative Council, Associate Judges, Faipule and District Representatives to 
The Administrator of Samoa, 18 Nov, 1946, MAST. 
32 Fautua, Members of the legislative Council, Associate Judges, Faipule and District Representatives to 
The Administrator of Samoa, 18 Nov, 1946, MAST. 
33 Report to the Trusteeship Council by the United Nations Mission to Western Samoa, 4 Jul - 28 Aug, 
1947, GP. 
no different from a mandate; it placed Samoa under the authority of another 
nation.34 
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New Zealand presented Samoa's petition to the United Nations General 
Assembly in November 1946, and its representatives, Sir Carl Berendsen and 
C. G. R. Mckay, argued that Samoa was not ready for self-government.35 The 
Trusteeship council approved New Zealand's plans for trusteeship, and 
postponed the discussion on the Samoan's petition to 26 February 1947. In that 
meeting, the council proposed that a United Nations visitation team would 
personally ascertain for itself Samoans' readiness for self-government. The 
council proposed two aims for the visit. 36 
1. To investigate the petition dated 18 November 1946 of the 
Fautua, members of the Legislative Council, associate Judges, 
Faipule and district representatives of Western Samoa that 
Western Samoa be granted self-government, and 
2. To visit Western Samoa for this purpose, to remain in the 
Territory for a sufficient period to ascertain all the relevant facts 
and to report back to the Trusteeship Council. 
New Zealand conducted its own investigation and reaffirmed its earlier view that 
Samoa was not ready for self-government.37 
The visitation team arrived in Samoa between 4 and 9 July 1947, and 
stayed on until 28 August 1947 to complete its investigation.38 The visit exposed 
the United Nations to the feelings of the Samoans regarding their future and 
34 Samoans seemed to misunderstand the difference between Mandate and Trusteeship. Mandate does 
not specify self-government, while a Trusteeship includes preparing a country for self-government. See 
Report to the Trusteeship Council by the United Nations Mission to Western Samoa, 4 Jul - 28 Aug, 1947, 
GP. 
35 Record of the Sixth Meeting of Sub-committee 1 of the Fourth Committee of the First Session of the 
General Assembly, 23 Nov, 1945, GP; Record of the Sixth Meeting of Sub-committee 1 of the Fourth 
Committee of the First Session of the General Assembly, 25 Nov, 1945, GP; Summary Record of the 
Thirteenth Meeting of the Sub-committee 1 of the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, 30 Nov, 
1946, GP. 
36 Report to the Trusteeship Council by the United Nations Mission to Western Samoa, 4 Jul - 28 11.ug, 
1947, GP. 
37 The administrations' Secretary for Native Affairs in Samoa, F. J. H. Grattan, and another member of the 
New Zealand team to the United Nations' visitation team, J. W. Davidson, produced several reports that 
were later presented to the United Nations' visitation team. See A Political Review, May 1947, GP; The 
Political Structure of Western Samoa .. ., 10 Jul, 1947, GP; Western Samoa - Fttness for Self-government, 
10 Jul, 1947, GP; Grattan to Shanahan, 1 Feb 1947, GP; Native Administration and Local Government in 
Western Samoa (Davidson), 21Jul,1947, GP. 
38 The team consisted of United Nations staff, Francis B. Sayre, Pierre Ryckmans, Eduardo Cruz-Coke, 
and Felix Keesing (Professor of Anthropology Stanford University). Members of the secretariat included 
Peter Anker, Jean de la Roche, Cleantho de Paiva Leite and Regina Raspier. The New Zealand 
delegation included C. G. R. McKay, J. W. Davidson (Professor Colonial Administration Cambridge 
University), Ernest Beaglehole (Professor Anthropology Victoria University), Dr. Beeby, Mr Parsonage, G. 
Larkin, and P. T. G. Patrick. See Report to the Trusteeship Council by the United Nations Mission to 
Western Samoa, 4 Jul- 28 Aug, 1947, GP. 
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their aspiration for self-government, and clarified for the Samoans many issues 
New Zealand had failed to explain or, at least, the Samoans had failed to hear 
New Zealand's explanation. It showed Samoan reluctance to believe New 
Zealand in any matters regarding their future. 39 The team heard statements 
from all sectors of the Samoan community, including papalagi and missionaries. 
The Samoans' constant demand was "we want to be free; we want self-
government because it is our birthright.. .. we want roads, and schools, and 
health .... more than New Zealand has given us," while others pointed out that 
"the Samoans should control [their] own Government, and run it according to 
[their] will."40 Many Samoans wore the Mau uniform to re-enforce their stance 
for self-government. The papa/agiwere not against self-government but wanted 
a 'transitional period' of ten or more years before self-government. They 
submitted a four-point document outlining their views and suggested ideas to be 
included in the final plans for self-government.41 The idea of a transitional period 
was also suggested by the matai of F alealili District. F alealili matai were more 
loyal to the administration than most Samoans, and believed a transitional 
period would give the Samoans more time to learn how to govern, as immediate 
self-government would take Samoa back to the rivalries of the past.42 
The working relationship between the missions during this period was 
benevolent, as they absorbed the euphoria of the period. The WMMS and Lotu 
Pope were very supportive of Samoan aspirations,43 as a change in government 
would not greatly affect their mission status. The Lotu Pope, especially, would 
remain a foreign mission using Latin for its Mass, while maintaining a clergy that 
were mainly European priests, who continued to fa'ai/oga le ko/use (sign the 
cross) under the authority of the Pope. For the LMS missionaries, it was a case 
"Report to the Trusteeship Council by the United Nations Mission to Westem Samoa, 4 Jul- 28 Aug, 
1947, GP. 
40 Report to the Trusteeship Council by the United Nations Mission to Westem Samoa, 4 Jul - 28 Aug, 
1947, GP. 
41 The four points referred to a 'transmonal period' before granting self-government, included memberships 
in the legislation, finance matters, and education. See Points to be Recommended to the Samoans by the 
Citizens Committee on Self-government, GP. 
42 Report to the Trusteeship Council by the United Nations Mission to Western Samoa, 4 Jul - 28 Aug, 
1947, GP; Grattan to Shanahan, 1 Feb, 1947, GP. 
"Damand to Voelcker, 26 Dec, 1948, Damand Correspondence, MAST; G. Powles to Damand 21 Dec, 
1949, Damand Correspondence, MAST; Powles to Darnand, 1Jun,1953, Darnand Correspondence, 
MAST. 
of ua le o gatasi le futia ma le umele (the sinnet ring and the stand for the 
fishing rod do not go together).44 
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The LMS missionaries in Samoa were probably ecstatic about the move 
towards political independence, but were not so overjoyed with the knowledge 
that they would also surrender the leadership of the Samoan (LMS) Church. 
There was a rift between the Au Fa'atonu and the Au Matutua over the plans to 
continue efforts to give the Samoan (LMS) Church independence. The LMS 
missionaries would have preferred a transitional period in the same way some 
Samoans and papalagi were advocating, than to give up total control of the 
mission. But, the LMS missionaries were hard pressed to stop the Samoan 
church from achieving its aspiration, especially when its members, such as 
Mata'afa Faumuina Fiame Mulinu'u II and Malietoa Tanumafili II, were also at 
the forefront of negotiations for political self-government. The support of the 
church for their efforts was unquestionable, and observers would have been 
excused in thinking that it was the independence of the Samoa (LMS) Church 
that the Samoan political leaders were pursuing; such was the intimacy of the 
two organisations. This was an aspect of the independence movement that the 
LMS missionaries failed to perceive, because they were blinded by their 
obsession to remain 'lords' over the Samoan church. 
The visitation team gave the Samoans confidence that they were finally 
being heard, and their wish was being seriously considered. Self-government 
had been launched in a way more meaningful to the Samoans, and nothing was 
going to impede its progress. The United Nations had confirmed self-
government by their visit. 
The petition to the United Nations, the meeting among both 
Samoans and Europeans to work out the details of the case of 
self-government, the appointment of the Commission by the 
Trusteeship Council; have given the movement its own 
momentum; even the leaders could not stop it now, if they would; 
they can merely clarify and modify the form of their demands.45 
The Samoans presented a draft as the basis for a government structure. 
It proposed a change in the existing constitutional bodies, which comprised a 
44 The bonito fishing rod is fastened to the thwart by means of a sinnet ring (futia). The lower end rests in a 
stand to which it is tied by means of a rope (umele). Both ropes must be of equal strength, lest one of them 
tear when a bonito bites. Ifs a saying, which implies that when two people or sides are in partnership, they 
must be of one mind. Should one be weak and faint-hearted, the undertaking will fail. 
45 Report to the Trusteeship Council by the United Nations Mission to Western Samoa, 4 Jul - 28 Aug, 
1947, GP. 
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Primary Authority (the authority of New Zealand over Samoa from the United 
Nations), a Secondary Authority (the authority of the administrator of Samoa), 
and an Advisory or Assisting Authority to the Administrator (the Fautua and 
Fono a Falpule). In its place, the Samoans proposed to change it to the 
authority of the three tama-a-aiga, Malietoa, Tuiatua, and Tuia'ana. The respect 
accorded to them was very clear. 
Each of them should be provided with a residence proper for their 
rank .... They should be provided also with furniture, cars, servants 
as at present allowed to His Excellency the Administrator.46 
lt was also proposed that the Samoan Parliament would consist of the 
Fono a Falpule, and from it a Premier, Ministers, and a tulafale (orator) of the 
House47 would be elected. The proposal also clarified the positions relating to 
various government departments, and other aspects of government such as 
duties and taxation. It also aimed at replacing expatriate New Zealanders with 
Samoans, while keeping the existing monetary rewards and perks lntact.48 The 
proposed government structure reflected the materialistic position of the 
Samoan leaders. 
The visitation team recommended that New Zealand continued to be 
responsible for Samoa and that Samoans be kept informed of all transactions 
regarding their future in order to keep peaceful relations intact. New Zealand 
assured the United Nations it would be carrying out its trusteeship of Samoa 
according to United Nations recommendations.49 The Samoans made sure New 
Zealand moved things along according to their will. For Instance, in 1948 the 
Fono a Falpule wrote to the New Zealand Prime Minister that Samoa had 
adopted its own flag, and proposed to cancel the office of Fautua in favour of a 
Council Of State, occupied together by the High Commissioner of New Zealand 
and the existing Fautua.50 It was part of the continuous campaign to exorcise 
European authority or, at least, to achieve equal footing. 
Preparations for independence began in March 1950. A special 
commission was appointed to draft a constitution based on Samoan protocol 
46 Constitution of the Government of Samoa, Draft, 1947, GP. 
47 It is interesting that the Samoans preferred to use the concept of orator (tulafa/e) rather than speaker of 
the house. It was intended to keep Samoa:s parliament close to the fa'asamoa . 
.,. Constitution of the Government of Samoa, Draft, 1947, GP. 
49 Report to the Trusteeship Council by the United Nations Mission to Western Samoa, 4 Jul -28 Aug. 
1947, GP. 
50 Legislative Assembly of Samoa Debates 1948. vol 1, 2 Jun, 1948 and 29 Jun, 1948. 
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and one that would also reflect democracy. The commission included three 
matai each from Savai'i and Upolu. They included Tofa Tomasi, an afakasi, 
Tuala Tulo, Matai'a Si'u, and Tofilau Siose, who held other official government 
posts, and Fa'amatuaina Tulifau and Namulau'ulu Siaosi, well known tulafale of 
Lufilufi and Safotulafai respectively.51 
The committee added two translators and interpreters, namely Etene 
Sa'aga and Arorae Petaia. Etene Sa'aga's father was a lecturer at Malua and a 
great leader of the church in the 1930s, while Arorae Petaia was a grandson of 
Va'aelua Petaia, another great leader of the church who died in the 1918 
epidemic. Both men were educated at Malua, but chose to serve in the 
government administration. They possessed the intelligence and commitment of 
their forbears, and had gained the respect of Samoans within the church and in 
the political arena. The commission relied on them to explain and clarify the 
issue of independence to the Samoans, and it gave them an avenue not only to 
fulfil their role as government officials, but also to influence Samoans to support 
Samoa's quest for independence.52 
The committee embarked on a malaga to ascertain Samoan opinions on 
the content of the constitution and enlightened the Samoans on the process of 
independence. Davidson, who was part of the committee, was surprised with 
the number of Samoans, afakasi, and papalagi entrepreneurs who were 
reluctant to support the status quo. The planters, such as Va'ai Ropati 
Sale'imoa and his sons Va'ai Kolone and Lesatele Rapi, Tufuga Fatu, 
Seumanutafa Lafaiali'i, To'omata Tua, Usu Tevita, and Anapu Solofa, had 
wealth and preferred the existing conditions. In other villages, the leading matai 
rejected any form of Samoan authority or interference from a central 
government, and saw independence as an avenue for free speech and 
individuality. 53 The commission was not impressed with such philosophy, as it 
would undermine any proposed constitution for a future independent state, and 
could influence Samoans to reject independence.54 The opposition to 
51 Namulau"ulu Siaosi died earty in the work of the commission and was replaced by Tuilagi Fetu, also of 
Safotulafai. See J. W. Davidson, Samoa mo Samoa: The Emergence of the Independent State of Samoa, 
Melbourne: Oxford University, 1967, 265. 
52 Davidson, 268 -271. 
53 For instance, Ulupoao, a son of Tamasese Tupua Lealofi, in the village of Papa, Palauli, abolished all 
village fono and regulations in favour of free speech for all village members in matters pertaining to the 
village's welfare. 
54 Davidson, 234 - 249. 
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independence persisted as the committee continued their malaga around the 
islands, especially from villages and districts loyal to New Zealand. But, over 
time, many Samoans embraced the call for independence, although their real 
feelings regarding the issue remained concealed, as they awaited the outcome 
of the new constitution. 
The period after the war also witnessed an explosion in missionary work 
in the Pacific. New Protestant missionary efforts, especially from America under 
new Christian and non-Christian church denominations and mission groups, 
entered the Pacific as some of the mainline missions were preparing to leave. 55 
Furthermore, in 1948, the Christian churches worldwide celebrated the 
inauguration of the World Council of Churches (VI/CC) in its first assembly in 
Amsterdam.56 It was a significant event for Christianity because WCC used the 
assembly to challenge the various missions to give local churches the 
opportunity to participate in the ecumenical movement as independent 
churches. For the LMS it was a challenge that was in line with its own 
philosophy regarding the Samoan (LMS) Church, and the fact that the Cook 
Islands Church was given self-government just after the war in 1945, confirmed 
their commitment to church independence. The WCC's vision for independent 
churches made it easier for the Samoan church leaders and, to some degree, 
the LMS missionaries, to accept the proceedings at hand.57 
The arrival of Dr John Bradshaw as Principal of Malua Theological 
College in 1956 was more than just a missionary appointment. It was an 
attempt by the Au Matutua to prepare Malua to endure the changes effected by 
independence. Bradshaw was a scientist and inventor and he took Malua to 
new heights in academic discipline. He was a practical man who truly believed 
in hard physical work and academic excellence. He used his scientific 
knowledge to install an electric generator in Malua, the first outside Apia. The 
55 This was the period of great Mormon insertion into the Pacific including Samoa. See Forman, 144. 
56 For background readings on the beginning and aims of the WCC, see W. A. Visser f Hoff!, The Genesis 
and Formation of the World Council of Churches, Geneva: Wortd Council of Churches, 1987; Nicholas 
Lossky and J. M. Bonio, et. al. eds. Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement, Geneva, Grand Rapids: 
Wortd Council of Churches, William B. Eerdmans, 1991; Ion Bria and Dagmar Heller, Ecumenical Pilgrim: 
Profiles of Pioneers in Christian Reconciliation, Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1995; M. Kinnaman 
and Brian E. Cope, eds. The Ecumenical Movement: Anthology of Key Texts and Voices, Geneva, Grand 
Rapids: Wortd Council of Churches, William B. Eerdmans, 1997. 
57 In an excellent study by Chartes Forman in relation to Church independence, it was found that 
eventually many of the churches in the Pacific had independence forced upon them (except for Samoa 
and Tonga) as mission societies began to divert their resources to other aspect of mission elsewhere. 
Fortunately, the transition period was long enough to achieve independence of these churches with ease 
and very few problems. The delay was very much due to the lack of indigenous trained leadership 
available. See Forman, The Island Churches of the South Pacific. 
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enisini o lamepa (the engine of lamps), as it was dubbed, lit Malua so brightly, 
many referred to it as New York city. 58 It astounded so many people, especially 
during the Fono Tele, that there was an instant demand by Samoans to 
implement such esesini o lamepa in their own villages. 
Bradshaw raised the standard of the entrance examination to Malua to 
ensure that only quality students entered the college, and consequently, the 
number of entrants was reduced. Bradshaw made English compulsory to further 
raise the standard of education, and to increase the chance of perusing the vast 
amount of printed knowledge available. Many students were made to attain the 
'Certificate of Proficiency in Religious Knowledge' from the University of London 
as part of the plan to prepare educated leaders for the new Samoan 
independent church. 59 The pursuits for academic excellence not only benefited 
the Samoan church in later years, but also provide educated Samoans to fill 
government positions. 
The formation of WCC did not, at first, have any influence on the Roman 
Catholic Church to review its stance regarding ecumenism and the indigenous 
status of its many parishes around the world. It was still carrying out it own 
reforms which had been put in place by the first Vatican Council of 1869. 
However, in 1959, under new Pontiff leadership, Pope John XXlll called for an 
ecumenical council to look at ways of renewing the spiritual life of the church, to 
update the teaching, discipline, and organisation of the church, and to address 
the issue of Christian unity. In 1960, Pope John XXlll took a further step in 
fulfilling his vision by establishing the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity, 
in an effort to develop ecumenical relations with WCC. In 1961, the Roman 
Catholic ser:it representatives for the first time to a WCC assembly. In 1962, the 
second Vatican Council gave the Roman Catholic parishes around the world the 
opportunity to worship and conduct their ministry in their own vernacular and 
cultural expressions.6° For the Lotu Pope in Samoa, it was the closest they 
would ever get to independence; the Pope still remained the head of the Roman 
58 This tenn is common among oral traditions about Malua's history. Today it is mainly heard in one of the 
old anthems of the college, namely 'Malua e, lo'u Sei (Malua my flower [worn on the ear]). 
59 Dr. Otele S. Perelini, Principal Malua Theological College, "A History of Malua Theological College 1944 
- 1994," Address given at the 150'" Anniversary of the Malua Theological College, Malua, 24 Set, 1994 (I 
was present in the celebration and heard the address personally). 
60 See Adrian Hastings eds, Modem Catho/acism: Vatican II and After, Oxford: Oxford University, 1991; F. 
L Cross and E. A Livingstone, eds, Oxford Dictional}' of the Christian Church, revised, Oxford: Oxford 
University, 1990; K. S. Latourette, Christianity in a Revolutional}' Age: A Histol}' of Christianity in the 1!1' 
and 2d' Centul}' in Europe, New York: Harper and Row, 1969. 
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Catholic Church in Samoa. The indigenisation process took some time before it 
was implemented due to the reluctance of the European priests to advance and 
carry out the resolutions, and the lack of trained indigenous leaders, delayed 
the transition from a 'foreign' liturgy to worshipping fa'asamoa.61 
On 9 December 1960, the United Nations independence committee 
heard submissions from the New Zealand government, and Samoan 
government representatives. The New Zealand government proposed to give 
Samoa its independence on 1 January 1962 and, in doing so, released New 
Zealand from the terms of the Trusteeship. Fiame spoke and reaffirmed 
Samoa's commitment to independence. 
The Samoan people have never wavered in their desire for 
independence .... Samoan aspirations have been fully accepted by 
the New Zealand Government. But, although our relations with 
New Zealand are - and are likely to remain - close and friendly, 
we believe that the time has come for us to attain the status of an 
independent nation.62 
Fiame assured the Council of the Samoans acceptance of a plebiscite under 
universal suffrage, although in his opinion the plebiscite was unnecessary. The 
council recommended that a plebiscite be conducted in May 1961. 
The year 1961 was an eventful one for the Samoans. Between 22 April 
and 4 May 1961, mission churches from around the Pacific met at Malua. It was 
an event that further encouraged Samoans to embrace church independence 
and participate fully in Samoa's political aspirations. The Pacific church leaders 
had gathered to meet each other, and to implement ways to promote 
ecumenism within the Pacific churches. The meeting at Malua was the 
forerunner in the establishment of the Pacific Conference of Churches, and the 
Pacific Theological College.63 It was an important stage for the Pacific church 
leaders to make an impression, especially with Samoa in the limelight of 
international interest over its preparations for independence. The Pacific church 
leaders were exposed to the phenomenon of political and church 
61 The ascendancy of Cardinal (later Archbishop) Pio Taofinuu to the leadership of the Latu Pope in 
Samoa in the 1970s, implemented changes recommended by Vatican II. The fa'asamoa became an 
integral part of the worship life of the members to the extent of using the Samoan language and its culture 
and customs (such as ie toga, presentation of a sua [offering of food], and wearing traditional Samoan 
dress and flower necklaces) to advance their spirituality. 
62 Davidson, 402. 
63 For a background of the Malua meeting and the history of the Pacific Conference of Churches, see 
Charles Forman, The Voice of Many Waters: Story of the Ufe of the Pacific Conference of Churches in the 
Last 25 Years, Suva: Pacific Conference of Churches (Latu Pasefika Production), 1986. 
independence; a challenge and a catalyst for their own independence 
aspirations. 
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The Pacific church leaders dispersed with God's blessings, and five days 
later, on 9 May 1961, the committee carried out a plebiscite under universal 
suffrage to canvass Samoan opinions on a newly drafted constitution and 
whether Samoa should be given independence. The Samoan political leaders 
rejected the proposal of universal suffrage in favour of matai voters only and, in 
doing so, made a mockery of Fiame's earlier assurance to the United Nations. 
The Samoan leaders felt that the matai had fully grasped the significance 
of the constitution and the importance of independence, a plebiscite under 
universal suffrage would, therefore, undermined matai status and role as sole 
representative and speaker for their families.64 The plebiscite was viewed as an 
insult and a sign of disrespect to the matai honour. The Samoan matai 
eventually conceded to universal suffrage when it seemed their objection would 
jeopardise their struggle. The Samoans had witnessed the church leaders of the 
Pacific taking charge of their own affairs, and many deacons, lay preachers, 
and stewards of the church who participated in that event took the lead in 
fulfilling the plebiscite.65 The Samoan pastors, in pursuing their own 
independent aspirations, persuaded their members to display a similar 
inclination towards political independence, and with the existing euphoria for 
independence at its height, the combination of the church and political groups 
was a recipe for success. The result of the plebiscite was overwhelming with 
80% supporting the constitution and 70% affirming Samoa's independence,66 
while a quarter of the Samoans remained dejected and undecided. On 1 
January 1962, the resilience of the Samoans was finally rewarded. The New 
Zealand flag was lowered and for the first time the Samoan flag fluttered by 
itself in the breeze at Mulinu'u to signal its new status as the independent State 
of Western Samoa. A few months later, the Samoa (LMS) Church became 
independent as the Ekalesia Fa'apotopotoga Kerisiano i Samoa (EFKS).67 
64 Davidson, 406. 
65 One such deacon was Mata'afa Faumuina Fiame Mulinu'u II, who spoke at the United Nations in 1960 
and later became the first Prime Minister of Samoa in 1962, and in the following year became the first 
Chairman of the General Assembly of the EFKS. 
66 Davidson, 406. 
67 In July 1997, a change in the constitution changed the name from Western Samoa to the Independent 
State of Samoa. The Ekalesia Fa'apotopotoga Kerisiano i Samoa (EFKS) is also known as the 
Congregational Christian Church in Samoa (CCCS). 
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CONCLUSION 
The independence of Samoa and the Samoa (LMS) Church did not 
happen overnight. They were not triumphs that resulted from an isolated 
incident or a single event prior to 1962. They were not accomplishments that 
could be attributed to any heroic deeds or to any one organisation or nation, 
although it cost the lives of people from several nations. The ecclesiastical and 
political face of Samoa's independence has been outlined in the preceding 
chapters, and it influenced and coerced the Samoans to aspire for 
independence. While the political face of independence has been expanded 
with new materials to give Samoan political history breadth, the ecclesiastical 
factors have been important in filling a void that has plagued Samoan history 
overall - the lack of a church perspective and analysis in Samoan history. This 
study has attempted to fill that void, especially in drawing attention to 
ecclesiastical factors, which had a significant impact on Samoa's independence 
aspirations. It is hoped a broader and yet compact history of Samoa, which was 
not only influenced by the political notions, but also church ideas, has been 
achieved. 
In recent years there have been specific studies of the New Zealand and 
German administrations in Samoa, focusing on specific issues such as the Mau, 
mandate and trusteeship, Chinese labourers, decolonisation, law and the 
fa'asamoa, genealogy, and Samoan traditions and culture, by scholars such as 
Kilifoti Eteuati, N. Plimmer, D. R. Haynes, William Lowe, S. M. Rutherford, M. C. 
Gilford, Jack Gill, l'uogafa Tuagalu, Asiata Va'ai, and Atoese M. 
Tuimaleali'ifano, all of whom concentrated on a specific aspect of Samoan 
history from a political perspective.1 The church perspective and how the 
missions and church members perceived such aspects of Samoan history were 
dealt with only briefly. 
1 For examples, see Kilifoti Eteuati, "Evaeavaga a Samoa: Assertion of Samoan Autonomy", Ph.D. 
Australian National University, 1982; Atoese M. Tuimaleali'ifano, "Aganu'u ma Agaifanua Faasamoa. 
Custom and Usage in Samoa ... Title dispute in Falelatai," Ph.D. Thesis, University of the South Pacific, 
1997; Asiata Va'ai, "The Rule of Law and the Fa'amatai. .. Western Samoa," Ph.D. Thesis, Australian 
National University, 1998; l'uogafa Tuagalu, "Mataafa iosefo and the Idea of Kingship in Samoa," M.A. 
Thesis, Auckland University, 1988; D. R. Haynes, "Chinese Indentured Labour in Samoa, 1900-1950," 
M.A. Thesis, Victoria University, 1965; N. Plimmer, "The Military Occupation of Samoa, 1914 - 1920," M.A. 
Thesis, Victoria University, 1966; M. C. Gilford, "The Nature and Organ of the Mau Movement in Samoa, 
1926-1936, M.A. Thesis, Auckland University, 1964; Jack Gill, "The Administration of Major General Sir 
George Richardson in Western Samoa, 1923-1928," M.A. Thesis, Victoria University, 1950; William Rowe, 
"The Samoan Mandate, 1919-1933," M.A. Auckland University, 1941; S. M. Rutherford, "Law and Customs 
in Samoa" A History of Native Administration ... 1838-1927," M.A. Victoria University, 1936. 
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There have also been numerous publications, older and recent, relating 
to Samoan political history, by J. W. Davidson, R. P. Gilson, Sylvia Masterman, 
Paul Kennedy, Michael Field, Nancy Tom, and Malama Meleisea, Mary Boyd, 
Stewart Firth, and Hugh Laracy.2 While these historians attempted to outline a 
comprehensive history of Samoa, their efforts were generally hindered by their 
personal focuses and because they largely viewed their subject from a political 
perspective. Again, the church and mission perspectives were largely ignored. 
For instance, Davidson's excellent account of Samoan history is 
generally restricted to a political history that highlights the Samoan struggle for 
self-government, and a history that reflects Davidson's own personal 
involvement in Samoa's trusteeship for independence. Field's superb study on 
the Mau is very much restricted to the political aspects of that period, and has 
the tendency to highlight the contributions of Olaf Nelson and the Tamasese 
family. The role of the church and mission, especially the LMS, is mentioned but 
has not been analysed and linked to the Mau itself. Tom's admirable study of 
Samoan Chinese was restricted to a Chinese perspective, and lacked a firm 
connection to Samoa's overall political history. Meleisea's Lagaga: A Short 
History of Western Samoa provides a good broad account of Samoan history, 
while The Making of Modem Samoa, addresses such issues as land alienation 
and the work of the Samoan Land Commission. A general history has been 
presented without the church and mission perspective. When these specific 
studies, both theses and monographs, are incorporated and read as a single 
study of Samoan history, they present a broad and rich political history of 
Samoa without a doubt. The addition of an ecclesiastical perspective, as 
attempted by this study, has hopefully provided new detail and insights to 
enrich, enhance and expand our view of Samoan history. 
2 For examples, see J. W. Davidson, Samoa mo Samoa: The Emergence of the Independent State of 
Western Samoa, Melbourne: Oxford University, 1967: R. P. Gilson, Samoa 1830-1900: The Politics of a 
Multi-Cultural Community, Melbourne: Oxford University, 1970; Sylvia Masterman, Origin of International 
Rivalry in Samoa, 1845-1884, London: George Allen, 1934; Paul Kennedy, The Samoa Tangle: A Study 
in Anglo - German -American Relations, 1878 - 1900, Dublin: Irish University, 1974; Field, Michael J. Mau: 
Samoa's Struggle For Freedom, Auckland: Polynesian Press, 1984. Nancy Tom, The Chinese in Samoa, 
1875-1985: The Dragon Came From Afar, Apia: Western Samoa Historical and Cultural Trust, 1986; 
Malama Meleisea, Lagaga: A Short History of Western Samoa, Suva: University of the South Pacific, 
1987; Malama Meleisea, The Making of Modem Samoa: Traditional Authority and Colonial Administration 
in the Modem History of Western Samoa, Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1987; Mary Boyd, "The 
Military Administration of Western Samoa," New Zealand Journal of History 2:2, 1968; Mary Boyd, "Coping 
with Samoan Resistance after 1918 Influenza Epidemic: Colonel Tate's Problems and Perplexities," 
Journal of Pacific History 15, 1980; Stewart Firth, "Governors versus Settlers: The Dispute Over Chinese 
Labour in German Samoa," The New Zealand Journal of History 11 no.2, 1977; Hugh Laracy, "Church and 
State in German Samoa: The Soll- Broyer Dispute," New Zealand Journal of History 12 no. 2, 1978. 
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The present study took up various political issues, including those 
already adequately studied, and attempted to re-evaluate their significance and 
contribution to Samoa's independence from the point of view, and participation, 
of the missions and the Samoan churches. It is not implied here that the 
missions and Samoan churches were excluded from current literature on 
Samoan history, but that their significance and impact in relation to the political 
history of Samoa has been neglected. It seemed when the Samoan churches 
and missions were mentioned, it was mainly to 'fill the gaps' in the political 
history of Samoa. 
The lack of a church perspective has left Samoan history mundane and 
has created a false impression that the church had no impact on the overall 
history of Samoa. This study has attempted to highlight, link and show that the 
main players in the Samoan political history were also adherents and leaders of 
the church, and that the decisions they made affected the missions, the 
churches, and Samoan politics. Several church historians, such as John 
Garrett, Charles Forman, and T. K. Faletoese,3 allude to Samoan church 
members participating in Samoan politics in their writings but the broadness of 
their subject matter restricted them to generalities. 
The church perspective in this study has enhanced the political side of 
Samoan history by pointing out the intimate, and at times complicated, 
relationship between church and politics, in particular the Samoan (LMS) 
Church and Samoan politics, and how this relationship developed to the point of 
creating an inseparable identity in quest of independent glory. The church 
perspective has also given the political face of independence a facelift per se, 
with the concentration on mission and church sources. The Samoan political 
story had been given a clearer picture, providing a well-based understanding, of 
the participants and their backgrounds, and their involvement in the process of 
independence. 
3 For examples, see John Garrett, Footsteps in the Sea: Christianity in Oceania to World War II, Suva, 
Geneva: University of the South Pacific, World Council of Churches, 1992; T, K. Faletoese, 0 le Ta/a 
Faasolopito o le Eka/esia Samoa (L.M.S), Apia: Malua Press, 1958; Charles Forman, The Island Churches 
of the South Pacific: Emergence in the Twentieth Century, Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1982. 
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From the time the Samoans lost the right to govern their own nation in 
the 1900s, the ecclesiastical and political face of Samoa's independence began 
to take shape and eventually found expression in 1962. The Samoans were 
proud of their traditions, culture and customs, and were willing to be guided by 
America, Britain, or Germany, as long as they had the power to govern 
fa'asamoa. The fa'asamoa was the guiding principle in everything the Samoans 
accomplished. It gave them pride and identity in Samoan concepts such as 
matai, tama-a-aiga, pule, soa/aupule, fono, nu'u, aiga, feagaiga, malaga, 
taligatoga, /otu, faipu/e, aitu, and so forth, which encompassed every aspect of 
their social, political and religious life. 
The Samoans maintained that in their efforts to govern, they tried to 
preserve the fa'asamoa (existing Christianised culture and customs), rather 
than to revive traditionalism (past 'pagan' ideologies). The papalagi 
misunderstood Samoan protocol, and the Samoans never understood what the 
papa/agi misunderstood about them. In the end, misunderstanding prevailed 
and Germany took away the right of the Samoans to control their own affairs. 
There was no soalaupu/e, and to be ignored on such important decisions, 
wounded their pride deeply. Nothing ever completely healed this wounded 
pride, except vengeance fa'asamoa - an ifoga and the return of Samoa to the 
Samoans. The seed for self-government, together with aspirations for 
independence, was sown, and throughout the next six decades the various 
foreign administrations indirectly nurtured it to fruition. 
The Germans watered the seed of independence with their oppressive 
stance and lack of sympathy for the fa'asamoa. Solf wanted to make Samoa 
German and to be rid of the fa'asamoa by taking away their right to govern, and 
forcing on them the rule of the German Kaiser as the only rule in Samoa. The 
idea of replacing the tafa'ifa with the Ali'i Sili buried part of the Samoan identity, 
and reduced the authority and influence of tama-a-aiga and the role of Tumua 
and Pule in Samoan politics. Solf castrated Samoan protocol by restricting 
ietoga distribution, banning malaga, terminating matai titles, and exiling matai 
from their villages. Solf had ventured into tapu (sacred) territory and meddled 
with the prerogatives of the matai. Solf refused to listen to Samoan grievances, 
and consequently, the Samoans voiced their disapproval and rejected Solfs 
efforts to eradicate fa'asamoa. 
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The Samoans found Shultz more responsive to Samoan grievances, and 
less strict in administering punishments than Solt. Shultz's understanding of 
Samoan culture and customs made him a target for Samoan grievances. For 
instance, during the Oloa Kamupani and the Mau-a-Pule controversies, Shultz 
dealt with the issues competently and in a manner respected by the Samoans. 
For the Samoans Shultz was there to be manipulated to advance their 
aspirations. The Oloa Kamupani was a genuine effort by the Samoans to 
express their authority through economic means. It gave the Samoans the 
chance to show they could administer their own affairs, but it failed because 
Solt not only took it as a challenge to Germany's business enterprises, but an 
idea detrimental to smaller German businesses. 
The Mau-a-Pule was a political statement to Solt to release the 
fa'asamoa from bondage. It was a statement to revive Samoan culture and 
customs, return to the Samoans the right to rule or at least to rule together with 
the Germans on an equal footing, and most of all, restore the dignity of Tumua 
and Pule. The Mau a Pule never had a chance to succeed, as Solt reasserted 
his authority with military backing and Samoan leaders under Solfs influence 
recanted their support. Solfs ability to pit the Samoans against each other 
created uncertainty and suspicion, and in the end, Samoan pride was the 
biggest sacrifice. Tumua and Pule never regained their mantle as king-makers 
and the authority on Samoan protocol; a position that would remain till Samoa's 
independence. It was not easy for losefo, Tamasese and Lauaki to face defeat 
and to be ridiculed in the presence of fellow Samoans. They had raised 
Samoan hopes and given them reasons to believe in their dreams, only to have 
them shattered by the lack of cohesion and the disunity of the leaders. It was 
also hard for the Samoan leaders to face their spiritual mentors in more ways 
than one. On one hand, they were respected leaders in their churches and as 
such they felt shame in tarnishing their mission's good name. On the other 
hand, they were probably disappointed with the mission's lack of support and 
intercession on their behalf. For the LMS, to show support for the Samoans' 
aspirations was unrealistic, although silent and secret support existed, but it 
knew its limits and played to them accordingly. The fear of being evicted from 
Samoa and replaced by a German mission kept the LMS in check. 
The Samoan (LMS) Church was a different matter. The Malua seminary 
and LMS schools became culture dishes for Samoan aspirations. The Samoan 
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(LMS) Church failed Lauaki because it was forced to remain passive by the 
non-commitment of the tama-a-aiga to Lauaki and, thus, the opportunities to 
achieve self-determination went begging. In failing, however, the Samoans 
became more determined to succeed, if not to accomplish their aspirations then 
to restore their pride. Lauaki's death in exile at least would have stirred Samoan 
emotions not to allow his death to be in vain. 
The Germans, who in their own ways, tried to develop Samoa and lead 
Samoans to a better life, failed miserably to give Samoans what they desired, 
because of their egoistic and oppressive approach. Germany never 
administered Samoa as a proud possession, but as a huge plantation to be 
reaped, sowed, and exploited as it saw fit. Samoan grievances piled up, as the 
thought of independence became firmly ingrained in their minds. World War I 
not only averted a possible future violent encounter with the Germans, but it 
presented the Samoans with a fresh opportunity to reassert their objectives. At 
first, the New Zealanders were less intimidating than the Germans, as they 
were only interested in promoting military law and order, and consequently 
allowed the Samoans space to practice their fa'asamoa. New Zealand's 
reliability was soon exposed in its role as caretaker administrator and the 
Samoans were not happy to be administered by a Dominion of the British 
Empire that had only just shed its 'colony' tag a few months earlier. 
New Zealand proved to Samoans beyond doubt it was 'a ramshackle 
administration,' and incompetent to rule, when it permitted the deadly Spanish 
Influenza to enter Samoa. In the aftermath, the Samoans called for self-
government and independence. The knowledge that assistance was readily 
available from American Samoa, and that Logan had not explored all the 
avenues available to combat the disaster, fuelled Samoan anger. While the Au 
Fa'atonu had a few unkind words to say to Logan regarding his treatment of 
Moore and Small at Papauta School, the Samoans went into a rage regarding 
the treatment of the Samoan girls at Papauta School. Many of the girls were 
matals daughters, and the thought of them being harassed, shamed, and 
kicked out of the school at the height of the epidemic was a transgression 
against all Samoans. Moore and Small cannot be exonerated from the incident 
as they had the power to detain the girls, but they were eventually forgiven and 
Logan chastised. But, the incident gave the Samoan church leaders more 
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reason to take control of their own spiritual welfare. The influenza epidemic was 
a 'sin' that was never forgiven nor forgotten. 
Tate added nourishment to the seed of independence. He took a leaf out 
of Selfs administration and found himself out of favour with the Samoans. The 
Samoans continued to resist New Zealand rule and remained firm in their 
passion for independence. New Zealand cursed the influenza epidemic 
because it gave young matai who were hungrier for power and authority the 
opportunity to fulfil their aspirations. The Au Fa'atonu also faced similar 
challenges from the Samoan pastors, and church members determined to vent 
their frustration on the missionaries for their part in the epidemic crisis. The 
appalling treatment of German missionaries after World War I, at a time when 
Samoans cried out for more missionaries, and healing relations should have 
been a priority, left an unpleasant sensation on the Samoans. The church 
leaders vented their frustration on the Au Fa'atonu, and Sibree was just one of 
the casualties. 
Richardson never rose to the expectations of the New Zealand 
government. He was too officious, and had tunnel vision in his treatment of the 
Samoans as inferior beings. Richardson continued Tate's policies on a grander 
scale with a broader range of rules and regulations to contain the Samoans and 
keep them industrious. Richardson forced Samoans to work on their land or 
have their land confiscated. He implemented new village models in order to 
achieve more cohesiveness, but the Samoans found this a nuisance and less 
akin to their more spacious nu'u. The Samoans rejected Richardson and his 
policies and called for his resignation. Richardson's insensitivity and oppressive 
administration gave rise to Samoan nationalism, which culminated in the Mau. 
Richardson's dream of a Samoa mo Samoa in his image was no more than a 
illusion. New Zealand's intimidating and oppressive approach was finally 
challenged to its core. The Mau was the pinnacle of Samoans' struggle for 
freedom, self-government and independence. It was Samoan nationalism at its 
climax, as it united afakasi, Chinese, and papalagi with Samoans. The laws and 
ordinances of the Mau counteracted the laws and ordinances of the 
administration. The Mau found an ally in the Samoan pastors, who had been 
'learning the trade' in administration and control of the Samoan church under 
the Au Fa'atonu. The significant reduction of LMS missionaries led to a 
significant increase in their leadership role in the Samoan church, and the 
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experience eventually led to a desire to control the Samoan (LMS) Church. It 
was in this desire of the Samoa pastors that the Samoan political leaders found 
their strength, and ultimately led to a merger between church and politics. 
The nationalistic euphoria split the Samoa (LMS) Church. The Mau 
supporters created their own church, as Mau and government loyalists served 
the same God under the same banner (LMS) on separate pews. Politics in the 
church, rather than 'party spirit', separated the Samoans. The Mau received its 
strength from the Church, and the movement of Samoan church leaders to 
support the Mau was not surprising, as Mau leaders were also pillars of the 
Samoan community and the Samoa (LMS) Church. The Samoan church and 
the Mau movement were part and parcel of the Samoan identity - fa'asamoa. 
The Mau was a political protest that gained a spiritual dimension along the way. 
The merge only confirmed for the Samoans that God was with them in their 
struggle for independence. The Samoan pastors would have exhorted the Mau 
with readings from the bible and Paul's words to the Romans, "if God is for us, 
who can be against us?" (Romans 8: 31 ); it would have been a very popular 
text. The Mau remained a menace and constantly reminded New Zealand of the 
Samoan quest for independence. 
The ill-treatment of the Chinese and the shameful handling of the 
indenture labour issue enraged the Samoans, and prompted demands for 
immediate action.4 New Zealand admitted it was a problem that stretched its 
resources in the 1940s. After World War II, the Samoans were divided over the 
repatriation of the Chinese, and their anger was focused squarely on the New 
Zealand administration's failure to deal with the problem when it had the chance 
under Richardson. At that time, the Samoans expressed their concern over 
Chinese criminal activities, gambling dens, and drug trafficking, which 
influenced and encouraged Samoan participation. 
The Samoans also protested at the increasing number of relationships 
between Chinese and Samoan women, but New Zealand ignored the pleas as it 
considered the wealth of merchants and planters a priority. The missions were 
also against mixed relations but were more inclined to support the 
administration's effort in obtaining more labourers than in minimising the 
population of illegitimate afasaina (half-Chinese). While the Samoans wanted 
the problem addressed, they were in a dilemma regarding Chinese repatriation. 
4 See Chapter 9 for further discussion and examples. 
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Many Samoans had fostered close relationships with the Chinese, especially 
during the Mau conflict. The Chinese probably anticipated changes to the 
existing political climate, and would have supported Samoan efforts in order to 
achieve their own needs and aspirations. The closer ties saw many more 
Chinese foster relationships with Samoan women despite the administrations' 
sudden interest in the 'purity of the Samoan race' soon after. 
The images of Chinese indentured labourers being dragged onto boats in 
1948, leaving behind wives, children and Samoan families, triggered memories 
of the Maligi's departure earlier. The separation of families was the hardest 
thing for the Samoans to accept, and they charged the New Zealand 
administration with cruelty and lack of sympathy. The LMS's lack of support to 
retain Chinese with Samoan families was not on account of any willingness to 
see the Chinese removed from Samoa, but on account of loyalty to the 
administration. It was also an opportunity to be released from its obligation to 
provide Christian support for the Chinese in the same way the LMS was 
catering for the Melanesian labourers. The Samoans noticed and took to heart 
the LMS missionaries' indifferent attitude towards the Chinese.5 
The LMS missionaries continuously (perhaps through ignorance) failed to 
comprehend the sympathetic and often changeable mood of the Samoans over 
personal relationships, especially when it involved loved ones, family members, 
or themselves personally. The continuous challenge to the Au Fa'atonu's 
leadership in the Samoa (LMS) Church during the twentieth century resulted 
from personal conflicts between the missionaries and the Samoan pastors. The 
subject matter was insignificant. The missions promoted complete isolation of 
the church from Samoan politics. But, it was a vision that was easily 
pronounced but difficult to put into practice. Samoans tried to separate church 
and politics but when family pride, district honour and Samoa's dignity were at 
stake, there was no barrier between church and politics. The Samoans had the 
attitude they could cross from church to politics and back without compromising 
their status in the church or in Samoan politics. Church and politics were 
inseparable. The Samoan church leaders shamelessly used their position to 
advance Samoan ideologies that were beneficial to all Samoans and kept 
Samoan pride intact. Right and wrong were usually left out of consideration and 
consultations. 
5 See Chapter 9 for further discussion, especially pages 218, 227-234. 
295 
The LMS missionaries in later years found it difficult to work with Samoan 
church leaders. They blamed the Samoans inability to truly comprehend 
Christianity, and being too influenced by the fa'asamoa. They also criticised the 
Samoan church leaders for being too young and inexperienced, too 
materialistic, and having too much authority. But, the Samoan pastors felt the 
Au Fa'atonu were always too quick to find fault and cry 'unchristian behaviour' 
without first understanding the Samoans and their particular perspective. While 
relations improved for many years, discontent on both sides usually erupted 
over the slightest issue and personal attacks were not uncommon. The Samoan 
church leaders, unfortunately, resorted to dismissing LMS missionaries to 
authenticate their authority in the church and over the LMS missionaries. The 
Samoans also found no comfort in the leadership of the LMS missionaries as 
the missionaries became more impatient and resorted to personal attacks on 
each other. The LMS missionaries took time to accept the fact that the 
Samoans were not only going to be in control, but were in control of the Samoa 
(LMS) Church. During negotiations for independence, the LMS missionaries 
were revered as mere icons of the LMS mission, playing second fiddle to the 
Samoan pastors, and filling the role of silent advisers. 
Independence was finally achieved and the Samoans began to count 
their blessings and the cost of independence. For the Samoan church, the Au 
Matutua continued to provide a European missionary for the principalship of the 
newly named Malua Theological College, and also to work as an adviser on 
matters the Samoan church felt diffident to deal with. The Samoan pastors fully 
appreciated the gesture, and finally admitted their inexperience to completely 
take over the reigns of the church. The Samoans admitted that theorising about 
independence was not the same as being independent. The Samoan pastors 
finally realised that full autonomy meant being 'fully blamed' for everything. 
There were no more LMS missionaries to be chastised, and the burden of 
accountability was an even bigger responsibility. Nevertheless, the transition 
from the Samoa (LMS) Church to the EFKS provided very few problems. It 
seemed all the changes to the structure of the church in the past years had paid 
dividends. The EFKS was self-supporting financially, and the various 
committees and boards that had been put in place for several decades, 
provided a much smoother transition to autonomy. The EFKS did not receive 
the criticisms that the political side of independence had to endure. 
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The euphoria of political independence was soon over, and questions 
whether independence was the real aim of the Samoans began to emerge. 
There was concern by those who had rejected independence over the words 
'self-government' and 'independence'. Many Samoans took the word 'self-
government' to mean self-govern in all matters but Samoa remained under the 
protection and overseeing of another nation, while the word 'independence' was 
taken to mean full self-govern with no strings attached. The conflict in terms had 
started with the wording of the Trusteeship Agreement, which only referred to 
self-government; an idea the Samoans had embraced during the United 
Nations' visit to Samoa and believed it to be the final destiny for Samoa. 
According to J. W. Davidson, a member of the Committee preparing Samoa for 
its independence, Samoans had only considered the idea of independence 
when in drafting the constitution the United Nations used the two words 
synonymously. The independence committee only then realised that the 
Samoans took self-government and independence as two separate concepts. 
When the Samoan political leaders realised it was independence and not just 
self-government being addressed they immediately gave their blessings. The 
Samoan people were not informed of the misunderstanding, and the Samoans 
continued to think they were getting self-government per se rather than 
independence. 
There was also concern over the result of the plebiscite. The result was 
impressive as far as the Samoan political leaders were concerned, but the fact 
that Samoans were intimidated into supporting Samoan independence and the 
constitution suggested that the result could have been much different. Davidson 
recorded that "Tupua Tamasese and Fiame and other leaders delivered 
broadcast addresses, in which they not only stated the case for the constitution 
and for the independence but also suggested that casting a negative vote would 
be an act of treachery."6 The intimidation and the manipulative influence of the 
matai on their aiga would have also made an enormous difference to the end 
result. One group that had a huge impact was Tumua and Pule. For over sixty 
years, their power as political kingpins had been quiescent, but the plebiscite 
gave them the opportunity to influence the political outcome of Samoa's 
independence, and to begin the long process of becoming involved again in 
Samoan politics. The fact that 30% of the Samoan people rejected the proposal 
6 Davidson, 405. 
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for independence suggested that either Samoans were confused over what they 
were voting for, or the Samoans were content with New Zealand's 
administration. The latter suggestion, however, may be doubtful when we 
consider that 95% of the Samoans rejected New Zealand's administration 
during the Mau.7 The real intention of the Samoans regarding independence 
was a matter for speculation, but it is a fact that the Samoan independence 
negotiators saw the opportunity to gain absolute authority, and dropped all 
notions of it being self-government without considering the real intention of the 
Samoans.8 
Nevertheless, independence was the final result and despite the 
criticism, the end result coincided with the initial aspirations of the Samoans. 
There is no doubt the United Nations gave the Samoans their independence, 
but the decision would not have been made if Samoa had not persevered in its 
efforts to entice the attention of the world to its problems, and its continuing 
hostility and aggression against unsympathetic and oppressive administrations. 
Many events and issues, both political and church related, arose to generate a 
huge impact in the way the Samoans eventually perceived their future. It also 
affected the Samoans in such a way that their vision of the future could only be 
achieved through the recovery of their identity - the fa'asamoa. Samoans 
slowly found in the events and issues that transpired avenues to achieve that 
future, but only to suffer humiliation and censure in the hands of their mentors. 
Samoan protocol was seen as inferior as its mentors advanced the Samoans 
towards Europeanisation. It only strengthened the Samoan passion for 
independence, and provided an incentive to initiate a nationalistic spirit. The 
painful issues and events of the past, such as the eradication of customs and 
culture, Goward's racist attitude towards Samoan missionaries, the Oloa 
Kamupani, the Mau-a-Pule, the exiling of respected Samoan matai, the horror 
of the influenza epidemic, the mixed marriages dilemma and the indentured 
7 A discussion by the author on the issue 'who made Samoa independent' was presented at the 
'Decolonisation Seminar' held al the Australian National University, Canberra, in 1997. See "Who Made 
Western Samoa Independent," in Emerging From Empire? Decolonisation in the Pacific, ed. Donald 
Denoon, Canberra: Australian National university, 1997, 40 -46. 
8 The legacy of this issue was presented in a case. Lesa v. Attorney General of New Zealand, to the Privy 
Council in 1982, which appealed New Zealand's decision to deport over-stayers on the notion that 
Samoans born prior to 1948 (trusteeship), and their children were entitle to New Zealand cHizenship. 
During the case, statements were made in reference to the New Zealand government lack of diplomacy in 
dealing with Samoans who did not want independence for Samoa. The Privy Council's upheld the appeal 
and forced New Zealand to enact new laws to stem the flow of Samoans into New Zealand. See Asiata A. 
V. S. Va'ai, "The Rule of Law and the Faamatai: Legal Pluralism in Western Samoa," Ph.D. Thesis, 
Australian National University, 1995. 
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labour problems, the insensitivity of missionaries such as Sibree, Darvill and 
Smart, the imprisonment of tama-a-aiga members and the assumption of 
superiority by the missionaries over the Samoan church leaders, culminated in 
the Mau. The impact of the Mau drew world attention to Samoa's troubles; and 
with the numerous petitions being sent to every corner of the globe, Samoa's 
mentors were also made to take notice. It made many people sympathise with 
the Samoans, and in the end it made an impact on the United Nations. 
The Samoa National Anthem summed up the feelings and the emotions 
that had gone into the Samoan struggle for independence. It expressed the 
message that their independence was not only achieved through political 
means, but that God himself had given it. The independence of the Samoa 
· (LMS) Church may have been in the wake of Samoa's political independence, 
but its impact was central to achieving it. The EFKS and the independent state 
of Samoa are the ecclesiastical and political expressions of Samoans' 
independence. Samoans sing their National Anthem to remember their struggle 
and to reaffirm their independence, and to testify passionately their nation's 
motto, 'Fa'avae i le Atua Samoa' (Samoa is founded on God).9 
Samoa Tula'i! 
Ma sisi ia lau fu'a 
0 lou pale lea 
Samoa Tula'i, 
Ma sisi ia lau fu'a 
0 lou pale lea 
Va'ai i le fetu 
0 lo'o ua agiagia ai 
0 le fa'ailoga lea 
0 lesu na maliu 
Fai mo Samoa 
Oi Samoa e, u'umau 
Lau pule ia fa'avavau 
Aua e te fefe, 
0 le Atua lo ta fa'avae 
0 lo ta sa'olotoga 
Samoa Tula'i, 
Ma sisi ia lau fu'a 
0 lou pale lea 
Samoa Stand! 
And raise your flag 
This is your crown 
Samoa Stand! 
And raise your flag 
This is your crown 
Look at the stars 
Fluttering in the wind 
It is the symbol 
Of Christ who died 
Adopt it for Samoa 
Oh Samoa, hold firmly 
Your authority be forever 
Don't be afraid, 
God is our foundation 
He is our freedom 
Samoa Stand! 
And raise your flag 
This is your crown. 
9 The Anthem was composed by l'iga Kuresa, a member of the Samoan parliament at the time. The 
anthem is included in the latest hymn book of the EFKS. Its inclusion is a recognition of the independence 
of Samoa and the EFKS simultaneously, and to re-emphasise the close relationships between the EFKS 
and the Malo Tuto'atasi o Samoa (the Independent State of Samoa). [The English translation is by the 
author]. 
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APPENDIX A 
MEMORIAL LIST: 
THOSE WHO DIED FROM THE 1918 SPANISH INFLUENZA EPIDEMIC 
The official death toll was 7,564. This list represents only a minute sample of 
those who died in the epidemic. It is an effort to record the names of Samoans 
who suffered so that they maybe remembered as individuals and not just a 
statistic. It also highlights the number of Samoan political (government and Mau) 
and church leaders who died in the epidemic. (All are males unless otherwise 
stated). 
Key: 
c ::: Chinese 
Ct = Catechist 
El = Elder 
Er = European 
F = Female 
FP = Faipule (Government Official) 
LOS ::: Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormon) 
LMS = London Missionary Society, Samoan (LMS) Church 
Me = Melanesian 
NZ = New Zealand 
p ::: Pastor 
RC = Roman Catholic 
T = Tutor at Malua 
WM = Wesleyan Methodist 
MEMORIAL LIST1 
Name Status Mission Village/District Comment 
Afamasaga Maua FP LMS Apia Govt. Secretary, Translator, Interpreter 
Afualao T autalatasi LOS Faia'ai 
Ah Sue, James c Apia Editor, Samoanische Zeitung 
Aiga Lesa Samuelu F Saanapu Died at Saanapu 
Alefaio p LMS 
Amatua LMS Apia 
Amoa LMS Sapapali'i 
Ana F, Ct-wife RC Died Saleufi (Apia) 
Anetele'a, Father RC Died at Safotulafai 
Asi Falana'ipupu Va'a Moata'a Principal chief of the family 
(see footnote 2 below) 
Ataline Tulutu F LOS Neiafu 
Atigilauga Died at Faleasi'u 
Atonio Faivale RC Amaile Member of the Aleipata Parish, died at 
Amaile 
1 The following names had been taken from the records of the LMS South Seas Archives, Maris! Archives of Samoa and Tokelau (Apia), the Mormon Church Registrar, Pesega, the 
Memorial stone at Leulumoega Church, Mapuifagalele Home For the Eldeny (Vailele), J. W. Davidson, Samoa mo Samoa: E:mergMce of the Independent State of Western Samoa, 
Melbourne: Oxford University, 1967, Newspapers, and interviews. Note: According to LMS records Malua lost 16 Students (3 singles) and three wives, Papauta (6 girls), Leulumoega 
Fou High School (20 boys). 
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Name Status Mission Village/District Comment 
Autu loane Letufuga RC Safotulafai Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 
50 years 
Ave Mupalu F LOS Moataa 
Avau Poloa LOS Avao 
Burgess, Mele F LOS Asau 
Burgess, Selepa F LOS Neiafu 
Burgess, Siaosi (George) LOS Neiafu 
Betham, Emanuel Er Died 30 Nov. 1918 
Brunt, Andrew Er Matautu, Apia 
Cagliiari, Private Er, NZ Soldier, died at Sa!eufi 
Christine F RC 8 months old, daughter of Taito and So;o, 
Members of the Malotau Parish. 
Duseigneur, Filomena F,Er RC Safotu!afai Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 
SO years. 
Eleele Sauvao Faleasi'u Died at Faleasi'u 
Emele Mati F LOS Falelatai 
Ericksson, B Er Salelavalu Manager Moors' Store 
Esene p LMS Papauta Chm. Eider's Comm. 
Fa'aaliga p LMS Leulumoega From Memorial at Leulumoega Church 
Fa'aee Kala!a RC Lano Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 
35 years. 
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Name Status Mission Village/District Comment 
Fa'ali'a Kuresa F Apia? Passenger in the Talune 
Faati pa'o Mataese F Salani Died at Salani, aged 57 years 
Fa'auliuli F, P-wife LMS Afega Died at Malua 
Fau p LMS Translator-Interpreter 
Faimalo p LMS 
Faipule Aiolupotea F Falelima Died at Falelima 
Faleagea Saleaula Died at Lepea 
Fau Tofa F LOS Sala'ilua 
Felaga'i p LMS Leulumoega From Memorial at Leulumoega Church 
Faleniko RC Mulifanua Member of the Malotau Parish, died 11 
November 1918. 
Fepulea'i Sivia RC Asaga Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 
45 years. 
Fetineia'i Patu LMS Saleaula Died at Vaiala 
Filemu Pesega Died at Pesega, aged 68 years 
Fourmeaux, Walter Er Died 30 Nov. 1918 
Frank Aivao LOS Fa'ala (Palauli) 
Fuaifale Fesola'i Faleasi'u Died at Faleasi'u 
Futi RC Matasiva Member of the Malotau Parish, died 11 
November 1918. 
Gerhard, lhren Er Died 3 Dec. 1918 
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Name Status Mission Village/District Comment 
Hadley, Private Er, S NZ Soldier 
Hegelagi p LMS Leulumoega From Memorial at Leulumoega Church 
Huberty, R.P. Nicolaus (Father) RC Luxemburgensis Priest of the Aleipata Parish, died at 
Amaile 
lake LMS Safua 
leremia Fesola'i Faleasi'u Died at Faleasi'u 
Imo El, T LMS Sec. Eider's Comm, Sec. Finance Comm. 
loane Fuimaono RC Amaile Member of the Aleipata Parish, died at 
Amaile 
lsaia p LMS Died at a parish in Savai'i 
lulio Alivaai RC Sam usu Member of the Aleipata Parish, died at 
Samusu and buried in Saluafata 
lulio Uili RC Member of the Aleipata Parish, born in 
Rotuma; mentor of Father Huberty 
Jackson, Mr Er NZ Manager Burns Philp Ltd 
Jensen, Aiga Er LOS Sala'ilua 
Joseph Tuataga RC Saleufi Policeman, died at Saleufi 
Joseph, Puni Er RC Faga Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 
55 years. 
Kirisome, R El LMS Iva Has worked on the Malua Printing Press 
Lagatasia Fesola'i Faleasi'u Died at Faleasi'u 
Lamese Laulu Logo LOS Palau Ii 
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Name Status Mission Village/District Comment 
Laulu Logo LOS Palau Ii 
La vu Me lndetured Labourer Vailele planatation, 
died at Vailele 
Leiataua Seleni RC Matasiva Member of the Malotau Parish, died 11 
November 1918. 
Leonia Lili RC Satitoa Member of the Aleipata Parish, died at 
Satitoa 
Lesina Pio RC Saleufi Farmer for RC mission, died at Saleufi 
Levila Faitau F LOS Falelima 
Use RC Pu'apu'a Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 
70 years. 
Uuvao p LMS 
Lolesio Ct RC Died at Vaiusu 
Losa Faafaofao F LOS Tafua 
LovineAloi F LOS Neiafu 
Luti Taualagi RC Pu'apu'a Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 
45 years. 
Maka Ulumii LOS 
Malaefou P, T LMS Afega Died at Malua. Son ofTema (El) 
Malia F, Ct-wife RC Iva Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 
35 years, wife of P. Pelenatino 
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Malia Lusia (Sister) F RC Saleaumua Member of the Aleipata Parish, died at 
Saleaumua 
Mamea RC Pu'apu'a Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 
40years. 
Manusina Fatuaiga LOS Palauli 
Mareta Leilua F RC Safotulafai Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 
65 years. 
Masoe Panapa Asau Died atAsau 
Mataafa RC Died at Mulinu'u Peninsula 
Mataese Pa'o Fuimaono Salani Died at Salani, aged 60 years 
Matagi Samu Tafi F LOS Iva 
Matatia Fiapai LOS Palauli 
McKenzie, Agnus F, Er LOS England Died at Faga (Savai'i), aged 82 years 
Me tu p LMS 
Mikaele Faliu RC Satitoa Member of the Aleipata Parish, died at 
Satitoa 
Mikaele Pulusi RC Member of the Aleipata Parish 
Moamoa Fuimaono F LOS Palauli 
Moegoa losefo RC Amaile Member of the Aleipata Parish, died at 
Amaile 
Mollmauina p LMS 
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Name Status Mission Village/District Comment 
Molo Me lndetured Labourer Vailele planatation, 
died at Vailele 
Moors, M Er Palau Ii 
Neitmann, Peter Er Matautu, Apia Died 3 Dec. 1918. 
Nofoa p LMS Leulumoega From Memorial at Leulumoega Church 
P. Atelea RC Safotulafai Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 
50 years. 
Palanapa Ct RC Safotulafai Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 
32 years. 
Palepa Tulaga F, Ct-wife RC Pu'apu'a Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 
40 years. 
Patelesio Leavai RC Matasiva Member of the Malotau Parish, died 11 
November 1918. 
Patisone Sufia F LDS Matautu (Savai'i) 
Pa'u Fa'aonea RC Safotulafai Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 
48 years. 
Pele LMS Apia Esene's son 
Pelenatino Pelenatino Ct RC Iva Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 
45 years. 
Peniperite p LMS Leulumoega From Memorial at Leulumoega Church 
Penisio Malo RC Amaile Member of the Aleipata Parish, died at 
Amaile 
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Pese Lafaele RC Pu'apu'a Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 
50 years. 
Petelo Aatoe RC Mutiatele Member of the Aleipata Parish, died at 
Mutiatele 
Pila Saau LDS Sala'ilua 
Pole F Sa!eaula Died at Lepea 
Poliako Fepulea'i RC Sam usu Member of the Aleipata Parish, died at 
Sam usu 
Pua Vitolina F RC Safotulafai Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 
52 years. 
Raphael, Joseph Er RC Safotulafai Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 
1 year old. 
Ross, Private Er, S NZ Soldier with New Zealand Anny 
Samu Tamapua Moata'a Planter, died at Moata'a 
Sas a LMS Apia Esene's son 
Sauvao Fuaifale Faleasi'u Died at Faleasi'u 
Savili p LMS Leulumoega From Memorial at Leulumoega Church 
Schmidt, Louis Er 
Selani Salafai F LDS Tafua 
Seu ii a F, P-wife LMS Died at a parish in Savai'i, possible wife of 
lsaia 
Seumanutafa LMS Apia 
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Siala Samusi F LOS Neiafu 
Siana Laulu F LOS Palauli 
Sii Ulo LOS Palauli 
Solitua Muliaga LOS Palauli 
Solomon a p LMS Apia Esene's son 
Sopoaga p LMS Leulumoega From Memorial at Leulumoega Church 
Sose Taula F LOS Lotofaga 
Stowers, Charles Er RC Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 
40 years. 
Ta (Pulega) Mosene LOS Vaaipouli 
Ta'ei Fesola'i Samoa Faleasi'u Died at Faleasi'u 
Talatalaga p LMS Leuluimoega From Memorial at Leulumoega Church 
Talilatunu Laii LOS Falealili 
Talila Tamasi F LOS Apia 
T alitiga Soana'i F LMS Safua Married to Auava of Sapapalii. Died at 
Safua 
Ta'u F LMS Apia Passenger in the Talune. 1st death 
Tauanuu Tue LOS Lalomalava 
Tauiliili Magele LOS Iva 
Taupaolo Tanuvasa F LOS Falelima 
Tauufi p LMS Leulumoega From Memorial at Leulumoega Church 
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Taviga Lose RC Member of the Malotau Parish, died 11 
November 1918. 
Teave p LMS Leulumoega From Memorial at Leulumoega Church 
Te'o Fagalima 2 Satalo Died at Lalomauga, principal chief of the 
family 
Te'o Petaia LMS Faleasi'u ex Govt. translator German period 
Timu Tanuvasa F LOS Sili 
Tina F aasalalau F LOS Falelima 
Toloumu p LMS Leulumoega From Memorial at Leulumoega Church 
Toma p LMS Leulumoega From Memorial at Leulumoega Church 
Tuaeoia p LMS Leulumoega From Memorial at Leulumoega Church 
Tuavao Tominiko RC Asaga Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 
40 years. 
Tulafono Paulo Vui RC Lano Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 
55 years. 
Tulaumu Logologo LOS Falelima nee Malaeulu 
Tulina Me lndetured Labourer Vailele planatation, 
died at Vailele 
Tulivaa Aiolupotea Falelima Died at Falelima 
Tumanuvao Fanafana LOS Tapueleele 
2 Te'o Fagalima is the brother of Asi Fa!ana'ipupu. Te'o had left Salato Falealili to attend his brother's funeral at Moata'a, and on his way back to his village he died enroute at 
Lalomauga from the influenza. 
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Tuu'u p LMS Leulumoega From Memorial at Leulumoega Church 
um p LMS Safua Died at Vailoa Parish, Palauli 
Usu Lui RC Safotulafai Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 
48 years. 
Va'aelua Petaia El LMS Lalomalava Eider's Comm. Died Faleasi'u Parish 
Vaotogo LMS Apia 
Viliamu Viliamu p LMS Sapapali'i Died at Leulumoega Fou High School, 
Principal Leulumoega Fou 
Visesio Ct RC Mutiatele Member of the Aleipata Parish, died at 
Mutiatele 
Williams, Jenny F, Er LOS Died at Sala'ilua 
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APPENDIXB 
The following report is taken from the LMS South Seas Archive, South Seas 
Letters (SSL).1 It is twelve pages long in the original document, and the pages 
are indicated in this reproduction of the report. The report has been reproduced 
as it is in the original. I have, however, included in the text English translations 
[ ] for Samoan words and terms used for clarification. 
REPORT ON RECENT WITCHCRAFT PRACTICE IN AANA, 3 May 1932 
[Page 1]. The beginning of the second century in the history of the 
Samoan church was considerably overshadowed by the probability of the 
imprisonment of a number of LMS pastors on charges of witchcraft. A number 
of deaths caused the Police to take action, and it was probably due to the 
wisdom of the Governor in allowing the LMS to settle the matter, that no more 
serious state is prevalent in Samoa. The government, which has had its hands 
full in recent years with the Mau trouble, would have been in an infinitely more 
serious position had they found themselves called upon to defend themselves 
against a charge of religious persecution. I was in Savaii conducting Faamasani 
[preparatory] examination when the first news came to me that witchcraft was 
being practiced in the Aana district of Upolu, that thousands were going to 
receive healing, but some were dead. I arrive at [sic] Upolu at 11 o'clock on the 
morning of Nov, 1ih and went to Leulumoega, there, although the time was late 
I found considerable consternation prevailing, as the Police had threatened a 
number of our pastors with imprisonment on the charge of witchcraft. We 
snatched a couple of hours of sleep, and at 5 o'clock I went to Satapuala, for 
the purpose of conducting school examination. After a short while in the 
examination, I was asked to meet the pastors and deacons of Aana on a matter 
of grave importance and I left the examination in the hands of the district 
schoolmaster. There were present at the meeting Elders, pastors and deacons 
from three of the sub-divisions of the Aana district, namely Alofi, Manono, and 
Falelatai. Lefaga was not represented. The meeting proceeded as follows: 
It was explained that during my absence in Savaii, Filemoni, the elder of 
the Falelatai sub-division had been to see me about an outbreak of 'consulting 
the oracle' practiced by one l'uvale in the village of Siufaga, Falelatai. As a 
consequence of this practice, four people were known to be dead and the 
1 Hoad, Report on Recent Witchcraft Practice in Aana, 3 May, 1932, SSL. 
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Police were threatening action - (no attempt was made to consult the 
missionaries until Police action was threatened). [Page 2) Explanation further 
showed that a deputation had been sent by the district to the Lefaga sub-
division namely Safaatoa, pastor, the Elder Amosa I, and Savaia, pastor Apela, 
and also to Siufaga in Falelatai, pastor l'uvale, to beseech them to stop this 
practice of witchcraft as the Police were on the point of interfering. This 
deputation went on Monday, November 11th. In each case the reply was the 
same namely that they were interpreting the will of God and would brook no 
interference whatsoever, thus defying the District authority. Later, in the same 
day, the District officer arrived with Police. They notified Amosa I, Apela, and 
l'uvale, that unless there was an immediate discontinuance of the practice of 
witchcraft, they would be under the necessity of arresting the pastors. The 
pastors answered that it was not witchcraft, but the interpretation of the will of 
God, and as such it was their legitimate business. Amosa I, and Apela replied 
that they were willing to discontinue under protest, but l'uvale would give no 
undertaking. 
Alesana, Elder, Leulumoega Fou, also wrote to Apela beseeching him for 
the love of Christ to stop such an iniquitous practice. Saaga, Malua, also wrote 
to Samuelu the Secretary for the Aana district, asking that some action be taken, 
as the Police were getting busy and calamity would come upon the church. The 
Police notified the district secretary that l'uvale would be arrested the following 
day, and the district therefore was most anxious that I should endeavour to see 
the Governor and deliver our pastors from judgement and prison. I next 
requested that a demonstration should be given of the method of consulting the 
oracle, so that we should not pass judgement upon it, without understanding. 
Some of the pastors were inclined to protest but the examination continued. It 
revealed the following:-
'A bible has a key partially inserted about the middle with the loop of the 
key protruding, and it is then bound tightly on both sides of the key so that the 
bible may be suspended by means of the key. Two ways are then open. (1). for 
two people each using their index finger beneath the loop of the key or (2). for 
the pastor to use the index finger of both hands. [Page 3] Prayer is then offered 
on the following lines 'O God Almighty, thou knowest all things, and thou dost 
reveal thy will unto thy people through thy Holy Word, tell us therefore we 
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beseech thee. (Then follows the question). If the answer is "Yes" turn the bible 
we are thy children, Amen.' Note, if the bible turns, the answer is 'Yes' if it does 
not turn, the answer is 'No'. 
The process is often a lengthy one as the answers are limited to 'yes' 
and 'no,' thus in the case, let suppose, of a sickness, the questions would be 
along these lines, - Can this be treated by prayer or medicine? If medicine, who 
shall prescribe, the hospital? the chemist? the misi? [European missionary] the 
store? the pastor? etc? What shall we give? Under this method, a four year old 
child had been given ten Calomel tablets at one dose, a woman starved to 
death, a man ordered to drink neat Lysol by the spoonful, and another poisoned 
by Samoan medicine (since this, other cases have come to my notice). I said it 
was a wicked and dangerous practice and that (a) the pastor concerned did not 
seem to understand that the Bible had been translated into many tongues in 
order that people might read and meditate thereon and thus come to the 
knowledge of the saving grace of God. (b) Nor was prayer understood, for in 
these cases their prayers amounted to Heathen Incantations. (c) Further, the 
Elder responsible should have reported immediately to me, and not himself 
have been a follower of the strange craft. I stressed the point that what most 
worried me, was not that the Police were about to take action for the 
preservation of lives, but the church itself should countenance this return to 
Heathenism. Under the circumstances, it was my opinion that the four pastors 
concerned should be dismissed. 
The idea of the dismissal of the pastors and the Elder concerned rather 
startled the assembly, whose main aim and object was to deliver them from 
judgement and prison. They argued that Falealill had taught them and that the 
four pastors were practicing the same thing. I refused to take any steps for the 
pastors threatened, unless the district would consent to [Page 4] their dismissal. 
I was willing to see the Governor, if on being asked the question "What had we 
done to stop it" I could answer "they have been dismissed." As the sub-division 
of Lefaga was not represented, it was decided to send a messenger post haste, 
calling the whole district to a meeting at Leulumoega on the following day, and 
in the meantime, l returned to the examination of the village children. I was 
appalled at the enormity of the danger, the whole of Christianity in Samoa 
seemed threatened, the thing would spread like wild fire, Perkins was on sick 
leave, and Phillips was young and it seemed that the full weight would fall on 
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me, under these circumstances I thought I would like some sane, experienced 
Samoans, and I went for Saaga and Alesana, from Malua, that I might talk the 
matter over with them before meeting the district. 
The following day began with village examinations, from which I withdrew 
when the district had gathered. First I met Saaga and Alesana. They were 
horrified at the position, and stated that never in the history of the Samoan 
Church has such a crisis of such a magnitude arisen. The district was unwilling 
to call Alesana and Saaga into their conference, as between us we held offices 
of Chairman of the General Assembly, Vice Chairman, and Secretary, and they 
were unwilling to lay what they considered a district sin before the church until 
at least they had passed a resolution upon it. The meeting proceeded much on 
the same lines as the previous day, with the exception that three of the culprits 
were present and were able to give an explanation of their conduct, the fourth 
was in prison with every prospect of a serious charge against him. Amosa I, the 
Elder, made a humble apology and said that they had found the procedure 
exceedingly useful for the church and its work, the culprits were then asked to 
withdraw. The remaining three Elders were of the opinion that the apology was 
sufficient and that the Elder concerned in the witchcraft, should not be 
suspended. I however stuck to my point that it would be worse than hopeless 
for the matter to end in words only. The vision of poisoned babies was far too 
strong to allow an ending to be countenanced. 
[Page 5] With the exception of the three Elders, the district unanimously 
agreed to the dismissal of those concerned and eventually the Elders agreed to 
be included in the decision. The miscreants were then called and told the 
conclusion of which we had arrived. Much time was taken up in discussion on 
how we should approach the villages concerned and it was decided to send a 
big deputation, myself, the three Elders, and four pastors and four deacons 
were appointed. Saaga and Alesana were then called and informed of the point 
at which we had arrived, and they expressed hearty agreement. I next 
proceeded to interview the Governor. I found the government offices in a state 
of great excitement The Public Prosecutor and Chief of Police were keen to 
proceed on a manslaughter charge. The secretary seemed to think I had better 
not interfere, and the chief medical officer was waiting for an order to exhume 
the bodies, I found myself in most unbelievable position, namely, that of adviser 
to the government. The Public Prosecutor pointed out the weakness from their 
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standpoint in that it would be difficult to secure a conviction on the major charge, 
as all the witnesses would be accessory to the fact, and only the charge of 
witchcraft could be counted on as a certainty, the maximum penalty for which is 
six months. I pointed out to His Excellency that the Government could not stop 
the practice, and that the government action would only resolve itself into what 
the Samoans would consider religious persecution, since the accused would 
argue that they were showing the will of God in a new revelation, and that the 
end of such a position no one could forsee, but if the Mau had been a difficult 
subject, the matter of a religious persecution in which all Samoan pastors were 
concerned would be a thousand times worse. 
'But you are able to stop it' asked the Governor. 'It is stopped' I replied. 
'The pastors are dismissed, and dismissal from that office is more punishment 
to them than imprisonment or death, and all Samoa has been warned,' The 
Governor was exceedingly wise and very gracious in taking the advice given 
and the order was not given to exhume the bodies, even though the doctor was 
waiting in the office for the order to [Page 7 - no page 61 exhume; nor were the 
pastors prosecuted, except l'uvale who since he was already in custody, could 
not easily be released. He is detained during His Majesty's Pleasure. I next 
interviewed l'uvale, I asked him why he had been so foolish as to give ten 
Calomel tablets to a baby, he said 'I am clean in the sight of God, only such 
things as His Holy Word tells me I do.' (i.e. the bible turning on a key). 
We next proceeded on the Deputation, and although the story is likely to 
be a long one, if ever there was a missionary journey, this was one. The 
deputation consisted of myself, Elders Samuelu, Filimoni, pastors Epelu, 
Tamate, Perelini, Laiva, Pilitati, deacons Fata, Vaafuga [Vaafusuaga?) and Anai 
(Nanai?]. We went first to Lefaga sub-division, Safaatoa pastor, the Elder 
Amosa I. We heard that until a late hour the previous night the village was trying 
to persuade Amosa to defy the district, but his better council prevailed, and they 
received us with grace. After a long discussion, they agreed to the dismissal of 
Amosa I, subject to the confirmation of the Ministerial Committee, with the thinly 
veiled threat that if Amosa were (sic] not not [sic] immediately reinstated by the 
committee, there would be trouble. (The village has since applied to the 
Mormons for a teacher). In the afternoon we went to Savaia where Apela, a 
young Samoan pastor worked. The people were ungracious and surly, and after 
a few minutes we were invited to enter the church, where the seances were 
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accustomed to be held. Here the whole village was gathered together, the place 
was crowded out, men, women, and children being present, and those who 
could not find room inside, crowded the windows outside. They looked the part 
of heathen darkness. I was asked to conduct the proceedings, so I said 'Apela 
will explain what he has done and why, after which, Samuelu, Filimoni, Tamate, 
and I will tell you what we think about it.' Apela sent off for his wife, who arrived 
with the tied up bible amidst suppressed cheers. We then sang 'Stand up, 
Stand up for Jesus' and Apela was then called upon for his statement. Briefly 
[Page 8] it was that he was absolutely certain what our opinion on the matter 
would be, and to what conclusion we should come to. With regard to the district 
meeting of the previous week, he had known for certain before starting, thanks 
to the turning of the bible, what would be the outcome. He had heard it called 
witchcraft, a devils thing and everything bad. He absolutely denied that it was so. 
With regard to the apology in which he had been included, he absolutely dis-
associated himself with that. He would now proceed to give us a demonstration 
of the way in which this new revelation of the will of God worked. I said 'not in 
this church' he said it was their church and that all their seances were 
conducted in it. But we had our way and no demonstration was given. Then 
Samuelu, Filimoni and Tamate addressed the meeting. Tamate pleaded with his 
dear brother to give up this wicked thing. I followed and pointed out that our 
God was a very different being from the one Apela served. Ours was absolute 
and infinite, could answer prayers and in his love gave His Son. Apela's God 
was ignorant and foolish, he poisoned babies, he could only answer yes or no, 
and so weak was his intelligence, that questions had to be arranged in such a 
form as to permit of his answering by means of the only two words he knew. 
There were frequent interruptions, but we made those responsible wait until 
'question time'. In due course question time arrived, and the questioners 
proceeded to revile us. They call us, a fool party. Said that we had come in the 
devil's way to do a devil's thing and limit the power of God. That where great 
tracks had been made through the forest to enable people to consult this new 
revelation, we wished to put a stop to it. In the end I said 'well friends it is 
perfectly obvious that you have been led astray by a wolf, Christ says 'if they 
receive you remain, if not wipe the dust from off your shoes against them and 
depart. You have not received us, we will depart. You poor lambs, remain with 
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the wolf.' Closed with benediction and we departed for Safaatoa. On the way we 
were stoned. But the light was bad and the aim worse, and no one was hurt. 
However, we returned the next morning, for, having left the fight on the 
previous day, we felt that we could not leave [Page 9] the matter as it stood. 
The action of this village and the young pastor is probably unprecedented in the 
annals of the Samoan church. For us to return home, successfully defied by a 
youth and a village, would mean the end of many things beside Christianity. On 
this occasion the 'high falutin' Samoan beat us, for three sections of us 
understood the matter in different ways as we found by comparison afterwards. 
However, it occurred to me to take the ordination certificate from Apela, and he 
was instrumental in his own undoing in that he gave it to me. Thus we parted, 
telling them that they could remain with the wolf, but he could do no more harm 
now, and his official recognition as a pastor was in the Misi's [missionary] hands 
(Three days afterwards, he left the village). It was chiefly on the word of Lepale, 
the most important man in the village, that the church would be closed until we 
ordered it to be opened, that we left, as it meant, that the seances would stop, 
but could authorise re-opening. Three days afterwards Apela left and at once 
instructed Perelini to re-open the church, and services are now being conducted 
as in the case of a vacant pastorate. We next proceeded to Siufaga the village 
of l'uvale, who was in prison, and to whom no less than six deaths can be 
definitely traced, probably more. 
Siufaga received us with disdain. Although Apia was a long way off, they 
had heard that Misi [missionary] had been to the Governor and had asked him 
to put l'uvale in prison for ten years. Very well, whether it was a month, a year 
or ten years, they would wait for l'uvale, and in the meantime, no services of 
any description would be held nor would children be taught. We argued. We 
explained just what happened at the government office. At the end of four hours, 
our deputation turned to me and said 'we can do nothing.' I said. 'If these 
people have their way and defy us successfully now, the church will die, let us 
die rather at our posts.' So for seven hours, we sat without a break, no 
refreshments, or going to stretch our legs, we beat the village and they 
absolutely surrendered. Services are to be held, and when l'uvale returns, 
whether he is found guilty or not, [Page 10] they will farewell him, his wife is to 
remain in their care until the husband is released from prison. (note: l'uvale is 
now out of prison and living in Leulumoega). From thence, we proceeded to 
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Manono, where is Salua, pastor Aseta, the village had been so distressed about 
the breach with the Wesleyans, that they were ready to do anything to make the 
matter right. It seems that by a process of elimination it had been shown 
through the oracle, that no other denomination had the 'new power' and the 
family being Wesleyan that required healing had turned to the 'true faith.' Rev. 
G. Shinkfield Chairman of the Wesleyan Church, was in Manono at the time, 
and much was done, by our personal friendly relations, to restore the good 
relations between the two denominations. I had lunch with him and afterwards, 
returned to Upolu in his boat. 
An interesting feature is that the oracle was asked by the villages 
concerned, whether or not it was right to give 'offering for general church 
purposes this year' and it gave the answer 'no', as a consequence, where we 
expected the sum of £200 from these villages, we received the sum of 13/-. The 
village examinations and annual meetings were held in Lefaga Nov 25/26, we 
made another journey there for that purpose, the children of Savaia were not 
present. The children of Safaatoa were present. A deputation came to us asking 
whether, under the circumstances it would be possible to let the Me 
[contributions to the church] stand over for this year while chiefs of Matautu 
[Lefaga] tried to fix things up with the affected villages. As the wolf had departed, 
and there were already distinct signs of improvement we agreed, and the Me 
was not held this year. Subsequent events have justified our action in that the 
sum of over £100 has now been contributed by these villages. There have been 
many visits to the affected parts and a good deal of bitterness has been 
prevalent. On one occasion Phillips and I visited the storm centre of Falelatai, 
Siufaga. Phillips' remark on a real Samoan village were illuminating, hitherto his 
experience has been confined to nice villages specially prepared. 
[Page 11] No attempt was made by Siufaga to welcome us, although we 
stayed at the pastor's house, he being in prison. That seemed to be their idea of 
'serving us right.' I took the morning service for Samatau and Siufaga (a united 
service) at Siufaga, followed by the communion service. All responsible people 
were present and reverent. In the afternoon I took a special evangelical address 
for Siufaga, dealing with Saul and the witch of Ender. The entire village was 
present. The village has since asked for the appointment of a new pastor. (It 
might here be said what a wonderful chance this country still offers for the 
preaching of the very rudiments of Christianity and the conversion of the 
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heathens. The white coats of Malua and Leulumoega Fou students often blind 
our eyes to the condition of the night outside the villages). 
During this period, it has been abundantly evident that the root of the 
trouble has been in Falealili. Most of our problems seem to come from there. 
Enosa the Elder in charge ought to be and probably some day will be in prison. 
But I have on other occasions mentioned the deplorable conditions existing in 
Falealili and the unsatisfactory nature of Enosa the Elder to make it necessary 
to add further here. 
At the Ministerial Committee which met in December, Enosa gave an 
account of the trouble in Falealili. It had all been settled, apologies had been 
accepted, all was well. But the Ministerial Committee took an entirely different 
view of the matter, the whole work of Christianity had been jeopardised. The 
R.C., Wesleyans and other denominations had all been gravely concerned and 
did not think that our present constitution would enable us to tackle a thing of 
this nature. The Seventh day Adventist had written columns about us. The 
Ministerial Committee realised that the only possible satisfactory way was in the 
dismissal of those concerned. Kirisome of the Mission Council, and of 
Faasalelaga said, in his usual brief but thoughtful way. 'They have betrayed the 
faith, let them be buried. If there had been 100 of them it would have been 
better to dismiss them all and begin again, than to retain them. Scores had 
been on the brink of yielding to this devil's way, and only the group action in 
dismissing those concerned and at once informing the [Page 12] church, saved 
a calamity of a degree that this church could not realise. Never in the history of 
the church's hundred years, had their been the likes of it.' Sentence was passed 
as follow:- Four pastors from Falealili and two from Aana are suspended for two 
years, and to come up at the end of that time for reconsideration. Two who had 
not repented in Aana were dismissed, not to return again. 
With the prospect of several of our pastors being in deadly peril of prison 
and their lives through exercising witchcraft, the new centenary opens. Thanks 
to the wisdom of the government in allowing the mission to settle a matter which 
was beyond the government's power, order has been restored, probably, in a 
few weeks time things will be normal again. But it has been an experience 
which will serve as a warning at least to the present generation, of how near 
these people are to heathenism, only a little flame is required to kindle the old 
fire. Our thanks are due to Almighty God that he had brought the Church 
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through this grave trial, and has cleaned it and given it a fresh start. Let us hope 
that these unsettled days may always find the church willing to accept a lead, 
and always ready to be guided back to the Father. 
Frank S. Hoad 
I should be extremely grateful if this report is kept entirely confidential. 
Publication in the Chronicle or any other publication would mean the immediate 
circulation in Pacific Publication. 
FSH 
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